






Department of Political and Social Sciences  
Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence 
 
PhD thesis in Political Science and Sociology 
 
 
Road to (k)Nowhere 
Policy instrument selection in complex Governance 
arrangements: 







PhD Candidate: Claudia Acciai 
 
Supervisor: Giliberto Capano (University of Bologna) 





Research and innovation (R&I) are increasingly understood as essential assets in national, and 
supranational, strategies for economic, social, industrial and technological development.  
Public engagement in these activities dates back to the pre-WWII period. Nowadays, its 
relevance has been revitalised as a powerful strategy to respond to major social, economic and 
environmental challenges (e.g. Grand Challenges). On the other hand, also the private sector 
has gained greater prominence within the field of scientific, engineering and technological 
activities employed for economic development (Arnold, Boekholt, 2003). Starting from these 
evolutions, the present research investigates the politics of policy instrument selection in the 
R&I sector. This study sheds light on the political dynamics that can explain how (and why) 
public actors decided to intervene (or not) in governing the field of scientific and technological 
innovation. Through a comparative analysis between France and Italy, the research 
investigates how the interplay between institutional characteristics, different policy styles and 
in ere  in ermedia ion pa ern  infl ence ac or  in erac ion , heir preference  for ario  
instrument mixes and ultimately the evolution of national R&I policy mixes. By adopting 
polic  in r men  a  a pro  for anal ing ac or  preference , it has been possible to 
understand different patterns of interaction taking place between governing, and non-
governing, actors along the policy design process.  In order to disentangle these dynamics a 
multi-method approach based on the triangulation of different sources (semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis and national statistics) has been adopted. Then, through a 
methodological approach to qualitative data analysis inspired by within and cross-case 
analysis (Miles, Huberman, 1994), thematic (Boyatzis, 1998) and content analysis (Schreier, 
2012), national policy instrument selection process have been investigated. The comparative 
analysis ultimately shows that when we focus only on how governments have used their power 
to steer target population towards their intended behaviours (e.g. the inducement embedded in 
instrument action) our two cases share many similarities in their aggregate R&I policy mix 
features. But if we look at the characteristics of how different instruments exercise social 
control (e.g. instrument shapes) and the relationship between policy makers and target 
population (e.g. delivery structure) our results display a greater variety. These differences 
reflect the alternative approaches the two countries have undertaken to interact with target 
population, as well as in the political entrepreneurship and organizational capacity of national 
R&I performers. 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
National economies are moving towards new technological paradigms, where Information and 
communications technology (ICT), green tech and other computational technologies are 
increasingly acquiring a prominent place in policy making agenda. The diffusion of innovative 
technologies is transforming not only the way our societies function but also the way public 
administrations internally works and their relationship with external actors, (how they deliver 
policies and interact with different stakeholders) (Pencheva et al., 2018). This is the reason 
why knowledge production, and the capacity to trigger technological changes, have 
increasingly become a relevant asset characterising countrie  economic development strategy 
(Nascia and Pianta, 2018). 
Nowadays, innovation has somehow become a buzzword for many policy documents in 
different fields. This might be related with the fact that the concept of innovation is evolving, 
moving from a means to achieve broad range of policy goals, towards a policy goal for a broad 
range of policy sectors (Flanagan et al., 2011). In reality, Research and Innovation (R&I) are 
much more than that, exactly because these activities are potentially related with all the tasks 
of governments, just think about the different research centres attached to various functional 
ministers (e.g. agriculture, health, environment), and this could give you a hint about its 
multiple applications (OECD, 2014). 
Over the last decades, despite contrasting interpretations on the drivers of economic 
development, a widespread agreement that innovation and knowledge represent important 
components of economic growth, especially in the long term, has emerged and consolidated. 
Their contribution to growth can be found in the enrichment resulting from technological 
progress embodied in physical capital (investments in more advanced machinery or 
computers); in the results coming from investments in intangible capitals (software, design, 
data, firm-specific skills); and in supplements linked to the increased efficiency in the use of 
labour and capital (OECD, 2015a, p. 17)1.  
At a different pace, national authorities have started to understand how contemporary 
economies cannot be able to compete globally if they do not start to invest in infrastructures, 
 
1 Some of the policy fields in which OECD (2015) registered an accelerated technological progress are the 
following: climate change mitigation, ageing, health, food security, information and communication 
management.  
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knowledge base, subsidies and programmes for retaining and upgrading their labour force in 
order to support their national competitiveness. Therefore, Research and Innovation can be 
interpreted as a special investment in long-term intangible assets that will (likely) generate 
profits in the future. This is different from regular investments, such as capital expenditures, 
because of its longer time horizon and higher risk (Bhattacharya et al., 2017, p. 2).  
Indeed, when one is examining the development of a national system of innovation, she is 
reading a co n r  economic, ocial and poli ical hi or  hro gh he par ic lar pri m of he 
conditions surrounding the use of technology in capitalist production and the choices made by 
the ruling class (or dominant élites), regarding the production and application of scientific and 
technological knowledge (Chesnais, 1993, p. 194).  
In parallel with the technological evolution of contemporary societies, and the increasing 
complexities of the challenges these are facing, the scope of R&I policies has broadened 
beyond its traditional mission (Meissner and Kergroach, 2019). Policy makers are coping with 
questions related to how can R&I become a means to address persistent challenges our 
societies are facing and how can they translate knowledge advancements into tangible benefits 
for their citizens? 
In modern times, state promotion for research and specific technologies has a long tradition, 
dating back to the pre-Wold War II period, when pubic research investments were mainly 
oriented towards agriculture (plant breeding, plant protection), health (vaccines), mining 
(geology, engineering) or navigation, transport and communication (shipbuilding, aeronautics, 
and telecommunications) (Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2008). As further developed in the 
following chapters of this research, the tradition of state promotion for research and new 
technologies has been carried on through different eras, reflecting heterogeneous political and 
economic objectives. In the present day, the relevance of public involvement in the 
development of research and new technologies has been revitalised, as a potential strategy to 
respond to major societal, economic and environmental challenges (Grand Challenges). On 
the other hand, also the private sector has gained greater prominence within the field of 
scientific, engineering and technological activities used in the economy (Arnold and Boekholt, 
2003). Consequently, we would expect that the power balance among the actors who possess 
the necessary assets to trigger innovation might have changed and, more broadly, the 
governance of R&I systems together with that.  
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This is closely related with the fact that economic growth has not only a rate but also a 
direction, and thus, it can actually undertake multiple, and alternative, paths (Kattel and 
Mazzucato, 2018, p. 787). Therefore, the actors who possess the necessary resources and 
capabilities to helm the ship toward a specific direction, can play a pivotal role in influencing 
the design of national R&I strategies.  
Our research aims exactly at understanding how the interaction between the differently 
motivated actors involved in the governance of R&I, including knowledge producers and 
developers, public and private actors, together with decision-makers, influence the design of 
national R&I policies. By adopting an actor perspective, we will investigate the way 
stakeholders designed their strategies for action, and the extent to which this ultimately 
affected the evolution and the characteristics of national R&I policy mixes.  
More specifically, we aim at understanding how the actors populating the governance of the 
sector have differently translated R&I questions into smaller scale issues, and their related 
political payoffs. Therefore, the role that alternative political ideas had in shaping policy-
makers attitudes for selecting specific instrument characteristics; the way interactions between 
actors took place within the bounds of different institutional organisation structures and the 
morphologies of interest intermediation between decision-makers and policy recipients. 
The innovative contribution of our research is closely related with the adoption of an actor 
perspective for the analysis, which allows to acquire an effective, and deeper, understanding 
of the political dynamics characterising the choices and the design of different policy 
instruments. Furthermore, our research aims at understanding these dynamics, and their 
consequences for policy making, focusing on a policy domain embracing multiple established 
sectors of policy intervention. Indeed, e ill in e iga e ho  ac or  hape he charac eri ic  
of different R&I instrument blends, and how this process take place in a sector where policy 
makers face issues that cannot be neatly categorised into clearly defined policy responsibilities 
(e.g. icked problem  (Mazzucato, 2013; Rittel and Webber, 1973)).  
Therefore, by focusing on R&I instruments, as the operational dimension of governance 
arrangements (Capano et al., 2019), we will open the decision-making black box of R&I 
policies with the aim of understanding the different causal pathways shaping instrument mix 
characteristics. Follo ing he La ell  defini ion of poli ic  a  the process of who gets 
what, when and how , e will decipher he e en  o hich ac or  choice  and in erac ion  
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matter in policy instrument selection process and how alternative choices over different policy 
strategies influenced the evolution of national R&I policy mix.  
Our ultimate goal is to understand what is happening behind the scenes of R&I policy design 
process, the extent to which different actors can be able to influence this process and the role 
that target population can play as catalyser of these choices. Therefore, ultimately contributing 
to a deeper understanding of how governments design more ambitious policy mix aimed at 
solving the complex, and cross-sectorial in nature, social challenges our contemporary 
societies are facing.  
 
1.1 The interesting case of Research and Innovation policies  
Looking at the characteristics of Research and Innovation with a public policy perspective, we 
will illustrate the extent to which their instrument mix tend to hinge upon governing 
arrangements embracing multiple established areas of public policy, while attempting to foster 
a policy mi  encompa ing common i ion  for he f re  (Braun, 2008a; Flanagan et al., 
2011). Indeed, in response to the increasing complexity of the problems our societies are 
facing the morphology of the policy making space is changing, and a growing number of cross-
sectorial links have been created in order to enhance policy-making capacity to design more 
ambitious policy mixes. Such complexity is closely related with the fact that R&I policies tend 
to address broad challenges, that given the impossibility to be tackled as a whole, require to 
be translated into smaller scale issues (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012).  
These phenomena are not solely specific to R&I, but they rather represent generalised 
ra egie  hich pan acro  differen  cla ical  ec or  of polic  re pon ibili  ( imilar 
transformations are analysed in the field of climate policies (Van Asselt et al., 2015), migration 
policies (Scholten et al., 2017) and health care policies (Trein, 2017)). This is closely related 
with the fact that strategies for solving Grand Societal Challenges, like for example climate 
change, food security and other economic, societal and technological threats (WEF, 2020), 
cannot solely rely on the design capacity, and resources, of one unique policy area. A greater 
extent of collaboration needs to be found among formerly detached policy responsibilities in 
order to gather the necessary resources for designing more encompassing strategies. 
These phenomena run in parallel with the increasing awareness emerging from policy 
instrument and governance literature regarding the reduced capacity that, in democratic 
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societies, political institutions have to act unilaterally (Bre er  and O Toole, 2005; Capano 
and Lippi, 2017; Majone, 1989; Ringeling, 2005; Woodside, 1986).  
Therefore, we believe that Research and Innovation policies represent an emblematic ca e 
of  (Ragin and Becker, 2009) complex governance arrangements in which policy makers are 
increasingly being asked to solve problems that cannot be neatly categorised into one policy 
sector, so-called wicked problems, (Mazzucato, 2013; Rittel and Webber, 1973); therefore, 
requiring greater cross-boundary synergies between interconnected policy areas and actors.  
This complexity is also embedded in the paradox many national R&I policy-making processes 
are exposed to; namely, the more complex the issues they aim at solving, the more 
compartmentalised the policy-making process become (Kattel and Mazzucato, 2018). All of 
that is exacerbated by the fact that specific policy responsibilities (and sectors) are 
characterised by relatively stable groups of actors and institutions, associated interests, 
representation practices and perception of the problems; that further hinder opportunities for 
creating venues for collaborations (Candel and Biesbroek, 2016). Therefore, by focusing on 
actors, their interactions and stakes along the policy design process, we will be able to unravel 
the complexity characterising R&I decision-making processes; while exploring for the first 
time with an actor perspective how policy instrument are selected and blended.  
 
1.2 Policy instrument have to be equipped for that 
The combined effect of the evolution of state structures both internally (reorganization of 
administrative structures) and externally (relationship with citizens and the market); together 
with the increased complexity of problems policy makers are facing, also in the R&I sector 
(Chou et al., 2017), have consistently modified decision-making settings.  
Crucial elements of public authority are shared with a multitude of non-governmental actors, 
that are often intimately involved in the management and implementation of public 
interventions. This is also the case for the research and innovation policies, where an increased 
number of instruments are implemented together with private or non-profit stakeholders (e.g. 
clusters, networks, pre-commercial procurements) (Edler et al., 2016, p. 8). Indeed, no single 
actor possesses sufficient resources to unilaterally influence policy change (Henry, 2011, p. 
367) and governments are not anymore simply and unilaterally authoritative, but they are 
instead dependent upon the action and acquiescence, or support of others, which they do not 
directly control (Bre er  and O Toole, 2005; Goe , 2008; Salamon, 2002a).  
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The governance of R&I becomes an highly complex arena for policy making, because the 
re o rce  needed for in r men  ac i a ion are increa ingl  dependen  pon he par icipa ion 
of different actors and the assets they can mobilize (Béland and Howlett, 2016; Capano and 
Lippi, 2017; Flanagan et al., 2011; Majone, 1976). Public choices have to be perceived as 
socially acceptable because, although instruments may be (in some theoretical or technical 
sense) substitutable, in practice they all differ in a number of ways, making their selection a 
highly (context-dependent) political matter (del Rio and Howlett, 2013; Edquist and Borrás, 
2013; Howlett, 2005; Knudson, 2009).  
Indeed, tools have heterogeneous substantive requirements of behaviours embedded in their 
action, as well as different mechanisms through which they can activate constraints, or 
oppor ni ie , on recipien . I  i  preci el  he po ibili  o iden if  inner  and lo ers  
from their activation, and their capability to shift the power balance, that makes instrument 
choice a politically salient moment (Borrás and Edquist, 2019; del Rio and Howlett, 2013; 
Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Linder and Peters, 1989; Salamon, 2002a). Therefore, the 
characteristics of policy instrument selected are dependent upon both decision-makers and 
target population behaviours and on the extent of conflict and agreement among these agents. 
That is why we cannot talk anymore of a paradigm in which one goal equals one instrument, 
where policy makers can freely select instruments from an already made toolbox (del Rio and 
Howlett, 2013; Edquist and Borrás, 2013; Howlett and Lejano, 2013; Knudson, 2009).  
From a theoretical perspective, this research aims exactly at improving existing theories on 
policy instruments. Building upon the contribution of the existent scholarship, we propose a 
more accurate classification of R&I policy instruments, considering both the behavioural and 
political characteristics embedded in tools  action. Since instruments refer to the aspects of 
policy intended to motivate target population to comply with a policy, or utilize policy 
opportunities (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 338); we believe that a focus on the relationship 
between decision makers and target population can help us to deepen our understanding of 
their selection. Because, ultimately, not only the types of instruments selected matter, but also 
their capacity to induce a specific behaviour while addressing the appropriate target (Candel 
and Biesbroek, 2016; EEA, 2005). 
Therefore, if we want to understand the way in which different policy tools affect the reality 
where actors interact, an instrument analysis should be integrated with a deeper understanding 
of how social control is exercised (instrument shape) and of the type of governing arrangement 
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coming together with the selection of different instruments (delivery structure). By 
introducing a theoretical and analytical difference between instrument shapes and delivery 
components we aimed at overcoming the restricted focus on policy instruments limited to the 
analysis on the way governments use their legitimate power to shape public action (instrument 
families). Since exercising power means to obtain collaboration, that is obtaining behaviours 
in line with our expectations (Stoppino, 2001); an understanding of the relationship each tool 
establishes between policy makers and target population is needed.  
Therefore, by introducing the analytical category of instrument shape, we are able to grasp the 
substantive characteristics of the inducement effectively administered to the target population 
through the selection of a specific tool. While, the delivery component, provides information 
on those actors who have the titularity, and the power, to steer instrument action along the 
managements process (Bouwma et al., 2017). Therefore, as demonstrated by the empirical 
results of our analysis, by adopting the R&I classification proposed in our research we aim at 
providing a greater understanding of the behavioural and political characteristics embedded in 
instrument action; while showing how both the choice, and the particular way instruments are 
crafted, reflect different types of interactions between decision-makers and policy recipients. 
 
1.3 Policy instrument selection in complex governance contexts 
Policy design can be defined as the political, and technical, process throughout which actors 
select and model policy instruments into different mixes (Howlett and Rayner, 2013), to 
achieve their interests. Re earche  on polic  mi e  ha e e en i el  foc ed on he echnical 
ide  of this process; therefore, investigating the extent of coherence and contradictions 
embedded in its components (Howlett and Rayner, 2013; Rogge and Reichardt, 2016; Schmidt 
and Sewerin, 2018). These concepts underline different perceptions on alternative policy 
making strategies, which ultimately are thought to influence the ability to design an instrument 
mix compatible with a specific environment.  
We believe that in order to understand the triggering reasons for instrument selection and 
policy mix evolutions, it is necessary to complement these approaches with a fine-grained 
investigation on the political side of this process. Indeed, what at first glance could be labelled 
a  an incoheren  polic  mi  e ol ion, it could actually be the result of an intentional and 
strategic political choice of actors.  
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In the everyday policy design practices, and specifically for the case of R&I policy, there could 
be some discrepancies between the intention, and the effective ability, to take on purposive 
instrumental policy designs according to these principles. Therefore, we do not want to take 
for granted the reflexive process by which policy makers take into account the principle of 
coherence and consistency in policy design practices. Policy instruments can alter power 
dynamics (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Salamon, 2002a), influence policy issue framing 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) and ultimately produce different patterns of opportunity and 
constraints on a given target population (Schneider and Ingram, 1990). Moreover, tools are 
not stable over time, they have a high degree of interpretative flexibility, due the stratification 
of new instruments and changes in the rationale of policy-makers (Flanagan et al., 2011); they 
tend to come in a blend, so their actual state is influenced by the fact that they often come in 
a mix, and they layer upon an existing set of tools (Ringeling, 2005).  
Consequently, it might be complicated the exercise of clearly identifying the goals and 
activities instruments were meant for at the moment of their design; to the extent that their 
action might be influenced by the context of pre-existing mixes, their overtime evolution and 
reinterpretation (Flanagan and Uyarra, 2010; Ringeling, 2005). That is to say that instrument 
decisions do not take place in a tabula rasa because there are contextual, and especially 
political and ideological constraints that shape the development of specific policy mix 
characteristics. Very few design processes begin de novo and when that was the case it 
reflected situations in which there was no previous history of policies in response to a 
perceived problem (Howlett and Mukherjee, 2014, p. 62). New instrument choices are 
constrained by existing policy mixes,  and they have to find their place in-between the 
stratification of policy styles preceding their selection (Bre er  and O Toole, 2005; Edler e  
al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 2011; Howlett and Mukherjee, 2014).  
Therefore, instrument selection, and the way they are implemented, is the result of a political 
process (e.g. following the formal/informal rules of the game North, 1990), which is dependent 
upon power dynamics, the institutional structure in which the decision takes place and on the 
preferences of the actors involved (Borr s and Edler, 2015; Capano and Lippi, 2017; Edler et 
al., 2016; Edler and Fagerberg, 2017; John, 2012; Laranja et al., 2008; Linder and Peters, 
1989; Ringeling, 2005). This process requires some extent of adaptation according to the 
different needs of each specific national context and public administration capacity (Borrás 
and Edquist, 2019). That is the reason why policy instruments are said to be highly context 
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dependent (Edler et al., 2016), because the actors and the institutional context in which they 
operate become crucial in determining their effect (Flanagan et al., 2011).  
Consequently, if we want to understand their assemblage into different packages, and the 
power relation they can trigger, a deeper understanding of the context in which instruments 
are selected, and will operate, is needed. This will be done through a reconstruction of the 
internal dynamics shaping their selection process together with an analysis of their operational 
characteristics following the analytical perspective provided by the focus on instrument shapes 
and devilry structure. 
 
1.4 The formulation of R&I policy: what matters? 
Policy making processes are said to be shaped by conflicts (and compromises) among involved 
interests, by the rule system inherited from the past, and by the formulation of different 
cognitive and normative framings (Palier and Surel, 2005) . Therefore, to fully understand the 
assembly of instrument mix and their evolution, it is necessary to investigate the political and 
contingent environment in which this process takes place, while integrating this information 
with a diachronic perspective on their evolution. 
As argued by Rist (in Vedung et al., 1998), in order to understand these internal dynamics, we 
need to consider the political ideas of those actors involved in the selection, the power and the 
preferences of the target population, the political and administrative costs associated with 
different alternatives. Consequently, we developed a theoretical framework which intersects 
insights on the role of ideas (as the impact of dominant framing in a given political system); 
the opportunity structures provided by the institutional system (internal coordination and 
specialisation between bureaucrats) and the role target population (the strategies for interest 
intermediation) plays in policy design process.  
This analytical perspective helped us to understand how ultimately, given the opportunities 
and constraints provided by different governance characteristics, actors interact for the 
selection of R&I policy instruments, and the extent to which this ultimately influenced the 
evolution of policy mixes. We are interested in explaining both the political process that stands 
behind policy instrument selection, as well as the extent to which alternative interactions 
between ideas, interests and institutions influenced the characteristics of instrument mixes. By 
breaking up this effect, it was possible to disentangle the political dynamics behind the 
selection and assemblage of different instrument mixes. More broadly, this helped us to 
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understand how, given the opportunities and constraints provided by different governance 
characteristics, actors interact for the selection of policy instruments, and the extent to which 
the way this is happening influences the resulting policy mixes.  
Research and Innovation rarely represent a goal in itself, but rather a means to a achieve 
broader political goals; therefore, the way these objectives have been translated into 
innovation-intensity targets, represent a relevant political matter (Edquist and Borrás, 2013). 
Consequently, the selection of alternative designs for public policy interventions in R&I is the 
result of different political framings concerning both problems interpretation and the expected 
benefits from the application of a given set of policy instruments. Nonetheless, the existent 
literature displays a clear shortcoming regarding the relevance that political ideas can have in 
shaping the design of R&I policy strategies, many studies overlook its relationship with party 
politics and more generally with government ideology (Bergek et al., 2015; Bhattacharya et 
al., 2017; Wang et al., 2019). We know that different political contexts can influence the 
availability of financial resources for investments in R&D in various ways (Bergek et al., 
2015), but it is still unclear how do different political preferences influence policy-makers 
attitudes in selecting specific R&I policy instrument characteristics. Therefore, with our 
analysis, we aimed at investigating this type of decisions, using as a proxy policy instrument 
characteristic; more broadly, we were interested in understanding how does the political 
orientation of different cabinets influence the formulation of national Research and Innovation 
policy strategies? 
From an institutional organisation perspective, R&I policies, stand at the intersection of 
cla ic polic  ec or .  The a  in hich policy responsibilities in this sector have been 
organized mirrors different national specificities reflecting their institutional systems, their 
framing of R&I issues and related policy strategies. Since ministerial organisation is not 
strictly determined by law, for the most part, these structures tell us how national governments 
have differently framed policy problems and the political priorities to be tackled (Peters, 
1998). The literature recognizes the influence the variety of national institutions, and inter-
institutional, networks play in shaping the ability of research and industrial actors to produce 
knowledge and innovation, as well as the set of problems related with policy areas 
characterised by the integration of different responsibilities, like the case of R&I (Braun, 
2008a, 2008b; Chung, 2013; Edler & Kuhlmann, 2008; OECD, 2005; Griessen & Braun, 2008; 
Koch, 2008; Pelkonen  Wal ari, 2008; Smi   K hlmann, 2010). However, an analysis on 
 23 
the way actors play within the formal (and informal) rule system defined by the cross-sectorial 
nature of R&I national institutional structures is missing. Our contribution builds on these 
evidences and moves forwards the focus of analysis, in order to investigate how different 
morphologies of ministerial organisation patterns influence the ability of policy makers to 
design instrument mix able to consider multiple traditional subsectors of public action.  
This will provide interesting insights on the interaction between functionally equivalent policy 
making institutions and, on the role, that specific ministries can play in the design of all-
encompassing R&I policy mixes.   
Ultimately, in policy making activities requiring technical competencies and skills that 
decision makers cannot provide by themselves, like in the case of knowledge or technological 
intensive activities, governing actors are likely to rely on the collaboration of external actors 
(Guston, 1996). This suggests how in R&I policy design it has increasingly become necessary 
to consider that governments are not anymore simply and unilaterally authoritative, but they 
are instead dependent upon the action, acquiescence or support of others, which they do not 
directly control (Bre er  and O oole, 1998; Goe , 2008; Ma ca o, 2013; Na elaer  and 
Wintjes, 2008; Salamon, 2002a). Consequently, despite the different preferences of decision 
makers and target groups, a minimum extent of agreement over the characteristics of public 
action should be found, because the latter have increasingly acquired the power to nullify, or 
alter, the operation of policy instruments (Dermont et al., 2017; Gross, 2007; Ingold et al., 
2018; Kammermann and Ingold, 2019; Varone and Aebischer, 2001; Woodside, 1986).  
This consensus will be grounded on the final characteristics of the instrument mix selected, 
since the extent of competence delegated to third party, reflects the room for manoeuvre they 
have in the application of public authority (Salamon, 2002a). On the one hand, this provides 
R&I performers with the power to shape the final instrument mix and to steer policy design 
process towards their expected benefits. While, on the other hand, part of this target population 
could miss the opportunity to see their interests represented, because of their incapacity to 
identify their shared needs and behave as a political constituency.  
Therefore, the cross-sectorial nature of R&I policies implies that in addition to the internal 
ability of policy makers (e.g. coordination of ministerial responsibilities), we also have to 
consider their capacity to account for the characteristics of the (cross-sectorial) target 
population, which will bring with them different specific set of associated interests, problem 
perception and ac or  config ra ion rela ed i h he pecifici  of he differen  ec orial 
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policies involved. Also, policy recipient matter, but since their heterogeneity in R&I sector we 
still know little about their strategic behaviours. For all these reasons, it becomes relevant to 
investigate the wat target groups relate to the policy process and the actors involved in these 
dynamics; therefore, how the internal policy making ability in R&I policy sector was 
challenged by the underlining necessity to integrate different policy responsibilities as well as 
a greater interaction with R&I target population.  
Finally, we also aimed at providing a comprehensive overview of the instruments adopted in 
the R&I innovation sectors, while examining how different national policy mixes, have 
evolved over time. Since ultimately instruments represent the operational dimension of 
governance arrangements (Capano et al., 2019), by following their evolution, we have been 
able to shed light on both relationship between policy makers and target population and the 
internal dynamics shaping the evolution of national R&I governance arrangements.  
 
1.5 The cases 
The research questions of this study relate to the debate on the politics of policy instrument 
selection, and on how these dynamics take place within complex governance arrangements 
charac eri ed b  ran er al  polic  i e , like he ca e of Re earch and Inno a ion policie .  
In order to conduct our investigations, we adopted a comparative case study research design. 
Since, ultimately, we were interested in understanding both the role of different actors in 
shaping policy instrument selection process, as well as to explore the characteristics of policy 
mixes according to our new theorization; the choice was inspired by both exploratory and 
estimate case selection strategies (Gerring, 2016). Therefore, we selected France and Italy, on 
the basis of the variance they display in the theoretical factors of interests (exploratory) 
(Seawright and Gerring, 2008), and we adopted a longitudinal estimate strategy to investigate 
the effects of their diachronic evolution on the evolution of policy mix. 
From the perspective of R&I policies, France and Italy are two apparently similar and binary 
systems nevertheless, within this similarity, there are also very different approaches 
characterizing national policy making dynamics. Therefore, even though the two countries 
share a stable centre-of-government R&I structure and a similarly sophisticated 
instrumentation; the Italian case suffers from an inherent fragmentation and duplication of 
instruments, that is matched with a scarcely effective monitoring and uncertainties related with 
the implementation process and availability of resources (Potì and Reale, 2011). If we interpret 
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layering as a way of designing institutions through which policy makers intervenes to affect 
related behaviours (Capano et al., 2019), we can differentiate the layering for equilibrium 
pursued in the French case and the attempt of layering for change characterising the Italian 
context. Indeed, in the former, the evolution of specific policy instruments (like the Research 
Tax Credit, the Incubator and Technology Transfer Organisations) suggests an underlying 
design logic aimed at chasing coherence through the stratification of multiple (often similar) 
instruments. Whereas, in the Italian case the systematic tendency to design one-off 
instruments, approved in the framework of broader national decrees, alludes to an attempt to 
trigger changes by exploiting the windows of opportunity provided by systematic national 
policy design practices, like the drafting of the yearly budgetary law.  
When focusing only on the on the way governments use their legitimate power to shape public 
action (instrument families), the French and the Italian case share many similarities in their 
policy mix characteristics. But if we look at the aggregate characteristics of the different 
shapes (e.g. how social control is exercised) and delivery structures adopted (e.g. relationship 
between policy makers and target population) the results display a greater variety. These 
differences reflect the alternative approaches the two countries have undertaken to interact 
with target population, as well as the different extent of activism and organizational capacity 
national R&I performers played in the two cases.  
 
1.6 Conclusions and structure of the thesis  
Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the politics of policy instrument selection. We 
aim at investigating the dynamics shaping the policy formulation process, and the extent to 
which the interactions between differently motivated across within and increasingly complex 
decision-making environment can influence this process.  
We will shed light on ac or  ake  for al erna i e rajec orie  of change and how these have 
been shaped along the formulation process into different instrument mix characteristics.  
Given the increasing complexity of the problems our societies are facing policy makers show 
reduced capacity to act unilaterally (as discussed in Chapter 2); moreover, they have to be able 
to design policy mix capable of embracing multiple traditional subsectors of public action, in 
order to address these issues in an all-encompassing manner. Consequently, this requires 
governance ability both internally (among ministers) and externally (interactions with policy 
recipients), in order to tackle these issues in an all-encompassing manner. That is ultimately 
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why we investigated the extent to hich ac or  choice  and in erac ion  ma er in polic  
instrument selection process. Because we believe that a greater level of analytical accuracy is 
needed in order to understand the complementarity between policy-makers  decisions, as well 
as the role that target population can play as catalyser of public choices. In the same vein, we 
propose a new typology of R&I policy instrument classification, which is able to embrace both 
the behavioural and the political characteristics embedded in different tools. Since, ultimately, 
instruments refer to the aspect of policy intended to motivate target population to comply with 
a policy, or utilize policy opportunities (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 338); we believe that 
the relationship between decision makers and target population needs to be taken into account 
in explanations concerning the underlining logics of instruments action. Because, ultimately, 
instruments display many differences not only regarding the concrete details according to 
which they are design, but also with respect to the context in which they are applied (Borrás 
and Edquist, 2019).  
To answer all these questions, and to test the validity of the proposed instrument classification, 
the thesis has been structured as follow. In Chapter 2 we first discuss the conceptual 
boundaries of Research and Innovation policies as applied in our research. Then we will 
review the contributions of the existent literature to the study of policy instrument selection 
process in the Research and Innovation sector; ultimately, we will conclude by presenting the 
research question driving our investigation.  
In Chapter 3 we will present our theoretical framework, together with the conceptualisation 
(and operationalisation) of policy instrument typologies and of the theoretical factors of 
interest we hypothesise shaping policy instrument selection. To conclude, we will define the 
path of investigation for the analysis of the two case studies, and put forward our predictions 
on the different causal pathways shaping instrument selection process.  
Chapter 4 will present the methodological approach adopted for the analysis. We will discuss 
case selection strategies and present the constitutive characteristics of our sample; then, we 
will move on by describing the methods of data collection and analysis adopted for our 
investigation. To conclude, we are going to discuss the piloting process for European and 
regional issues, in order to provide further evidences in support of our analysis. 
Chapter 5 and 6 are focused on the within case study analysis of France. In the former we will 
describe the chronological evolution of the R&I sector together with an accurate description 
of the instrument mix adopted and the governance arrangements characterising the sector. 
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While in the latter, we will analyse the characteristics of the case in the light of our theoretical 
framework, and we will test the validity of our predictions on the different causal pathways 
shaping instrument characteristics.  
Similarly, Chapter 7 and 9, will mirror the same narrative but for the Italian case. Therefore, 
in the former we will present the historical evolution of the national R&I governance 
arrangements, together with the policy mix characteristics. While in the latter, we will present 
the results of the within case analysis in the light of our analytical framework. 
To conclude, Chapter 9 will wrap up on the results of the within case study analysis (the four 
chapter above mentioned) and it will focus on the cross-case comparison of these data. 
Therefore, it will dig into the analysis of national policy mix evolution, testing the relevance 
of proposed policy instrument classification. Then, it will comparatively analyse the different 
causal pathways leading policy instrument selection in our two cases. Finally, the conclusion, 





















2 Chapter 2: The literature review 
This research is addressed to a broad audience in the field of public policy studies, therefore 
an accurate conceptualisation of what we do mean by Research and Innovation sector is 
needed, so that readers who are not familiar with these concepts can easily grasp the 
boundaries of the phenomenon under investigation. Particularly, we are interested in 
understanding the dynamics shaping the characteristics of policy instrument selection taking 
place in this sector. Meaning, the way instruments are selected and blended into different 
mixes, with the ambition of creating policy mixes able to encompass the cross sectoral nature 
of R&I policy goals.  
After a problematisation of the specific features of R&I policies, we will review the current 
literature analysing the fundamental characteristics of this policy sector. We will discuss the 
contributions of the existent scholarship in explaining how ideas influence the way R&I 
challenges have been translated into smaller scale issues; stressing the necessity for a more 
accurate analysis focusing on how do party politics preferences influence policy-makers 
attitudes for selecting specific policy instrument characteristics and the extent to which the 
legacy of previous strategies affect this process. We will shed light on how R&I policy 
strategies tend to hinge upon governing arrangements embracing multiple established areas of 
public policy; and underline the necessity to fill the a consistent gap in the literature with 
respect to an understanding of the extent to which this institutional structure influences the 
capacity of actors to fo er an in r men  mi  bearing encompa ing common i ion for he 
f re  (Braun, 2008a; Flanagan et al., 2011). Moreover, we will discuss the present 
contributions investigating the system of interactions between the actors involved in both 
knowledge production and development sectors; hence, among the state, university, public 
research organisations and different business actors (Amable and Petit, 2001; Considine et al., 
2009; Edler et al., 2016; Edquist, 2001a). We will show how a deeper understanding of the 
role, interests and strategies of these actors could contribute to a more accurate understanding 
of R&I policy making, and the shortcomings of the existent literature with respect to the 
relevance that target population have acquired on the way instrument are selected and blended 
into different mixes. On the same vein, we will move toward a more accurate discussion on 
policy instruments literature, in order to how the gaps we identified in the Research and 
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Innovation policy literatures, actually mirror some of the most relevant open questions in the 
study of how government select and design policy instruments.   
 
2.1 Conceptualizing Research and Innovation policies 
The field of innovation policy is a strongly multidisciplinary area. Different scholars from 
various fields have contributed to its development and establishment. The downside of this 
synergic process is the fact that the components of this field of research have been labelled in 
different ways, thereby producing heterogeneous definitions and analytical perspectives.  
To disentangle the stratification of contributions and to make clarity on the characteristics of 
this policy sector it useful to begin with the conceptual exercise provided by Lundvall and 
Borras (in Fagerberg  Borr , 2009). Before starting, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
m ch of ha  i  called inno a ion polic  oda  ma  pre io l  ha e gone nder o her label  
ch a  ind rial polic , cience polic , re earch polic  or echnological polic  (Edler and 
Fagerberg, 2017, p. 5). Therefore, this represents one among the multiple definitions of 
innovation policy, but we believe it is a good starting point, to the extent that it sketches out 
the main dimensions characterising the policy sector. 
The authors identify three broad concepts, science policy, technology policies and innovation 
policies, in the effort to understand the components of a system that in real world can 
consistently overlap. Science policy aims at allocating resources to science and regulating the 
internal and external structures of the actors involved in the research and knowledge 
production. Technology policy focuses on the creation of connections between universities 
and industries, with a more instrumental focus on economic/industrial objectives. Finally, 
innovation policies put emphasis on the role organisations and institutions have in 
coordinating the components of science and technology policy to produce innovative outputs 
and to create interactions and dialogue between the actors involved. Therefore, following the 
same line of thought, according to this perspective innovation policy can be defined as  
“the system of public activities devoted to coordinate the results of science and 
technology policy with the characteristics of national economic and industrial 
systems, in order to support the generation and diffusion of new products, processes 
or services” (Lundvall, Borras, 2009 in Fagerberg  Borr , 2009). 
Within this system enterprises and private actors at large, represent one among the various 
stakeholders involved in the process, that can produce innovation autonomously or in 
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cooperation with public actors. For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to define what do we 
mean for innovation outputs. Here it is useful to rely on the definition provided by the Oslo 
manual2, and applied by Eurostat, which identifies four types of innovations, namely: 
organizational innovation, market innovation, process innovation and product innovation3. 
Hence, if inventions can be defined as the first occurrence of an idea (and its first application), 
innovation represents the systematic development and exploitation of this idea into practice 
(Fagerberg et al., 2009a). 
For the purpose of this research it is also necessary to consider the set of activities which often 
stand at the upstream of innovation processes, as defined by the Frascati Manual these are 
classified as follows: basic research; applied research and experimental development4.  
The relevance of the research component for understanding knowledge production-
development process is related with the fact that knowledge advancements are often a 
necessary, although not sufficient in themselves, conditions for producing innovations. Since 
countries differ in their economic and industrial specialisations, they also tend to display 
different needs with respect to their demand of skills, knowledge and finance structure. 
Moreover, the interactions between policy makers, knowledge infrastructure and innovation 
performers are consistently shaped by these needs (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). Therefore, we 
think that both knowledge production and knowledge exploitation systems need to be 
con idered join l , o he e en  ha  he  can m all  hape each o her  need  and fea re , 
while moulding national R&I strategies. This is also in line with other arguments found in the 
current literature (Smits et al., 2010) concerning the necessity to keep a wider approach for 
investigating the origins and dynamics of innovation.  
 
2 It is an OECD document which contains guidelines for the collection and use of data on innovation activities 
in industries.  
3 Organizational innovation, refers to the implementation of a new organizational model or business practice; 
market innovation concerns the introduction of a new marketing method involving changes in product design 
and product placement; process innovation is the implementation of a new method of production and finally, 
product innovation refers to the new improvements in technical specification, components and material for both 
goods and services (OECD/Eurostat, 2018, p. 45).  
4 Basic research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the 
underlining foundations of phenomena and observable facts, without any particular application or use in view. 
Applied research is an original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge; it is however, 
directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or objective. Experimental development is systematic a work, 
drawing on knowledge gained from research and practical experience and producing additional knowledge, 
which is aimed at producing new products or processes or at improving existing products or processes (Frascati 
Manual 2015, pp. 50 51). 
 31 
Consequently, the governance of R&I defines a system of interactions between the actors 
involved in both the knowledge production and knowledge application sector; therefore, 
among the state, firms, university and public research organisations (Amable and Petit, 2001; 
Considine et al., 2009; Edler et al., 2016; Edquist, 2001a). In order to understand policy design 
process and the universe of actors, and interests, who gravitate around it, we believe a broader 
perspective is needed. 
Following on that we delineate the operational boundaries of the policy sector under 
investigation according to what can be classified as Research and Innovation Policies 
(henceforth R&I).  
Therefore, if research policies focus on the generation of new ideas and innovation policies on 
the activities related with exploitation of this idea into practice (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017); 
we identify Research and Innovation policies as:  
the system of public actions aimed at supporting research and knowledge production, 
and their coordination with public interventions focused on the development and 
exploitation of this knowledge into practices for various political goals (e.g. 
economic growth, national competitiveness, employment, Grand Societal 
Challenges).  
This implies both systematic strategies designed to enhance the knowledge developments and 
their coordination with measures aimed at supporting the process of generation, diffusion and 
adoption of new products, services, processes and business models (Doern and Stoney, 2009). 
Inasmuch as innovation can be framed a  he proce  horo gh hich idea  can be e ploi ed 
in prac ice  (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017, p. 16); we believe that in order to understand the 
process that shaped the design of national strategies it is necessary to account for both requests 
to support public research (Cantner and Pyka, 2001) as well as the necessity to support the 
demand, development and application of this knowledge in practice (Borrás and Edquist, 
2019). 
O r concep ali a ion i  al o con i en  i h ha  ha  been defined a  he hi orical e ol ion 
of the science policy frame to a technology policy frame and to a broader innovation policy 
frame  (Ulnicane, 2016, p. 8)5. Its boundaries are intentionally kept broad, so as to embrace 
 
5 As for any conceptualisation process, also in this specific case, researchers are always engaged in a tension 
between generalisation and accuracy. Therefore, in order to deal with this issue, we believe that it is necessary 
to specify that the conceptualisation provided defines R&I policies in the context of Western European 
Democracies and from a purely public policy-oriented perspective.  
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the universe of actors gravitating in the sector, with the goal to understand their potential role 
in the policy design process and in the governance system at large.  
Borrowing a conceptual framework from Tödtling and Trippl (Tödtling and Trippl, 2012, 
2005) we can think of R&I policies as composed of two subsystems, one devoted to knowledge 
creation, centred around universities, PROs and private research. Another one, focused on 
knowledge exploitation based on firms (heterogeneous in size and sectors), universities spin-
offs and public developmental agencies. R&I policies represent the system of public activities 
devoted to fuel knowledge production and application in these two (ideal type) systems and to 
enhance cooperation and synergies among the actors involved. 
These interventions can be administered and designed by governments, including agencies 
and public institutions at different territorial levels (Edler et al., 2013). Therefore, private 
corporate policies or strategies for innovation are not included within this operational 
definition. Nevertheless, given the relevance of private actors as both knowledge producers 
and developers, we included these stakeholders in our analysis (Edler et al., 2016), with a 
focus oriented to the role they can play in policy making process and as recipients of different 
R&I policy mixes. We are aware of the advices made by Borras and Edquist (2019), regarding 
he endenc  o adop  a liner model of inno a ion  per pec i e hen anal ing Re earch and 
Innovation policy, and the related risks to overestimate the role of the research component at 
the expenses of the innovation one (putting too much attention on the Research and 
overlooking the Development side). Taking these warnings into consideration along our 
investigation, we believe that in order to understand policy design process we need to adopt a 
more encompassing view on this policy sector, exactly because we have to be able to 
nder and al o ho e ac or  ra ionali ie  ha  do no  follo  he principle of a holistic 
innovation approach. To conclude, we are convinced that given the discrepancies between the 
willingness of actors, and their actual organizational capacities, to deal with R&I issues, by 
analysing these two components in combination it will be possible to enhance our analytical 
accuracy.  
 
2.2 A public policy analytical perspective on the study of R&I policies 
Looking at the characteristics of R&I policies with a public policy analytical lens, it emerges 
how these policies strategies tend to hinge upon governing arrangements embracing multiple 
established areas of public policy (defined as policy sector or policy subsystems) while 
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a emp ing o fo er an in r men  mi  encompa ing common i ion  for he f re  (Braun, 
2008a; Flanagan et al., 2011). That is why R&I policies are thought to design multi-level, 
multi-actor and multi-issue governance systems (Chou et al., 2017), where each intervention 
needs to be joined up across a broad set of delivery areas, including tax, science, education, 
immigration, enterprises, foreign and direct investments and health policies.  
This inherent complexity is closely related with the fact that R&I policies tend to address 
broad challenges, that given the impossibility to be tackled as a whole, require to be translated 
into smaller scale issues (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012). Therefore, behind the 
process of issue framing, a parallel process takes place, shaping different organizational 
structures of policy-making, while defining what some of the current literature describes as 
boundary-spanning policy regimes (Jochim and May, 2010) or horizontally connected policy 
sectors (Trein, 2017). Basically, these governance structures define different extent of 
integration practices across cla ical  polic  ec or re pon ibili ie , in order o coordina e 
policy making between multiple areas and design holistic R&I interventions.  
The literature in this field suggests that policy integration represents a political goal that must 
be obtained (Tosun and Lang, 2017, p. 560), it can be related with different framings of policy 
problems (Nilsson and Nilsson, 2005), or it can be the result of conscious organizational 
design based on strategic considerations (Christensen et al., 2014).  An emblematic case of 
policy integration between policy sectors is provided by the research of Trein (2017), who 
investigated health care and public health sector integration. Here the author shows the extent 
to which the governance capacity to coordinate the actions of different policy sub-sectors is 
closely related with the institutional design adopted for integration (e.g. ministerial structure) 
and the collaborative attitudes of the stakeholders involved, what he calls ac or  
responsiveness. These phenomena are not solely specific to R&I, but they represent 
generali ed ra egie  for ackling ocie al i e  hich pan acro  differen  cla ical  
sectors of policy responsibility (e.g. climate policies (Van Asselt et al., 2015), migration 
policies (Scholten et al., 2017) and health care policies (Trein, 2017)).  
The rationality behind our conceptualisation of R&I policies and the underlining goal of our 
research aim exactly at investigating how policy design processes take place in cross-sectorial 
governance arrangements, and the way the actors involved in this process influence the 
selection of instruments that could effectively design an ambitious policy mix for Research 
and Innovation. Indeed, policy integration challenges becomes particularly severe, when 
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complex societal issues are confronted with governance systems characterised by relatively 
stable actor configurations, associated interests, problem perceptions and interest beliefs 
(Candel and Biesbroek, 2016). Because policy sectors, as well as subsystems, are made of 
institutions, actors and specific interests regarding certain problems (Howlett and Cashore, 
2009). And the current literature in this field, is mainly focused on how to achieve policy 
integration (or coordination) rather than on the effects that such a peculiar cross-sectional 
governance arrangement can have on policy design, and more generally on decision-making 
practices. Therefore, in order to investigate how policy instruments are selected, and blended 
into mixes, a deeper understanding of how actors play within the cross-sectorial nature of the 
R&I governance arrangements is needed. Together with a deeper understanding of the 
characteristics, and expected consequences of instrument mix actions. Consequently, the 
interpretative framework of our analysis will consider both the institutional capacity of policy 
makers to (attempt to) integrate ministers with complementary competences; as well as the 
role target population have in easing or hampering these practices. Since policy design is 
fundamentally an intellectual process of constituting a reality and then attempting to work 
with it (Linder and Peters, 1998, p. 45), which is linked to the general policy preferences in 
the sector (Cashore and Howlett, 2007), these dynamics should also be interpreted accounting 
for alternative framings influencing the politics of problem definition. All these issues are 
coherent with the increasing awareness emerging from policy instrument and governance 
literature (Bre er  and O Toole, 2005; Capano and Lippi, 2017; Majone, 1976; Ringeling, 
2005; Woodside, 1986) regarding the reduced capacity that, in democratic societies, political 
in i ion  ha e o ac  nila erall . Beca e, l ima el , i  i  all abo  ( ing o) e abli hing, 
promoting and supporting a specific type of relationship between governmental and non-
go ernmen al ac or  in he go erning proce  (Capano et al., 2015, p. 313). 
Consequently, in order to understand policy design in complex governance regimes we will 
investigate how the integration between R&I policy responsibilities has been effectively 
pursued in our two cases and the way this affected their ability to coordinate public action 
internally (among ministers) and externally (interactions with policy recipients), and 
ultimately, the different policy instrument blends.  
As extensively discussed in the following chapters, theory and practice do not always overlap; 
indeed, our two cases display different extent of successful policy making experiences in 
which they were able to design such a comprehensive strategy. Therefore, through a 
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reconstruction of the policy design process, of the rationalities of the actors involved, their 
ideas, interests and strategies for action, we will contribute to the scholarship of policy 
instruments, by providing a deeper understanding of how tool selection, and the interaction 
between differently motivated actors shaping their final characteristics, takes actually place in 
governance arrangement characterised by cross-sectorial policy issues. While supporting a 
more general understanding of the dynamics characterising the sectorial specificities of R&I 
policy design process. However, from a public policy perspective, the R&I sector represent an 
example among the broader variety of complex governance regimes characterised by the 
integration of different policy responsibilities. Therefore, we aim at providing theoretical and 
empirical contributions that could be easily generalised to the broader sphere of policy sectors 
characterised by policy integration issues.  
 
2.3 Different rationalities for state intervention: the politics of R&I policies 
In 1934 Schumpeter defined innovation as creative destruction, meaning a process able to 
shape new combinations of hitherto disconnected ideas, knowledge domains, technologies or 
markets (Smits et al., 2010). Since technological progress, and more broadly knowledge 
advancements, represent one of the factors supporting economic development, the interest of 
policy makers in knowledge-intensive activities is closely related with the positive spill-overs 
these can trigger (in terms of employment, human capital, national economic competitiveness) 
and the possibility to steer them, towards their interests.  
Looking at the history of past policy design in the R&I sector (Edler et al., 2016; Gassler et 
al., 2008; Laranja et al., 2008; Mazzucato, 2013) it is possible to identify four different 
historical phases of R&I policies, mirroring different cognitive paradigms (political framings) 
according to which governments have differently translated their political purposes into 
innovation-intensity objectives. These rationalities, and the characteristics of the related policy 
mixes attached to them, are intimately linked with various perceptions of the duties and 
benefits that public actors can get out of this political process.  
The first phase emerged in concomitance with the historical and political contingencies arising 
in the aftermath of the Second World War conflict (1940s- 1950s) and the upcoming, cold war 
period. Polic  maker  goal , in ha  no ada  is called R&I, were focused on key military 
technologies, in order to support the production of public goods in areas where there was no 
private incentive to do so. Their primary goal was restricted to develop particular technological 
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capabilities (Foray et al., 2012), with a purely top-down, market fixing rationality (Kattel and 
Mazzucato, 2018; Laranja et al., 2008) . In this context, state intervention was perceived as a 
necessary condition in order to overcome market failures embedded within the public good 
characteristics of knowledge (distinguished by non-rivalry and non-excludability).  
The following period was distinguished by the application of R&I goals for civilian industrial 
technologies, and it was contextual to the post-war industrial and economic development era. 
The dominant framing was mainly driven by a first mover advantage logic, and it was focused 
on the development of private industry with the ultimate goal of disseminating results to the 
wider public (Gassler et al., 2008). Innovation process was mainly interpreted as a linear 
mechanism starting from basic research, through applied research and development, until the 
market introduction of new products and technologies (OECD, 2005). Public actors had a 
prominent role in leading innovation process often from the input, through public research 
laboratories, either military or civilian, until the output, by supporting (or in some case 
owning) national industries.  
The third phase characterised the 1980s and it was closely associated with the emergence of 
the National System of Innovation (NIS) approach (Freeman, 1987; Gassler et al., 2008; 
Lundvall, 1992; R. Nelson, 1993). The innovation process was seen in a broader perspective, 
as an interplay of systemic elements with institutional framework conditions, where the 
production of innovation was made up of constant interactions and learning among the 
constituents of this network (Edquist, 2001a). Public intervention was perceived as necessary 
in order to support coordination, enhance complementarities among the components of the 
system and to ease the cooperation between actors and organisations involved. The rationality 
for state intervention was guided by the perceptions of different systemic failures inherent to 
the network-based nature of the sector, such as infrastructural failures, capability failure, 
institutional and network failures (Chaminade and Edquist, 2006; Cimoli et al., 2009; Edquist, 
2014, 2001a). Therefore, public intervention was sometimes req ired, b  i  co ldn  
completely displace the role of private actors, whose coordination and interaction were meant 
to fuel innovative processes.  
The last period, which started around 2000s, saw the role of R&I policies as increasingly 
oriented to respond to major societal and economic challenges. This concept has been used 
since 2007, with the drafting of the Green Paper on the European Research Area, and it has 
been introduced into the policy discourse with the adoption of the Lisbon strategy (2000-
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2010), that framed R&I as an important component for economic growth (Ulnicane, 2016). It 
represented a new mission-oriented approach with a pronounced orientation towards 
technologies and innovations relevant for coping with new societal developments, such as 
environmental and health problems, job creation, security and defence (Borrás, 2009; Gassler 
et al., 2008). It supported a wider policy making attention towards how research and 
innovation could become instrumental to tackle economic and social challenges nations face 
in contemporary global environments. This approach reflects an emphasis on new strategies 
adopting cross boundaries collaboration between multiple actors and policy sectors (Ulnicane, 
2016), dealing with new interconnected and complex (wicked) problems (Head and Alford, 
2013; Kattel and Mazzucato, 2018; Peters, 2017), requiring insights from many perspectives. 
The historical overview of ideational approaches behind R&I policy design shed light on the 
evolution of different governance modes, and related dominant policy framings this policy 
sector has experienced over the last decades. Since ideas are closely related with various 
cognitive paradigms, meaning how people make sense of the reality surrounding them, in turn 
these are also embedded within different interpretations of the problems at hand.  
Different paradigms of priority setting (in R&I) did not substitute their predecessors but they 
rather tend to develop new features, which add up to the existing structures of priorities 
(Gassler et al., 2008). Consequently, the extent to which policy makers have adopted one or 
another rationality is related with how political preferences have been translated into research 
and innovation-intensity targets. Indeed, this process is the result of a specific political framing 
(Edquist and Borrás, 2013), which tend to be influenced by both individual values and 
perceptions, as well as by long-lasting assumptions about how the world should be.  
Technological progress, and more broadly knowledge advancements, represent one of the 
factors necessary to sustain economic and social development, these can also (potentially) play 
a vital role in designing strategies to support poverty alleviation, rural development and 
sustainable economic growth (Taylor, 2016, p. 31). Therefore, the political context is said to 
(in)directly influence the availability of resources for investments in R&D, and to legitimizes 
different spaces in which firms can gain access to resources (Van de Ven and Garud, 1989). 
Consequently, R&I represent a highly risky and long-term intangible asset, mainly supported 
through public finance, which is expected to generate profit in the future (Bhattacharya et al., 
2017). Because of its long-term benefits, or losses, this could eventually create, it is plausible 
to expect that different stakeholders would have different stakes with respect to the spill-overs 
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R&I policies can trigger in different policy areas. Meaning that the choices of alternative 
designs for public policy interventions in the sector should be influenced by alternative 
political framings concerning both problems interpretation and expected benefits. 
Actually, as suggested by the literature, many studies on innovation overlook its relationship 
with party politics and more generally with government ideology (Bergek et al., 2015; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2019). There are some contributions concerning the 
influence of left/right wing party cleavages on the application of university tuition fees 
(Kauder and Potrafke, 2013), on the progress of technical innovation (measured through 
patents and trademarks) (Wang et al., 2019); on the influence that political uncertainty plays 
on economic incentives to innovate (Bhattacharya et al., 2017), and on the conditions affecting 
the innovative attitudes of different governments (Ma, 2017). 
Nevertheless, the existent literature displays a clear shortcoming regarding the relevance that 
different political ideas can have in shaping the design of R&I policy strategies. We know that 
the political context can differently influence the availability of financial resources for 
investments in R&D (Bergek et al., 2015). But it is still unclear how do party politics 
preferences influence policy-makers attitudes for selecting specific R&I policy instrument 
characteristics. Therefore, our analysis aims exactly at investigating the content of R&I 
decisions, and the way different governments formulate their choices on alternative instrument 
mixes. A  he ame ime, e are al o a are ha  ince polic  de ign i  an in ellec al proce  
of con i ing a reali  and a emp ing o ork i h i  (Linder and Peters, 1998, p. 45) there 
might be some discrepancies between what actors want and what they can actually achieve. 
Indeed, both individual values and long-lasting assumptions about how the world should be, 
are key ideational components shaping the politics of problem definition (Béland, 2016). 
Consequently, alternative framings tend to cluster into long-term paradigms, acting as a lens 
that filter information and focuses attention on specific issues (Wilson, 2000). They carry out 
various sets of values, interpretations of the reality and images of target population influencing 
the characteristics of different governance settings (Capano and Lippi, 2017; Edler et al., 2016; 
Sanz-Mendez and Borrás, 2001). That is why, it is relevant to focus our attention on the extent 
to which different dominant R&I cognitive framings influence how innovation intensity 
problems are framed, and how strategies are differently assembled.  
The combination between policy problem interpretation and the perceived appropriateness of 
a given instrument influences interest definition; this can fuel the creation of different political 
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constituencies (Daviter, 2007), as well as the tendency for some instruments to become 
institutionalised (Laranja et al., 2008) or supported by a specific group of actors (Voß and 
Simons, 2014). 
Since alternative design of R&I instrument mix mirror different political priorities (by 
differently distributing cost and benefits to actors), by investigating how different 
governments formulated their choices on R&I instrument mix, and the influence that existent 
framings had on this process can ultimately help to shed light on the politics dynamics fuelling 
R&I policy making.  
 
2.4 The institutional shapes of R&I policies 
At the beginning of 2000s Borr s and Biegelbauer (Biegelbauer and Borr s, 2003) noticed a 
trend in national innovation policies directed towards their integration with other national 
policy fields. This was interpreted as a result of the combination between an increasing 
awareness concerning the systemic nature of innovation processes, an acquired relevance in 
the role of knowledge for economic development, and as a consequence of networking and 
bridging strategies of previous policies. From an institutional perspective this trend has been 
accompanied by an increasing blurring of competences between executive national 
departments, which consequently led to different patterns of institutional organizations among 
actors with complementary competences in the sector (Edler et al., 2016; Perry and May, 
2007)6. 
This phenomenon is associated with the characteristics of R&I policy discussed in previous 
paragraphs, namely the fact that traditionally these issues lie within the remit of different 
ministerial responsibilities, whose task division varies according to different national contexts 
(Edler et al., 2016; Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). From an institutional organisation perspective, 
R&I policies, like for example climate policies (Van Asselt et al., 2015), migration policies 
(Scholten et al., 2017) and health care policies (Trein, 2017), stand at the intersection of 
cla ic polic  ec or , mirroring differen  f nc ional e ec i e polic -making organisations 
(as further operationalised in the next chapter). The way in which R&I responsibilities have 
 
6 This is also related with the increasing awareness regarding the systemic nature of innovation processes (see 
Lundvall (1992); Lazonick (1993); Elidias et al., (2005) Considine et al., (2011)), which highlights the relevance 
of different type of institutional and political relations existing between different locus of power with integrative 
decision-making competences in the sector. 
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been organized among ministries mirror different national specificities reflecting their 
institutional systems, the different framings of R&I issues and of related policy strategies 
(Tosun, 2018). Since ministerial organisation is not strictly determined by law, for the most 
part the organisation of institutional structures tell us how national governments have 
differently thought about policy problems and the political priorities to be tackled (Peters, 
1998). Ultimately this is closely related with the fact that R&I policy strategies imply a policy 
mi  encompa ing common i ion  for he f re  (Braun, 2008a, p. 231; Flanagan et al., 
2011), aimed at solving transversal policy issues (Jochim and May, 2010; Peters, 2005). 
Consequently, the system of ministerial organisation can take different shapes, according to 
how differently national governments have translated these issues into smaller scale, policy-
related strategies.   
In both the Italian and French case, these responsibilities are mainly coordinated externally, 
between the Minister of Research and Education and the Minister of Economic Development, 
with the open window for functional ministerial, or regional, activation 7. These structures 
have been supplemented by the creation of platforms for interministerial dialogue (e.g. the 
CIPE in the Italian case), common budgeting procedures (e.g. the MIRES in the French case), 
or the involvement of public agencies (see the Finnish case in Pelknonen et al., 2008); in order 
to overcome the lack of hierarchical coordination and enhance collaboration among peers.  
Differently, for example, in the British case, after the creation of the Department of Innovation 
Universities and Skills (2007), competences in the field of higher education, skills and 
innovation have been merged within a unique institution8. Such integration went even further 
in 2009 with the creation of the Department of Business Innovation and Skills, where also 
responsibilities related with trade, business regulation and support have been merged under 
the same structure. Then, this has been supplemented by the creation of specialised public 
sector organisations (Innovate UK), with the mission to support innovation (Edler and 
Fagerberg, 2017). 
Despite the mixed results emerging from previous studies (Bäck et al., 2017; Martin and 
Vanberg, 2014), we are confident to assume that ministers detain a central role in the 
formulation of policy mixes within their areas of competences given their expertise, resources 
 
7 In these cases, Regions can also develop their own R&I initiatives on the basis of the concurrency principle. 
8 This Department took over some of the competences of the former Department of Education and Skills, and 
the Department of Trade and Industry.  
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and institutional power in policy making process. Even in the case of political systems relying 
on collective decision-making at the cabinet level, or presidentially-based systems, 
discussions on policy strategies often consider whether to accept, reject or amend, a particular 
policy proposal usually produced by the minister (or department) in charge of a specific policy 
issue (Laver, Michael; Shepsle, 1996).  
The influence of ministerial structures on R&I policy mix characteristics is related with the 
fact that social choices are shaped, mediated and channelled by the structure of different 
institutional arrangements (John, 2012; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Indeed, as 
organizational research points out, and as confirmed by some of our interviewees (see case 
study analysis Chapter 6 and 8), differen  depar men al iden i ie  affec  ac or  elec i e 
perceptions, by focusing their attentions on different phenomena; therefore, shaping different 
understandings of causal effectiveness (Scharpf, 1997, p. 40).  
This influence becomes even more relevant if we consider that R&I policy issues design a 
complex governance regime, characterised by the integration of different policy competences, 
in which interventions often need to cut across multiple established areas of policy 
responsibility.  
Therefore, given the complexity of R&I issues (Verhoest and Bouckaert, 2005) the traditional 
siloed approach characterising many public administrations (Christensen et al., 2014; 
Pencheva et al., 2018) as well as the classic departmentalized structure of formal policy 
making institutions (Pelkonen et al., 2008), some extent of coordination between the different 
locus of policy making power is needed. The literature recognizes the influence that the variety 
of national institutions, and inter-institutional networks, play in influencing the ability of 
research and industrial actors to produce knowledge and innovation, as well as of policy 
makers to invest and regulate (Braun, 2008b; Chung, 2013; Smits et al., 2010).  
Koch (2008) provides an interesting example for the Danish case, showing how changes in 
ministerial organizations, and more generally in their internal dynamics of coordination, are 
related with shifts in the instruments characterizing dominant policy mix in the sector. Edler 
and Kuhlmann (2008), analysing the German case, stress the relevance that ministerial 
coordination practices plays in shaping a balanced R&I policy mix, within and across 
knowledge sectors, in terms of a coordinated blend of different policy measures. On the same 
vein, Griessen and Braun (2008), show how despite Switzerland can be grouped among the 
most successful countries in terms of knowledge production and technological innovation, it 
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faces consistent cross-sectoral policy coordination challenges within its institutional 
structures.  
Consequently, in the current literature it is well established the set of problems related with 
policy areas characterised by the integration of different responsibilities, as well as the 
necessity to support ministerial coordination in order to enhance policy making practices 
(Braun, 2008b; OECD, 2005; Pelkonen et al., 2008). Our contribution builds on these 
evidences and attempts to move forwards the focus of analysis, in order to investigate how the 
different morphologies of formal (and informal) ministerial interactions at work have 
influenced the ability of policy makers to design instrument mix able to consider multiple 
traditional subsectors of public action.  
All the different ministerial organisation strategies require to strike a balance between 
coordination, in terms of designing an all-encompassing policy strategy, and specializations, 
related with the fine-grained calibration of policy mix to specific contexts.  Therefore, the 
choice of different ministerial organization structures can have different trade-offs according 
to how differently actors do manage to integrate their policy making structures and interact 
with policy recipients. There is not best organizational strategy because divisions can persist 
in both external or internal institutional strategies, due to the different system of competence 
division among departments (Pelkonen et. Al., 2008), and related mechanisms of habituation 
and socialization within organizational structures (Binder et al., 2009; Merton, 1938). These 
patterns influence the way authority is exercised, meaning how ministers, and eventually 
agencies, organize their actions during the governing business.  
Therefore, building on that, we want to understand how internal policy making ability in R&I 
policy sector was challenged by the underlining necessity to integrate different policy 
responsibilities; and the extent to which different policy mix choices addressed (un)balanced 
or (un)coordinated blend of instruments to their targets.  
As reported in the literature, another emerging phenomenon in R&I policies is the tendency 
for knowledge and innovation components to invade the field of many traditional policy 
sectors (Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2008), defining a situation very similar to the external 
coordination practices discussed above. For the sake of clarity, in this research we adopted a 
strictly institutional approach (Edler et al., 2016) to investigate national R&I policy-making 
process. Hence, we decided to focus on the typically sector-based division of labour between 
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different ministers, or public agencies, with direct competences in R&I sector9. The extent to 
which different functional ministries are involved in the policy design of national R&I 
strategy, is also dependent upon the type of strategies governments are determined to achieve. 
Hence, their participation in policy-making processes can only be assessed in the empirical 
analysis of the cases; when it will also be possible to understand whether different national 
governments have undertaken R&I policy strategies in a wider sense, therefore including 
specific objectives in other sectorial domains, such as environment or health; or whether they 
focused on stricter R&I-oriented goals (OECD, 2005). All these questions will go along with 
the empirical analysis of the two cases under investigation, and will pave the way to 
understand the role different institutional factors play in shaping R&I governance 
arrangements, and the extent to which different actors can interfere in this process.  
 
2.5 The quest for systemic approaches: how interest intermediation takes 
place  
In policy making activities requiring technical competencies and skills that public decision 
makers cannot provide by themselves, like in the case of knowledge or technological intensive 
activities (e.g. R&I policies), public actors are likely to rely on the collaboration of external 
actors. During this delegation of responsibilities, the agent should perform the task but with 
some consequential benefits accruing to the principal (governing actors) as well (Guston, 
1996, p. 230).  
In the case of science policy, but we can also expand it to R&I at large, the delegation process 
between political principals and R&I performers embeds a trade-off in the role of science and 
technology in societies, which has been consistently debated. Beginning, with Bush (1945) 
and Merton (1938), both pointed out the necessity to preserve the autonomy of science as a 
premise for its development and circulation among researchers, governments, industries or 
elsewhere. One empirical example of this principle is the German case, where scientific 
 
9 We focused our attention to the study of policy making organisations explicitly responsible for research and 
innovation (technology development) issues. Therefore, for the sake of this research we did not primarily focus 
on the measures in support of research and innovation designed and implemented by functional ministries and 
agencies (e.g. energy, health, or transport), serving the purpose of supporting innovation as means to achieve 
their ultimate policy goals (Edler et al., 2016). That is because in this research we are not interested in policy 
integration (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003), therefore in commitments aimed at minimizing contradictions between 
innovation and sectorial policies; but rather in formal policy processes aiming to get the various institutional and 
managerial system, which formulate policy, to work together (OECD 2003:9). 
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autonomy is constitutionally established, and the government has little possibility to influence 
basic funding for research councils (Van der Meulen, 1998a, p. 405). 
In some instances, the creation of intermediary institutions between governors and R&I 
performers has represented a strategy to stabilize the interest of the actors involved and to 
(temporarily) temper the politics/science conflict. Such as in the Danish case, where the 
creation of different research councils with tasks related to the coordination of public research, 
the production of policy advice and, partly, the management of national funding allocation, 
represented a strategy to balance university autonomy (Koch, 2008). While in other cases, as 
demonstrated by the comparative case study of Braun (1993), this strategy has represented a 
sword with two edges. On the one hand it alleviated administrative burdens while intergrating 
access to information and cooperation with recipients; but on the other hand, it granted 
considerable power to R&I performers. 
The tension for power is persistent in the Research and Innovation sector, to the extent that 
often the freedom of choices of the agents who carry out these activities is the underlining 
moutus that can feed new discoveries. Even though, as suggested in the literature (Mazzucato, 
2013), there have been experiences in which the contribution of the State has been pivotal for 
the development of new societal, economic and technological breakthrough innovations.  
Another persistent debate, as also reported by some of our interviewees, regards the 
identification of those actors who have the legitimacy, and power, to determine national R&I 
investments decisions, and whether these choices should be driven by market needs versus 
scientific considerations. Indeed, as for any delegation process, also in this case, the 
information asymmetry between those who govern research (principals  governments-) and 
those who conduct research (agents  R&I performers-) is the central issue (Guston, 1996).  
Van der Meulen (1998) theorised three main solutions in order to stabilize the relationship 
between these players: blind delegation to scientists, consensus building among the actors 
involved or competition for resources, whose priorities have been decided by the principal. 
Nevertheless, all these forms of stabilisation are closely dependent upon the dynamics 
characterising different systems, therefore on the preferences, the perceptions of preferences, 
the strategies of both actors, and how their relation institutionalise (p.412). 
Borrowing and expression from Braun the issue of science-government relations, and its 
related autonomy, is an antinomy or a paradox, because equally rational but contradictory 
views exist and solutions are consequentially hard to come by (Braun, 2003, p. 309).  
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Indeed, if on the one hand the main problem of science policy concerns the support of research 
with governmental funds; on the other hand, policy makers should not undermine the vigour, 
initiative and independence of scientific institutions (Ben-David, 1991, p. 297). Therefore, 
some extent of preference alignment between the principal and the agent is needed, that is 
what Trein (2017) defines as actor responsiveness.  
This is in line with some of the arguments extensively illustrated in the case of the 
environmental policy sector (Dermont et al., 2017; Gross, 2007; Ingold et al., 2018; 
Kammermann and Ingold, 2019; Varone and Aebischer, 2001); meaning also policy 
preference  of arge  pop la ion become impor an , o he e en  ha  he lack of akeholder  
support, or legitimacy, for the behavioural change proposed by a new instrument can hamper 
cooperation and undercut successful implementation.  
Indeed, when actors are cooperating to produce a public good, the major problem is how to 
distribute the revenues of the sale of the public good among all contributors. Since, this is not 
ea  o be mea red, here i  a endenc  of each ac or o free-ride (Braun, 1993, pp. 137
138). So, establishing communication channels between the political system and the 
addressees of political action, directly or through an intermediary agency, can help to 
overcome possible moral hazard, while easing the activation of policy instruments.  
The available solutions to this issue mainly rely on either the sharing of common goals, 
therefore by including some joint formulation practices between the principal and the agent 
(eventually also through the involvement of intermediary agencies) or through monitoring and 
evaluation of results. These two scenarios differ in terms of the extent of discretion left to the 
target population and on the characteristics of the resulting governance arrangement.  
These dynamics suggest how it has increasingly become necessary to consider how 
governments are not anymore simply and unilaterally authoritative, but they are instead 
dependent upon the action, acquiescence or support of others, which they do not directly 
control (Bre er  and O oole, 1998; Goe , 2008; Salamon, 2002b). In the case of R&I policy 
issues, policy makers have to design actions which require to be legitimated by highly different 
actors, from the research production, development and industrial sector. This provides R&I 
performers with the power to shape the final instrument mix characteristics and to steer policy 
design process towards their preferences. While, on the other hand, part of this heterogeneous 
target population can be cut off, because of their incapacity to identify their needs and behave 
as a proper political constituency.  
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Consequently, we believe that the current challenge to understand R&I policy making process, 
requires to disentangle the relationships existing between the actors involved in the broader 
governance of the sector, both on the R&I performers and the government side (as explained 
in the paragraph above). An understanding of how target population (R&I performers) relates 
to R&I policy process and different political actors is needed. This perspective will provide 
useful information on the different opportunity structures R&I performers face along the 
policy making process, as well as to reconstruct their rationality of action.  
This path of investigation closely mirrors a phenomenon taking place in R&I policy making 
defined by the OECD (2005) as horizontalization. Meaning the belief that a unique authority 
could autonomously identify in a top-down manner national strategy in R&I seems to have 
disappeared; leaving space to a policy-making environment where both top-down and bottom-
up forces are present, and where actors bargain over the selection and design of national 
strategies (Gassler et al., 2008; Kattel and Mazzucato, 2018). The interrelated nature of R&I 
policies maps out a system of production where actors become interdependent on the basis of 
the exchange of resources; R&I performers do benefit of public funding for their activities, 
but also policy makers benefit from the results of these activities. And that is because, 
investments from both public and private actors are required (Kattel and Mazzucato, 2018). 
 
2.6 What about policy instruments in R&I policies? 
As suggested by the literature on Research and Innovation, policy mix are meant to design 
encompa ing common i ion  for he f re  (Braun, 2008a; Flanagan et al., 2011). Their 
selection is a political moment, it should be based (ideally) on tackling the problematics of the 
innovation system, while requiring some extent of adaptation according to the different needs 
of each specific national context and public administration capacity (Borrás and Edquist, 
2019). Indeed, policy instruments are said to be highly context dependent (Edler et al., 2016), 
because the actors and the institutional context in which they operate become crucial in 
determining their effects (Flanagan et al., 2011).  
The combination between the increased complexity of problems in the R&I sector (Chou et 
al., 2017), and the incapacity of contemporary governments to move unilaterally, neglecting 
the preferences and resources of other social actors (Bressers, 2005; Fraussen, 2014; Smits, 
2010), suggests that analysing policy design as a mere technical process becomes too 
simplistic and reductive of real-world complexities. We cannot talk anymore of a paradigm in 
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which one goal equals one instrument, where policy makers can freely select instruments from 
an already made toolbox (del Rio and Howlett, 2013; Edquist and Borrás, 2013; Howlett and 
Lejano, 2013; Knudson, 2009). Consequently, policy design can be rather depicted as: 
“a case of muddling through (Charles E. Lindblom, 1959) in which the choice is 
shaped by the characteristics of the instruments, the nature of the problem at hand, 
past experiences of governments in dealing with the same or similar problems, the 
subjective preferences of decision-makers and the likely reaction to the choice by 
affected social groups (Howlett and Ramesh, 1993, p. 13)”.  
Therefore, it has become necessary to investigate policy selection process from a two-way 
perspective, where both policy-makers and recipients have the power to influence the 
likelihood ha  cer ain in r men  fea re  ill be elec ed. Since l ima el  polic  
instrument represent an attempt to ge  people do hing  he  migh  no  o her i e do  
(Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 513), we have to understand which are the factors that can 
influence the way differen  ind cemen  embedded in ool  ac ion ha e been assembled. The 
following table (Table 2.1) summarizes different contributions to policy instrument selection 
literature, while classifying them according to the principal variables influencing this process, 
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The theoretical approaches displayed in Table 2.1, provide valuable suggestions regarding the 
contributions of both policy-makers and recipients to the process of policy instrument 
selection. Reading through the cells it clearly emerges how these theoretical statements are 
not in contrast, but they rather compensate, and sometimes overlap, with each other. Indeed, 
they all consider the relevance of policy-makers and target group relationships in both the 
choice and the design of different instruments. The resources needed to activate policy 
instruments are not all simply given by virtue of being governments, but they are rather 
dependent upon the participation of different actors and the assets they can mobilize (Béland 
and Howlett, 2016; Capano and Lippi, 2017; Flanagan et al., 2011; Majone, 1976).  
This is connected with the specificities related to any given decision-making situations and 
the extent to which the presence of different interests can influence policy-making outputs 
(Capano and Lippi, 2017; Doern and Wilson, 1974; Linder and Peters, 1989; Macdonald, 
2001; van der Doelen, 1998; Woodside, 1986). Therefore, in theory, policy-makers should 
make sense of the type of resources needed to undertake certain actions, the public ability to 
find hared ol ion , arge  gro p  re o rce  and attitudes for collaboration.  
Governments are part of a broader decision-making environment, where the selection of 
different instruments is somehow constrained by the nature of the context in which decision-
making takes place. Public choices have to be perceived as socially acceptable, to the extent 
that these represent interventions aimed at solving collective problems of general interest. 
Indeed, decision-makers have to fulfil the democratic principle of political accountability 
(through parliament and other auxiliary channels), the preservation of public sectors values 
and the support of the institutional structure12 (Considine and Afzal, 2010). Moreover, public 
officials are subject to their electoral mandate embedded in the functioning of representative 
democracies, as much as to the constraints of the institutional structures regulating policy 
making process and the political system at large.  
That is to say that governments are not free in selecting the instruments they prefer indeed, 
“only authoritarian states do not have to bother with these limitations”(Ringeling, 2005, p. 
199). Therefore, in addition to the interest of stakeholders involved in the process it is also 
necessary to consider the political and institutional constraints actors face along the policy 
design process (Bre er  and O oole, 1998; Capano and Lippi, 2017; Ho le , 2000; Linder 
and Peters, 1989; Majone, 1976). 
 
12 Thi  i  in ended a  he formal r le  and proced re  reg la ing ac or  in erac ion.  
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Consequently, instrument selection, and the way they are implemented, is the result of a 
political process (e.g. following the formal/informal rules of the games North, 1990) which is 
dependent upon power dynamics, the institutional structures in which decisions take place and 
on the preferences of the actor involved in the R&I sector13(Borr s and Edler, 2015; Capano 
and Lippi, 2017; Edler et al., 2016; Edler and Fagerberg, 2017; John, 2012; Laranja et al., 
2008; Linder and Peters, 1989; Ringeling, 2005). 
Both the literature on policy instrument and the sectorial R&I policy studies contributions, 
suggest how the interplay between state preferences, the ability to internally agree upon a 
general policy making strategy and the willingness to cooperate between stakeholders, are 
among the most relevant factors shaping policy instrument choices. All of that proves that, in 
order to understand policy instrument selection process, it has become necessary to shift the 
focus of analysis towards the actors involved, their interplay and strategies for action. From 
this perspective we will be able to analyse the effective influence that actors play in the 
definition of different national R&I strategies, as well as to comprehend the underlining 
rationalities for governments-target groups interactions and ultimately the different causal 
pathways leading to policy mix crafting.  
 
2.7 The main lines of investigation 
The ultimate goal of our analysis is to understand how the interactions between differently 
motivated actors can influence the process of policy instrument selection in complex 
governance arrangements like the Research and Innovation sector. The literature on policy 
instruments has e en i el  foc ed on he echnical ide  of polic  de ign proce , herefore 
investigating the extent of coherence and contradictions embedded in their components 
(Howlett and Rayner, 2013; Rogge and Reichardt, 2016; Schmidt and Sewerin, 2018). 
Scholarly contributions have focused on the different trade-offs associated with instrument 
selection and on the complementary approach needed for their blending into mixes; 
 
13 The ne  config ra ion  of p blic and pri a e role in polic  making proce  don  have to be read as a complete 
hollowing out of the state; but they rather represent a transformation of previous model of power distributions 
and practices (Peters and Pierre, 1998). As argued by Goetz (2008), “governance constitutes part of the reality 
of how modern states are run, but traditional institutions, process and means of governing associated with the 
concept of “government” still prevail at national and probably also at European level” (:271). This means that, 
although with different features, the components of state legitimacy in governing are present also inside new 
governance arrangements characterising contemporary democracies (Considine and Afzal, 2010, p. 4; Héritier 
and Lehmkuhl, 2011).  
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in rod cing concep  like complemen ar  effec ,  goodne  of fi  and degree  of 
freedom  (Howlett and Rayner, 2013). 
However, in the everyday policy making practices, and specifically in the case of R&I policies, 
given its inherent cross-sectorial nature and its underlining goal of designing more ambitious 
policy mix able to encompass different areas of public action; there could be some 
discrepancies between the intention, and the effective ability, to take on purposive 
instrumental policy design according to these principles.  
The combination between the increased complexity of problems in the R&I sector (Chou et 
al., 2017) and the incapacity of contemporary governments to move unilaterally, neglecting 
the preferences and resources of other social actors (Bre er  and O Toole, 2005; Fra en, 
2014; Smits et al., 2010), has designed a policy-making environment where the selection of 
different instruments is somehow constrained by the nature of the context in which decision-
making takes place. Indeed, although instruments may be, in some theoretical or technical 
sense, substitutable, in practice they all differ in a number of ways, making their selection a 
highly political matter (del Rio and Howlett, 2013; Edquist and Borrás, 2013; Howlett, 2005; 
Howlett and Rayner, 2013; Knudson, 2009). Indeed, it is precisely the possibility to identify 
inner  and loo er  from heir ac i a ion and he oppor ni  o hif  he po er balance 
that makes their choice a politically salient moment (Borrás and Edquist, 2019; del Rio and 
Howlett, 2013; Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Linder and Peters, 1989; Salamon, 2002a). 
That is why, in order to understand the reasons for specific instrument selection and policy 
mix evolutions, it is necessary to complement these approaches with a fine-grained 
investigation of the political side of this process. What a first sight could be labelled as 
incoheren  polic  mi  e ol ion, in reali , it could simply be the result of an intentional, 
and strategic, political choice of actors. Therefore, to fully understand the selection of R&I 
policy instruments, it is necessary to investigate the political ideas of those actors involved in 
the selection, the power and preferences of the target population, the political and 
administrative costs associated with different alternatives (Rist, 1998). 
Similarly, also in the field of R&I policies, despite a growing scholarly interest, the policy mix 
concept has been more often used in a normative sense, with few evidences (Ghazinoory et 
al., 2019; Neicu et al., 2016) of how innovation policy mixes are blended, and even thinner 
evidences of how their interactions effectively work (Meissner and Kergroach, 2019).  
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Therefore, our research agenda easily meet at the crossroads of the open questions 
characterising the policy instrument and more generally, the policy design of R&I policies 
literature. Namely, both streams of research overlooked the relationship of R&I policy 
instrument selection process with party politics and more generally with how alternative ideas 
can shape the way political objectives are translated into innovation-intensity targets (Bergek 
et al., 2015; Bhattacharya et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2019). Also considerations regarding lock-
in, or path dependent, effects that long-lasting assumptions, or paradigms, about how the world 
should be (Béland, 2016; Wilson, 2000) can have on the design of R&I policy strategies are 
missing.  
In order to support a more general understanding on the political stakes related with alternative 
R&I policy mixes, and the role of the actors who bear these preferences, we will investigate: 
How do the political preference of different cabinet periods influence the formulation of 
national Research and Innovation policy strategies?  
This analysis will support a more general understanding of the political stakes related with 
alternative R&I policy mix scenarios, and the diachronic evolution of their governance 
arrangements. We will explain how governmental instrument mix preferences have evolved 
against different cabinet periods and the feedback effects related with the accumulation of 
long-lasting institutional aims attached to different dominant R&I paradigms.  
One of the most intriguing peculiarities of the R&I policy sectors, which also make it an 
in ere ing ca e of comple  go ernance arrangemen , i  he fac  ha  he e policie  address 
issues of a cross-sectorial nature, in which policy makers are increasingly asked to solve 
problems that cannot be neatly categorised into one policy sector, so-called wicked 
problems  (Kattel and Mazzucato, 2018; Rittel and Webber, 1973). Therefore, R&I policy 
design practices are confronted with the challenge of assembling more ambitious policy mixes, 
which should be able to embrace multiple traditional sectors of policy responsibility.  
From an institutional perspective this trend has been accompanied by an increasing blurring 
of competences between national executive departments, which consequently led to various  
patterns of institutional organisations among ministries with complementary competences in 
the sectors involved (Edler et al., 2016; Perry and May, 2007).  
The literature tells us that the influence of different ministerial structures on policy decisions 
is related with the fact that social choices are mediated and channelled by the structure of 
different institutional arrangements (John, 2012; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). And the actors 
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playing within their rules tend to experience selective perception biases, since different 
departmental identities influence their attention and understanding of policy issues (Scharpf, 
1997).   
Thi  comple i  doe n  rela e e cl i el  o he differen  al e  and percep ions of the actors 
involved, but also to their structure of interaction. Indeed, the different morphologies of 
ministerial organisations portray different framings of the political priorities to be tackled 
(Peters, 1998), which in turn shape the necessary coordination practices to be established 
among different institutions. Therefore, R&I decision making process are increasingly facing 
an internal paradox (Kattel and Mazzucato, 2018) meaning, the more complex the issues they 
aim at solving become, the more compartmentalised is their policy-making process.  
Previous investigations have recognized the influence that the variety of R&I institutional 
arrangements have on the ability of research and industrial actors to produce innovation, as 
well as of policy makers to invest and regulate (Braun, 2008b; Chung, 2013; Kuhlmann et al., 
2010). Other contributions have focused on the policy making trade-off of alternative 
ministerial organisation structures (Edler and Kuhlmann, 2008b; Koch, 2008) and the 
challenges these pose to R&I policy making (Griessen and Braun, 2008). Our contribution 
builds on these findings, and aims at deepening our understanding of the way actors interact 
within alternative institutional structure. Therefore, specifically, we investigate how different 
morphologies of formal (and informal) ministerial organisations influence the ability of policy 
makers to design more ambitious policy mix, able to involve multiple traditional sectors of 
public action. Alternative ministerial organisation strategies require to strike a balance 
between coordination, in terms of designing an all-encompassing policy strategy; and 
specialisation, related with the fine-grained calibration of policy mix to specific contexts. 
Therefore, our analytical focus will be directed towards understanding how did the internal 
policy making ability in R&I policy sector was challenged by the underlining necessity to 
integrate different policy responsibilities? And, to what extent did different policy mix choices 
addressed (un)balanced or (un)coordinated blend of instruments to their targets? 
The interrelated nature of R&I policies issues maps out governance arrangements where actors 
become interdependent on the basis of the exchange of resources. Indeed, R&I performers do 
benefit of public funding for their activities, but also policy makers benefit from the results of 
the same activities. And this is because in this sector investments from both public and private 
actors are required (Kattel and Mazzucato, 2018) 
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Indeed, if on the one hand the main issue of R&I policy concerns the support of research with 
governmental funds; on the other hand, policy makers should not undermine the vigour, 
initiative and independence of scientific actors undertaking these tasks  (Ben-David, 1991). 
All of that is also consistent with the findings in the literature (Dermont et al., 2017; Gross, 
2007; Ingold et al., 2018; Kammermann and Ingold, 2019; Varone and Aebischer, 2001) 
concerning he e en  o hich he lack of akeholder  ppor , or legi imac , for the 
behavioural change proposed by new instruments can hamper cooperation, while undermining 
a successful implementation. Therefore, the tension for power between policy-makers and 
R&I performers is persistent in this sector, especially for what concerns the identification of 
those actors who will have the legitimacy, and power, to determine national R&I investments 
decisions, and whether those choices should be driven by market needs versus scientific 
considerations. However, despite an increasing attention on the relevance of target populations 
for R&I policy design, and on the different forms of stabilisations of this conflict, the current 
scholarship is still loosely focused on understanding the strategic behaviours that move the 
choices of R&I performers. Therefore, in order to fully comprehend, and assess, the role policy 
recipient plays in the selection of policy instruments it is relevant to investigate: 
How do target groups relate to the policy process and the actors involved in these dynamics? 
And, to what extent do the different strategies of interest intermediation influence the 
characteristics of the instrument mix selected?  
Consequently, we believe that current challenges to understand R&I policy making process, 
require to disentangle the relationship between the actors involved in the broader governance 
of the sector, both on the R&I performers and the government side. We have to understand 
the way different policy actors manage to find a seat, and play a role, in the process of policy 
instrument selection and the extent to which the internal ability of policy makers (e.g. 
coordination of ministerial/departmental responsibilities), and their capacity to account for the 









The ultimate goal of our research is to investigate what is happening behind the scenes of R&I 
policy design process. Therefore, the extent to which different actors, with their resources, 
interests and preferences do manage to influence this process and the role that R&I performers, 
the recipient of these policies, play as catalyser of these choices. This will ultimately shed light 
on the way governments design more ambitious policy mixes aimed at solving the complex, 
and cross-sectorial in nature, social challenges our contemporary societies are facing.  
As discussed in previous paragraphs, the design of R&I policies is a complex political process, 
which involves different actors, their interest and rationalities within a broader policy 
environment shaped by the legacy of previous interventions. Therefore, in our analysis, we 
will first focus on the way the political preferences of different cabinets, as well as the legacy 
of former decision-making rounds, influence the formulation of national R&I policies. Then, 
given the inherent cross-sector nature of the issues these policies are tackling, we will 
investigate how the different shape of ministerial organisation structures influence the 
coordination between ministers involved in the sector and in turn, the way practices affect the 
capacity of the resulting policy mix to integrate different policy responsibilities.  
The holistic nature of many R&I policy issues maps out governance arrangements where 
actors become interdependent on the basis of the exchange of resources. Indeed, R&I 
performers do benefit of public funding for their activities, but on the other hand, also policy 
makers benefit from the results of the same activities. Therefore, due to the persistent tension 
for power between policy-makers and R&I performers, in order to understand policy 
instrument selection, it becomes relevant to investigate how target groups relate to the policy 
process and the extent to which their strategic behaviours influence the characteristics of R&I 
policy mixes.   
The governance of R&I policy represent an extremely complex arena for policy making, 
exactly because the resources needed for instrument activation are increasingly dependent 
upon the participation of different actors, and the assets they can mobilize (Béland and 
Howlett, 2016; Capano and Lippi, 2017; Flanagan et al., 2011; Majone, 1976). For the same 
reason, public choices have to be perceived as socially acceptable, because it is precisely the 
possibility to identify inner  and lo ers  from in r men  activation, and their capacity 
to shift the power balance, that makes their choice a politically salient moment (Borrás and 
Edquist, 2019; del Rio and Howlett, 2013; Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Linder and Peters, 
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1989; Salamon, 2002a). Since, ultimately, policy tools refer to the aspect of policy intended 
to motivate target population to comply with a policy, or utilize policy opportunities 
(Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 338); it is the relationship between decision makers and target 
population which can help us to understand the underlining logic of instrument action. That is 
why we believe it is necessary to stress the analytical and theoretical contribution that a 
differentiation of the dimensions characterising instrument action (e.g. instrument shape and 
delivery structure) can make in understanding how both the choice, and the particular way 
instruments are crafted, reflect different relationship between decision-makers and policy 
recipients. Because, not only the types of instrument selected matter, but also their capacity to 
induce a specific behaviour while addressing the appropriate target (Candel and Biesbroek, 
2016; EEA, 2005). 
This will contribute to a greater understanding of the behavioural and political characteristics 
embedded in instrument action; while showing how both the choice, and the particular way 
instruments are crafted, reflect different extent of interaction between decision-makers and 
policy recipients. We will interpret this relationship as a two-way bond, where both actors 
have a stake in finding a common terrain for agreement, which can be consequently 
substantiated in the characteristics of the instrument mix selected. Then, through a diachronic 
analysis of policy design processes, we will highlight the rele ance of ac or  in erac ion  for 
instrument selection, of the resources and political risks related with their application. Then, 
by focusing on instrument characteristics, and the history of policy mixes, it will be possible 
to sharpen the analytical focus so as to reconstruct the political dynamics that can explain the 
long-term mosaic of national R&I strategies, the characteristics of the actors involved and 











3 Chapter 3: The theoretical framework 
Policy instrument selection and design, contrary to how it has been portrayed so far, it is not 
a rational, linear and purely technical exercise. It rather represents a muddling through 
(Charles E. Lindblom, 1959), an inherently political process involving different actors, 
interests and constraints (Linder and Peters, 1989; Salamon, 2002a).  
In our research, we aim at exploring the political dynamics taking place behind the scenes of 
polic  de ign proce e ; b  in e iga ing ac or  ake  for al erna i e rajec ories of change 
and how these have been shaped along the formulation process into different instrument mix 
characteristics.  
The chapter is organised as follow; first, we briefly describe the theoretical framework that 
will guide our analysis, as well as the analytical perspective adopted for analysing policy mix 
characteristics.  Then we will operationalise policy instruments and describe their constitutive 
components; and after the concepts of Ideas, Institutions and Interest according to their 
distinctive features. Finally, we will define the path of investigation for the analysis of the two 
case studies, and outline our expectations regarding the political dynamics characterising their 
policy design process and then put forward our predictions on the different causal pathways 
explaining the selection of different instrument characteristics.  
 
3.1 Institutions, interest and ideas: the influence on actors  interactions 
and instrument mix characteristics 
In order to understand the different causal pathways leading to policy mix crafting it is 
necessary to narrow the focus of analysis on how actors do manage to find a common strategy 
for action. The quest for coordination requires governance ability both internally (among 
ministers) and externally (interactions with policy recipients). In addition to the reduced 
capacity that political institutions have to act unilaterally (as extensively discussed in Chapter 
2), policy makers are also facing the challenge to design R&I policy mix able embrace multiple 
traditional subsectors of public action, in order to address these issues in an all-encompassing 
manner.  
Therefore, policy makers are part of a system where, due to the complexity of problems at 
stake, the morphology of different decision-making structures, and the relevance of target 
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population activation, they are often bounded to share their authority with a plurality of actors. 
The more power is dispersed, the more different actors tend to have a say in the decision-
making process; and the more difficult it becomes to foster the consensus necessary to support 
change. Consequently, in order to shed light on the policy design process, it is also necessary 
to understand the way in which the relationship between R&I performers and policy makers 
shape policy instrument characteristics. Indeed, given the resource dependency tie between 
target population and policy makers (Schneider and Ingram, 1990), and more generally the 
cross-sectorial nature of R&I policy issue, alternative solutions need to be legitimated by 
multiple actors. This is the reason why it becomes necessary to dig into the dynamics of this 
process.  
An in-depth investigation of these activities needs to consider, the political ideas of those 
actors involved in the selection, the power and the preferences of the target population, the 
political and administrative costs associated with different alternatives (Rist, 1998). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, policy instruments are said to be highly context dependent (Edler et 
al., 2016), because the actors and the institutional context in which they operate become 
crucial in determining their effect (Flanagan et al., 2011). Decisions regarding policy design 
are made in a nested context characterised by a complex regime of goals, related instruments 
and settings, in which new elements have to be adjusted within the existing framework 
(Cashore and Howlett, 2007). In order to understand the political essence of this process, we 
need to figure out the extent to which the context, actors and their practices of interaction 
influence these dynamics (Varone and Aebischer, 2001).   
Indeed, by analysing different political preferences of governments (e.g. ideas), we can 
understand various patterns of preferences for the content of the policy mix; so, how 
governments have differently formulated their R&I decisions. While, by looking at the 
interaction between different ministerial organisation structures (e.g. institutions), the patterns 
and the content of intermediation practices with target population (e.g. interests), we aim at 
illustrating the political process that leads to the selection of different instrument typologies.  
Since the effectiveness of tools varies according to different context-specific characteristics, 
also their perceived utility and attractiveness is dependent upon that. Therefore, it becomes 
necessary to specify these circumstances in order to understand policy design process and how 
different policy mixes have been assembled (Howlett, 2005; Salamon, 2002a)  
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In Figure 3.1 is depicted the analytical process we will employ to disentangle the dynamics, 
actors and processes embedded in policy design activities, which are ultimately meant to 




Figure 3. 1 Theoretical framework 
 
Ideas are said to represent a proxy for a more general understating of the political stakes related 
with alternative R&I policy mix scenarios, and programmatic beliefs about its content. The 
ideational fractures activated by different R&I framings will help to shed light on the political 
payoffs alternative policy design will likely put in place and the distribution of attitudes among 
differen  go ernmen .  While he combina ion of ac or  in erac ion bo h in erm  of in ernal 
policy making ability (e.g. coordination between ministers/departments with R&I 
competences) and external ability to interact with target population, can help us to understand 
instrument calibration and the final characteristics of the mix adopted.  
To translate these theoretical insights into the R&I policy sector it is first necessary to 
understand which are the political trade-offs attached to the scenarios different policy mix will 
likely put in place. Therefore, the political freedom decision-makers have in supporting the 
adoption of different instruments and the cleavages attached to alternative mixes. This will 
help us to understand the content of different national policy mix, and their likely evolution.  
Secondly, we have to understand how internal and external cooperation between actors take 
place, influencing the shape and delivery structure characterising the final policy mix. This 
reflects the various patterns of ministerial specialisation, and related coordination practices, as 
well as the characteristics of different R&I performers, their power and ability to influence the 
policy decision.  
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From this perspective we will be able to analyse the effective influence actors play in the 
definition of national R&I strategies, as well as to comprehend the underlining rationalities 
for governments-target groups interactions and ultimately the different causal pathways 
leading to policy mix crafting. Therefore, we are interested in both explaining the political 
process that stand behind policy instrument selection, as well as the extent to which alternative 
interactions between ideas, interests and institutions influence the characteristics of the 
instrument mixes. By breaking up this effect, it will be possible to disentangle the political 
dynamics behind the selection and assemblage of different instrument mixes. More broadly, 
this will help us to understand how, given the opportunities and constraints provided by 
different governance characteristics, actors interact for the selection of policy instruments, and 
the extent to which the way this is happening influences resulting policy mixes.  
 
3.2 The perspective on instrument mix evolution 
Given the complex nature of policy design processes, many contributions in this field of 
studies have investigated the extent to which instruments interact with each other, and how, 
ultimately, this can shape public actions. Therefore, introducing concepts such as policy 
con i enc  (e.g. he capaci  of in r men  o reinforce each o her ), and polic  coherence 
(e.g. the capacity of policy goals to achieve synergies and positive connection between 
instrument actions) (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016; Schmidt and Sewerin, 2018). In the same 
vein Howlett and Rayner (2013) theorised different trade-offs associated with instrument 
selection. They talk about a complementary effect, so the extent to which instruments should 
avoid to invoke contradictory responses from target population, a context-dependent degree 
of freedom in the availability of choices and the necessity of a specific goodness of fit related 
with the adequacy of any policy mix alteration. These concepts underline different perceptions 
on policy making strategies, which are ultimately thought to influence the ability to design an 
instrument mix compatible with a specific environment. 
Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that the selection of policy design components reflects 
poli ical and ocial al e , na ional rend  and idea  abo  good  policie  (Schneider and 
Sidney, 2009). Therefore, theoretically, when policy design components are modified, policy 
makers should account for the political and technical synergies among its constituents, in order 
to leverage the possibilities for change provided by the design structures into force. 
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We believe that in the everyday policy design practices, and specifically for the case of R&I 
policy mix, there could be some discrepancies between the intention, and the effective ability, 
to take on purposive instrumental policy designs according to these principles. Therefore, we 
do not want to take for granted the reflexive process by which policy makers take into account 
the principle of coherence and consistency in policy design practices. 
Indeed, instruments are not stable over time, they display a high degree of interpretative 
flexibility, due the stratification of new instruments and changes in the rationale of policy-
makers (Flanagan et al., 2011). They tend to come in a blend, consequently their actual state 
is influenced by the fact that they often come in a mix, and they layer upon layers of existing 
set of tools (Ringeling, 2005). Consequently, it might be quite complicated the exercise of 
clearly differentiating the goals and activities instruments were meant for at the moment of 
their design; to the extent that their action can be influenced by the context of pre-existing 
mixes, their overtime evolution and reinterpretation (Flanagan and Uyarra, 2010; Ringeling, 
2005).  
That is to say that instrument decisions do not take place in a tabula rasa because there are 
contextual, political and ideological constraints that shape the development of specific policy 
mix characteristics. Very few design processes begin de novo and when that was the case it 
reflected situations in which there were no previous history of policies in response to a 
perceived problem (Howlett and Mukherjee, 2014, p. 62). Therefore, new instruments are 
constrained by the existing policy mixes,  and they have to find their place in-between the 
stratification of policy styles preceding their selection (Bre er  and O Toole, 2005; Edler e  
al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 2011; Howlett and Mukherjee, 2014).  
Consequently, we cannot isolate the additionality effect of one instrument package over the 
existent blend, given their likelihood of overtime interactions and instability. Also, because, 
as demonstrated by Capano and colleagues (2019), the mix of instrumental shapes created by 
pecific mi , make  a difference regardle  of he q an i  of he hape  incl ded.  
Therefore, since policy tools refer to the aspect of policy intended to motivate target 
population to comply with a policy, or utilize policy opportunities (Schneider and Ingram, 
1993, p. 338); we believe that the behavioural relationship they establish between decision 
makers and target population can effectively help us to understand their logic of their action.  
 63 
Analysing instrument mixes from the perspective of the behavioural changes required to the 
target population, can help us to explain more accurately their selection process (and related 
ac or  ake ) a  ell a  heir ra ified infl ence on he d namic  of R&I ec or.  
Indeed, tools have heterogeneous substantive requirements of behaviours embedded in their 
action, as well as different mechanisms through which they activate different constraints, or 
opportunities, on recipients. Therefore, since ultimately instruments represent the operational 
dimension of governance arrangements (Capano et al., 2019), by following the evolution of 
these characteristics, we will be able shed light on the internal dynamics shaping the design of 
national R&I strategies. This broader perspective over the evolution of the governance 
arrangements can help us to understand whether, and how, governments have been able to 
learn from previous experiences, and the extent to which feedback effects had a positive or 
negative influence on their decisions.  
 
3.3 Conceptualisation and operationalisation of the dependent variable: 
policy instruments and mixes 
Policy instruments represent different techniques of governance by means of which policy 
makers can connect their ideas and preferences with the formulation of different strategies in 
the effort to achieve their goals. They tend to be combined in specific mixes, in response to 
the complexity of problems they are aimed to solve (Edquist and Borrás, 2013) and to the 
historical stratification of public actions (Howlett and Rayner, 2013).   
Consequently, policy mix represent a complex portfolio of instruments, which combines 
newly selected tools, with instruments already into force, in the effort to fulfil various, and in 
some cases even conflicting, goal (Bre er  and O Toole, 2005; Ho le  and del Rio, 2015; 
Howlett and Rayner, 2007; Martin, 2016). Whereas, policy design can be defined as the 
political, and technical, process throughout which actors select and model policy instruments 
into different mixes (Howlett, Rayner, 2013), to achieve their goals and fulfil their interests.  
The basic unit of thinking for investigating decision-making processes are policy instruments; 
by analysing their constitutive features, it is possible to understand the strategies and the goals 
embedded in public action. Their interaction within mixes is something which takes place over 
time (Edler et al., 2016), that is why a diachronic perspective of analysis is adopted. As 
suggested by the current scholarship (Edquist and Borrás, 2013; Rogge and Reichardt, 2016), 
we believe that some conceptual clarity needs to be provided before digging into the 
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components of policy instrument analysis. Therefore, when we refer to policy design, we mean 
the formulation process that stand behind the creation of different package of instruments; the 
policy mix concept encompasses the overtime process by which instruments emerge and 
interacts, while instrument mix refer to a temporally defined set of tools and their different 
configurations. To use a metaphor, when we refer to policy mix, we imply a longitudinal 
perspective of analysis, while with the term instrument mix we adopt a cross-sectional view, 
and we allude to the temporally defined features of a specific instrument blend.    
 
3.4 Different categories for different purposes  
In the policy instrument literature, we find various conceptualizations for governing tools, 
reflecting different theoretical approaches to the study of their origins and consequences. 
Therefore, identifying a common and shared definition for this concept is a rather difficult 
business, because “there is a lack of coherence in the literature on public policy instrument 
regarding their definitions” (de Bruijn and Hufen, 1998, p. 13). Indeed, as correctly stated by 
Hood (2007), alternative classifications represent “ways of doing different kinds of analysis, 
rather than different ways of doing the same kind of analysis” (p.141). 
Despite the explanatory power embedded in various policy instrument theorizations, an 
overview of the different conceptualisations is helpful to understand the various analytical 
perspectives developed by the existent scholarship so far.   
According o Ved ng (1998), polic  in r men  repre en  a set of techniques by which 
governmental authorities wield their power, while attempting to ensure support and affect 
social changes” (p.3). They represent ends in themselves, to the extent that instruments are 
the content of the political debate because they have the capacity to influence policy making 
process. According to Lascoume and Le Galés (2007) instruments are institutions, because 
they influence the way in which actors behave, driving forwards representations of problems, 
by organizing specific social relations between the state and those they are addressed to. On 
he ame line of ho gh , Salamon (2002) claim  ha  tools significantly structure decision-
making networks, by defining actors that are centrally involved in a particular type of program 
and the formal rules they will play” (p.64).  
Differently, other streams of literature focus on the role of policy instruments as techniques 
and devices governments use to implement policies and achieve their goals (Howlett et al., 
2009; Schneider and Ingram, 1990); as means through which governments attempt to shape 
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the life of its constituents (Hood, 1986) and make use of legitimate coercion (Doern and Phidd, 
1983). 
The various instrument conceptualizations mirror a likewise definition of theoretical 
frameworks to classify and identify the patterns for their applications; there is no best 
classification, but rather different categories for different research purposes. Following on that, 
it is necessary to highlight the heterogeneous meanings that have been conferred to these 
concepts, in order to understand the theories that stand behind their definition and 
classification. The following Table (3.1) summarizes the most relevant developments in policy 
in r men  li era re. The cla ifica ion  en r  refer  o he ariable  differen ia ing heir 
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The classification adopted in this analysis build upon, and attempt to improve, the tripartition of 
Vedung (1998). The selection of this classification is consistent with the framework of analysis 
adopted indeed, it doesn  concei e he a e a  ni ar  ac or, opening ne  en e  for in erpre a ion 
considering a shift towards a governance paradigm and the participation of different actors to the 
policy-making process. Moreover, it differentiates instruments on the basis of the type of connections 
established between governors and governed. Indeed, Vedung (1998) considers the relevance of the 
type of political relationships needed for ool  activation, overcoming the strictly resource-based 
approach of previous categories (Hood, 1986; Hood and Magretts, 2007; Howlett, 2000). Instruments 
are not selected from a toolkit, but they are rather dependent upon the context in which they are 
applied. This can require different extent of political and technical legitimacy from their target 
populations as well as different, and sometimes multiple, governing resources. Moreover, thanks to 
its analytical simplicity, this classification remains the most accepted in the literature and it is 
extensively applied in practical contexts (Salamon, 2002a) 
This double-way relationship between those who exercise the legitimate power for the general 
interest, and the recipients of the measures, embodies the move toward a governance setting. Because, 
the resources needed for governing are not only localised at the governmental level, “simply by virtue 
of being governments” (Hood, 1986, p. 4), but these are rather dependent upon the action and 
acquiescence or support of others, which cannot always be directly controlled (Bressers et al., 1998). 
 
3.5 Climbing down the ladder: from theoretical categories to operational devices 
The multidimensionality inherent in policy tools complicates the task of describing and sorting them. 
Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that the most appropriate tool dimensions useful for 
classification depend upon which outcomes are of particular interest to us (Salamon, 2002, p. 1644) 
leaving enough room for interpretation.  
The operationalization of tool dimensions adopted in this research originates from the classification 
theorized by Vedung (1998). This choice is driven by the desire to focus not only on the influence 
the institutional structure plays on policy design activities, but also account for the role of actors 
involved in the process. Since we believe that the type of instrument selected is dependent upon the 
participation of different private, public or non-for-profits organisations, their preferences and the 
assets they can mobilize. Therefore, the dynamics embedded in the functioning of different 
instruments require to simultaneously account for different phenomena meaning, the dominance of a 
given policy style (Salamon, 2002), the political components embedded in the unfolding of 
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instrument actions (Vedung, 1998) as well as the power affected interest might have in this process 
(Woodside, 1986)16.  
Following on that we can operationalise policy instruments as made up of two components: 
- Authority component: it represents the degree to which governments use their authority in 
order to induce specific behaviour on target population (Capano et al., 2019). Since public 
policy almost always attempts to get people do things that they might not otherwise do; or it 
enable people to do things that they might not have done otherwise (Schneider and Ingram, 
1990, p. 513). 
- Instrument shape component: it provides information on the characteristics of the inducement 
effectively administered to target population. Therefore, it provides information regarding the 
substantive requirements of behaviours embedded in instruments action, which can vary on 
the basis of the degree of coercion they apply on target population to obtain compliance and 
deliver expected outcomes.  
- Delivery component: it represents different types of governing arrangements that accompany 
each instrument, therefore its activation process. Because, in addition to social control, every 
instrument embeds a particular way of exercising it, therefore influencing instrument action 
by privileging some actors and interests over others (Kassim and Le Galès, 2010; Lascoumes 
and Le Gales, 2007). This is closely related with the governance system in which decisions 
are taken and activated, that is dependent upon the acquiescence or support from others.  
 
3.5.1 Authority component  
It represents the common defining feature embedded in any policy instrument and it consists of the 
degree to which governments use their legitimate power in order to steer target population towards 
their intended behaviour. It can vary on the basis of the type of inducement applied for shaping target 
group conduct, and it remains intimately linked to the exercise of public authority.  
The classification of policy instruments theorized by Vedung (1998), represent a solid point of 
departure to fully understand the degree of power embedded in public action. In order to have an 
accurate overview of its heterogeneity, it is useful to order instrument types on a continuum, from the 
most (regulative17) to the least (information) authoritative inducement their embed in their action 
(Figure 3.2).   
 
16 These factors characterise the multidimensionality (Salamon, 2002) embedded in policy instruments. 
17 This conceptualization deviated from the standard English usage of the regulation concepts according to which the 
exercise of authority is backed by negative sanctions (or the threats of thereof). Regulations are often associated with 
threats of negative sanction, but this is not always the case. Moreover, this definition is also in contrast with interpretations 
equating regulation with all forms of governmental interventions. Here regulation is intended as one of the varieties of 




Figure 3. 2 Instrument Families 
 
Regulatory instruments represent formal limitations of certain types of activities backed up by 
formulated rules and directives (Vedung, 1998, p. 31). They require (or forbid) some behaviours to 
target population under the threat of penalties identified by the rules embedded within them18.  
Then, at a medium level, we find expenditure instruments, which ask requirements or behaviours in 
exchange for subsidies (money, time, services or material benefits) they make available. Following 
on the lower authoritative scale we find fiscal measures, which do neither forbid nor require a given 
action, but they simply make costlier/easier to pursue certain behaviours. They do so by affecting the 
cost of alternative courses of action open to recipients.  
An important addition to the classification of Vedung (1998), is the separation between expenditure 
and fiscal measures (which are clustered inside economic instruments by the former). This exercise 
is intended to fully grasp the heterogeneity of behavioural constraints these instruments will put in 
place. Indeed, the relationship of power between decision-makers and target population will be 
different in the case of expenditure-oriented economic tools (where government provides funds to 
certain actors/activities for a given purpose), compared to taxation-oriented economic tools (where 
 
18 Since o r in erpre a ion of in i ion  rela e  o he e plici  norm  and r le  con raining indi id al ac or  choice  
and influencing their behaviour, meaning the set of shared codes and beliefs influencing the rule of the game (North, 
1990; Jhon, 2012; Peters, 2013). The creation of public agency, represent a highly coercive instrument. Indeed, such a 
change drives to the modification of the institutional structure and of the system of power relations among the actors 
involved in a given sector.  
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government rewards or charges certain behaviours of the target population). Therefore, economic and 
taxation instruments can be thought of having a different political economy (Woodside, 1983) 19. 
These typologies vary on the basis of the underlying inducement involved in the governing effort, so 
on the extent to which policy makers can steer target populations towards the intended behaviour.  
Finally, the least authoritative set of instruments are information instruments, which rely on the 
voluntary cooperation of recipients. Indeed, they influence target groups conduct through moral 
suasion, by filling the information gap between actual and potential new behaviours. This variety of 
instruments clearly set out different typologies of authoritative relationships between decision-
makers and recipients of public action.  
 
3.5.2 Instrument shapes 
Each family of tools displays a high degree of heterogeneity regarding the way in which their basic 
inducement is moulded to obtain compliance from the target population; because policy instruments 
containing similar inducement principles can be applied in different ways (Vedung, 1998). Therefore, 
even if instruments can be grouped into families according to the degree to which governments use 
their power, each of them displays a high level of variation in their action content, meaning in the 
different extent of constraints they can enforce (Woodside, 1986). 
Consequently, tools have heterogeneous substantive requirements of behaviours embedded in their 
action, varying on the basis of the degree of coercion they apply on target population to obtain 
compliance and deliver expected results. This is what Salamon (2002) defined as instrument shapes; 
which “should be the basic analytical units to adopt when assessing how policies are made, and 
which governance arrangement actually works in terms of policy performance” (Capano et al., 2019, 
p. 5). Because, in addition to social control, any tool embeds a particular way of exercising it, 
influencing how target population will behave, by privileging some actors and interest over others 
(Kassim and Le Galès, 2010; Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007). An example of the different design 
features embedded in policy instrument shape is the case of loans and grants. Indeed, both shapes fall 
under the family of expenditure instruments, therefore both instruments are used to encourage specific 
activities through the provision of funds, but they differ regarding the degree of coercion applied on 
 
19 These two types of instruments create different typologies of preferences and incentives on the behavioural decisions 
of recipients: “I’ll give you money to do this (expenditure)”; “If you do (don’t do) this I’ll give you money (taxation)”. 
Subsidy involves money that comes to recipients from the government in the form, for instance, a grant (a transaction 
that involves government ownership and control over the money priori to receipt of the grant); whereas fiscal instrument 
involves money that the government has not taken from the recipient, which suggests that the recipient has been, and 
remains, the owners of those funds. A second difference is their visibility. While expenditures will be funded through 
a pa er  con rib ion, he a  e pendi re in ol es foregone revenue. The importance of the visibility is related with 
the fact that the exercise of power entails winners and losers, and thus conflict. Therefore, the extent to which the action 
is easily associated with the government can become an important variable in government decision-making (Woodside, 
1983:175). 
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target population. Due to the expectation of repayment, and possibly the fulfilment of some conditions 
attached to it, loans are more coercive than grants, which basically identify a goal (or a behaviour) 
and simply provide funds for it. This suggests us how policy instruments can be disaggregated into 
relatively small units, and scored according to the behavioural dimension of interest for the analysis 
(Schneider and Ingram, 1990, p. 522) nderlining ho  an  ool i  ac all  a package  of differen  
elements characterizing the various aspects of public action. 
The Figure 3.3 below represents a classification of the most employed instruments in the research 
and innovation sector according to different policy instrument families. This list is the result of the 
analysis of secondary sources20 and it will likely be modified overtime, because the variety of policy 
instruments available to decision makers is limited only by their imagination (Howlett, 2009, p. 114). 
Nevertheless, it represents a satisfactory overview of the different instrument shapes of governing 
action in the Research and Innovation sector.    
 
 





Figure 3. 3 Instrument shapes (by authoritative dimension) 
 
Each instrument type is organised along a continuum from the most to the least authoritative family, 
while the within-shape description is listed by decreasing coercive order, meaning according to the 
extent to which target population is free to choose alternative behaviours. An analytical perspective 
able to consider the combination of different shapes into different instrument mix can provide a more 
accurate assessment on the extent to which the variety of behavioural changes required to target 
population has been differently coordinated.  
 
3.5.3 The delivery component of policy instruments  
This dimension focuses on instrument activation process, reflecting the mechanisms through which 
tools trigger different constraints/opportunities on recipients (Salamon, 2002a). It provides 
information on the different types of governing arrangements which come together with each 
instrument.  
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Polic  de ign proce  doe n  reall  end i h he enac men  of polic  deci ion , b  i  ra her con in e  
along the structure of political relations that instruments unfold in the post-enactment process 
(Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007). This is closely related with the fact that establishing an instrument 
involves a great number of different tasks, and each can attract the interest of various actors and 
connect various specific practices (Simons and Voß, 2018, p. 21).   
Consequently, the extent of automaticity embedded in instruments activation provides insights on 
those actors who have the power to steer their action along the management process; describing the 
parties involved in a particular tool management (Bouwma et al., 2017). 
Low automatic instruments are accompanied in their enactment by the involvement of an 
administrative or organizational structure (e.g. bureaucracy, public agency, local-regional actors) to 
unfold their effects, therefore adding an intermediary actor between decision maker and recipients. 
An example of an instrument with low degree of automaticity is an expenditure instrument, like 
competitive funding for research, through which governments earmark resources for the development 
of basic research programs (e.g. ministerial funding for research). In order to become effective, the 
instrument requires the creation of a system of actors, or organisations, which draft the call for 
funding, collect the requests and analyse them, grant the money to the winner and undergo the 
management (and eventually) evaluation procedures. Consequently, by adopting this type of delivery 
structure, the responsibility for providing the service is shared among multiple public organizational 
entities. 
Whereas, automatic instruments rely on already existent organizational structures, like the market, 
the fiscal system or the private credit system. This type of delivery structure requires a different extent 
of resource investments, since it makes use of already existing structures. An emblematic example of 
this system are tax deductions for investments in R&D provided to enterprises. In this case, the 
recipient can automatically benefit of the measure by deducting tax expenses related with innovative 
investments (e.g. advanced machinery, new skills), directly from their balance sheet.  
The main difference regarding these two delivery structures stand in their visibility and on the 
political burden attached to their effects. Low automatic instruments tend to be highly visible because 
of the bureaucratic machine they put in place for their enactment, consequently they are highly 
exposed to credit-claim and blame avoidance political mechanisms. Differently, automatic structures 
are less visible, inasmuch as the effective enactment of the tool is mainly evident just to the recipient 
and the grantor. Therefore, their effects tend to be less evident to the general audience. 
A cer ain o erlap e i , be een he a oma ici  dimen ion and he direc ne  dimen ion of ool . 
However, not all automatic tools are indirect and no  all indirec  ool  are a oma ic  (Salamon, 2002, 
p. 1663). This similarity is due to the fact that both dimensions focus on the mechanisms through 
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which policy instruments unfold their effects (post-enactment phase). Anyhow, the dimension of 
automaticity provides a fine-grained contribution of various policy style preferences attached to 
instrument activation, on the role of actors engaged in procedures that succeed policy instrument 
formulation, and their power to steer their enactment.  
Figure 3.4 provides a classification of different delivery structures for instrument activation, on a 




Figure 3. 4 Delivery component 
 
At a low degree of automaticity, we find delivery structures relying on the involvement of public 
management resources, existing bureaucracies must be appointed to new tasks, new organisations 
must be created or agreement with decentralised administrative structures have to be set in place.  
Mixed type of delivery systems relies on the cooperation with Research and Innovation performers 
like universities, public research organisations, enterprises, venture capitalists or foundations. Finally, 
instrument with highly automatic delivery system make use of existing management structures, like 
the private credit system (e.g. banks) the fiscal system or the market. In these cases, instruments 
unfold their action by exploiting the consolidated system of relations already into force, requiring a 
reduced amount of public management resources.  
The degree of automaticity is not an exclusive component of policy instrument delivery; indeed, it is 
rather highly context dependent. That is because the same instrument can be more or less automatic 
according to the way in which it has been activated. For example, an economic instrument like loans 
can be either directly provided by governments (low automatic) or by private lenders like banks (high 
automatic).  
Therefore, instruments differ on the basis of the amount of public resources that are necessary for 
their management, comparing structures of control based on already existent self-operating systems, 
to command-and-control techniques which have to be undertaken by public agencies or executive 
bureaucracies (Salamon, 2002).  Their different activation mechanisms, together with the coercive 
nature of various shapes, influence the extent of discretion left to the target population in the 
managemen  of ool  ac i a ion, haping ario  ac or  in erac ion  ha  can ac i a e differen  
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processes of change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Thus, one might hypothesize that just as the choice 
of different policy instruments will reflect the political clientele of the policy, also the way in which 
they are structured and assembled may reflect similar considerations (Woodside, 1986). 
 
3.6 Conceptualisation and operationalisation of the independent variables 
Governing actors have become part of a system where, due to the complexity of problems at stake, 
they are often bounded to share their authority with a plurality of agents to cope with new policy 
problems. Therefore, in order to disentangle the characteristics of actor interactions for instrument 
selection, it has become necessary to understand how the interplay between different institutional 
characteristics, political framings and interest intermediation structures shape policy making 
processes. These features are relevant to the extent that they influence the different characteristics of 
the national governance of R&I, which ultimately affect the available strategies governing actors have 
at their disposal in order to steer the sectors towards their preferred goals.  
The following paragraphs, builds on the literature review of Chapter 2, and bring the theoretically 
relevant concepts for explaining policy instrument selection at the level of empirical analysis. 
 
3.7 Ideas: the role of different Research and Innovation paradigms 
Innovation rarely represents a goal in itself, but rather a means to achieve broader political goals like 
economic growth and competitiveness, increasing employment, environmental protection and 
strategies to tackle social and health challenges (e.g. Grand societal challenges). Consequently, R&I 
objectives become one of the instrumental paths through which national governments attempt to reach 
these wider purposes, by means of meso-level innovation goals. How these objectives have to be 
translated into innovation-intensity targets, and the way in which these interventions should be 
balanced represent a relevant political matter (Edquist and Borrás, 2013). Therefore, policy design is 
a political process exactly because instruments embed different framings concerning individual 
perceptions on a given problem, and possible strategies to tackle it.  
As emerging from the historical overview of R&I policy rationalities (See Chapter 3), the logic behind 
the design of public action in R&I has been driven by a multiple array of motivations. Starting from 
the highly top-down market fixing logic of the WWII period, passing through the first mover 
industrial advantage strategy of the post-war phase, to the systemic perspective of the National 
Innovation System and finally to the instrumentality of R&I for tackling grand societal challenges.  
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These rationalities reflect how policy makers attempt to make-sense of the reality and elaborate 
different policy strategies, on the basis of their perceptions of the problems at stake and their political 
framings on how to handle the interpretation of policy issues.  
On the one hand change is said to come along with, and being supported by actors, their power in 
promoting new framings and the resources they can mobilise (Bouwma et al., 2016; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005). Indeed, the capacity of some governance arrangements to last over a long period of 
time, has been explained as the outcomes of different coalitions of actors able to gather enough 
resources to keep the status quo intact (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). 
On the other hand, the room for manoeuvre actors have to design new policy interventions is 
consistently influenced the by the existent set instrument mixes (and related political dynamics), 
which can constraint, or ease, the likelihood of different scenarios for change. This is closely related 
with the fact that he charac er of in r men al belief  of pre io  polic  in r men  elec ion ill 
con rain  he likelihood and he direc ion of poli ical change  (Hall, 2010, p. 208). Consequently, 
policy instrument selection, and more broadly, the policy-making process, can be thought as being 
linked to the nature of the general governance context and long-term policy styles embedded in a 
given sector. Because previous interpretations of policy problems (framings) influence the following 
decision-making rounds according to either a dominant set of beliefs or the supremacy of a set of 
policy instruments perceived as the best technical or political strategy.  
Indeed, at the individual and organizational level, policy makers work within a set of pre-established 
abstract aims and implementation preferences linked with the dominant governance mode and long-
term policy preferences in the sector (Cashore and Howlett, 2007). Therefore, new policy initiatives 
have to deal with, and are bound to be affected by, long-term legacies emerging from earlier rounds 
of decision-making activities, and the system of power distribution resulting from their consolidation 
over time (Edler et al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 2011; Hall, 2010; Howlett, 2009; Howlett and 
Mukherjee, 2014; Linder and Peters, 1989). These cognitive legacies refer to the historical 
stratification of different institutional aims; which mirror the dominant policy framings characterising 
the evolutions of state preferences for R&I strategies. They can be operationalized along the lines of 





21 As pointed out by Cantner and Pyka (2001), the indirect classification method theorised by Ergas (1987) represents a 
crude insight on the technology policy of a specific country. Anyhow, given the comparative breadth of his classification 
and the richness of details it is able to embrace, it still represents a very useful heuristic tool in order to classify macro-
level policy trends in R&I along different historical and political contexts.   
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Diffusion Oriented paradigm  
It concerns strategies aimed at upgrading knowledge competences among different sectors of R&I 
governance system. The main goal of public intervention is widely defined as of increasing overall 
national economic capacity by concentrating on a series of processes: investments in economic 
infrastructures, technology transfer, cooperative R&D, creation of university and industry links 
(Cantner and Pyka, 2001; Ergas, 1987). Within this style, governments do not display long-term 
preferences for any specific sector of knowledge creation and development, but they rather endow 
heterogeneous sectors approximately for the same extent.  
Research targets are broadly defined, as well as the spectrum of industrial and technological sectors 
involved as possible recipients. Policy decisions tend to be taken in a decentralised manner. Meaning, 
central governmental agencies paly a limited role in implementation, leaving room for a greater 
involvement of actors from the private sector (Ergas, 1987). More broadly, these strategies focus on 
the acquisition, diffusion and assimilation of new technologies in industry, rather than aiming at 
creating brand new sectors (Chiang, 1991). 
 
Mission Oriented paradigm  
Governments have a strong hand in the R&I process, by selecting specific technological sectors, they 
support large industrial efforts and organize research through large public institutions mainly in 
selected sectors (Borr s and Seabrooke, 2015). Policy programs are distinguished by a high degree 
of centralization, together with the central determination of goal and a restricted arena of 
technologically sophisticated agents participating in the execution of programs (Foray et al., 2012). 
Public actors play a central role in the innovation process, in both leading the generation and 
exploitation of radical innovations, and in the creation of entirely new industries (Chiang, 1991). The 
target of intervention is clearly defined and associated with technological objectives and future 
economic applications. In relation to that, it may emerge a tendency toward the concentration of 
investments in large companies, which have at their disposal the necessary infrastructure to develop 
these programmes (Ergas, 1987).  
Finally, a consistent share of publicly funded research is performed in house, meaning within public 
research organisations or laboratories (Cantner and Pyka, 2001) (or through military R&D 
investments Ergas, 1987). 
 
Mission and diffusion-oriented policy styles represent two ideal types for different dominant policy 
framings, providing actors with a particular world view on the appropriateness and consequentiality 
of different policy mixes in the R&I sector (Campbell, 1998; Sanz-Mendez and Borrás, 2001). 
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Therefore, they influence policy design process shaping problem interpretation and the definition of 
strategies to solve them. Indeed, despite policy makers seem to have a large choice concerning which 
policy instrument to select; in reality, they tend to repeatedly choose them from a much more limited 
set of alternatives conditioned by the technical and political legacy of previous interventions (Cashore 
and Howlett, 2007; Howlett, 2009, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). That is why policy design 
doe n  ake place in a vacuum, but rather in a political context where different policy styles do not 
substitute their predecessors, but develop new features, adding to the existing structures of priorities 
(Gassler et al., 2008). 
The design of alternative policy strategies is conditioned by the legacy of previous interventions and 
by the characteristics of the dominant governance arrangement into force. Therefore, long-term state 
and societal preferences can shape the political debate around possible alternative design, hence 
constraining partisan preferences (Jungblut, 2015). 
If we translate these dynamics within the on-the-ground policy making process, where collective 
political actors compete with each other in order to get the legitimate power to govern, it is clear how 
R&I policies can mirror different political priorities22. Specifically, the two main lines of 
differentiation between diffusion and mission-oriented paradigms reflect well established preferences 
on what governments should do, and how they should make it happen. The structural differences 
between these two paradigms, though not as sharp as they may at first appear to be, play a relevant 
role in explaining different patterns of R&I governance trajectories (Ergas, 1987). Consequently, we 
would expect to see different trends in the distribution of government attitudes for R&I policy mix, 
given the different beliefs on the accuracy and effectiveness of instruments associated with different 
dominant paradigms. More specifically: 
 
H1: in countries characterised by a dominant diffusion-oriented paradigm, it will be more 
likely that governments will display preferences for less authoritative and more automatic 
instrument mixes. 
H2: in countries characterised by a dominant mission-oriented paradigm, it will be more 
likely that governments will display preferences more authoritative and less automatic 
instrument mixes. 
 
In repre en a i e democracie  ci i en  opinion and preference  are ppo ed o be ar ic la ed and 
aggregated by parties and other type of political organisations. Consequently, we would expect that 
 
22 Because, ultimately, the objectives of innovation policies have to do with the different national traditions and form of 
state market society relations not to mentioning the ideology of government in office (Edquist and Borrás, 2013, p. 1514). 
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different preferences concerning R&I policy styles could be present in relation to different political 
parties, to the extent that electoral competition can be thought as being about the control over 
resources and their different management.  Following on that we would expect that changes in 
governing parties, those political actors producing legitimate framings, can open windows of 
opportunity to undermine the dominant ideational framing in national R&I strategies. Indeed, as 
argued by Hall (1993), changes in the dominant political framing can come along with a combinations 
of different political aspects, like the position of institutional advantage of some actors, the resources 
they can command  and exogenous factors affecting the power of one set of actors to impose its 
paradigm over others. These conditions likely represent the post electoral moment, when new 
political actors take office and can be able to redirect the dominant R&I policy style towards the 
framings representative of their interests (Capano, 2009; Natali, 2015). 
Indeed, elections represent an institutionalised window of opportunity where new ideas (and policy 
entrepreneur who support them) can find a place into decision-making venues and alter dominant 
policy styles. Policy rationales evolve from a highly path dependent process (Laranja et al., 2008), 
instruments can become bearers of lock-in effects (Capano and Lippi, 2017), and policy makers tend 
to avoid being politically related with past instruments mixes that are not associated with their 
political framings (Voß and Simons, 2014). Different parties in government can find themselves in a 
situation of constrained party preferences (Jungblut, 2015), given that the process of political 
preferences formation is shaped by the legacy past political struggles (Kriesi, 1998, p. 177). 
Consequently, we would expect a trade-off between the willingness of new governing parties to 
modify the dominant policy style into force and the room for manoeuvre they have given the 
characteristics of the instrument mix inherited from previous governments. Therefore, we expected 
that he charac eri ic  of cabine  rno er ill likel  infl ence he e ol ion of go ernmen  
preferences for policy mix features, namely: 
H3: the more similar the political orientations between incoming and outgoing governments, 
the less authoritative will be the diachronic evolution of instrument mix preferences. 
Therefore, by diachronically comparing the evolution of instrument mix preferences for different 
governing party (along the lines of instrument dimensions), it will be possible to map out the 
connec ion be een ac or  par i an po i ion  and polic  in r men  preference  in R&I ec or. We 
expect that in parallel to the change of party in government, and of their policy style preferences, a 
change in the preferences for R&I instrument mix characteristics will likely occur. Ultimately, this 
could help us investigating the counteracting effect of institutionalised window of opportunities 
(cabinet changes) and the persistence of certain policy paradigm characteristics (mission VS diffusion 
oriented), on the evolution of governmental policy mix preferences.   
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3.8 Institutions 
In i ional r c re  infl ence ac or  beha io r o differen  e en . Primarily, by producing 
reg lari ie  on aggrega e beha io r , b  haping ho  ac or  b ild heir e pec a ion  regarding o her  
actions (John, 2012). They manipulate the functioning of agent coordination, according to how 
differently powerful actors are distributed within their structures (Borr s and Edler, 2015; Lepori, 
2011). Ultimately, they mediate individual choices (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) influencing 
information exchange and the strategies various actors are able to pursue (Peters, 2000). Their 
relevance for R&I policies is striking, to the extent that by its inherent nature the sector is 
characterised by policy making responsibilities lying on the remit of different ministerial 
organisations (Edler et al., 2016; Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). It is exactly because of the blurring of 
competences between R&I responsibilities, and the dispersion of power among different 
organisations that in order to understand their operating system it is necessary to take into account 
formal institutions side by side to informal ones. There is often a tendency to think of formal and 
informal institutions as alternatives, but these structures assist one another, and together they 
represent the backbone of the governance arrangement (Borrás, 2009; Peters, 2012). This is because, 
even if formal institutions define the rules of the game (North, 1990), many of the core interactions 
among actors take place informally23.  
Consequently, in order to coordinate their functional responsibilities, policy makers have developed 
different strategies to harmonise competences among the various ministries.  
In the literature we find different conceptualisations of these practices, Braun (2009) call them 
external, and internal, coordination practices, focusing on the type of ministerial coordination 
necessary to guarantee the coherence of public action. Whereas Verhoest and Bouckaert (2005)label 
them as horizontal, or vertical, specialisation strategies, which also recalls strategies to purposefully 
align departmental structures in order to enhance policy capacity.  
Both typologies portrait how differently governments have framed the political priorities to be tackled 
in terms of formal institutional structures and coordination practices necessary to fuel policy making 
process. In the specific case of R&I policies we conceptualised these different ministerial organisation 
structures as follow: 
 
 
23 Consequently, it is necessary to make a distinction, formal institutions refer to the rules and procedures that are created, 
communicated and enforced through channels widely accepted as officials (Helmke, Levitsky, 2004:727). While informal 
institutions are socially shared rules that can be created communicated and enforced by the willingness and the ability of 
powerful or entrepreneurial actors. They represent the decision-making practices led by informal norms, intermediation 




Internal Specialisation Patterns 
Overall competences related with R&I have been centred around one superministry (Braun, 2008b), 
who has acquired all the capabilities and decisional leadership over the entire policy sector. The 
differentiation of responsibilities take place within a unique organizational structure in a vertical 
manner among departments or directorates. Attempts of coordination hinge upon intra-organizational 
bargaining, hence transaction costs between different areas are internalised. Different tasks across the 
policy cycle are split-up among departments within the same organisation and issues of administrative 
coordination, can be tackled in the shadow of ministerial hierarchy.  
 
External Specialisation Patterns 
Policy responsibility are decoupled among functionally homogeneous organisations, and 
specialisation is organised horizontally among peers. Ministers attempt to coordinate externally, by 
means of different type of interdepartmental bargaining (Braun, 2008a). In many national examples 
these have been supplemented by the creation of platform for interministerial dialogue (e.g. the CIPE 
in the Italian case) or common budgeting procedures (e.g. the MIRES in the French case). The most 
relevant drawback of this strategy is related with the fact that normally, decision-making venues that 
do not have their own organizational identity, tend to be an arena for exchanging information 
dependent upon the political will of singular ministers (Braun 2008a); rather than an effective policy-
making laboratory.  
 
In both cases of ministerial specialisations an encompassing R&I policy strategy has been parcelled 
through a differentiation of responsibilities either internally or externally. Despite their different 
shapes, both experience transaction cost problems, related with the need for coordination between 
actors. Indeed, they all require to strike a balance between coordination, in terms of designing an all-
encompassing policy strategy, and specialization, related with the calibration of policy mix according 
to specific contexts.  The success of alternative structures is highly dependent upon the capacity to 
create dialogue among different policy responsibilities; therefore, the formal picture of how things 
work, based on codified procedures and organization of competences among ministers, can tell us 
only part of the dynamics taking place in the governance of R&I. 
Consequently, we can hypothesize that (formal) institutional structures can influence the ability of 
different ministries (or department) to collaborate: 
H4: countries undertaking similar ministerial specialisation strategies (formal institutions) 
will likely adopt similar coordination practices (informal institutions).  
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Indeed, the way through which policy makers foster synergies to enhance the effectiveness of their 
interventions is more flexible, and it is bound to be affected by different internal agreements and 
entrepreneurship of actors. These alternative strategies (informal institutions) influence their internal 
policy ability (Giest, 2016; Lepori, 2011; Trein, 2017). Because, if coordination or dialogue is 
difficult, policy objectives and instruments may not be appropriately designed and implemented; 
consequently, each minister (or department) can decide to design policy to maximize their interest, 
without an overall consensus for a holistic R&I approach (Chung, 2013). Therefore, institutions serve 
as (potentially) integrative structures to add stability to the system, but given the fact that they interact 
with actors, their interests and ideas (Blyth, 2003), they can also trigger unintended effects and they 
might not be fully equipped for different issues. Because, the larger and the more complex 
governmental bureaucracies become; therefore, the higher their level of specialisation, the more likely 
it will be that competitive behaviours would emerge among departments (Chung, 2013). In case of 
high level of organizational fragmentation, it will be more challenging to collectively agree on a 
unique strategy for public action. Consequently, we will expect that institutional fragmentation will 
affect ministerial strategies of action to the extent that it requires a minimum degree of coordination 
in order to avoid tensions between policy making responsibilities. 
 
3.9 Interests 
In policy making activities requiring technical competencies and skills that public decision makers 
cannot provide by themselves, like in the case of knowledge or technological intensive activities (e.g. 
R&I policies), public actors are likely to delegate certain tasks to external agents24. Consequently, 
polic  maker  become omeho  dependen  pon arge  gro p  re o rce  in order o ran la e their 
different framings into practices. This two-way bond reflects the inability of contemporary 
governments to move unilaterally, neglecting preferences and resources of other social actors 
(B e e  a d O T le, 2005; F a e , 2014; Smits et al., 2010). 
Since, policy tools refer to the aspect of policy intended to motivate target population to comply with 
a policy or utilize policy opportunities (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 338); cer ain in r men  
features are necessarily shaped on the basis of target population characteristics. Therefore, despite 
 
24 Private sector business enterprises are dominant players in the field of scientific, engineering and technological 
activities to the extent that they operate a very large proportion of the scientific engineering, technological activities used 
in the economy, and they play a large role in developing human resources engaged in all these activities (Arnold, 
Boekholt, 2003:2). But these can also include public research operators in the field of R&I, like universities, Public 
Research Organisations, Laboratories.  
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he differen  preference  be een deci ion maker  and arge  gro p , a minim m e en  of agreemen  
for the entrusted activities should be found, because target groups have increasingly acquired the 
power to nullify, or alter, the operation of policy instruments (Woodside, 1986). 
This consensus will be grounded on the final characteristics of the instrument mix selected, since the 
extent of competence delegated to third party, reflects the room for manoeuvre left to them in the 
application of public authority (Salamon, 2002b). Therefore, the relationship between governing 
actors, and the performers of R&I activities, revolves around the various type of contracts stipulated 
among the parts; which are subject to the instability of power balance between policy makers and 
target groups (Braun, 1993). To overcome uncertainties, policy makers have developed different 
intermediation strategies to institutionalize conflict, such as the creation of R&I funding 
organisations, which can help the dialogue between policy makers and target groups (Braun, 1993; 
Van der Meulen, 1998b). In many countries, specialized research and innovation agencies are 
appointed to the program management and development of national R&I strategies, with the task to 
translate political guidelines, or thematic priorities, into different practices (Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 
2008). More broadly, the creation of specialised agencies is also a practice related with the 
development of New Public Management (NPM) principles, according to which national 
bureaucracies increasingly rely on external bodies and committees to formulate and implement their 
policies (OECD, 2005). In the specific case of R&I policy, NPM has consistently shaped the forms 
of public action, introducing decentralisation, contract management, privatisations, PPPs and more 
generally the dispersal of power to quasi-state and non-state actors (Borrás, 2009; Flanagan et al., 
2011). 
Within this context, public agencies represent an intermediary actor located in-between different 
societal spheres, with the task to institutionalise social interfaces and to create common contexts for 
action (Hartmann and Kjaer, 2015) These actors can display different organizational characteristics, 
which can be thought to mirror various structures of interest intermediation between policy makers 
and target group. To operationalise the varieties of intermediation strategies we build upon the 
typology of Arnold, Boekholt (Arnold and Boekholt, 2003) in order to provide an improved 





Figure 3. 5 The variety of intermediation strategies 
 
The first typology of agency is the mono-principal agency (Arnold and Boekholt, 2003), which is 
politically bounded to only one governing actor, but it can (potentially) deal with one or multiple 
agents. The second type are multi-principal agencies (Arnold and Boekholt, 2003), they represent 
broader management platforms that can be employed by different ministers for different target 
populations. In this case their organizational structure can be used as a system in order to define 
coordination mechanisms among ministers (multi-principal), while trying build a dialogue with 
different R&I performers. Finally, there are instances in which governing actors do not make use of 
any intermediary actor to stipulate delegation contracts with different target groups. In these cases, 
policy makers interact directly with the universe of performing agents on the basis of their 
responsibilities; and Research and Innovation policies are therefore steered directly by the minister 
(or ministries), under the supervision of the Parliament (OECD, 2014, p. 125). 
The variety of policy management competences devolved to intermediate agency25, will likely 
influence both the relationship among policy makers and with R&I performers. This is closely related 
with the fact that the inclusion of intermediary actors can represents a strategy to externalise and de-
politicise conflict between policy makers and R&I performers, by making use of technical and 
managerial motivations. Nevertheless, the three morphologies of intermediation are not all immune 
to the necessity of internal ministerial coordination. Indeed, in both the second (multi-principal) and 
the third (direct interaction) typologies, the internal policy making fragmentation is simply transposed 
to the relationship with R&I performers. Since ministers play the role of coordinating objectives and 
instruments (Chung, 2013), in case of organizational fragmentation it will be more challenging to 
collectively agree on a unique strategy for public action. Consequently, the more demanding it will 
 
25 These can be research councils, ministerial agencies, technological agencies, depending on the national specificities. 
Despite their different areas of interests, all these actors share the role of intermediary between the principal and the agent.  
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be to concertedly motivate target population to modify their behaviours, given the high likelihood of 
internal incoordination. On the other hand, R&I performers could manage to exploit these deadlocks 
at their favour, in the effort to see their interest represented. Following on that we will expect that: 
H5: the higher level of institutional fragmentation and the higher the capacity of R&I 
performers to behave as a political constituency, the more likely it will be to have an 
instrument mix characterised by low coercive, and more automatic instruments. 
In many national contexts R&I priorities at the governmental level are defined in a very broad way, 
because these are then translated into specific thematic programmes at the level of agencies 
(Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2008). Therefore, public agencies can shape instrument mix characteristics 
both because of their role in the face of state executive and because of their relationship with R&I 
performers. In case of agency controlled by multiple principals, we could expect that the coordination 
problems ministers are facing, will likely influence their capacity to give a consistent mandate to an 
intermediary agency. Similarly, in the case of direct intermediation strategies, since ministers interact 
directly with different R&I performers, we could expect different strategies not to be automatically 
funnelled into a shared framework of action.  
Therefore, in the presence of R&I performers able to collectively mobilize their resources, we could 
expect that their powers to nullify, or alter, the operation of policy instruments could be enhanced by 
the lack of policy-making common framework of action. Consequently, this will likely impact the 
characteristics of the instrument mix, paving the way for more permissive (less coercive shape) 
instruments, together with a grea er R&I performer  po er in he managemen  of heir ac i a ion 
(more automatic delivery structures). 
 
3.10 Conclusions 
The ultimate goal of our research is to understand the political dynamics embedded within policy 
design process, and how the interactions between differently motivated actors within different 
ideational and institutional contexts, could influence policy mix evolution. Given the complexity of 
R&I decision-making processes, we adopted an approach that intersects different insights on the role 
of ideas (as the influence of dominant framings in a given political system); the opportunity structures 
provided by the institutional system (internal coordination and specialisation between bureaucrats) 
and the role of target population (the strategies for interest intermediation). These factors are 
consistently intertwined in the influence they play on alternative policy strategies, because policy 
instrument selection and design into different packages, contrary to how it has been portrayed so far, 
it is not a rational, linear and purely technical exercise. Indeed, it rather represents a muddling through 
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(Lindblom, 1959), an inherently political process involving different actors, interests and constraints 
(Linder and Peters, 1989; Peters, 2000).  
We aim at investigating how different cabinets have differently formulated their R&I decisions, and 
the extent to which different ideas influenced in this process. Moreover, we will explore the extent to 
which decision makers took target group interests into account during the policy design process 
(Skodvin et al., 2010), and how differently powerful actors did manage to exploit institutional 
organisation structures to influence the final shapes of policy mix evolutions.  
From a theoretical perspective, this research aims at improving existing theories on policy instrument 
and it uses hem a  pro ie  for nder anding ac or  preference  for differen  beha io ral 
characteristics of public action. Building upon the contribution of the existent scholarship, we propose 
a more accurate classification of policy instruments, considering both the behavioural and political 





















4 Chapter 4: The research design 
In order to investigate the process of policy instrument selection (and its outcome) in the R&I sector, 
we decided to adopt a country-level unit of analysis.  Indeed, as demonstrated by the comparative 
study of Nelson (1993), there are consistent differences among various systems regarding their set-
up, investments in R&D and performance at the national level. That is because, ultimately, differences 
in R&I systems mirror differences in national economic and political priorities.  
Therefore, since countries differ in terms of their economic specialisation patters, industrial 
specialisations have different requirements with respect to their demand of skills, finance and political 
strategies. Hence, the knowledge infrastructure evolving parallel (and in response) to R&I sector, and 
through interactions with the political system, tend to acquire a distinct national flavour, which is 
likely to be further strengthened by differences in political and institutional structures (Edler and 
Fagerberg, 2017). For all these reasons, it is meaningful to adopt a country-based unit of analysis also 
because most public policies directly affecting the characteristics of R&I policies are designed at the 
national level (Edquist, 2001b). 
On the other hand, as the literature points out (Flanagan et al., 2011; Perry and May, 2007; Tödtling 
and Trippl, 2012, 2005; Ulnicane, 2016), national governments are embedded in a multi-tiered 
governance structure where, in addition to a national perspective also a regional and European one 
should be taken into account.  
The supranational actor has manifested increasing interest for the role that research and innovation 
can play for the economic and social development of its member state. Important pillars of this 
process have been the creation of the European Research Area (Edler et al., 2003), as well as the 
increasing support for horizontal learning among the actors involved in R&I policy design at the EU 
level (Tamtik, 2016; Veugelers, 2012). Nonetheless, despite the relevance of European institutions, 
the real political battle over funding allocation decisions, and strategies, seems to take mainly place 
at the national level. This is closely related with the fact that inside the political space defined by 
internationally accepted models for R&I policies, the overall system concerning national public 
intervention in the economy, together with the specificities of national strategies, defines each  
specific country policy profile (Thèves et al., 2007). Therefore, despite a consistent intensification of 
supranational policy making, there are still evidences that governments remain in the business of 
governing, since the adoption of certain European procedures and policy instruments is considerably 
influenced by the national policy legacy, context and interest (Capano et al., 2012; Héritier and 
Lehmkuhl, 2011).  
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As further developed in the following paragraphs, in order to shed light on the role European actors 
might have effectively played in the national policy design of our two cases, we decided to use 
interviews as a trial test, in order to supplement the information provided by the literature on this 
topic. Indeed, the interview questionnaires included a set of standardized questions (the same for 
differen  pe of ac or  across the two cases) on the role of the European Union, with respect to 
national R&I policy making. The same practice has been adopted in the case of regional level, which 
is nonetheless a variable we took into consideration during the case selection process, given the 
similar devolution path the two case studies have undertaken. Therefore, each interviewee either, 
policy maker or stakeholder or expert, coming from different organisations, has been asked to reply 
the same set of questions on this topic.  
The chapter is organised as follow, we begin with an overview of the research design techniques 
adopted, and their close connection with the dimension of the theoretical framework described in the 
previous chapter. Then, we move to the case selection, data generation and analysis techniques. To 
conclude, we are going to discuss the piloting process for the European and regional issues.  
 
4.1 The research design techniques  
The ultimate goal of our research is to understand the dynamics, actors and processes embedded in 
R&I policy design activities, which are ultimately meant to influence policy mix features. In order to 
put these theoretical insights into practice, it is necessary to consider the different level of analysis 
characterising our factors of interest. Indeed, ideas are said to represent a proxy for a more general 
understanding of the political stakes related with alternative R&I policy mix scenarios, and 
programmatic beliefs about its contents. They refer to the political payoffs related with different 
instrument choices, together with a more general understanding of the overall cabinet attitudes with 
respect to national R&I policy mixes. Differently, institutions and interest, support the interpretation 
of the internal dynamics taking place along the policy instrument selection process both internally, 
regarding the coordination between ministers/department with complementary R&I responsibilities; 
as well as externally, concerning the interactions between policy makers and target population, and 
their capacity to influence this process.  
Consequently, ideas remain at a higher level of abstraction, to the extent that they provide information 
on the various patterns of cabinets attitudes for alternative instrument mixes. Differently, institutions 
and intere  g ide  hro gh he roo  of he poli ical d namic , and ac or  rela ion hip aking place 
along policy design process; hence climbing down the ladder of abstraction to the on-the-ground 





Figure 4. 1 The methodological strategy 
 
Indeed, by analysing different political attitudes of governments (e.g. ideas), we investigated the way 
different cabinets have framed national R&I issue. While, by looking at the interactions between 
different ministerial organisation structures (e.g. institutions), the patterns and the content of 
intermediation practices with target population (e.g. interests), we illustrated the political process that 
led to the calibration of different mixes.  
The choice to place ideas at an upper level of abstraction (compared to interest and institutions), is 
reflected by the adoption of a different set of methodological procedures for data generation and 
analysis. Indeed, as we will discuss in further details in the following paragraphs, the analysis of ideas 
makes use of documents (specifically of budgetary documents) and investigate them through a 
methodological approach inspired by both Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA)  (Schreier, 2012) and 
Thematic Analysis techniques (Boyatzis, 1998). While, institutions and interest stand at a lower level 
of abs rac ion, and he  ere anal ed join l , o he e en  ha  bo h fac or  ere aid o hape ac or  
interactions along design process. Differently from the previous case, the data generation process 
relied on a e  of e per  and akeholder  in er ie , which have been analysed through a second 
codebook inspired by within and cross case qualitative data analysis techniques (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Therefore, in both cases we analysed our data through qualitative data analysis 
procedures, which basically consist of the search for patterns and ideas in the data that help explaining 
why those patterns are there in the first place (Bernard and Ryan, 2010, p. 109). These approaches 
allowed respectively to systematically reduce data, while describing and interpreting the meaning of 
the sources (Schreier, 2012); to explore and compare contents between (and within) cases (Miles and 
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Huberman, 1994). To develop the analysis, we employed the computer-aided software Nvivo12, 
which allowed to systematically analyse and compare our data.  
The distinction between these two levels of analysis allowed first to account for the different 
theoretical relevance of these concepts, while also supporting the triangulation of various sources, 
which helped to balance (and compensate for) the drawbacks related with data collection techniques 
and the specific nature of the sources employed. More specifically, in the case of interviews, 
interviewees may (un)consciously misinterpret a given situation or question, as well as imposing 
current knowledge on recollection of unconnected events in the past. Because, ultimately, interviews 
concerns what people say, and how they say it, as opposed to what people actually do or think (Buse 
et al., 2005, p. 187). In the case of document analysis, thought collecting reliable, and often accurate, 
information on the policy mixes adopted; we might fall in trap of overlooking the dynamics of 
informal interaction (what happens behind the scenes of document drafting), which stand often at the 
core of the policy design process. Consequently, each technique represents a piece of a broader picture 
intended to capture different perspectives of a phenomenon, while trying to validate the findings by 
complementing, and providing additional cover to each other (Dür, 2008). 
These data have been supplemented in their interpretation by relying on the information provided by 
secondary literature on Research and Innovation policies and especially by the ERAWATCH, lately 
called RIO-Co n r , repor . The e doc men  ere earl  prod ced b  he Re earch and 
Innovation observatory of the European commission (JRC-IPTS) to support the mutual learning 
process and the monitoring of Member States' efforts. They provide country-based data on the context 
in which actors operate, assessing the performance of national research system and related policies 
in a structured way; therefore, representing a useful source of information for tracking developments 
in R&I policy mixes, and more broadly changes in the national governance of the sector.  
 
4.2 Case selection 
In order to unfold the dynamics characterizing policy instrument selection process and the casual 
pathways leading to the selection of specific instrument mix characteristics we adopted a comparative 
case study approach. Our unit of analysis was set at the country level and the procedure for case 
selection followed a combination of different logics (Gerring, 2007). 
Since, ultimately, we were interested in understanding both the role of different actors in shaping 
policy instrument selection process, as well as to explore the characteristics of policy mixes according 
to our new theorization; our choice was inspired by both exploratory and estimate strategies (Gerring, 
2016). Therefore, we selected France and Italy, on the basis of the variance they display in the 
theoretical factors of interests (exploratory) (Seawright and Gerring, 2008), and we adopted a 
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longitudinal estimate strategy to intensively investigate the effects of their overtime variation on the 
evolution of policy mix. 
Longitudinal estimate strategies are usually based on a single case study (Gerring, 2016); 
nevertheless, since we were interested in the examination of both the dynamics of policy instrument 
selection (process) and the characteristics of the formulated policy mix (outcome), we decided to 
enrich our analysis with insights coming from the exploratory diverse case study research design. 
This methodology allowed to achieve a high level of variance among our variable of interest (e.g. 
what Patton (Patton, 2002) defined as maximum variation sampling), so that our cases were likely to 
be representative, in the minimal sense, of a broader population (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). 
The diversity in the theoretical factors of interest, allows to consider the combination of possible 
causal pathways leading to specific instrument mix characteristics; so that we could account for 
alternative causes (or combination) of an outcome (Gerring, 2016). Their interaction was investigated 
according to a typological logic (Alexander and Bennett, 2005), which allowed to specify the 
combination between different theoretical factors, and to identify their conjunctive effects 
(underlining causal pathways) on policy instrument selection process; ultimately helping to 
generalize (in a limited way), possible future events of the same type. That is why this type of case 
selection strategy is ultimately said to be both exploratory and confirmatory (Gerring & Cojocaru, 
2016). This combination of techniques was useful to both eliminate the factors which were not 
relevant to explain instrument selection, as well as to estimate the causal pathways leading to 
alternative instrument mix characteristics. Ultimately, we were able to test the validity of our typology 
of policy instrument classification, and its capacity to contribute to a more fine-grained understanding 
of the reasons behind their selection.   
Our two cases display a high degree of variations in the characteristic of our theoretical factors of 
interests. With respect to the ideal types of R&I ideational paradigms, France consistently overlaps 
with the mission-oriented type. Indeed, it is historically characterized by a tradition of industrial 
Grand Programmes, where governments use to have the primacy in the selection, and support, of 
specific technological sectors. Differently, the Italian case displays many similarities with the 
diffusion-oriented ideal type. Therefore, different governments did not show long-term preferences 
for any specific sector of knowledge creation and development, but they rather endowed 
heterogeneous sectors approximately for the same extent. Consequently, research targets were rather 
broadly defined, as well as the industrial and technological sectors involved. Figure 4.2 and 4.3 below, 
 92 
briefly summarises the extent to which these ideal types have effectively influenced Government 
Budget allocation choices26.  
 
Figure 4. 2 GBARD by sector of performance France 
    
 
Figure 4. 3 GBARD by sector of performance Italy 
 
 
26 The Figures (4.4 and 4.3) above summarize GBARD national statistics, which refers to Government Budget Allocation 
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The colours of each column refer to the different sectors of investments, as a percentage of the total 
yearly national R&D investments. In the French case it is possible to identify a specific periodization 
in investments decisions, both in terms of share of total budget allocation per year as well as in terms 
of overtime consistency across sectors (especially for defence, environment space and earth 
exploration). These features mirror some of the constitutive components of the Mission oriented type 
(Berger, 2016), characterized by the choice to invest in specific technological sectors associated with 
national objectives and strategies for economic development. In these cases, policy makers were able 
to provide a vision, a specific framing of R&I objectives, and to mobilize actors. 
In the Italian case the annual share of investments is much more heterogeneous and, despite some 
cases (space and Industrial production), it displays a high degree of variation both over time and 
across sectors. This closely mirror the characteristics of the diffusion-oriented ideal type (Gallo and 
Silva, 2006; Sirilli, 2010), where governments do not display long-term preferences for any specific 
sector of knowledge creation and development, but they rather endow heterogeneous sectors 
approximately for the same extent. As Figure 4.2 and 4.3 suggest, the mission and diffusion oriented 
ideal types represent a proxy for the attitude of different countries to develop specific strategic choices 
in terms of R&I investments. It reflects both the national political priorities (how different political 
preferences have been translated into R&I issues) as well as the different ability to design long-term 
national policy strategies.   
Another theoretically relevant difference between our two cases refer to the strategies they selected 
for their interest intermediation practices. 
In the French case it was well widespread the strategy of relying on different type of public agencies, 
like the national research agency (ANR) for the financing of public research, or the OSEO agency for 
the support of industrial innovation projects. The move towards public agency took place during the 
time period under investigation, therefore making even more relevant the within country comparison 
before  and af er  he e e en  (Gerring, 2016), as well as the cross-country comparison with and 
highly comparable case that decided to pursue a different strategy. The Italian case was mainly 
characterised by direct intermediation practices, usually between each minister and their related 
constituencies. As extensively discussed in the following chapters, this case has had some short-term 
experiences with public agency, but these actors had a short life, and a minor role in the intermediation 
with interests in comparison with the responsibilities left in the hand ministries.  
Differently, in the case of ministerial organisation structures France and Italy share some (formal) 
similarity in their institutional specialization patterns. In either case, R&I policies competences lie 
under the remit of the minister for Higher Education and Research, and the minister with economic 
competences (called Minister of Economic Development in the Italian case, and Minister of Economy 
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and Finance in the French case). Since ministerial organisation is not strictly determined by law, for 
the most part different institutional structures tell us how national governments had differently think 
about policy problems and alternative strategy to tackle them (Peters, 1998).  
Given that at the moment of case selection the characteristics of the national policy mix were not 
known, this similarity represented a good proxy for some extent of congruity between the two cases, 
therefore supporting a solid baseline for their comparison27. Moreover, the similarities in formal 
in i ional r c re  didn  pre cribe an  pecific pa ern of in erac ion be een mini rie , hich 
was rather the dynamic of interest investigated during the analysis. Actually, these were similarities 
in the so-called formal institution al structures (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004), therefore they 
represented just one side of the coin. Whereas, the informal ones, those related with consolidated 
practices of interactions between actors needed to be discovered during the analysis, therefore it 
seemed pointless to equate their theoretical contribution in explaining internal policy making 
interactions.  For what concerns the characteristics of our outcome of interest, policy mix, these have 
been defined in parallel with the case study analysis. Because, official database or document typically 
do not capture policy mix characteristics, their operationalization required first hand data collection 
and interpretation (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). This analysis provided also to be a necessary exercise 
in order to test the validity of the innovative instrument classification typologies proposed by our 
research.   
When we select country as unit of analysis for case study investigation, we have to be aware that their 
history, culture and society, all come together with the theoretical factors we are interested in; 
consequently, there might be multiple sources of extraneous variance (B. Guy Peters, 1998).  
Since we were interested in the role that ideas, interest, institutions (and the combination of thereof), 
play in shaping the politics of policy instrument selection, during the selection for our cases we 
accounted for the similarity of some background conditions, in order to avoid their interference on 
the activities of our theoretically relevant factors. 
Overall, France and Italy have similar national economic size, they are respectively the second and 
third largest European economies in terms of contribution to the European Gross Domestic Product, 
right after Germany28. They display similar patterns of competence distribution among actors, namely 
a context where specialized research and funding are (mainly) kept as central competences, while 
competences in lover level of education, cluster policies and technology transfer (and related 
incubation activities) tend to be devolved at the regional level. Moreover, they both share the 
 
27 To the extent that, differently to outcome (Gerring, 2016) or extreme case studies (Seawrtight, Gerring, 2008), diverse 
case studies do not have to display extreme values on the outcome of interest, which in our case was not known in advance.  
28https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20180511-1?inheritRedirect=true (last access, 
September 2019); http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do (last access, September 2019). 
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professor privilege (Lissoni and Montobbio, 2015) in patent regulation legislation, granting the 
titularity of invention to researchers. They have very similar administrative traditions, to the extent 
that the Italian administrative system is, in many respects, one of the most Napoleonic outside France 
(Spence, 2014, p. 104). Both countries face private under investments in R&D, and public 
contributions occupies he lion  hare of he Gro  Dome ic E pendi re  in hi  ec or.    
Ultimately France and Italy, despite being two diverse case, display sufficient similarities that allow 
to hold constant some of the factors that are not theoretically relevant to explain the process of policy 
instrument selection, but which can nonetheless influence its dynamics. From the perspective of R&I 
policies, France and Italy are two apparently similar and binary systems nevertheless, within this 
similarity, there are also very different approaches characterizing national policy making dynamics. 
Contrasting these different characteristics is useful in order to explore issues around the politics of 
policy instrument selection and more broadly alternative causal pathways that led to the selection of 
specific policy mix characteristics.  
 
4.2.1 The Case study analysis (time) 
Since observations from case studies are constructed diachronically (by observing case through time) 
(Gerring, 2009), evidences about historical sequences (Rueschemeyer and Stephens., 1997) are 
needed o a  o e plore he infl ence ha  differen  pa ern  of ac or  in erac ion migh  ha e had on 
policy design processes, and on the resulting policy mix characteristics.  
By adopting a periodization strategy, within and across country, on the basis of different cabinet 
periods, we have been able to assess the overtime impact that changes in key explanatory variables 
might have had on the selection of different policy instrument characteristics, and resulting policy 
mixes.  
Analysing time according to shifts in cabinet organisation was meaningful to the extent that it 
provided a useful proxy for the likely variations in the drivers expected to influence policy instrument 
selection process. As extensively discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, the theoretically relevant concepts for 
explaining policy instrument selection, are bound to be affected by variations the power balance 
within the executive. Indeed, the institutional variable (coordination of R&I competences in the 
executive), represent different ways to interpret R&I policy strategies. Therefore, since ministerial 
organisation patterns are not strictly determined by law, for the most part they represent a political 
choice based on governmental priorities and strategies. In the same vein, the dominant policy styles, 
can be thought as driven by different ideas, which can therefore vary on the basis of different party 
government. Similarly, the type of interest intermediation patterns, the shape and the missions of 
different intermediary agencies, can vary according to different executives.  
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Moreover, the focus on the shift of government composition is closely related with the political 
perspective adopted throughout the research, which cannot hence overlook the influence of changes 
in cabinet composition. Because, ultimately these actors are those who primarily detain the power 
and legitimacy to steer the direction of policy strategies. Consequently, we adopted a time-frame for 
the analysis starting in 1998, a year in which both countries experienced a consistent reorganisation 
of the national R&I structures, and we followed their evolution until 201029. The total number of 
years under investigation is line with the appropriate time framework for examining policy change 
identified by the literature (Sabatier, 1986), and it is able to take over many of the constitutive 
elements that have shaped national R&I policy mix.  
 
4.3 Macro-level: ideas 
In order to investigate how political orientations of different cabinets influenced the formulation of 
national R&I policy strategies; more broadly, the role that different ideas had in R&I policy 
instrument selection, we relied on the analysis of national budgetary documents. Because documents 
are not only produced, but they are also productive (Prior, 2003, p. 84); therefore, they are social 
facts, which are created, shared, and used in socially organised ways (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997, p. 
47). These records provided information on the contingent R&I preferences across different cabinet 
periods, to the extent that they accounted for the characteristics of the political and historical moments 
in which they have been drafted. Indeed, they provide data on the context in which actors operate, 
they represent means for tracking changes and developments in R&I policy mixes. Moreover, they 
represent an effective source for gathering data when events cannot longer be observed (Bowen, 
2009); their analysis is instrumental to sharpen ideas, conceptual boundaries and to clarify the 
relevance of categories (Charmaz, 2003). Indeed, various policy problem framings, can be 
extrapolated by the document itself, to the extent that they can make clarity on policy making 
perspectives (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2013). 
For the French case we analysed the annexes jaunes ( ello  appendi ), he e doc men s 
accompany the yearly budget law, they include a report on the state of the art, and on the budgetary 
resources, devoted to a specific policy sector, in our specific case Research and Innovation.  
 
29 Actually, the Italian case focuses on a slightly longer period, namely until 2012. This choice was related with the fact 
that we decided to include in the analysis the Monti cabinet period. This executive represents a case of so-called Cabine  
of E per  and i  ook he lead in a period in which Italy was caught in the financial storm due to the worsening of the 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Consequently, we believe that, given the specificity of this cabinet, as well as the political, 
economic and historical context in which it came to power, it was worth to analyse R&I policy design through a period 
of severe budgetary constraints.  
 
 97 
While, for the Italian case, we analysed the Economic and Financial Planning Document (Documento 
Programmatico di Economia e Finanza -DPEF-), which outlines, in a medium-long term perspective 
the policy commitments of each governments (also the National Research Program, when present, 
was drafted according to the guidelines included in this document). For both countries these 
documents are drafted by the government and presented to the Parliament; therefore, by interpreting 
government as a unitary actor (Bäck et al., 2017), they provided highly comparable information 
necessary to trace the general pattern of cabinet orientations. The selection of similar typologies of 
documents among France and Italy, allowed for a high degree of comparability of the information. 
Indeed, due to the yearly-based institutional nature of these reports it has been possible to control for 
eventual biases, while maintaining a high degree of scope-similarity among the sources.  
Therefore, by analysing these documents it was possible to reconstruct the architecture of different 
R&I political orientations from the perspective of decision-makers (Giest, 2016). The different 
cabine  poli ical orien a ion  for differen  polic  in r men  componen , ha e been ed a  a pro  
to trace their preferred strategy for action in the R&I sector.  
This allowed to locate different national governments within a common space for analysis, and to 
compare their policy mixes attitudes over time and across countries.  
The total number of sources analysed was equal to N= 32 and equally distributed among the two 
cases. Nonetheless, because of national political specificities, and contingent events (which are far 
behind our will and possibility of action) it was not possible to analyse the same number of sources 
for each cabinet periods. Consequently, the results of our analysis (as discussed in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 8) have been weighted according to the number of sources analysed, to maintain a high 
degree of comparability between the different periods, and across the two cases.  
In order to interpret our data, we adopted a methodological approach inspired by Qualitative Content 
Analysis (QCA) (Schreier, 2012) and Thematic Analysis (Boyatzis, 1998) techniques, and we ran the 
analysis through the support of Nvivo 12 software. The QCA methodology was useful to 
systematically reduce data and describe the meaning of categories, through the latent examination of 
their contents (Schreier, 2012). Similarly, thematic analysis drove us across the interpretation of the 
patterns in the data, and supported our analysis on the occurrences and frequency of information; 
while maintaining a systematicity in coding procedures (Boyatzis, 1998).  
Accordingly, we developed a codebook closely related with the dimensions characterizing the 
phenomenon we are looking at (policy mix), following a concept-driven strategy. This was drafted 
on the basis of the theoretical categories applied to describe different instruments dimensions, namely 
authority and automaticity. Each dimension has been assigned to a specific node, for example the 
family of regulation instrument was a node, the family of information instrument another node and 
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so forth, according to the characteristics of each category30. This choice was related with the fact that 
we aimed at investigating the variation in cabinet preferences for the principle of inducement 
contained in different mixes. Moreover, these documents, did not often provide a description for all 
in r men  componen , b  he  impl  pro ided informa ion regarding he l ima e goal of p blic 
action. 
Overall, the analysis was developed by coding different portions of text to meaningful concepts of 
our codebook (nodes), which recalled the main themes of analytical interest for the research.  
Such procedure might have been subject to consistency issues, related with the interpretation of 
specific information and their inclusion within different categories. Consequently, after the coding 
process, we run a reliability test in order to assess the consistency of our data analysis exercise. Even 
though the coding procedure was autonomously developed by one researcher, and not by a group, it 
was still possible to assess the solidity of our procedure by using a coding comparison query. An 
indicator for coding consistency is the K-coefficient, a statistical measure which takes into account 
the amount of agreement that could be expected to occur by chance among different coding (or 
coders) choices, it varies between total agreement (1) and total disagreement (0)31.  
Following the methodological suggestions of the current literature (Schreier, 2012), after 60 days 
from the end of the coding procedures, we went through a second coding exercise in a representative 
sample of our data32 and we run the coding comparison query in order to assess the reliability of the 
second round of coding and compare the results with the first round. We first assessed the coding 
reliability using as unit of analysis the paragraphs coded, this provided a K coefficient of 0,86 for 
unweighted values and 0,91 for weighted; while in the case of sentence-base reliability the scores of 
the K coefficient were respectively of 0,86 and 0,9133. Consequently, after assessing the high degree 
of coding reliability, we carried on our analysis looking for patterns among nodes, in order to shed 
light on the different instances of political orientation along different cabinet periods.  
 
 
30 In he ca e of a oma ici , gi en i  aria ion in erm  of degree , he differen  ca egorie  ha e been crea ed b  
grouping dimensions on the basis of the extent of policy-maker  in ol emen  in in r men  managemen , a  di c ed 
in Chapter 3. 
31 http://help-nv11mac.qsrinternational.com/desktop/procedures/run_a_coding_comparison_query.htm (last access 
October, 2019). 
32 The literature provides that the subsample should be at least 10% of the total sample. In our case, out of the total 36 
sources we identified a subsample of 8 sources, four for each of our country, which were representative of more than the 
20% of the total sample 
33 In the case of unweighted values sources were treated equally, regardless of their size, during the calculation; while for 
weighted values source size was taken into account when calculating the overall results for each node.  
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4.4 Micro-level: institutions and interests 
As discussed in earlier paragraphs it is necessary to account for the fact that documents are highly 
context-specific, therefore they have to be integrated with other sources (Bowen, 2009).  Moreover, 
contrary to the case of ideas, institutions and interest support our interpretation on the dynamics taking 
place during policy instrument selection process both internally (coordination between 
ministers/departments with complementary R&I responsibilities) and externally (interactions 
between policy makers and target population); and their capacity to influence the resulting instrument 
mi  charac eri ic . Therefore, be ide  being a  a lo er le el of heore ical ab rac ion , he  al o 
rely on different data in order to assist our interpretation, namely semi-structured interviews. 
Thro gho  he re earch e ha e adop ed bo h e per  and hen akeholder  in er ie , i h he 
theoretical and empirical purpose of differentiating the role and the information gathered from the 
two groups of actors. 
Although some of the questions included in the interview questionnaires were kept constants (so as 
o nder and differen  ac or  preference  on he ame issues), many of them have been differentiated 
according to the role played by the interviewee within the national R&I governance.  
The ampling echniq e didn  adhere o q an i a i e concep ion  of repre en a i ene  (Bogner et 
al., 2009, p. 103). Hence, we defined our sample by adopting insights from two different approaches, 
criterion based (or purposive sampling) and theoretical sampling techniques (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003). Our ultimate goal was to keep the sample as heterogeneous as possible in order to include all 
the main organisations involved in the national R&I governance. Therefore, following a theoretical 
sampling procedure, we selected actors on the basis of their characteristics and roles in the policy 
proce  o a  o con rol for he rele ance of each in er ie ee  profile and e perience according o 
the potential contributions these could provide to our analysis.  Moreover, this technique provided 
ample room for manoeuvre during the analysis, allowing for (when needed) an iterative process 
between sample selection, fieldwork and analysis (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). As for the selection of 
experts, we relied on the information gathered from their CVs and from the relevance their 
personalities might have in the national public sphere on this topic (such as highly ranked scientists, 
coverage in the media, participation in conferences or seminars, both popular and scientific, 
concerning R&I themes). 
Then, we enlarged our sample on the basis of snowball techniques, according to which the researcher 
asks people who have already been interviewed to identify other people they know who fit the 
selection criteria (Longhurst, 2003; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). This technique allowed to both account 
for selection criteria related with the perceptions of knowledgeable observers (our experts), which is 
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defined in the literature as reputational methods (Knoke, 1993), as well as to get first hand contacts 
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Therefore, out of our total sample of 22 interviewees we maintained a high degree of comparability 
both within case (in terms of coverages of the organisations involved in national R&I sector) as well 
as across case, to the extent that many interviewees played the same roles within their own national 
contexts. 
For the sake of conceptual clarity, we defined experts as those individuals who possess the necessary 
knowledge to structure collective problems, and/or to find the most appropriate alternatives to solve 
them (Dente, 2014, p. 50). The most relevant characteristic these individuals must fulfil, is not having 
been directly involved in the policy-making process as representatives of political interests. 
Therefore, experts were researchers, or scientists, who worked in academia or public research 
organisations and possess an education title or consolidated experience in a specific field (Rimk  
and Haverland, 2015). By gathering information from individuals with any direct stakes in the 
process, but with the necessary knowledge to understand its dynamics, we were able to have a first 
understanding of how R&I issues were structured within different national contexts, and the specific 
open q e ion . Differen l , in he ca e of akeholder in er ie , he goal was exactly to interviews 
those actors involved in the policy making process, to investigate the cognitive perceptions and values 
shaping their action. We decided to interview one actor per each organisation involved in the national 
R&I governance, as a proxy to understand its strategy during the period under investigation.  
Therefore, in the trade-off between accuracy and representativeness, we decided to opt for the value 
added that a greater diversity in the sample could provide to the analysis. We interpreted the 
information gathered from interviewees as a proxy for the perspective of their organisation of 
affiliation, and we integrated this information with secondary literature, in order to reconstruct the 
details of different processes.  
Expert and stakeholder interviews were analysed through a methodological approach to qualitative 
data analysis inspired by within and cross-case techniques (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Starting with the within case analysis, we were able to understand how the contents of interviews 
ppor ed o r e pec a ion  regarding he a  in hich ac or  in erac ions influenced policy making 
process. Basically, through the support of a software (Nvivo 12) portions of data were assigned to a 
specific set of concepts (codebook) in order to interpret and organize the information gathered on the 
patterns characterising actors, their interactions and their relevance in influencing policy instrument 
selection. The analysis of interviews transcripts allowed to explore the information provided by 
different interviewees and to reconstruct policy instrument adoption from differen  ac or  
perspectives. Then, with the cross-case approach, we were able to go through an in-depth 
investigation of the similarities and differences (in terms of information coded) across our two cases 
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so to understand the extent to which our theoretical expectations were supported by the evidence 
gathered (Burns, 2010; Chmiliar, 2010; Mathison, 2005; Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
In order assure consistency between the data gathered through interviews, and the framework of 
analysis, the codebook reflected both the content of the interview protocol and the research questions 
driving our investigations. Consequently, we adopted codes of the pattern coding type (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994), because we aimed at directly matching portion of our interview transcripts to our 
research questions. 
 
4.5 A multi-tiered governance structure: piloting process from experts  
interview on regional and European influence.  
Despite the intensification of supranational policy making, there are still evidences that governments 
remain in the business of governing, since the adoption of certain European procedures and policy 
instruments is considerably influenced by national policy legacy, context and interest (Capano et al., 
2012; Capano and Piattoni, 2011; Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2011). The case of R&I policy represents 
a peculiar example because this policy sector has been included within the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) strategy since its quite early stage of development. By its very nature, the OMC 
represented a non-legally binding set of recommendations and guidelines, which attempted to find a 
balance between Members states decision-making a onom  and a cen rall  impo ed one i e fi  
all  E ropean polic  (Buchs, 2007; Pochet and Porte, 2002). It worked through coordinated 
agreements among representatives of member state on benchmarks and indicators to measure best 
practices, then each member state had to transposes these guidelines into national and regional 
policies.  
Issues related with research and innovation were included in European Public documents form the 
early 1990s, with the Green Paper on Innovation and the First Action Plan for innovation in Europe 
(Seravalli, 2009). With the adoption, by the European Council, of the Lisbon strategy in 2000, there 
has been a clear focus on developing a knowledge-based economy in Europe through investments, 
especially in research and innovation. This led to both the introduction of a stronger focus on R&I by 
the objectives of the European Structural Funds in support for regional policies, and to a clear linkage 
of research policy to innovation, acquiring an undisputed place as a core element for national 
competitiveness (Reillon, 2015). 
Furthermore, also European regulations have changed accordingly, in order to ease the diffusion of 
innovation-oriented policy among Member States. For example, the reform of clauses granting 
exemptions on competition policy regulation concerning R&D agreements. Indeed, with the new 
rules of 2000, the EU is said to have moved away from legalising approach to competition law, toward 
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an economic approach based on analysis of market impact of these type of agreements and the 
potential market dominance of large R&D alliances (Borrás, 2009, p. 6). With the modification of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, research policy 
was transformed from a supportive to a shared competence, enabling the EU to adopt binding acts in 
this policy sector (Reillon, 2015, p. 2). Furthermore, the following European strategy for growth (EU 
2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth), presented in March 2010 further increased 
the relevance of research and innovation in supranational policies. In parallel with the increasing 
awareness on the relevance of localised opportunities for innovation development, and following on 
from the Lisbon agenda, European Programmes started to support regional development through the 
promotion of innovation-related interventions  (Prange, 2008). One empirical example of this process 
has been the increase in the share of funds allocated to innovation-related activities in cohesion 
policies (Seravalli, 2009); or in the framework of the new regulation on European Regional 
Development Funds (ERDF)34. This required that  between 50-80% of the funds have to be dedicated 
to, at least, two of the following objectives, namely: strengthening research, technological 
development and innovation; enhancing access to ICT; competitiveness of SMEs, of the agricultural 
sector and the fishery/aquaculture sector; supporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy in all 
sectors (Reillon, 2015).  
Therefore, it seems that national government could take advantage and leverage European 
instruments to design R&I policy in their own national context weighing out potentially negative 
factors (Prange, 2008). According to some scholars (Seravalli, 2009), regional innovation policy can 
represent a partial revision of the classical European cohesion policies and the usual top-down 
redistributive practices, toward a more horizontal-oriented approach. Nonetheless, we have to keep 
in mind that, despite the role European Union could play in pushing toward regionalisation in some 
policy areas regional initiatives are to a large extent related to intra national framing of problems 
(Olsson and Åström, 2003). 
Consequently, European institutions play a role in the framing of European Research and Innovation 
strategies, as well as in identifying the objectives related with specific structural funds.  
On the other hand, also national governments take part in European decision-making process; 
therefore, theoretically they could be able to influence the framing of different objectives. 
Consequently, given the interplay between national and supranational policy making capacity in 
shaping national R&I policy objectives we decided to run a piloting exercise during our interviews 
in order to understand the perceptions across our two cases. This consistent of including a set of 
 
34 Regulation EU No 1301/2013 of the European Parliament and the European Council 17/12/2013.  
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similar questions regarding the influence that European Research and Innovation policy making is 
able to play in national policy design practices.   
According to the results of our interviews, the major European constraints national policy makers are 
facing in designing their policies are related with state aid regulation, which is perceived as reducing 
their room for manoeuvre to directly intervene in the industrial sector (INTERVIEWEE 8, 
INTERVIEWEE 5, INTERVIEWEE 12, INTERVIEWEE 21). It clearly emerges an inclination to 
emulate some successful European experiences at national level, like the European Research Council, 
while trying to transpose some of their principles at the national level (INTERVIEWEE 2, 
INTERVIEWEE 13, INTERVIEWEE 15, INTERVIEWEE 14; INTERVIEWEE 3; INTERVIEWEE 
12). 
There is also a widespread agreement concerning the active role that national policy makers play in 
the definition of the European R&I agenda (INTERVIEWEE 7, INTERVIEWEE 10, 
INTERVIEWEE 2). Moreover, these objectives tend to be broadly framed, leaving enough room for 
manoeuvre in identifying national goals (INTERVIEWEE 22, INTERVIEWEE 11, INTERVIEWEE 
2, INTERVIEWEE 18) 
In addition to the European perspective also a regional one needs to be considered, because of the 
increasing evidence that the governance of innovation policies has been more and more oriented 
toward a multilevel governance dimension (Flanagan et al., 2011; Perry and May, 2007; Tödtling and 
Trippl, 2012, 2005). In both co n rie  regions have frequently complemented government measures, 
particularly in the framework of State-region contracts, competitiveness clusters, academic research, 
and industrial and commercial activities. For our cases the involvement of regional and local 
authorities has sometimes increased the complexity of national policy strategy, triggering 
administrative confusion, and the layering of similar instruments across different territorial levels 
(INTERVIEWEE 14, INTERVIEWEE 10). Regional governments are perceived as a complementary 
funder of national R&I interventions (INTERVIEWEE 16), as well as the best administrative level 
to implement specific national policies (INTERVIEWEE 17, INTERVIEWEE 5, INTERVIEWEE 
2).  
In both the cases of regional and European relevance for national policy design, our interview piloting 
process suggest how, despite the importance of these dimensions, they do not seem to heavily 
interfere in national instrument design practices. This is because R&I tend to be a sector which could 
heavily contribute to country economic growth; therefore, the scale of interventions is often kept at 
national level (Tamtik, 2016). The interaction and networks between actors are shaped by national 
institutions; and national governments play a central role in their establishment (Chung, 2013, p. 
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1053). That is the reason why, ultimately, a country-based level of analysis is the most suitable to 
understand the underling dynamics of policy instruments selection. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
Our research design relies on a combination of different sources (budgetary documents, experts and 
stakeholder  in er ie ) and anal ical echniq e . Each of hem repre en  a piece of a border 
picture intended to capture different perspectives on policy instrument selection process, while trying 
to validate the findings by complementing our data. The analysis of these sources followed a 
methodological approach inspired by both Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) (Schreier, 2012) and 
Thematic Analysis (Boyatzis, 1998) in the case of budgetary document; while within and cross case 
techniques (Miles and Huberman, 1994) for interviews.  
These approaches allowed respectively to reduce data, while describing and interpreting the meaning 
of the sources (Schreier, 2012); and to explore and compare contents between (and within) cases 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). To develop the analysis, we employed computer-aided software 
Nvivo12, which allowed to systematically analyse and compare our data.  
Since, ultimately, we were interested in understanding both the role of different actors in shaping 
policy instrument selection process, as well as to explore the characteristics of policy mixes according 
to our new theorization; our choice was inspired by both exploratory and estimate case selection 
strategies (Gerring, 2016). Therefore, we selected France and Italy, on the basis of the variance they 
display in the theoretical factors of interests (exploratory) (Seawright and Gerring, 2008), and we 
adopted a longitudinal estimate strategy to intensively investigate the effects of their possible 
overtime variation on the evolution of policy mix.  
The decision to focus our analysis at the country level was also supported by the results of a piloting 
procedure through which we asked our interviewees their perceptions on national and regional 
influence on policy making.  
In the next chapters, which dig into the dynamics of our two cases, we are going to put into practice 
our design and to test its validity as useful heuristic to understand the politics of policy instrument 








5 Chapter 5: The French Case study 
 
Today French R&I policy is organised according to different national plans (the national research and 
innovation strategy SNRI, launched in 2009 and replaced by the SNR in 2014), the Investment for 
he f re plan and he ne  ind rial France  plan implemen ed nder he Hollande pre idenc  
(OECD, 2014).  These strategies are the result of a long transition process which began in in the late 
1990s. In the present chapter we will diachronically review all the most relevant public interventions 
that have been shaping the national R&I strategy. This context is historically characterised by a 
radi ion of large ind rial programme . S ar ing from he beginning of 2000  here ha  been a 
great increase in the support for companies working in the field of ICT, and the development of 
technological research networks on a regional basis (European Commission, 2002a), which 
culminated somehow with the competitive cluster policy in 2004.  
After the creation of the ANR in 2005, public research has been moving towards more competitive 
oriented project funding systems for public research; which was matched with an increased autonomy 
of universities in 2007.  
In the following paragraphs we will go through the most important policy initiatives that have shaped 
the French R&I system from the late 1990s until the 2013 (approximately). 
As displayed in Figure 5.1, we will dig into the process that stand behind the mandate given to Henri 
Guillaume for drafting the report, which than shaped public interventions in R&I with the adoption 
of 1999 Law on innovation and research and the 2003 Innovation plan. 
Then we will investigate the fragmented landscape of measures in support of SMEs, the adoption of 
the Competitive cluster strategy (2004) and the parallel developments in the Research sector, with 
the adoption of the 2006 research act and the creation of the OSEO and ANR public agencies. 
Finally, we will briefly touch upon the 2007 Law on the liberties and responsibilities of universities 
and the Law for the modernisation of the economy, in order to get to the Plan for the Future 










Figure 5. 1 The chronology of the case (France) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 we adopted a broad perspective on the study of R&I policy sector, because 
we believe that both knowledge production and knowledge exploitation systems need to be 
considered jointly. Nevertheless, the interactions between these two spheres might not be easy to 
build in reality. Especially for the French case, that has been historically characterized by a separation 
be een re earch , con idered a  a pri ilege of he p blic realm and inno a ion , perceived as an 
activity belonging to the private sphere (European Commission, 2004a).   
Therefore, this chapter first analyses those public strategies of intervention which attempted to adopt 
an encompassing, holistic-oriented (Borras, Edquist, 2019), view on the components and synergies, 
of the R&I sector. This means policy mix targeting different R&I performers, with an emphasis on 
creating coordination among these two subsystems. Then, we will investigate those strategies that 
tend to be focused on either the research or the innovation component.  
The structure of the chapter is meant to provide the reader with a first understanding of the more 
encompa ing R&I polic  in er en ion , o a  o comprehend ho  more egmen ed  in er en ion  
could be differently integrated within those views. Indeed, we do believe that all these interventions 
equally influence the evolution of the R&I, despite the fact that some are ad hoc designed with a 
broader systemic logic. Finally, the chapter descriptively analyse the evolution of policy instrument 
characteristics adopting an historical, within-case, perspective and pave the way for the comparative 




5.1 The national governance of R&I 
R&I activities tend to be related with heterogeneous governing tasks, to the extent that different 
research centres are attached to different ministries. Nevertheless, two ministers play a prominent 
role to play in this sector, namely the Minister of Higher Education and Research and the Minister of 
Economy Finance and Industry. The great difficulty embedded in this ministerial organization 
structure is related with the required coordination between these two sectors, in the effort to ensure 
linkages among them (OECD, 2014). At the highest level of the governance structure seat the 
president of the republic and the Prime Minister, usually advised by the High Council for Research 
and Technology (HCST), made up of major figures in the research and innovation field. 
As we can see in Figure 5.2 the Minister of Higher Education and Research, together with the Minister 
of Economy Finance and Industry, occupy the primacy in the national R&I policy making. Together 
with sectorial ministries they design the National Strategy for Research and Innovation, which will 
then define the funding streams towards different operators. After 2010 also the Alliances started to 
play a role in the priority setting exercise, as representative of different public stakeholders in specific 
research domains. With the creation of the Investment for the Future Plan (2009-2010), another actor 
has emerged in the realm of R&I policy design definition, the General Commissariat for Investment 
(CGI). This is a committee, which takes decisions on the thematic allocation of competitive funding 













Figure 5. 2 The governance arrangement (France) 
 
Among the operators we find the National Research Agency (ANR), created in 2005 with the task of 
funding research, mainly on a competitive basis, which became one of the main operators of the PIA 
program. The BPI France, which is a public investment bank financing innovation activity through a 
different portfolio of actions, from the provision of loans and guarantees, to the shadowing and 
consultancy of innovation projects. It is the main operator for R&I in the private sector and it resulted 
from evolutions and merging of first ANVAR and then OSEO. ADEME, Environment and Energy 
management Agency in charge of the implementation of the Investment for the Future program, and 
other sectorial actions. The Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations CDC (Deposits and Consignments 
Fund), is a state bank which funds companies and is heavily involved in innovation and SMEs 
financing (OECD, 2014). 
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Then, among R&I performers we have Public Research Organizations and Higher Education 
Institutions, together with Research and Higher Education Cluster (which basically groups these 
actors on a thematic, and geographical, principle). Then the hybrid organizations of R&I performers 
including (potentially) both private and public operators, like competitive clusters, Technological 
Transfer Acceleration Companies; and finally, the different private R&I performers.  
 
5.2 The Public R&I Performers 
Public Research Organizations  
The French higher education and research structure has a mixed nature, mainly because of two 
reasons. The first refers to the deep, and cultural, separation between highly selective Grandes Écoles 
(mainly oriented towards the training of the future French élites) and universities. This delineates a 
dual tertiary education system especially in disciplines like science, engineering and management 
(Veltz, 2007).  
The second reason is related with the nature of the public research system, that is split between two 
actors, Public research organizations, mainly devoted to research activities (e.g. basic-research 
oriented CNRS35, or applied oriented INSERM) against the low commitment of university faculty 
members (Musselin and Paradeise, 2009a).  
During the 1960s, in the attempt to fill this gap, CNRS put in place a system of partnership between 
its personnel and university groups (called unite mixte de recherche)36 (Mustar and Larédo, 2002). 
These joint research units are fully fledged research groups of small and medium size, often 
physically located within universities; they are made up of mixed personnel (also in terms of 
employment status) and are under the dual supervision of the related University and PROs37.  
The powerful role of PROs in the public research realm, is closely related with their legacy as pillars 
of the publicly led Grand Programs, which used to absorb the majority of French R&I strategy in the 
1950s-1980s. Following on from the disappearance of what has been a central model of public 
in er en ion ( Colber i m ) he a e ha  inheri ed a e  of p blic re earch organi a ion  (Mustar and 
Larédo, 2002).  
 
35This is the largest Public Research Organization in terms of number of researchers, and it is focused on multidisciplinary 
basic and applied research. It usually combines responsibilities for strategic planning and programming with a role as 
research performer (OECD, 2014; Schoen et al., 2008). 
36 This approach is not unique, since INSERM or medical research has also generalized it, and other research institutions 
such INRA and IFREMER have also been active in this respect (Thèves et al., 2007, p. 394) 
37 These units accounted for the 88% of the 1303 CNRS units in 2000 and 95% of the 1029 research units in 2012 (OECD, 
2014, p. 129). 
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Indeed, starting from the 1930s onward many public research institutes were created at the mercy of 
different Ministries or public research programs. In the 1980s this resulted in a dispersed landscape 
of organizations with various legal status and fragmented competences (Théry, 2004). 
A first attempt to reorganize the landscape of PROs was the 1982 Law (Loi de Programmation pour 
la recherche et le développement technologique de la France), through which these organizations 
were given a new specific status and structure, according to their roles and competences: 
- EPIC Industrial and trade related public institution (Établissement public à caractère 
industriel et commercial). They are aimed at conducting finalized research and their areas of 
interventions tend to overlap with administrative public services, industrial and commercial 
public service missions. To some extent these were designed to fulfill the technology transfer 
role between academic research and business38.  
- EPST Scientific and technological public institution (Établissement public à caractère 
scientifique et technologique), which conduct upstream research39. 
The underlining logic of intervention aimed at rationalizing the system of public research 
organization and enhance their collaboration. Another move in that direction, especially towards the 
mobility of researchers between PROs, was the provision of the civil service status to all the 
researchers employed by EPSTs. This new status empowered research laboratories to establish 
cooperation around specific projects with scientific and industrial partners (Chesnais, 1993).   
For what concerns their governance, each PRO (except for the CNRS, which is solely under the 
supervision of the Minister for Higher Education and Research) was moved under the double 
supervision of the Minister for Higher Education and Research and the functional minister related 
with the specific research area. EPSTs were linked to their supervising ministries through a multi-
year contract, which defined general objectives, and determined the internal allocation of resources 
among priorities and research teams (OECD, 2014). 
 
Universities 
Hi oricall  ni er i ie  ha en  been a pi o al ac or in R&I land cape e peciall  beca e in he 
French context they were quite young institutions. During the French revolution they were 
suppressed, and before the late 60s these were re-organized into faculties (Musselin and Paradeise, 
2009a). Since the law Faure (1968) universities, with the new status of public institution of scientific 
and cultural nature, replaced the faculties and were designed to became an autonomous actor. Indeed, 
 
38 For a complete list please refer to http://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/cid49700/etablissements-publics-a-
caractere-industriel-et-commercial-e.p.i.c.html (Last access May, 2019). 
39 For a complete list please refer to : http://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/pid25357/etablissements-publics-
a-caractere-scientifique-et-technologique.html (Last access May, 2019). 
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they were entitled with the power to define their statutes and internal structures, their pedagogical 
methods. 
With the Loi Savary (1984) university presidents acquired (potentially) important powers, like: 
directing the university, concluding agreements and conventions, managing revenues and expenses. 
With the Organic Law on Finance Acts (LOLF) approved in 2001 and entered into force in 2006, the 
introduction of new management rules (performance measurement, transparency) asked universities 
to perform a true cost calculation, to set up accounting costs. This was strengthened with the 2007 
Law on the autonomy of university, which provided increasing power to university presidents, by 
transferring to them authority over their technical staff, new responsibilities on recruitment, the 
management of technical and academic staff and the power to decide on real estate (Musselin, 
Paradeise, 2009). Together with the introduction of the compulsory definition of the 4-year contract 
with the Minister of Higher Education and Research.  
Overall, despite some research activities remained inside university, the division of labour between 
HEIs and PROs was still pronounced. This partitioning was even deepened by the law 1982, which 
granted the civil servant status to full time researchers within PROs (Musselin and Paradeise, 2009b).  
As we will discuss into details in the following paragraphs different instruments have tried to support 
the connection between the three different actors of the French research and HE system, experiences 
like the PRES tried to pool the research activities and the resources of these actors together. 
Nevertheless, also from the opinions gathered by our interviewees, the cleavages universities versus 
PROs and universities versus Grandes Écoles seemed still persistent.  
 
5.3 Encompassing Research and Innovation strategies 
Since the end of the 1990s, France has extensively debated the decline of its Research and Innovation 
system. The discussion mainly concerned its organizational structure, which dated back to the 1982 
Loi de programmation et orientation de la recherche40.  
This was coupled with early reflections concerning the increasing willingness to start evaluating 
university performance (Rapport Croizer, 1990) and on the need to reform the composition of their 
financing system (Text proposed by Conf rence des pr sidents d’universit , 199441). After the end 
of an historical phase of major state-led public research programs and a combined hardening of 
budgetary constraints, the government seemed inclined to start taking charge of the main issues which 
were thought to hamper the modernisation of the French R&I system: low efficiency of the 
 
40 Loi n° 82-610 du 15 juillet 1982 d'orientation et de programmation pour la recherche 
41 Thi  e  called for a o erha l  of ni er i  financing em and a grea er par icipa ion of local a hori ie , b ine  
and families, because the current system of exclusive financing by the state was perceived as no longer suitable to cover 
their needs (https://www.vie-publique.fr/politiques-publiques/enseignement-superieur-universite/chronologie/).  
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technology-transfer structures, low mobility of researchers, inadequacy of legal, financial and fiscal 
conditions for the creation of innovative companies (European Commission, 2002a).  
Therefore, at the end of the 1990s the need to take over these problems was evident for both policy 
makers and stakeholders, but no clear direction was provided yet.  
This mission was jointly given by the ministry of Research, the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
and Industry and the Secretary of state for the Industry42 to Henry Guillaume. They asked the 
honorary president of ANVAR and Vice-president of ERAP43 an in-depth analysis of the 
organisations and activities financed through the national Civil Budget of Research and Development, 
with the final goal to put forward alternative propositions on how to increase the effectiveness of 
national strategies.   
The Rapport Guillaume (1998), in line with the concerns expressed by public authorities, highlighted 
the general difficulties policy makers were facing in organising, and boosting interactions between 
public research and industrial system. The main conclusions of the report were that the quality and 
potential of French research did not meet the needs of industrial sectors as easy as in other countries.  
Following on that, the report identified the following weaknesses: 
- A marked division between Higher Education and Public Research Organisation, between 
different Public Research Organisations and between universities and engineering schools. 
These issues were closely related with the peculiar type of organizational structure that was 
characterising the R&I national environment (as we will discuss in further details in the 
following Chapter 6); 
- The complexities embedded in the instrument for technology transfer, which did often 
represent a barrier to the access of SMEs; 
- The inadequacy of investments in risk-capitals (venture capitals and seed-capitals), that were 
still insufficient to cover the start-up phase of new technological enterprises; 
- The lack of a consolidated national strategy for the coordination, implementation, evaluation 
and support of industrial research; 
- The lack of diversification in state investments, which were still focused on a limited number 
of industrial groups and sectors44.  
The reflection conducted by Henri Guillaume, was followed by the organisation of a national 
consultation with stakeholders, Les Assises de l’Innovation (1998), involved in the different spheres 
 
42 Rispectively: Claude Allegre, Dominique Strauss-Khan, Christian Pierret. 
43 Entreprise de recherche et activités pétrolières (entreprises for oil research and activities), it was a state-owned French 
petroleum company. 
44 Specifically, for many years, research priorities targeted raw materials, energy independence and defence (European 
Commission, 2002). As confirmed by Figure 4.2. 
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of research and innovation (scientific, technological, financial, industrial). This was preceded by 
seven regional meetings, focusing on specific technological areas, organised by research 
organisations in liaison with local and regional actors. It involved policy makers and different public 
and private stakeholders of R&I sector, in order to gather opinions and suggestions on the design of 
R&I national strategies. 
 
5.3.1 The Law on Innovation and Research 
The suggestions provided by the Guilliame report, especially with regards to the barriers to 
innovation, have been almost directly channelled into the 1999 Innovation act (Loi sur l’innovation 
et la recherche45 also known as Loi Allegre). This strategy consisted of an instrument mix oriented 
towards improving the diffusion of results from research towards the business world. It attempted to 
breakdown the deeply rooted mutual deference between academia and industry, while providing new 
tools for risk-capital development.  
The instrument mix hinged upon different measures supporting the mobility of researchers in private 
firms, by easing their participation in the creation (and management) of innovative firms46. Therefore, 
trying to encourage them to participate in the establishment of private companies to develop the 
results of the research work carried out. On the same line, it aimed at boosting the cooperation 
between research and industrial sectors by providing universities with the opportunity to create their 
own commercial and industrial business services (SAIC Services d’ activites industrielles et 
commerciales) and to develop projects with the industrial sector and regional partners (RRIT Reseaux 
de Recherche et d’Innovation Technologique, CNRT Centres Nationaux de Recherche 
Technologique, Regional Incubators). Finally, it designed innovative solutions for venture capital 
development (Co-investment funds for young enterprises and Seed-capital development), horizontal 
measures to help enterprises supporting their R&D expenses (CIR Crédit Impôt Recherche 
amendments) and to promote the creation of new technological based firms (National competition for 







45 Loi n. 99-587 du 12 juillet 1999 sur l'innovation et la recherche.  
46 Specifically, by extending the power of the existent legislation the 1999 Law on innovation and research, at art. 2, 
increased the freedom of public research performers in the commercialization of their discoveries, amending the previous 
regulation provided by Loi n. 82-610 du 15 juillet 1982.  
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It allowed universities to create new organisations to structure and 
manage their activities of research exploitation (e.g. activities for 
which an enterprise can request a service, valorisation of research 
ac i i ie , ge e al ma ageme  f i e i ie  c mme cial 
activities).  
Technology Transfer Organisation 
[regulation #l ow coercive] 
[mixed automatic] 





It clustered all the players in a technological field or industry: 
PROs, SMEs, universities and engineering school, professional 
associations and unions, technical centres, interest groups. 
Bottom-up approach for deciding objectives and large autonomy 
left to the project partners. 
PPPs 
[information # high coercive] 
[mixed automatic] 




Ad hoc legal public private partnerships aimed at creating links 
between public/industrial research, as a vector for technology 
transfer. Created in the context of State Regions contracts. They 
mainly involved large companies as industrial partners 
PPPs 
[information # high coercive] 
[mixed automatic] 
[HEIs + PROs + Enterprises] 
Regional Incubators Consulting structures in support of technologically based firms 
through different services: training, advices and funding system. 
Consulting service (incubators) 
[information # high coercive] 
[low automatic] 
[HEIs + PROs] 
Co-investments in 
fund for young 
enterprises  
It took up minority participations in young technological 
enterprises, or together with the investment funds established in 
the European Union. It intervened under the same conditions as 




[expenditure # high coercive] 
[Start-ups] 
Seed Capital Fund for 
development 
Seed-capital funds on major areas of technology at the national 
level, with the partnership of public research institutions and 
private investors. Through regional incubator structures it allowed 
the development of regional seed-capital funds to invest 75% of it 
in enterprises linked with public research. CDC was the major 
investors with 30%of total funding. 
Cash Advance 
[expenditure # coercive] 
[low automatic] 
[Start-ups] 
Tax Credit for 
Research Expenses 
Extension for expenses associated with researchers working 
directly in R&D project. 
Tax reduction 




for the creation of 
technology-based 
firms 
National competition opens to anyone willing to set up a new 
technology-based firm. It supported the best projects through a 
grant and by providing services to newly created firms.  
Competitive Funding 




Table 5. 1 Instrument mix Law on innovation and research 
 
Overall, the policy mix displayed an exhortatory attitude. Indeed, through a mix of highly coercive, 
but not highly authoritative instruments, it mildly required certain behavioural changes from the target 
population; by providing the direction in which to go (through moral suasion) compensated by the 
provision of different types of subsidies. The CNRT and RRIT instruments were both aimed at 
creating networking between actors of the innovation process, to overcome the divide between public 
re earch and ind rial orld. De pi e he imilari  of in r men  fea re , the mix addressed to 
different industrial partners, namely SMEs and big enterprises, envisaging the cleavage between 
private R&I performers analysed in the following Chapter (6). 
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5.3.2 The innovation Plan 
The Loi allegre has dominated the Research and innovation policy agenda until 2003-2004, during 
the enactment of this strategy the country has undergone through a period of intensive transformations 
in the field of Research and Innovation sector. The underlining logic of intervention was driven by 
the belief that France needed a more favourable institutional (and legal) framework for the 
cooperation between public and private research actors, as well as for the development of research 
results by public actors (especially in the form of start-up companies).  
The second step of this systemic transformation was grounded in the understanding that national 
innovative capacity was closely related with national economic development strategies. Therefore, in 
December 2002 the Minister delegated for Industry and the Minister delegated for Research and new 
Technologies presented some guidelines regarding a plan to boost innovation which strengthen a 
series of measures undertaken in 1996 and in 1999 with the Innovation Act. This strategy was 
discussed by R&I stakeholders in a national consultation which lasted three months. In the 
meanwhile, the competent ministers went through a series of individual meetings with industrial 
managers, public and private researchers, experts and investors.  
This process culminated into the Plan pour l’innovation published in April 2003. This was made of 
six main axes of intervention which concerned: encouraging the market of business angel investors 
(SUIP Soci t  Unipersonnelle d’Investissement Providentiel), the support for highly R&D intensity 
enterprises (JEI Jeune Entreprises Innovantes), the redefinition of the role of ANVAR (towards an 
agency aimed at ensuring national consistency between the measures implemented at the regional 
level, while providing expertise to local authorities), the valorisation of research in enterprises 
(extension of the CIFRE47 convention industrielle de formation par la recherche) and finally an effort 









It supported the recruitment of students and researchers by private 
enterprises to undergo joint applied research projects supervised by 
enterprises and public universities/laboratories. 
Targeted funding 
[low automatic] 
[expenditure # low coercion] 
[SMEs] 
Supports to 
projects by Young 
Innovative 
companies 
It helped young and highly innovative firms to overcome the first years 
of existence by providing tax credit in favour of R&D investments.  
Tax exemption 
[high automatic] 
[fiscal # low coercion] 
[Start-ups] 
 





It aimed at mobilising individual investors (business angels) by granting 
corporate tax exemptions and income tax exemptions (for a fixed period).  
Tax exemption 
[high automatic] 




It allowed Higher Education Institutions to develop offices to open up 
universities to the business world (raise students awareness of 
entrepreneurship, exchange of good practices, promotion of 
entrepreneurial culture).  
Targeted funding 






It aimed at assessing enterprise needs in terms of industrial property 
rights through consultations with experts 
Consulting service  




Tax Credit for 
Research 
Expenses 
Extension of the exonerations granted with the 1999 Innovation act Tax Reduction 




Table 5. 2 Instrument mix Innovation plan 
 
The redefinition of the role of ANVAR culminated in its merge with the former and BDPME 
(Development bank for SMEs) and the creation of OSEO in January 2005. This agency became the 
main public operator in the field of innovation in charge of the implementation and monitoring of 
national policy, especially for enterprises (European Commission, 2005a).  Overall, the policy mix 
was characterised by a low degree of coercion and a marked preference for both automatic, and not 
automatic, subsidies. In this case a clearer orientation toward SMEs and highly innovative companies 
was pursued.  
 
5.3.3 The investment for the Future plan 
In the following years different interventions were adopted in the Research and Higher Education 
sector (Research Act, 2006; Law on the liberties and responsibilities of universities, 2007) and in the 
industrial and technology sector (SME Pact, 2005; Law for the modernisation of the economy 2008), 
as discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Only in 2007, with the elaboration of the National strategy for Research and Innovation (Stratégie 
Nationale de Recherche et d’Innovation SNRI) policy makers get back towards a more encompassing 
approach in designing R&I policies. The definition of the SNRI was directed by the Minister of 
Higher Education and Research, but revolved around the consultation with the scientific community 
and other R&I operators. It was a five years strategy aimed at building a coordinated action to meet 
Great Societal Challenges. Despite the coordination effort embedded in its definition, the SNRI was 
no  e  a  he opera ional le el, and i  didn  allo  o alloca e b dge  (OECD, 2014), resulting a 
smooth exercise of aligning the agenda between players, rather than a plain joint policy making 
exercise.   
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Nevertheless, it was influential in identifying the thematic areas for the following R&I strategy 
designed under the Sarkozy presidency: The investment for the future plan.   
The Investissement pour l’avenir  plan (PIA) a  foc ed o ard  he impro emen  of the long-
term growth potential of the French economy. It aimed at boosting productivity, increasing 
competitiveness, supporting employment and equal opportunities by promoting investments and 
innovation in 5 priority sectors: higher education and research; industries and SMEs, sustainable 
development and the digital economy.  
The program was initiated by the budget law of 2010, with the objective of covering the period 2010-
2020, on the basis of the recommendation of an expert commission chaired by Juppé and Rocard (two 
former Prime Ministers). This committee was set up by the French government, following the 2008 
economic and financial crisis, in order to identify the priority sectors for the new strategic investment 
plan (Eparvier et al., 2009).  
The final report was transmitted to Sarkozy the 19th November 2009 and it agreed upon an amount 
of 35 billion euros in favour of innovation. It basically, recommended giving priority to investments 
in Higher Education and research, plus other areas to be taken into account for the effectiveness of 
na ional R&I em: he emergence of he ci  of omorro ; he digi al econom , rene able 
energies, transport of the future, life science and support for innovative SMEs.  
After the implementation of this program an innovative governance structure has been put in place 
under the competences of a new coordination committee created in 2010, the Commissariat Général 
à l’investissement (CGI). It was responsible for steering and coordinating the overall coherence of 
the PIA scheme, it coordinated interministerial policy design under the authority of the PM as well 
as the cooperation among other governmental bodies responsible for the distribution of funds. It 
ensured the transparency and quality of the selection procedures, the allocation of funds to existent 
operators, as well as the overall coherence of the strategy. The program was organised as follow: a 
first phase of preparation of agreements between the PM and each of the operators (ANR, OSEO/BPI 
France), a second phase for the management of the calls for project. 
The governance of the strategy involved different actors: the ANR was responsible for the higher 
education and research fields48, ADEME49 for actions related with the energy and ecological 
transition, OSEO (BPI-France) for the support to companies and industries. Moreover, the 
 
48 It was in charge of managing the calls for proposals, setting up the evaluation and selection process, preparing the grant 
agreements, funding the selected teams, monitoring the activities in their development and providing the impact analysis. 
49 Agence de l’environnement et de la maitrise de l’ nergie (Environment and Energy management Agency). It was an 
EPIC, which participated in the implementation of public policies in the fields of environment, energy and sustainable 
development. The agency also supported project financing, from research to implementation, in the following areas: waste 
management, soil conservation, energy efficiency and renewable energies, row materials, air quality, the fight against 
noise, the transition towards the circular economy and the fight against food waste (https://www.ademe.fr/lademe Last 
Access May 2019).   
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Commissariat-General was aimed at controlling major public investments of the state, by keeping a 
permanent inventory and organisation of independent counter-expertise. 
Ultimately the PIA was translated into competitive calls for national projects around themes prepared 
by the CGI and its operators. Projects were evaluated by a jury of independent experts, sometimes 
international, bringing together high-level competences to select innovative projects with high growth 
potential. The investment for the future plan included 9 measures: financing of equipment for 
research/technological infrastructures (EQUIPEX); providing financial support to leading lab or 
public research institutions aimed at international competition (IDEX, IRT, LABEX, IEED); 
financing of research in health, biotechnology and biomedical fields (IHU; Health and Biotechnology 
actions); creating interface structures between academia and industry (SAAT; France Brevet).  
 
 





It aimed at connecting, on a territorial basis, Higher Education 
Institutions, Grandes Écoles and research institutions recognized for 
their scientific and pedagogical excellence. They aimed at ensuring 
their visibility and attractiveness on an international scale (also for 
the economic actors).    
Competitive Funding 






It aimed at reinforcing the expertise of French research in the Health 
and Biotechnology sector, by funding research in different subfields 
(e.g. bioinformatics, Nano-bio echnologie , and ario  cohor 50 . 
Competitive Funding 






It supported the creation of 4 to 6 Technologic Research institutes, 
within existing French campuses. These institutes, through public-
private partnerships on research, innovation and education, 
reinforced existing competitiveness clusters, in order to help the 
country reaching international level in diverse economic fields, and 
thus create growth and jobs. 
Targeted Funding 





It aims at supporting the creation of foundations associating one 
University, one hospital and several research institutes on an 
excellence programme in the field of care, crosscutting research and 
clinical and applied research. 
Targeted Funding 







It supported technology transfer acceleration companies. These will 
be mostly owned by a consortium of HEI and research centres. Their 
mission is to focus on the valorisation of public research through 
innovative strategy in respect to patents, industrial partnerships, 
crea ion of SME , and re earcher  mobili . The  ill ac  a  er ice 
provides in the field of research valorisation for their shareholders 
and other potential clients.  
PPPs 






It aimed at selecting excellent research laboratories and providing 
them with the financial means to compete with international research 
institutions, attract internationally recognised researchers and 
perform high level research and education programmes. 
Competitive Funding 




in the Field of 
It aimed to create five to ten Institutes (IEED) on campuses with 
international visibility. Each of them could benefit from public 
financial support, targeted investments and support in long-term 
strategy development. The overall objective is to build up several 
Targeted Funding 




50 A cohort consists in following for several years, or decades, a population of subjects, healthy or sick, in order to 
accumulate reliable knowledge on their health. It can help improving the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of a wide 





campuses with the capacity to aggregate public and private 





It aimed at investing in infrastructures in view of boosting the French 
Research and accelerate research breakthroughs, at reducing the 
delay in the acquisition of medium-sized equipment, especially those 
that fit with the national strategy for research an innovation.  
Targeted Funding 
[expenditure # low coercion] 
[low automatic] 
[HEIs+PROs] 
France Brevet It was a public enterprise (owned by the state and CDC) serving the 
valorisation and protection of French technological innovation. Its 
mission is to support companies in valuing their innovations by 
structuring their intellectual property and by defending it around the 
world.    
Equity Participation 




Table 5. 3 Instrument mix Investment for the future plan 
 
With the design of the PIA the government developed a new intervention model, where central 
administration, through CDC, made contribution in equity participation in the capital of the SATT 
(33% of their capital), similarly to the France Brevet, sovereign patents fund. This system can be 
defined a  holding model  (Eparvier et al., 2011), where through the provision of different funds the 
central administration possess financial stakes in innovation organization, without the cost associated 
with their management. This structure was mirrored by the high share of targeted funding 
characterizing the strategy and the increasing professionalization of the national bureaucracy with the 
prominent role of public agencies like ANR, OSEO and ADEME. 
Overall the policy mix was characterized by a high share of expenditure-oriented and low coercive 
instruments, which were matched with the relevance of the political (government and CGI) role in 
setting the priorities for the competitive funding.  
The Investment for the future plan has been maintained and extended also in the following 
presidencies. The second wave of PIA (PIA 2), in 2014 under Hollande, slightly reoriented the 
strategy toward a more prominent role of the digital economy and it increased the number and the 
specificity of the sectors of investments. The last wave (PIA 3), was implemented by Macron in 2017 
and it became part of the broader Grand Plan Pour L’investissement strategy, with the goal of 
improving cooperative behaviours in R&D and related areas. Differently from the former strategy 
PIA 3reduced the number of sector of investments51 and transformed the CGI in the Secrétatiat 




51 https://www.gouvernement.fr/le-programme-d-investissements-d-avenir (Last access May, 2019). 
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5.4 The reforms in the Research Sector.  
The French public research system hinged upon universities and large public research organizations 
(as portrayed in Figure 5.2), the largest of which was the CNRS. These organizations, unlike other 
countries in the world, played a great role in the structure of French public research scenario (OECD, 
2014).  
Their relevance was closely related with the historical development of French public research 
infrastructures, which used to be highly supported by the state and to focus on few sectors, related 
with major national companies, responsible for the industrial exploitation of the research undertaken 
by public organizations (Mustar and Laredo, 2002).  
This model allowed for key technological breakthroughs in some sectors (e.g. space, railways), but 
its limitation become clear after the emergences of new technological sectors, like for example ICT 
technologies (European Commission, 2000a). At the end of 1990s policy makers became increasingly 
aware of the fallacies of their R&I structure, especially for what concerns the diffusion of research 
results through industrial sectors, and more generally the lack of systematized connections between 
public research and enterprises (especially SMEs).  
The 1999 innovation act and the 2003 Plan represent the first attempts to solve these issues.  
Governmental efforts to raise innovation awareness, especially for economic development, were 
going hand in hand with the discourse on the decline of the national structure of research. This debate 
ha  been mainl  foc ing on he em  organi a ion, hich da ed back to the 1982 research act, 
and whether or not it could be one of the main causes for the average performance of the French R&I 
system.  
As a first attempt to tackle these issues, the government  designed the Pacte Pour la recherche, an 
action program for public research, aiming to restore French competitiveness (Arnold, 2007). 
Originally, the reform of the research system, which was first outlined in the innovation plan 
presented by the Ministry delegated of research and new technologies in 2003, was expected to be 
launched in the second quarter of 2005. The first draft of the bill faced strong criticisms by the 
representatives of Public Research and Higher Education institutions, consequently the approval 
process was delayed.  
Indeed, in the meantime, a movement Sauvons la recherche (SLR) representing public research and 
higher education institutes kicked off in 2003. Some researchers chose to voice their worries to the 
press and to put pressure on the government regarding the design of the new Law for Research.  
They expressed concerns regarding the plan to launch a National Research Agency (ANR) for the 
funding of research, its increasing budgetary power and its subordinated role in terms of ministerial 
control. Researchers were afraid that this would be detrimental for the multidisciplinary nature of 
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EPSTs, like the CNRS, and it would allow the government, rather than the research community, to 
pick and choose new areas of research (Schoen et al., 2008). In heir ord : hi  pilo ing i  done b  
the prince, and as such the direction will change with the mood of the prince52 . 
On the same line, they also claimed that the increasing political focus on applied research should not 
overlook the relevance of basic research, since these are both necessary for their mutual development. 
The triggering event (April/May 2004) for the beginning of a strong protest movement, was the 
decision of the Minister in charge of Research to change the status of 550 life-long research positions 
and transform them into fixed terms contracts. This unveiled a profound unease throughout the French 
research system and dramatically highlighted very sensitive issues such as lack of funding, excessive 
administrative burdens and, more fundamentally, the inadequacy of the status of researcher as defined 
by the legislation into force (Law 1982).  
Apart from the reintegration of the researchers and the creation of further university positions, the 
movement triggered a vivid national debate which culminated, thanks to the mediator role played by 
some exponents of the institutional and scientific world, in o he États généraux de la Recherche  
(The General State for Research) in 2004.  
This initiative gathered researchers and citizens, first at the regional and then at the national level, to 
make proposals in view of contributing to the design of the new Pacte Pour la Recherche.  In the 
meanwhile, also internal pressures pushed for a reform of the research system.  
Indeed, in 2005 the Court of Audit release a report (La gestion de la recherche dans les universités), 
which supported some of the measure included in the Pact for the Research for what concerned public 
research in universities. The report proposed to increase the management autonomy of universities, 
the creation of a single evaluation authority and to enhance the concentration of universities in order 
to gather their resources to be able to compete internationally.   
 
5.5 The Research Act 
After all, at the end of 2005 the Research act bill was presented to the Parliament by the Minister of 
National Education and the Minister delegated for Higher Education and Research, to be finally 
approved in the spring 2006. One the main underlining elements of the Research Act was a 
commitment to increase public R&D funding, in order to achieve the European agreed 3% of GDP 
goal by 2010. This strategy revolved around different axes of intervention.  
The first aimed at encouraging public research actors to engage in joint research projects, with other 
Higher education/ PROs institutions in order to increase their critical size (PRES Pôles de recherche 
 
52 [ ] Ce pilotage est le fait du prince, et comme tel, le cap changera avec l’humeur du prince  [ ] 
http://sauvonslarecherche.fr/spip.php?article1481   
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et d'enseignement supérieur). It also provided the opportunity to create partnerships between public 
research excellence initiatives and industrial actors populating the local competitive cluster (RTRA 
Réseaux thématiques de recherche avancée). These were complemented by a time-limited targeted 
funding in case of research that involved socio economic partners (enterprises or SMEs) in the 
development of innovation (Carnot Award). In the same vein, through the creation of an Industrial 
Innovation Agency (AII Agence de l'innovation industrielle)53, also medium-term public programs 
for industrial innovation were implemented (PMII Programmes mobilisateurs pour l’innovation 
industrielle).  
The governance of the system was consistently modified through the creation of an agency devoted 
to the rationalization of the research system evaluation (AERES Agence d'évaluation de la recherche 
et de l'enseignement supérieur) as well as an advisor council (HCST Haut conseil pour la science et 
la technologie), which was created to support the President of the Republic on science and technology 
decisions.  
Finally, also the landscape of research funding system was modified. Traditionally public research 
was funded through contract mechanisms between the state and the research performing institutions, 
with the creation of the ANR (Agence nationale de la recherche), the government was clearly moving 
from a mechanism of block grants towards a system of competitive and targeted funding.  
 
Instruments Content Shapes Family 
Delivery 
Target 
Research and Higher 
Education Clusters 
PRES 
Contractual tool for grouping Higher education/PROs in 
geographical proximity (district, department, region) to pool their 
resources and create a unique cluster to manage research, education 
and valorisation activities   
Contract 






Funding structure for research units in geographical proximity, able 
to gather high level researchers working on a specific thematic field 
and interact with local industrial clusters.  
Targeted Funding 




Carnot Award It awarded (with funding) a limited number of pubic research 
entities or private research organizations with general interest 
goals, for their implication with the socio-economic partners. (these 
are supposed to be the French counterpart of the German 
Fraunhofer).  
Competitive Funding 







It aimed at creating and supporting consortia between enterprises, 
research laboratories and SMEs devoted to the creation of highly 
innovative and commercially viable products (within 5-10 years).  
PPPs 





Agency for the 
evaluation of research 
This agency encompassed all the previous agencies in charge of 
research evaluation. It evaluated research institutions, research 
Agency for Evaluation 
[regulation # high coercive] 
[low automatic] 
 
53 In September 2004 the government commissioned a report to Jeanl-Louis Beffa (the CEO of Saint Gobain company) 
on industrial policy. The repor , Pour une nouvelle politique industrielle , concl ded ha  French ind r  a  c rren l  
specialized in low- ech ec or , hich e plained he rela i e ind rial decline of na ional econom . The e per  
recommendations were to promote a new industrial policy based on the creation of a new agency, the Industrial Innovation 
Agency (AII), with the task of coordinating medium-term industrial programs (European Commission, 2005a). 
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and higher education 
AERES 
teams and education institutions, allowing to concentrate 
assessment and evaluation of public research and teaching 
institutions within one agency.  
[HEIs+PROs] 
 
High council for 
science and 
technology HCST 
It advised the President of the Republic and the Government in 
matters related with science and technology. The members were 
highly distinguished personalities appointed directly by the 
President of the Republic for four years. 
Advisory Committee 




National Agency for 
Research ANR 
It administered competitive research funding allocation. It took 
over the support action previously conducted with the technology 
research fund (FRT Fond de la recherche technologique) and 
national science fund (FNS Fond national de la recherche) 
Funding Agency 





Table 5. 4 Instrument mix Research act 
 
With this strategy new instruments have been introduced to cluster universities on a regional basis, 
in the effort of reducing fragmentation (Schoen et al., 2008). The underlining policy rationality of the 
PRES was related with the perception that in a context of international competition, the acquisition 
of a critical size by federations of universities, Grandes Écoles and PROs would enhance their 
visibility (the size matters for the calculation of international performance rankings) and therefore 
increase their attractiveness. 
Ultimately, a greater size was meant to strengthen their influence in steering French research and as 
a way to bridge universities with other higher education and research actors, while respecting their 
heterogeneous status. According to Musselin and Paradeise (2009) this strategy for developing 
incentives for research excellence and clustering among institutions through bottom-up mechanisms 
eventually activated by territorial actors (e.g. president of universities, heads of research 
organizations, regions, local industries) accelerated the blurring of competences between Higher 
Education Institutions and Public Research Organizations.  
To some extent the RTRA instruments followed the action of some of the instruments included in 
1999 law for research and innovation (e.g. CNRT and RRIT), with the slight difference that these 
networks were thematic; therefore, hinging upon selected research and industrial sectors.  
The instrument mix was characterized by a majority of low coercive instruments, designed to leave 
target group enough room for manoeuvre in engaging in joint research activities. This was 
compensated by structural changes in the governance of the sector through the introduction of an 
evaluation agency (AERES) and a funding agency (ANR), which could be read as an attempt to 
consistently rationalize the system, devoting particular attention to systematize its evaluation and 
funding procedures.  
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5.6 The reforms for Higher Education Institutions 
The following step in the reform of the national R&I governance structure was a transformation of 
university governance mainly defined by two long-lasting legislative interventions, the Loi Farue 
(1968) and the Loi Savary (1984). A first attempt in the direction of enhancing their autonomy, was 
proposed by the Minister for Youth, National Education and Research Luc Ferry in 200354. 
Ultimately, the Minister gave up on his reform proposal under the combined pressures of the student 
unions, the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic, who feared students and academic 
uprising55. Nevertheless, the issue of the role of universities in the national R&I structure, and more 
generally the willingness to modify their internal governance structure, was still politically relevant 
at that time and it was simply put aside, waiting for the right window of opportunity.  
The right event to bring back on the table the role of University and Public research was the release 
of the 2003 Shanghai ranking were French universities scored a lower performance than expected. 
As claimed by Musselin (2017), this event came to reinforce the initiatives that had been already 
ongoing, rather than triggering new ones. On the public research side this was translated in the 2006 
research pact, whereas on the university side this helped to overcome the stalemate of the Ferry 
proposals, which finally culminated in the 2007 Law on the freedom and autonomy of universities. 
Another support in the direction of the approval of this reform was the election of a new President of 
the Republic, Nicola Sarkozy, who endorsed the reform as one of the main goals of his mandate.   
Designed in combination with the 2006 research act, specifically with regard to PRES clusters, the 
Loi Relative aux Libertés et Responsabilités des Universités (LRU Law on the Freedom and 
Responsibilities of Universities) aimed at providing a central position to higher education institutions 
(specifically universities) in the R&I system (Zaparucha, 2010). It reduced the size of universities 
administrations councils, while increasing the role of university presidents, who had the possibility 
to became the project manager of each institute strategy, also for the recruitment of technical and 
academic staff. Indeed it allowed universities to recruit (within certain limits) academic and 
admini ra i e aff on emporar  con rac , without providing the status of civil servants, they 
could offer salaries or bonuses which were not dependent on the national salary scales and impose 
teaching duties that were different (higher) than for civil servants (Musselin, 2013, pp. 27 28). 
University administration councils began to open up to social and economic actors, by including 
 
54 This proposal has to be read in the light of the historical phase France was undergoing. Indeed, during the same years, 
the government manage to successfully implement the 2003 Innovation Pact, while starting up the draft for the future 
Pact for Research (2006).  
55 Which was actually the case, one year after, with the SLR movement in the context of the 2005 Pact for Research 
proposal.  
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external personalities as: representatives of local/regional authorities, entrepreneurs or executive 
managers of companies and representatives of the economic and social world.  
Overall, universities acquired greater budgetary and financial management competences of their 
institution, in conjunction with this it became obligatory for them to sign a four-year contract (contrat 
quadriennaux) with the ministry of Higher Education and Research for a shared management of their 
strategies. 
The underlining logic of the LRU was to put universities at the center of the systems as main operators 
of public research. This ran in parallel with the increasingly undermined role of Public Research 
Organizations in terms of funding powers, following from the creation of ANR and the decline of 
their evaluation role after the establishment of the AERES (Musselin, 2017).To some extent with the 
LRU policy makers attempted to counterbalance the loss of power and resources of PROs with an 
increase in the social, economic and networking role of universities (especially from a 
locally/regionally- based perspective). After this law few large universities have emerged (e.g. 
Universit  Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris-Orsay), nevertheless these remained weaker compared to 
other international research institutions, and much of their research was still done in mixed research 
units, some of which were controlled by the CNRS or other PROs (OECD, 2014).  
The last piece of our chronological overview on the evolution of Higher Education and Public 
Research system, fall outside our strictly analytical period of interests. Nevertheless, I believe that 
even a brief reference to the changes it generated might be useful to understand the macro-level 
evolution of the sector. 
After the presidential election of Hollande (May, 2012), and the take office of a new cabinet. The 
newly elected Minister of Higher Education and Research (Geneviève Fioraso), on July 2012 
organized a national consultation process among the actors of the French Higher Education and Public 
Research system, with the aim of gathering their opinions for the definition of a new law on Higher 
Education. This was approved in 2013, Loi relative à l’enseignement sup rieur et à la recherche 
(Law on Higher Education and Research), and it provided both breaks and continuity points with the 
previous 2007 LRU strategy. Specifically, it carried on the site policy/research cluster strategies 
undertaken by the previous governments but it replaced the PRES with Communities of Universities 
and Institutions (COMUE). The latter, despite the similarities of objectives, differentiated themselves 
form the PRES given the greater freedom left to Higher Education and Research actors to create their 
own associations form, without any clear reference to the criteria of excellence56. Moreover, the law 
transferred to regions the mission and the budget to develop and disseminate scientific and technical 
 
56 With the government Hollande the concepts of excellence and performance are no longer present in texts or speeches, 
and the objectives of rebalancing and redistribution regain some legitimacy (Musselin, 2017, p. 67).  
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industrial culture; it increased the involvement of external actors in the governance of universities by 
providing for the acceptances of externals as voters for the election of the president of the university.  
  
5.7 Business actors: the industrial and technological sector  
French research and innovation policies were for a long time characterised by a tradition of highly 
cen rali ed and ec orial p blic R&D Grand programmes , coordina ing large a e PRO  and a e-
owned firms “Champions Nationaux” in domains such as aerospace, nuclear energy or 
telecommunications. The leitmotiv of this system was the following: to develop a pilot public research 
projects in-house (public administration, research agency, Public Research Organisation), matched 
with the support of one or more national champions, charged with the industrial exploitation and 
commercialisation of new discoveries (Mustar and Laredo, 2002).These were large firms belonging 
to the oligopolistic French business, in some cases they were nationalised enterprises (or with just a 
majority share owned by the state) or normal business enterprises behaving much in the same way as 
firms with public capitals (Chesnais, 1993, p. 193) 
Despite nowadays we can still distinguish a consistent share of government budget allocations for 
Research and Developed flowing toward specific sectors (as provided in Figure 4.2), over the past 20 
years this policy paradigm has evolved. Indeed, according to Mustar and Laredo (2002) since the 
beginning of the 1990s, government priority setting logic has started to become more open towards 
bottom-up oriented strategies, and some of the classic grand programmes have been replaced by 
network-based initiatives.  
On the other hand, this was coupled with low private R&D resources mobilisations which, in spite of 
the increase compared with the past, still relied to a significant extent on few and partly state-owned 
enterprises (Schoen, 2008). Despite R&D investments in this sector were not easy to capture, French 
economy was only moderately oriented towards high research and technological intensive 
manufacturing activities (Antonie et al., 2013). Overall, the system suffered from the lack of small 
and medium size technology-based companies; governments seemed to have changed their rhetoric 
from large companies, however these actors were ill (e en if more indirec l ) benefi ing of he lion  
share of public support for R&D (Eparvier et al., 2009, p. 21) 
Over the last decades the gradual refocusing of French State intervention in industry tended to hinge 
pon he di co r e on ne  ind rial policie , hich ie ed compe i i ene , and mee ing 
community needs as the major drivers for economic development. Examples of this new narrative 
were the National Research and Innovation Strategy, launched in 2009 (and replaced by National 
Research Strategy in 2014) and the Investments for the future plan adopted between 2009 and 2010 
(OECD, 2014).  
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5.8 From the Champions Nationaux  to the Gazelles  
Since the 1945 several actors of the French economy were consolidated into nationalised services 
(Banks, Gas, Electricity), the public control of industry and finance was further deepened until the 
end of the 1980s when, under the Mitterand (and the later Chirach I) presidencies, facing serious 
fiscal constraints, the state began its privatisation policy (Chandler, 2014).  
At the beginning of the 1990s the French central model of state intervention (Grand Programmes) 
was almost disappeared following the privatisation of the majority of formerly public companies 
(Mustar and Laredo, 2002). 
In 1993 Chesnais was writing: “France is a country in which there is a continuous talk about the 
importance of SMEs and innovation, but where, barring a few exceptions, one finds only limited 
evidence of their role as active components of the innovation system” (p.193).   
In the decades following this statement the landscape of French R&I has changed together with its 
instrument mix, paving the way for a more relevant role of SMEs. Differently from other 
contributions (see Mustar and Lared 2002), we do not believe that these changes have caused a 
paradigmatic shift toward a new mode of state intervention, to the extent that path dependence effects 
are still dominant, despite the introduction of new instrument mix characteristics (as demonstrated in 
Chapter 6).  
Indeed, the polic  legac  of he Grand Programme  model a  difficult to dismantle, as confirmed 
by the low level of private participation in the R&D effort and the well-pronounced, and steady, state 
propensity for certain sector of R&D investment. Nevertheless, some measures devoted to SMEs and 
more network-oriented approaches were already in place since the early 1980s (CRITT), overtime 
these have been compensated in their actions and layered with various other instruments.  
This transition period towards an increasing focus on SMEs was characterized by the proliferation of 
thematic research and technological networks aimed at bringing together the (numerous) actors at the 
local level and help enterprises familiarize with various funding (differently) tailored to their needs. 
Starting from the 1980s we can group instrument mix according to three different underlining focus: 
- Targeted actions to support innovation activities (ATOUT, SOFARIS, API, Innovation 
Award, Support investments in key technologies, FCPI); 
- Targe ed ac ion  o enhance re earcher  mobili  and employment opportunities in SMEs 
(CORTECH, ARI, DRT, Post-Doc recruitment); 
- Development of incubation and technology transfer services (CRITT, CRT, RDT, PFT). 
Despite the stratification of sometimes very similar instruments the underlining logic of policy mix 
evolution was to boost the creation of different partnerships between the institutional actors involved 
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in the R&I field (regional authorities, Higher Education Institution, PROs, public agencies) in order 
to reach enterprises not targeted by traditional innovation initiatives.  
The nderlining goal a  o make hem a are, and e peciall  g ide hem hro gh he j ngle  of 
funding designed by public authorities. So, the mix aimed at persuading local stakeholders to create 
collaborative innovative network in exchange of subsidies identifying more or less accurately the 
indented behavioural change, by relying on locally-based networks of public actors  
The following table provides an overview of the vast range of stratified instruments into force in the 
period 1980s-1990s.  
 






1979 It provided zero interest rate loans to SMEs to develop innovative 
projects 
Soft Loan 





de garantie des 
financements 
des PME) 
1982 The scheme aimed at providing economic guarantee to 
entrepreneurs who did not have easy access to bank loan in order 
to develop their SMEs business  
Economic Guarantee 






1984 Targeted funding to support SMEs project aimed at improving 
their technological level (technical and commercial feasibility 
studies, pre-competitive research in priority sectors)  
Targeted Funding 
[expenditure # low coercion] 
[low automatic] 
[SMEs] 
Innovation Award  1991 It aimed at increasing general SMEs awareness of innovation. 
Specifically, it rewarded SME  and re earch in i e  hich had 
successfully used patents for business or innovation development 
Competitive Funding  
[expenditure # low coercion] 
[low automatic] 
[HEIs+ PROs + SMEs] 
Key technologies 
development 
1996 Targeted funding aimed at supporting the development of key 
technological areas in SMEs.  
Targeted Funding  
[expenditure # low coercion] 
[low automatic] 
[HEIs+ PROs + SMEs] 
Mutual fund for 
innovation (FCPI) 
1997 Risk mutualization instrument to promote investments in 
innovative SMEs by buying funding shares in exchange of fiscal 
benefits.  
Equity Participation 
[expenditure # high coercion] 
[mixed automatic] 
[SMEs] 






1988 Targeted funding aiming to associate researchers with enterprises 
through the development of one-year research project to stimulate 
innovation within SMEs. 
Targeted Funding 






1988 Targeted funding aiming at supporting SMEs to reinforce their 
R&D personnel and resources by hiring a post-graduate/ under 
graduate. 
Targeted Funding 






1997 Targeted funding aiming at supporting SMEs to reinforce their 
R&D personnel, by allowing young engineers to take a high degree 
diploma while working in an SME. 
Targeted Funding 





1998 Targeted funding aiming at supporting SMEs to reinforce their 
R&D personnel by hiring Post-Doc researchers. 
Targeted Funding 








1980 Partnership between Minister of Higher Education and Research 
and local authorities, providing SMEs with technological services. 
Local interfaces between public research business, adopting HEIs 
and PROs competences to increase technological level of SMEs.    
Consulting service (incubators) 
[information # high coercive] 
[mixed automatic] 




1996 Label (jointly assigned by the Minister of Higher Education and 
Research and the Minister of Economy Finance and Industry) 
intended to certify the good quality of the services provided by 
different CRITT 
Label (quality standard) 
[regulation # medium] 
[low automatic] 




1990 Incubators associating an informal network of different 
institutional actors working in the field of technology transfer and 
SMEs support at the local level (DRRT, DRIRE57, ANVAR, 







2000 They form a network of Higher Education Institutions, engineering 
schools, universities and CRITT, providing access to equipment, 




[HEIs + PROs + SMEs] 
 
 
Table 5. 5 Business-oriented policy mix (1980s-1990s) 
 
The evolution of the policy mix reflects a pattern of instrument selection oriented towards the 
adoption of very similar policy instrument shapes addressed to the same target (SMEs) (e.g. 
Stratification (Capano and Lippi, 2017)). The underlining leitmotiv was a layering of different 
instrument intended to gradually trigger a move from a Grand Programs pattern towards a more 
SMEs-oriented approach.  
For ha  concern  arge ed ac ion  aimed a  ppor ing inno a ion ac i i ie  and re earcher  
mobility, despite the reiteration of similar instrument shape-target group combinations, (e.g. in the 
case of researcher recruitment they cover different spectrum of skill development projects) no evident 
inconsistencies can be stressed in the evolution of the policy mix58.  
Differently, the case of incubator and technology transfer organizations is more striking. The regional 
centre for innovation and technology transfer (CRITT), created at the beginning of the 1980s, were 
the first locally based interfaces between public research and SMEs. These were based on 
partnerships established between the minister of Higher Education and Research and local authorities, 
financed by state-region contracts and, in some instances, by small business. Their nature could be 
defined a  bo om- p  o he e en  ha  he compe ence  he  ere foc ing on ere rela ed o he 
characteristics of the local stakeholders involved.  
 
57 The DRRT (Délégation régionale à la recherche et à la technologie) and the DRIRE (Direction régionale de 
l’industrie, de la recherche et de l’environnement) are regional delegated offices, respectively of the Ministry of research 
and the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry. These decentralized departments were created in 1983 and they were 
charged with the regional implementation R&I national policies. 
58 As further developed in Chapter 6, a fine-grained analysis of the different policy making organizations in charge of the 
formulation of the overlapping instruments will shed light on how do formal organizational structure influence policy 
mix evolution. 
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On the one hand, this logic allowed to target services to the specific needs of local actors involved, 
while on the other hand, this freedom left room for the overlapping of services by different CRITTs, 
causing dispersion of public resources. Therefore, in order to limit these drawbacks, in 1990 policy-
makers designed the Technological Development Networks, with the aim to coordinate and monitor 
the actions of the different actors involved in incubators and technology transfer services at the local 
level. These included, the newly created, ministerial delegated office (DRRT and DRIRE), the 
ANVAR and the different thematic CRITTs. Moreover, in 1996 a joint decision of the minister of 
Higher education and Research and the Minister of Economy Finance and Industry introduced a 
labellization procedure in order to further coordinate the system of local interfaces, the Technological 
Research Centre (CRT). This certified the good quality of the services provided by different CRITTs.  
Finally, in 2000 with the creation of the Technological Platforms (PFT), policy makers aimed at 
harmonizing and bringing coherence to the varieties of regional actors involved in technology 
transfer, with the underlining goal of promoting the third mission of public education and training 
institutions. The PFT was designed to create an additional superstructure comprising different actors 
involved in local incubation activities in order to first inventory the interventions in place, and 
secondly to boost their integration.  
The diachronic evolution of the instrument mix suggests a design strategy based on the overtime 
stratification of slightly different incubation structures. With the underlining motivation of chasing 
coherence between the instrument into force, this allowed policy makers to gently steer a so-called 
bottom up mix towards their preferred dynamics of action. Ultimately, the consecutive adoption of 
different highly coercive instrument shapes (incubators) allowed policy makers to persuade target 
population towards their intended aim, and to promote the uptake of the subsidies for innovation 
ac i i ie  and re earcher  mobili ie  incl ded in he in r men  mi . The po en ial recipien s of the 
services provided by these structures were the technological research partnership promoted with the 
1999 Innovation act, namely: the technological research network (RRIT) and the national technology 
research centres (CNRT). The former were public-private partnerships developed between public 
research and private actors working on a specific topic (e.g. micro and Nano technologies, 
telecommunications, water and environmental technologies) chosen by the actors involved in the 
partnership. The latter was also a public private partnership which brought together public research 
laboratories and private research centres affiliated with big enterprises.  
Therefore, even if the target had consistently shifted from the past, going towards the direction of 
SMEs and local stakeholders, the modus operandi of p blic a hori ie , doe n  eem o ha e changed 
much being mainly cantered on an ind cemen  b idie  in e change of in ended behaviour , and a 
still relevant role of public agency in the delivery. 
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At the beginning of the 2000s the Law on economic initiative (Loi Dutreil 2003) and the introduction 
of different new shapes of funding instruments, displayed a slightly modified public attitude towards 
establishing interactions with R&I performers. Indeed, the instrument mix into force in the period 
2000-2005 (circa) was characterized by a mix of different expenditure-based instruments like: the 
proximity investment fund, the Participatory Priming Law (Prêt Participatif d’Amorçage PPA), the 
Innovation Development Contract (Contrat de Développement Innovation CDI), the Technological 
fund of funds (Fonds de Fonds Technologique FFT) and the Gazelles programs. 
 





2003 Investments fund for investments in SMEs on a 
specific regional zone 
Investment Fund 






2005 OSEO loans funding early stage of innovation 
projects in SMEs 
Loans 






2005 OSEO loans funding mature (>3 years old) SMEs 
innovation projects in SMEs 
Loans 




Technological fund of 
funds (FFT) 
2005 Public equity participation in venture funds investing 
in technological enterprises  
Equity Participation 




Gazelles 2006 Support to promote venture and development capita 
for Gazelles (most fast-growing SMEs) 
Tax Exemption 




Table 5. 6 Late business-oriented instrument mix  
In this second phase it seemed more evident the shift in the attitudes of public actors towards target 
population. By a mix of information and persuasion, and indirect financial participation to support 
inno a i e ac i i ie , he  epped back from he b idie  in e change for e pec ed beha io r , 
leaving more room for manoeuvre to target groups, at the expenses of a more competitive oriented 
source of funding. The increasing push towards an active role of SMEs was accompanied by the 
definition of a more supportive legal framework with the adoption of the Law Dutreil (2003) aimed 
at facilitating business creation through a combination of administrative simplification and tax reliefs.  
So, after a first period (1980s-1990 ) of carro  in e change of e pec ed beha io r , he in r men  
mix rationale has changed. Therefore, even the high coercive nature of the mix (constrained freedom 
of action for target population), policy makers invested less authoritative energies on inducing SMEs 
towards their expected behaviours. 
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5.9 The cluster approaches 
In 2005, while the minister of national education higher education and research, together with the 
minister delegated for Higher education and research were struggling to put forward their proposal 
for a Pact for Research, the minister of Economy, Finance and Industry approved several relevant 
measures for the development and support of national innovative enterprises.  
First of all, in 2004, the minister presented the pôles de compétitivité, territorially-based competitive 
clusters aiming at fostering the synergetic development of specific sectors, or a technology, through 
ac i e par ner hip  be een he cl er  member . Specifically, they were aimed at bringing 
together, in a particular area and on a particular theme, companies of all sizes, public laboratories and 
training establishments. Their purpose was to support innovation, by promoting for example 
collaborative R&D projects between stakeholders (OECD, 2014, p. 197).  
These networks were territorially defined by the coexistence of an highly specialized industrial basis 
matched with research and education potential that, through the creation of  partnerships, could have 
access to funding under privileged conditions and  rebates on corporate and social taxes (European 
Commission, 2005a). Their establishment followed from the release of three different expert reports.  
The first, the Ailleret report (2003), through an analysis of the development of knowledge economy 
in France, stressed the rich potential of the R&I system, but also pointed out some inconsistencies, 
such as: the lack of coherence between the interventions of local actors, the complexity of the 
instrument mix into force and the extent to which their intricate nature could hamper the effective 
exploitation of some service by SMEs.  
The second report was produced in 2004 by the Agency for spatial planning and regional actions 
(DATAR), arguing in support for the development of an industrial policy based on synergies between 
localized agglomerations of enterprises, scientific and technological potential. Demonstrating how 
this pattern was successfully developed worldwide. 
Finally, the Blanc report (2004)59, by analysing the national economic structure since 1945, 
highlighted the French economic and social handicaps that did not allow a sufficient level of 
economic growth, despite the competitive level of investment in basic research. The reports suggested 
that a new model for economic development revolving around public research organizations, 
universities and entrepreneurs was needed.   
The guidelines emerging from the three reports were channelled into the strategy of the competitive 
clusters adopted in September 2004. The design of the pôles de compétitivité represented a clear 
attempt to reorganize and enhance the competences developed, both from public actors and R&I 
 
59 This report responded to the request of the Prime Minister in his letter of September 30, 2003 which awaited the 
definition of concrete measures that could promote the establishment of competitiveness clusters. 
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performer  per pec i e, hro gh pre io  in er en ion . Their l ima e goal a  no  o ac  direc l  
on, but rather to create an ecosystem for stakeholders where innovations could flourish. 
Overtime, this was combined with the development of a new approach for state action, which hinged 
upon the design of a public procurement-based instrument mix. Indeed, in 2008, following on from 
the Law for the Modernization of the Economic, public procurement became established in the French 
system, through a strategy based upon a mix of three different instruments: the SMEs Pact, the 
Passerelle Programe and he French-S le  Small B ine  ac . 
 
Instruments  Contents Shapes Family 
Delivery 
Target 
SME Pact  2005 It established Public Agency, large private companies, pôles de 
compétitivité procurement targeted to SMEs 
Public Procurement 





2007 Targeted funding for SMEs aimed at supporting tripartite financing 
for the development of the SME pact procurement.  
Targeted Funding 




Style  Small 
business act  
2008 Allows SMEs preferential access to public procurement (assign then 
15% of the average yearly share of their high technology marked, 
R&D and technological studies) 
Public Procurement 




Table 5. 7 Cluster I instrument mix 
 
The policy mix for Procurement was composed by these three instruments which integrated 
procurement provisions for SMEs coming from different private and public actors, or the government, 
together with a targeted funding managed by OSEO to encourage SMEs to engage in the related call 
for tenders. For what concerns the design of public procurement measures they were deeply inspired 
b  he American mall b ine  ac  of 195360.  
Finally, this instrument mix was followed by the introduction of two different shapes of economic 
instruments, always targeted to help SMEs financing their innovation activities, namely: the aide au 







60 This framework was the milestone of US SMEs policies, which affirmed the need to prioritize the action of public 
authorities towards these actors. Other countries, as the UK and the Netherlands designed very similar instrument inspired 
by the US example (OECD, 2014). 
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Instruments  Contents Shapes Family 
Delivery 
Target 
Support to innovative 
industrial strategic 
project ISI 
2008 Targeted funding devoted to help SMEs with high growth 
potential to develop disruptive innovation as a part of a 
collaborative project involving other 
companies/competence centres 
Targeted Funding 





2009 Public equity participation as minority shares in French 
companies carrying out industrial projects creating 
economic benefit and competitiveness 
Equity Participation 




Table 5. 8 Cluster II instrument mix 
 
Both instrument shapes were aimed at supporting the advancement of SMEs business. In the first 
ca e, hi  a  an in r men  mainl  de o ed o ppor ing SME  financing, hile in he econd one 
the policy maker basically became a shareholder of the company. 
 
5.10 The crédit imp t recherche   
On the one hand the evolution of French R&I policy mix has been characterized by the frequent 
stratification of different instruments, while, on the other hand, it is worth noting the case of a specific 
instrument shape introduced in 1983 and still alive nowadays: The Research Tax Credit (Crédit Impôt 
Recherche, CIR). This is a horizontal, non-discriminatory across sectors, fiscal instrument aimed at 
supporting R&D investments by means of tax incentives calculated on the basis of their expenditures.  
It was introduced in a period characterised by the decline of direct state financing of R&D, as a 
strategy to boost private contribution to national innovation efforts. Despite its overtime calibration 
across multiple cross-sectorial goals (e.g. national competitiveness, cooperation between SMEs and 
PROs, employability of PhDs), its underlining logic of interventions was meant to increase the 
competitiveness of companies by supporting their R&D expenses.  
To date this measure is still into force, and in 2013 it has been supplemented by the introduction of 
an Inno a ion Ta  Credi , hich a  e cl i el  arge ed o SME . More generall , de pi e being 
the main form of fiscal contribution to business R&D, it was complemented by a system of reduced 
rated of taxation for capital gains from patent transfers and other support mechanisms devoted to 
young innovative enterprises (JEI) (OECD, 2014). 
The final shape of CIR is made of two credit calculation components:  
- A volume share, determined upon the R&D expenditures incurred over one year;  
- An increase share calculated according to an augmentation of expenses in relation to the 
average expenditure over a benchmarking period. 
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The balance between these two different components, and the calibration these have undergone 
during the 36 years of its existence, are an important indicator for the final aim of the instrument and 
its most likely recipients.  
Indeed, at the time of its introduction the CIR was incremental in nature, therefore the tax relief was 
propor ional o he increa e in he compan  R&D e pendi re compared o a benchmark period and 
renewed by legislative provision on a multiyear basis (3-5 years). It consisted of 25% of the increase 
for a maximum ceiling of 3 Million Francs. Consequently, recipients of this instruments were 
subordinated to this time span in making their projects and to the effective yearly increment of R&D 
expenses. According o ome e al a ion repor , the mere fact of taking into account an increasing 
share made this device a marginal instrument, except for companies in their first years of life and 
some companies constantly increasing R & D  (Larrue et al., 2006, p. 89). 
Following the release in 2003 of a report from the Tax Council criticizing the measures as being quite 
unattractive for enterprises because of its complexity, the budgetary law for 2004 heavily intervened 
on its nature: 
- the legislative provision of the CIR was stabilized and transformed from a multi-year to an 
annual basis; 
- the instrument was divided into two components, one increase-based (45%) and a new part 
calculated on the volume of expenses (5%); 
- increase of the ceiling to 8 Million Euros of maximum expenses. 
The volume of expenses component allowed to calculate the tax benefit on the basis of each projects, 
rather than being dependent upon the expenses undertaken in previous years, so the credit was no 
longer calculated in dynamic terms, but it was only taking into account the volume of research 
spending. The first argument for that change was simplification: the incremental system resulted in 
specific calculation difficulties that made it more impenetrable and forced SMEs to hire costly 
peciali  er ice  o op imi e  heir a  declara ion . Addi ionally, an incremental credit did little 
to incentivize companies whose R&D expenditure was stable over time, for example after a previous 
pike (OECD, 2014, p. 189). 
With the 2006 budget law the CIR was modified again by the introduction of: 
- new costs as eligible expenses (patent protection expenses; subcontracting fees for research 
made by PROs, universities or technical research centers; expenses related with employment 
of PhD and their contractual stabilization); 
- the immediate reimbursement of research tax credit in the year of creation, and the following 
four, for young companies (younger than 5 years old);  
- an increase in the benefits calculated on the volume of expenses (10%);  
 138 
- a shrinkage for those calculated on an incremental basis (40%); 
- maximum expenses ceiling increase to 10 Million Euros.  
Finally, with the budget law of 2008 the tax credit has been consistently reshaped to acquire the 
characteristics of the system that is still largely in place today, namely: 
- A suppression of the increase-based component; 
- A strengthening of the volume-based component: a tax credit of 30% of research investments 
will be granted for investments up to 100 Million Euros and of 5% beyond; 
- The eligibility of all the expenses classifiable as research (the OECD Frascati Manual 
definition); 
- The ceiling has been eliminated.  
The evolutions of this instruments mirror to some extent the changes taking place in the R&I system 
at large. The 2004 reform took place almost at the same time of the cluster policy implementation, 
and it was somehow meant to simplify the CIR system usage by SMEs, which were one of the pillars 
of cluster development. With the 2006 intervention, the tax credit included new eligible expenses 
related with the subcontracting of research made by PROs, Universities and other research centers. 
In the same period, with the 2006 Research Pact new contractual tools for grouping HEIs and PROs 
in geographical proximity were created (PRES). Those actors, together with the competitive clusters, 
might have been the beneficiary of the sub-contracting research services included in the CIR.  
More generally, the CIR represents a relevant measure in the overall R&I French instrumentation. 
Indeed, following on from the privatization of process, the relevance of the tax credit has been 
reversed within the national policy mix61. Also, foreign companies contributed to this shift, to the 
extent that the features of the CIR were perceived as an incentive to move R&D activities in France 
(Mini re de l ed ca ion na ionale de l en eignmen  p rie r e  de la Recherche, 2014).  
 
5.11 Conclusions 
The evolution of the policy mix in the period 1980s until late 1990s reflects a pattern of instrument 
selection oriented towards the adoption of very similar policy shapes addressed to the same target 
(SMEs). It clearly portraits the characteristics of what Capano and Lippi (2018) identify as the 
Ro ini a ion , meaning he la ering of differen  in r men  in order o change he direc ion of 
in r men  ac ion and abili e heir ac ion in o a more con i en  and coheren  ac ion. Thi  i  al o 
 
61It represented a credit of EUR 4.5 billion in 2010, and it has represented around EUR 5 billion per year since then and 
could reach EUR 7 billion per year once fully operational (French Court of Auditors, 2013), i.e. between 4 and 6 times 




confirmed by the OCED (2014), which clearly highlights how in the French case, instruments tended 
to be created overtime without systematic discussion on the mix already in place, therefore hampering 
their reciprocal effectiveness and the possibility of State oversight.  
The French system has undergone consistent changes in the last decades, due to an acquired relevance 
of the structures devoted to the support of technology transfer. Nonetheless, their success in altering 
the overall governance principles dominating the sector are affected by a lack of long-term 
perspective and an intricate institutional landscape (Dosso, 2014). Therefore, despite an increasingly 
attention toward technology transfer and the creation of specific organizations for its development, 
the system can still be characterized as mainly mission-oriented (Berger, 2016).  
With the 1999 Innovation law policy makers seemed to be quite dependent for the disclosure of their 
strategy on the cooperation of R&I performers, as demonstrated by a majority of mixed and automatic 
instrument delivery structures. Hence, the strategy attempted to provide R&I performers with 
generous room for manoeuvres in the enactment of certain instrument shapes, while prescribing the 
direc ion here o go  a onomo l , beca e of the overall high coercive nature of the mix.  
With the 2003 innovation plan there was a clear shift towards SMEs and start-ups as main targets of 
public interventions. The instrument mix was characterized by low degree of coercion and a quite 
pronounced propensity towards automatic instruments, therefore R&I performers had more autonomy 
in the use of instruments behavioural incentives. 
With the competitive cluster strategy of 2005 there was a clear attempt to reorganize and enhance the 
compe ence  de eloped, bo h from p blic ac or  and R&I performer  per pec i e, hro gh pre io  
interventions. The ultimate goal was to trigger, by mainly exploiting the set of incentives already in 
place, the creation of an ecosystem for stakeholders where innovations could flourish; leaving great 
decisional freedom to R&I performers. With this strategy policy makers attempted to debunk the long 
lasting hierarchical and vertical national system, by attempting to ease locally based interaction 
between research, education and business. Nevertheless, their evolution and especially the increased 
rele ance for p blic proc remen  in r men  o er hado  he bo om- p  approach, nder he role 
of public actor as innovation customer. Overtime, this was combined with the development of a new 
approach for state action, which hinged upon the design of a public procurement-oriented instrument 
mix. Indeed, in 2008, following on from the Law for the Modernization of the Economic, public 
procurement became established in the French system, through a strategy based upon a mix of three 
different instruments: the SMEs Pact, the Passerelle Programe and he French-S le  Small 
Business act. 
With the implementation of 2006 Research act and the creation of the ANR (funding agency) and 
AERES (evaluation agency), policy makers seemed to be willing to take back the reins of the 
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situations by introducing an evaluation-based logic for funding allocation to R&I performers.  
Moreover new instruments (PRES), have been introduced to cluster universities on a regional basis, 
in the effort of reducing fragmentation (Schoen et al., 2008); which was then combined with the 
increasing university autonomy provided by the application of the 2007 Law on university reform. 
Ultimately, with the application of the PIA the government developed a new intervention model, in 
which through CDC it contributed to equity participation by acquiring shares of innovation 
organizations, without being directly involved in their management (Eparvier et al., 2011). 
Therefore, despite some smartly designed connections among different instrument mixes, the overall 
evolution of national strategy seemed to be stuck in the grip between a state-led, quite coercive 





















6 Chapter 6: Case study II, the policy instrument selection in the 
French case 
In order to understand the forces underpinning the evolution of R&I policy mixes, we designed an 
interpretative framework which intersect different insights on the role of ideas (as the influence of 
dominant framing in a given political system); the opportunity structures provided by the institutional 
system (internal coordination and specialization between bureaucrats) and the role of target 
population (the strategies for interest intermediation). These factors are consistently intertwined in 
he infl ence he  pla  on ac or  choice , b  haping he polic  de ign proce  and, l ima el , he 
characteristics of policy mixes. By breaking up the influence that their different combinations might 
have on actors and their strategies, it has been possible to disentangle the political dynamics behind 
the selection and assemblage of different instrument mixes. This helped us understanding how, given 
the opportunities and constraints provided by the governance characteristics, actors interacted for the 
selection of policy instruments, and the extent to which this influenced the evolution of instrument 
mix components.  
The chapter is organized according to our variables of interest. In the first section we investigate the 
role of ideas, and their influence in terms of cabinet turnover and path dependent effects. Then, we 
analysed the interaction between formal an informal institutional structure, by digging into 
interministerial coordination practices. Finally, we examine the different structure of interest 




Policy instruments are not politically neutral devices, to the extent that they can alter power dynamics 
(Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007; Salamon, 2002), influence policy issues framing (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993) and ultimately produce different patterns of opportunity and constraints on a given target 
population (Schneider and Ingram, 1990). Their selection can be read as an ideational process to the 
extent that instruments embed different framings concerning the individual perceptions on a given 
problem, and possible strategies to tackle it. Therefore, theoretically their choice would be exposed 
to the influence of different political and ideational dynamics. 
In order to investigate the counteracting effect of institutionalised windows of opportunities (cabinet 
changes) and the persistence of long-lasting R&I institutional aim (Mission versus Diffusion oriented) 
on the evolution of governmental policy mix preferences, we diachronically compared the preference 
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mix for different cabined periods. By using policy instrument characteristics as a proxy for 
go ernmen  preference , e ere able o map o  he connec ion be een ac or  par i an po i ion , 
long-term preferences for R&I strategies and their overtime evolution. 
Table 6.1 cross-tabulate the percentage of coding references for different cabinets according to the 
different type of policy instrument preferences 62. In order to allow the comparability of the sample 
under investigation, and a meaningful interpretation of the codes, all the share of coding references 




Figure 6. 1Type of policy instrument preferences (France) 
 
On the left side of the table (Y axis) we find the shares of coding, while on the bottom side of the 
table (X axis) we find the different cabinet periods under investigation. At this point, it is necessary 
to highlight a peculiarity of the French case, namely the presence of a period of co-habitation between 
a president of the republic (Chirac I) right wing oriented, together with a prime minister (Josipn) left-
wing oriented. The type of data collected, and the typology of coding procedures adopted, do not 
 
62 Each column represents the percentage of codes assigned to each instrument category over the total share of codes 
assigned to each policy mix in a given cabinet period. Therefore, the different columns are comparable and their sum is 
equal to 100%; meaning the total share of preference for an instrument mix in a given cabinet period. The same logic is 
applied to Figure 6.2 for the case of instrument delivery component, and for the Figure 8.1 and 8.2 of the Italian case in 
Chapter 8.  
63 Due to data accessibility issues, we were not able to analyse the same number of documents for each cabinet period. 
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allow to differentiate the preferences between these actors64. For this reason, we decided to focus on 
prime mini er  preference .  
The left-wing oriented Jospin cabinet shows a policy mix preference pattern characterised by a high 
authoritative attitude (23,39% of preferences for legislative and 40,06% for expenditure instruments). 
This might sound consisted with the strategy aimed at changing the path from previous right wing 
oriented Juppé cabinet. On the same line, the next right-wing government Raffarin II shows a slight 
increase towards the preferences for a more authoritative mix (28,81% for legislative and 35,59% for 
expenditure) followed by a second mandate characterised by a decrease in this share of preferences 
(23,53% authoritative and 35,29% expenditure).  
Finally, the last cabinet under the presidency of Chirac (II), the Villepin government, is characterised 
by an increase in the preferences for more authoritative tools, namely 28,42% of preferences for 
legislative and 36,84% for expenditure instruments.  
The first Fillon government under the new Sarkozy presidency, display an increase in the preferences 
for more authoritative mix (32,47% for legislative instruments and 38,31% for expenditure 
instruments) followed by a second mandate, Fillon II, distinguished by a decrease in the total share 
of preferences for more authoritative mix (legislative instruments dropping at 25,71% and 
expenditure at 42,86%).  
Table 6.2 ho  cabine  preference  for differen  degree  of in r men  a oma ici , herefore i  
tells us the attitudes for the diverse types of relationship between policy makers and target population 
e abli hed i hin he managemen  of differen  ool  enac men .  
 
 
64 Indeed, at this stage of the analysis, by treating government as unitary actors, and by using budgetary document as the 
main source of analysis it was impossible to grasp the different nuances between Prime Minister and President of the 




Figure 6. 2 Policy instrument delivery structure preferences (France) 
 
Looking at the overall distribution of cabinet preferences along the period of analysis it is worth 
highlighting the overtime high average of preferences for not automatic delivery structures, which 
reaches peaks of 57,16% of the total mix in the Jospin cabinet and respectively 55,21% and 68,18% 
in the two Fillon mandates. On the other hand, also the high share of preferences for mixed, therefore 
more collaborative-oriented, delivery structures, is interesting. The average share for mixed type of 
instruments score high values in the case of Raffarin III government (36,11%) and Villepin cabinet 
(42,62%), that is actually the only case in which it represents the highest share of preferences for the 
whole mix (which is, on average, dominated by preferences for less automatic delivery structures).  
 
6.1.1 Cabinet turnover 
We expected that in parallel with cabinet turnovers, a change in the preferences for instrument mix 
characteristics will likely occur. To the extent that cabinet shifts represent an institutionalised window 
of opportunity where new ideas (and the policy entrepreneurs who support them) can find a place 
into decision-making arenas. Changes in cabinet composition should influence policy mix evolution 
inasmuch as different parties in government can find themselves in a situation of constrained party 
preferences (Jungblut, 2015) since the legacy of past political struggles shape political preference 
formation (Kriesi, 1998, p. 177). Accordingly, we would expect a trade-off between the willingness 
of new governing parties to modify the dominant policy style into force and the room for manoeuvre 
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Therefore, the more similar the party politics orientations between incoming and outgoing 
governments, the less authoritative will be the diachronic evolution of policy mix preferences.  
The preference trend displayed in Figure 6.1 does not completely confirm our expectations.  
In the case of the first cabinet period the turnover between left-wing Jospin cabinet and right-wing 
Raffarin II confirms an increasing authoritative evolution of policy mix as well as the second mandate 
of Raffarin (III), therefore confirming our expectations regarding political incoming and outgoing 
phenomena.  
Differently, the same party Villepin cabinet shows an increasing preference share for more 
authoritative mix, despite the political continuity with the two previous governments. There might be 
some specific reasons for this phenomenon. 
First, the new government was appointed after the defeat of the 2005 European constitution 
referendum, strongly endorsed by Chirac and the previous government. After this event, Raffarin 
tendered his resignation for the third time, Chirac accepted and appointed Dominique Villepin as 
Prime Minister (Kam and Indridason, 2009, pp. 51 52). As pointed out by Levy et al (2008) many 
votes against the approval of the European constitution represented a signal of dissatisfaction with 
the economy and more generally with the Chirac  admini ra ion, ra her han a blame again  he 
European proposal. Therefore, the appointment of Villepin represented a political attempt to regain 
the trust of French population, bringing back the traditional republican French model promoted by 
the Chirac presidencies. Secondly, the Villepin cabinet managed to overcome the long-lasting 
stalemated on the reform of the research system, by approving the highly contested research act put 
in the pipeline by the previous Raffarin cabinets. Therefore, some extent of continuity between the 
two periods could be expected.  
Reading in-between the lines of the increase in the share of preferences for a more authoritative mix 
we can both see the continuity with policy proposals of previous cabinet (and the implementation of 
highly authoritative instruments, like the creation of AERES and ANR) together with a national 
strategy aimed at promoting the model of state interventions characterizing the Chirac era. 
Nevertheless, we have also to interpret this trend in combination with the results displayed by the 
preferences for mixed delivery instruments (Figure 6.2), scoring the highest values of the sample in 
this period; therefore, mirroring also preferences for an increasing reliance upon the collaboration 
with R&I performers for the enactment of policy instruments.  
Finally, the last increase in the share of preferences for authoritative mix of the Fillon II cabinet, 
followed by a decreasing trend in the Fillon III period, mirrors the influence that a change in the 
President of the Republic can have on the overall instrument mix pattern. Indeed, the Fillon II cabinet 
has been the first one with Nicolas Sarkozy as President of the Republic, after more than a decade of 
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Chirac presidencies. The new elected president based his agenda (and electoral campaign) upon the 
rhe oric of he r p re  i h he radi ional French a  of doing hing , a  ell a  por ra ing him elf 
a  an o ider ho o ld break he a  q o (Cole et al., 2008). 
Therefore, despite the political party continuity of the two leaders, a deviation in R&I policy strategies 
supported by a new President of the Republic seems plausible to take place.  
To conclude a politically-oriented policy mix preference alternation trend seems to be meaningful 
but, it is also consistently subject to internal national political and electoral dynamics like the case of 
Villepin government. Nevertheless, also the increase in preferences for highly authoritative mix for 
electoral purposes, is symptomatic of the political payoff a greater extent of governing power invested 
in R&I can have in electoral terms.  
 
6.1.2 Path dependent effect  
The dominant cognitive background embedded in the policy mix into force delineates the most 
appropriate model for public action in the R&I policy sector, while consolidating power relations 
between actors. Therefore, from a diachronic perspective, the likelihood of any policy change is 
affected by the extent to which actors gains or lose access to advantages they associate with past 
designs. Therefore, new policy making initiatives are bound to be affected by, long-terms legacies 
emerging from earlier rounds of decision-making activities, (Edler et al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 2011; 
Hall, 2010; Howlett, 2009; Howlett and Mukherjee, 2014; Linder and Peters, 1989) . 
Diffusion and mission-oriented paradigms reflect well established preferences on what governing 
actors should do and how they should make it happens. Consequently, in the case of French mission-
oriented legacy of institutional aims we would expect that it will be more likely that governments 
will display preferences for more authoritative and less automatic instrument mix characteristics. 
The general trend of preferences for more authoritative and less automatic instrument features seems 
to be confirmed by the results in Figure 6.1 and 6.2, and the path dependent effect of mission-oriented 
R&I paradigms seems to be predominant on the evolution of cabinet R&I instrument mix preferences.  
This is also confirmed by the dominant trend of preferences for more authoritative policy mix 
(mirroring the legacy of a state-led R&I policy tradition); and the constant high share of preferences 
for not automatic instruments. The high peaks of preferences reached in the Jospin and Fillon 
cabinets, portray the relevance of state role in the strategies characterising the outset of a new French 
R&I policy after the Grand Programmes, and he ne  holding model  (Eparvier et al., 2011) of 
public interventions.  
Moreover, the high, even if more discontinuous, share of preferences for mixed type of delivery 
systems is coherent with he acquired relevance of networking practices and the increased attention 
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towards technology transfer structures. As demonstrated by the Raffarin III and Villepin cabinets, 
which coincide with the introduction of the competitive cluster strategy and the new contractual 
agreement to group research and higher education institutions into cluster (PRES). 
Therefore, in the French case, policy instrument selection process seems to be truly linked to the 
nature of the general governance context and long-term cognitive legacy embedded in national R&I 
strategies. And when policy makers have to decide upon how to shape the existent mix, given the 




Public interventions in the field of R&I tackle transversal policy issues (Jochim and May, 2010; 
Peters, 2005) related with knowledge production and exploitation practices, which do not easily fit 
into departmentalised structures and areas of responsibility of formal policy-making institutions 
(Pelkonen et al., 2008). Therefore, in addition to the formal institutional distribution of competences, 
some measures for the coordination among decision making organisations must be adopted as well. 
Because, the way actors manage to find a common terrain for action, will likely avoid redundancies 
between instruments, therefore influencing the final characteristics of the policy mix. On the other 
hand, as demonstrated by organizational studies (Scharpf, 1997), different departmental identities can 
make collaboration between policy makers affiliated to different institutions more difficult.  
The Minister of Higher Education and Research (MESR), and the Minister with delegated 
competences for Industry represent the two fundamental institutions of French R&I governance 
structure. Their attributions and names have been slightly modified along different cabinet periods; 
nevertheless, the public governance of R&I has remained almost intact over the last decades. The 
roles of these ministries reflect the fact that R&I policies are inherently made of two substantive 
components (research and technology development) which might be more or less integrated 
according to policy making capacity and foresight. On the same line, given the external ministerial 
specialization strategy adopted by French institutions, some extent of collaboration among ministers, 
and internally within departments, might be needed to assure policy mixes encompassing action in 
both research and innovation aspects.  
In the following paragraphs we will dig into the evolution of different ministerial coordination 




6.2.1 Ministerial coordination practices 
As briefly explained in Chapter 5 while describing the evolution of Public Research Organisations, 
during the era of the Grand Programs the French R&I institutional system was highly fragmented.  
In the aftermath of the WWII the relaunch of French scientific policy was supported by a focus on 
nuclear energy, which led to the creation of the Commissariat for Atomic Energy (CEA) in 1945; 
together with the creation of the High Council for Scientific Research in 1954. Two years after the 
Colloques de Caen65 , De Ga lle crea ed hree differen  organi a ion  de o ed o he coordination 
and advice in French R&I policy-making, namely:  
- The interdepartmental committee for scientific and technical research (CIRST), a deliberative 
decision-making body devoted to interministerial coordination and chaired by the Prime 
Minister; 
- The advisory committee on scientific and technical research (CSRT)66; 
- The General Delegation for scientific and technical research (DGRST), an interministerial 
body responsible for the preparation and execution of research policies67. 
Each ministry was highly specialised in the support and development of research in its own specific 
domain, which resulted in the proliferation of different mission oriented Public Research 
Organisations supervised by heterogenous governmental departments (Mustar and Laredo, 2002).  
This structure of responsibilities between different functional ministers and their affiliated research 
institutions was modified with the 1982 Law on Research, which was a first attempt to rationalize the 
overall governance structure, and coordinate the national strategy according to two lines of 
interventions. 
The first one, implemented a financial division between EPSTs and their parent ministries with the 
transfer of budgetary responsibilities to a single ministry in charge of research. Consequently, all 
mayor public research organisations were put under the double remit of the MESR and their specific 
functional minister. Even if the latter had pre er ed join  g ardian hip , he n ield  na re of he 
budgetary mechanism is too well known for the eventual impact of such a separation not to have been 
weighed up (Mustar and Larédo, 2002, p. 63).  
The second one regards the introduction of a new national budgetary procedure for the allocation of 
resources in the field of research through the creation of the Civil Budget for Research and 
 
65 Global project for scientific development (held in 1956), gathering 250 among scientists, public administrators, civil 
servant, industrialist, member of the parliament and journalists to discuss about the future of science and research in the 
country. The underlining aim was to draw the lines for a modernization programs of French Higher Education and 
Research. 
66Abolished and replaced in 1982 by the Higher Council for Research and Technology (CRST), a forum for dialogue 
between stakeholders chaired by the Minister of Higher education and Research, 
67 This will be abolished in 1982 and replaced by the minister of Research and Technology. 
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Technological Development (BCRD). This was a budgetary platform defining the credits for public 
research within a single procedure. It was led autonomously by the minister of Higher Education and 
Research, leaving the possibility for sectorial ministers to participate at the definition of the budget.  
The BCRD covered funding for public research organisations and incentive funds, namely the 
National Fund for Science (FNS) dedicated to fundamental research (but not to Higher Education 
which had another specified budget68), and the Technological Research Fund (FRT) dedicated to 
industrial researchers and EPICs. 
To these funding it is necessary to add the Fund for Enterprises Responsibilities, under the full 
responsibility of the Ministry in charge of industry, supporting aids to enterprises and partnerships.  
With the definition of the BCRD policy makers decided also to dust off the CIRST (created in 1958, 
but it a n  con ened an more from 1981 on ard ), an in erdepar men al deci ion making 
committee for the definition of R&I policies, only rarely activated as a decision-making procedure 
(European Commission, 2003a).  
Nevertheless, the relevance of BCRD as an instrument for interministerial coordination should not be 
overestimated. Indeed, when a research sector was deemed as strategic for a given ministry this had 
the possibility to negotiate directly with the minister of Finance.  So that their R&I budget 
appropriations entered in another section under their full management responsibilities, thus 
overtaking the coordination competences of the Minister for Higher Education and Research. This 
was a quite simple process especially for the minister of industry which has been integrated in the 
ministry of economy and finance since 1997 (Cytermann, 2006). 
A second attempt to enhance R&I policy making coordination was focused on the embedded division 
characterizing the higher education and public research landscape. This came as a part of the broader 
reform of public management supported by the Constitutional bylaw on Finance Act (LOLF) 
approved in 2001.  
Indeed, for the first time in 2006 state budget was defined according to the provision of the LOLF, 
which attempted to provide a common framework for budgeting procedures in the field of R&I by 
creating an interministerial mission for Research and Higher Education (MIRES). This promoted the 
aggregated presentation of all the budgetary resources that the State devotes to the production, 
transmission and transfer of knowledge in the field of scientific research, technological development 
and Higher ed ca ion, idening he cope of he BCRD ( hich didn  incl de he la  ca egor  of 
endowments). Basically, all the credits in the budget law were grouped by missions and then 
organized according to different programs referring to a specific policy field. In first instance it was 
 
68 Coordinated Budget for Higher Education (BCES).  
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created as a voting unit, in order to simplify budgeting procedures, then slowly also an intermnisterial 
coordination component was added.  
Within this context the Minister responsible for research was in charge of coordinating government 
action among the different ministers involved in public research. It was the primary interlocutor of 
the minister responsible for budget during the preparation phase of the budget law and of the 
parliament during the examination and vote of appropriations.  
The drawbacks of this coordination platform were primary rela ed i h he fac  ha  i  didn  pro ide 
any obligations for joint programming, so each minister could participate in the mission simply by 
including its autonomously designed program. Therefore, once again, the Ministry in charge of 
Research was a king without a kingdom, to the extent that it was appointed with the role of coordinator 
among the ministers with transversal competences in R&I, but it was not provided with the necessary 
powers to steer them towards an effective interministerial decision making.  
A successive mild attempt to promote coordination between ministers in R&I policy making was 
provided by the introduction of the National Strategy for Research and Innovation (SNRI), which 
aimed at framing research and innovation as the component of a unitary and encompassing national 
strategy. Approved by the Council of Ministers in September 2008, it was a document providing 
long-term political orientations for national research and innovation policies.  
Differently from previous instruments, this strategy was restricted to the definition of broad political 
objectives, identifying a common agenda for the stakeholders involved in the formulation of the 
strategy for a period of four years (2009-2012). It was a bottom-up priority setting process involving 
research, business and civil society stakeholders, identifying three main Social Challenges national 
R&I policies should be directed at, namely: health, environment and ICT.  
According to these broad themes state would allocate resources and plan its R&I activities. 
This strategy became more relevant wi h he appro al of he In e men  for he F re Program  
(PIA), to the extent that this investment plan, at least for its first wave of application (2010-2014), 
was in line with the main priorities of the SNRI (Eparvier et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the binding 
power of this strategy was limited to he e en  ha  i  a  no  e  a  he opera ional le el, and i  didn  
allocated budget, circumscribing its action to the provision of thematic guidelines for R&I national 
themes (OECD, 2014). 
In combination with implementation of the PIA program, another policy-making committee was 
created, the Commissariat G n ral à l’Investissement (CGI). Rather than a pure instance of 
coordination, this committee was much more an attempt to re-centralise some of the R&I policy 
making competences under the authority of the Prime Minister. In line with the investment priorities 
identified within the Juppé-Rocard commission, the Commissariat closely followed the enactment of 
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the program, it drafted contracts with the agencies in charge of the implementation (ANR; CDC; 
ADEME), providing specifications to supplement calls for proposals and finally ensuring the overall 
consistency of the investment plan through yearly reports of activities.  
The CGI ac ion didn  display any explicit attempt of coordination, or interaction, with other ministers 
involved in the R&I national effort, and its funding were not explicitly included in the national 
Governmental Budget Allocation for Research and Development since they were considered as 
investments (Lepori et al., 2017).  
 
6.2.2 The actual patterns of ministerial interactions 
According to the OECD (2014) country evaluation, the coordination between ministers involved in 
R&I policy making seemed to be effective at some level; but it was lacking at the strategic level, 
since each minister could autonomously establish its own priorities and schemes. This evaluation was 
symptomatic of the poor success of the above-mentioned strategies for interministerial coordination, 
which might have faced some obstacles related with the interweaving forces characterising the 
national governance of the sector.  
As described in Chapter 5 French higher education and public research structure has a mixed nature, 
characterised by different public stakeholders with different role and legacy of power. 
On the one side, there is a profound separation between highly selective, élites oriented training, 
Grandes Écoles versus universities. While, on the more research-oriented side, there is a deep 
separation between public research organisations and universities, inherited from the legacy of a 
prominent public-led research and technological programs. Therefore, the mixed nature of public 
research landscape, and the extent of cooperation between public research actors, may hinder 
ministerial collaboration for R&I strategies.  
The way different governments have tried to re-equilibrate the power between these actors, and to 
design an encompassing national R&I strategy could be traced by following the evolution of 
ministerial organisation structures in the sector, as a proxy for different framings of the issue.  
Nevertheless, as claimed by the two interviewees representatives for the Minister with delegated 
competences in Industry and the Minister of Higher education and research, this cannot provide all 
the details necessary to understand national R&I strategies: “It is not possible to explain everything 
through administrative organisation; this can be rather a symptom.[...]this type of reunification 
(between ministers with R&I competences) often requires a strategy, since it is not the reunification 
itself that makes the strategy, but rather the opposite”. 
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Therefore, the selection of an external ministerial specialisation pattern, could actually be 
symptomatic for the lack of an all-encompassing R&I national policy strategy. However, it is worth 
to highlight that mini erial organi a ion r c re  ha en  al a  been like ha .  
Indeed, at the time of approval of the 1982 law on research, which exactly attempted to reorganise 
the system by introducing a financial division between public research organisations and their parent 
(functional) ministers, the competences for Research, Economy, Finance and Industrial Policies were 
merged within a unique ministerial organizational structure.  
This pattern has changed in the following decades, in parallel with the clear dismissal of state role in 
national Grand Programs and the two ministers have been separated.  
The ministry of industry has been merged within the broader Ministry of Economy and Finances 
(MINEFI), and industrial policies started to became less and less a matter of direct, targeted public 
intervention (Mustar and Larédo, 2002). As reported by our interviewee (INTERVIEWEES 20-21) 
the weakening of the role of a (unique) Minister devoted to industrial competences went hand in hand 
with the abandonment of French sectoral industrial policy, and the move toward a horizontal-based 
industrial approach; consequently, industrial competences have been merged within the boarder 
structure of MINEFI. This was a minister with a strong organizational legacy, and the industrial 
component experienced some difficulties in finding its own space within this organisation. This 
situation evolved in parallel with the implementation of the pôles de compétitivité (in 2004), when a 
new division of competences within the MINEFI and the consequent creation of two separated 
institutions (promoted under the Sarkozy presidency), allowed the industrial component to slowly 
find its place again.   
Whereas, on the research side the ministerial organisation was evolving around the competences for 
national education, higher education, research and technology; with the establishment of the first 
Ministers of Higher Education and Research in 1993, under the Balladur cabinet. In the following 
decades the competences for these policy fields were differently organised on the basis of functional 
delegated ministers, to be finally merged into a unique Minister for Higher Education and Research 
under the last Raffarin Cabinet (during that period the proposals for the Research Act were under 
discussion). 
In addition to the frequent changes characterising the evolution of their formal institutional structures, 
the coordination between these two R&I institutions was further complicated by their different 
framings concerning the innovation process. Indeed, also according to our interviewees, the Minister 
of Higher education was perceived has having an approach highly oriented towards basic research, 
and de pi e ome openne  o ard  he role of en erpri e , i  ill remained he mini er of P blic 
Re earch Organi a ion . So, hene er PRO  or HEI  faced problems, they would be the focal point 
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of MESR intervention, rather than the role of enterprises and applied research (INTERVIEWE 21-
15-). 
The MINEFI was perceived as mainly oriented towards helping enterprises and the innovations 
developed by them; whereas the MESR had a vision of innovation related to PROs (EPICs). So, the 
main issue was that these two ministers had different framings of the innovation processes, and its 
rela ed i e , beca e he  referred o differen  con i encie , herefore they saw things 
differently (INTERVIEWE 17). 
Consequently, at worst, some degree of competition could even arise between the two ministries; in 
any case this pattern of interactions prevented an overall view of the system, and much of the national 
R&I strategy depended on the individual in charge of the ministries concerned (European 
Commission, 2003a). As suggested by one of our experts:  
“[…] it is true, it can be conflictual the relationship between different ministries with shared R&I 
competences, but not always. For example, in 1999, when the innovation law was approved, Claude 
Allegre and Dominique Strauss-Khan got along very well (INTERVIEWE 15). 
Indeed, as mentioned in the case study description at Chapter 5, these ministries jointly gave mandate 
to Henri Guillaume in order to draft a report on national Research and Innovation activities in France.  
This cooperation, and the suggestions provided by the report,  gave birth to the most relevant French 
interventions in the field of R&I during the 2000s. Firstly, the design of the 1999 Innovation act, 
which consistent of an instrument mix aimed exactly at creating synergies between research and 
b ine  orld, herefore among he differen  con i encie  of he o mini er . And, econdl , 
the Innovation plan in 2003, which boosted and strengthen the strategies implemented by the former 
law. The coordination embedded in the policy mix characterising these two strategies was related 
with an underlining logic of boosting cooperation between public and private R&I performers, 
therefore overcoming the strictly ministerial-constituency limitations stressed by interviewees.  
In addition to the internal and external collaboration forces, the MESR was also highly exposed to 
institutional (and more informal type of) relationships with different functional Ministers (e.g. 
Mini er of Ecolog  and Energ ; Mini er of Tran por a ion ). 
Indeed, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, despite the adoption of the BCRD, the MESR 
played the role of formal coordinator, despite different functional ministers preserved enough powers 
to develop their own strategy for research, by interacting directly with the Minister with budget 
competences (Cytermann, 2006). Similarly, in the case of the MIRES, despite the introduction of an 
in egra ed moni oring of go ernmen  re earch programme , each f nc ional mini er pre er ed i  
own budget, and competences, over the design of ministerial research strategies  (OECD, 2014). 
Therefore, the nature of the MESR piloting capacities remained rather incomplete.  
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Ministers with integrated competences in R&I did design a unique mission for governmental research 
strategy, but actually the programs making up the strategy clearly mirrored different functional 
research competences showing how actually the dialogue between project managers (different 
ministers) was less structured than among department within a unique ministerial organisation 
(Cytermann, 2006). 
Certainly, as highlighted by our interviewee (INTERVIEWE 17), the mainly consultative nature of 
these strategies, the weak role of some specific interministerial forums (e.g. CIRST) and the lack of 
any type of incentive for collaboration hampered their success.  
This is confirmed by the fact that different national functional ministers still play a relevant role in 
the allocation of funding for public research (Lepori et al., 2017), especially in the definition of 
contracts with their supervisees (Public Research Organisations). 
The table below provides an overview of the MIRES organisations in 2012. The MESR was the major 
contributor to the mission, with five programs funded out of the 10 included in the strategy.  
 
Programme Title Funding ministry 
142 Higher education and agricultural research Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Forestry 
186 Cultural research and scientific culture Ministry of Culture and 
Communication 
190 Research in the fields of sustainable energy, development and 
planning 
Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable 
development and Energy 
191 Dual-use research Ministry of Defence 
192 Research and higher education in economic and industrial 
fields 
Ministry of Economy and Finance 
150 Higher education courses and university research MESR 
172 Multidisciplinary scientific and technological research MESR 
187 Research in environmental and resource management MESR 
231 Student life MESR 
193 Space Research  MESR 
 
Table 6. 1 The Ministerial contribution to MIRES (2012) 
 
Among the programs autonomously financed by the MESR it is worth noting the characteristics of 
two programs. The programme 172, which funded PROs like CNRS, INSERM, INRIA (institutional 
block funding), the ANR (competitive funding) and tax incentives like the CIR; and the programme 
150 financing only HEIs under the supervision of the MESR, since also Higher Education was an 
area highly contended between ministries. Indeed, some of the schools considered to be the most 
prestigious ones, e.g. Grandes Écoles, fell under the supervision of other functional ministers (for 
example the Écoles des Mines was under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance), 
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who were extremely reserved against any attempt of interference by the MESR (Cytermann, 2006, p. 
88). 
If we look at the programs under the competences of other ministers than the MESR, these were 
mainly ministers detaining a joint supervision of a PROs: the Minister of Agriculture with the INRA; 
the Minister of Economy and Finance (INRIA), the Minister of Defence (CNES).  
Unfortunately, disaggregated data were not available, but the nature of the ministerial-based 
programs, and the fact that these ministers supervise some specific Higher Education Institutions and 
PROs, can be symptomatic of a still persistent functional-based ministerial struggle for power69.  
Consequently, the coordination game between public actors involved in the governance of national 
R&I policies is complex, the boundaries of their institutional competences are sometimes fuzzy and 
path dependent effects seems to play a relevant role in the distribution of power among actors.  
Under the Sarkozy presidency, within the framework of the Investment for the Future Plan, a new 
layer was added to the complex national governance of the system, through the creation of the General 
Commissariat for Investments. As argued by one of the experts we have interviewed: “with the CGI 
they didn’t create coherence among the organisations involved, but rather competition between 
ministers and the PIA” (INTERVIEWE 15). 
After the centralisation of decision-making competences under the supervision of the Prime Minister, 
and the implementation of the program through public agencies, there seemed to be any organic link 
with other ministries. In the case of the IDEX program, the Technological Research Institutes and the 
creation of Technological Transfer Acceleration Companies (especially those within the 
competitiveness clusters), the PIA interacted closely with the MERS and the Minister with delegated 
competences on Industry70. While, on the other hand, the general system of allocation of funding did 
not create any link between the ministers in the affected areas of competences, resulting in systemic 
frictions between the old and new institutions with overlapping missions and different operating 
methods (OECD, 2014, p. 42). 
According to one of the experts we have interviewed, the CGI represented a very powerful actor in 
the interpretation of the PIA, since every decision regarding the allocation of funding had to be 
negotiated with the committee (INTERVIEWE 12). Also, Musselin (2017) argued that as a result of 
 
69 When presenting the MIRES architecture to the Higher Council for Research and technology (CSRT), an observer 
noted a certain correspondence between the programs of the other ministers and the major technical bodies of the state 
(Corps d’ tat): energ  and ind rial re earch  Corps de Mines, Eq ipmen  ran por  and habi a  Corps des Ponts, 
D al re earch  Corps des ingénieurs de l'armement, Higher ed ca ion and Agric l ral Re earch  Corps du Génie 
rural et des Eaux et Forêts (Cytermann, 2006, p. 87). A relevant detail for understanding the whole picture is the fact that 
many of the personnel in the corps are people coming from a Grandes Écoles training.  
70 For what concerns the integration of the PIA within the broader framework of Ministerial programs it is worth noticing 
that after 2014 the CGI reports to the Minister with delegated competencies to Industries, in the effort to ensure operational 
cooperation with other innovation programs. Before it was reporting to the Prime Minister only (OECD, 2014). 
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the increasing relevance of the Commissariat, the MERS was increasingly marginalised and deprived 
of the control over some of its necessary means of intervention.  
Ne er hele , i  i  riking o no ice ho , he CGI a  in rod ced abo e  he comple  em of 
interactions between ministers and R&I performers, which was smartly circumvented through the 
leadership role of the committee, which was exclusively under the supervision of the Prime Ministers, 
and consequently of the President of the Republic.  
 
6.3 Interest 
French R&I policy making has an extensive record of consultations with R&I performers, the first 
case date back to 1956, with the  Colloque de Caen, followed by Les Assisses Nationales (1981), 
which anticipated the adoption of the 1982 law on research, and by the consultation during the design 
of the 1999 Innovation Plan and the 2003 Innovation Act. While, as mentioned in Chapter 6, 
following on from the beginning of the SLR movement in 2003 a national dialogue was organised in 
2004 (the General state for Research) in order o collec  R&I performer  opinion regarding he 
features of 2006 Research act. Ultimately, the most recent consultations took place during the 
definition of the National Strategy for Research and Innovation (2009), then again in 2010 with the 
Roundtable for Industry and finally in 2013 with the National Conference on Higher Education 
(Assises de l’einsegnement superieur). These events were meant to create a more favourable 
environment for building consensus among R&I performers (OECD, 2014). Therefore, as expressed 
by one of our interviewees, they often represented consultative, rather than strategic, forum for 
discussions in which the establishment of an effective collaboration seemed impossible to reach 
(INTERVIEWE 19). 
Consequently, as argued by one of our interviewees (INTERVIEWE 17) the shift towards public 
agencies by ministers (making reference to the trend started in 2005) could exactly be interpreted as 
being driven by the search for neutrality and professionalism, aiming a  compen a ing polic  maker  
competencies and externalize the management of highly salient issues.  
 
6.3.1 The creation of the Agency for Research Funding (ANR) 
The relationship between EPST, HEIs and the Minister of Higher Education and Research defined a 
complex mechanism of funding streams and interactions including also different functional ministers 
according to specific policy issues.  
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Major research organisations were linked with their respective parent minister by contracts71, which 
assigned them general objectives, that were then taken into consideration during the internal 
allocation of priorities between research teams. Similarly, universities negotiated contracts with the 
Minister of Higher Education and Research, which involved the provision of specific funding 
allocations. 
Within this system of power relations EPSTs detained a considerable supervisory latitude in their 
strategic choices and internal allocation of resources, therefore being quite influential in setting 
national research priorities (IGAENR, 2012). Because, despite the institutional architecture designed 
for he defini ion of he MIRES and for he di c ion of PRO  b dge , he arbi ra ion on b dge ar  
appropriations for research didn  take place on the basis of major research themes, but it was 
essentially done by the operator itself (French Court of Auditors, 2013). Moreover these organizations 
brought together under a single authority different functions that in other countries tend to be spread 
out among several institutions: the orientation, funding, execution and evaluation of research in their 
respective fields (OECD, 2014, p. 125).  
Therefore, as expressed also by some of our interviewees the public research landscape looked quite 
unbalanced. On the one hand, universities seemed o be le  po erf l  beca e he  were 
fragmented across the national territories; whereas big PROs, essentially financed by the state, were 
bigger organisations with a structured network of national laboratories, which allowed them to design 
a well-structured national strategy (INTERVIEWEES 17-21).  
As already mentioned in Chapter 5 this divide was not only functional, but to some extent it was also 
cultural72. Indeed, it is striking how this cleavage was also present in the movement (SLR) against 
the 2006 Law on Research, as reported by one of our interviewees involved in the group 
(INTERVIEWE 19): yes, it is true, the relationship between PROs and universities have always been 
a little bit difficult. […] Initially, the SLR movement was structured around mainly PROs researchers. 
Then, we quickly realize that it was necessary to open the movement to universities as well, and 
actually some of them joined the protest. But I think that, already by the selection of the name (“Save 
the Research”) some people from the universities believed that they weren’t concerned. 
 
71 The contractual nature of the relationship between research performers and policy makers was introduced by the 1982 
law on research and further enhanced by the 1999 Loi Allegre, but their provision became compulsory only in 2007 with 
the approval of the law on the autonomy of universities (Art.7). 
72 As argued by one of the experts we interviewed (INTERVIEWE 13): “it is necessary to understand that in France 
universities didn’t use to be relevant institutions. Differently from other countries, the executive élites are not trained 
within universities. This is historically related with French Revolution, at that time universities were related with the 
church. Since the revolution was anticlerical, we have created new élites detached from the church, with the creation of 
the Grandes Écoles; which has been enhanced during the Napoleon era, and in 1945 with the creation of ENA. Therefore, 
French bourgeoisie trains their children in the Grandes Écoles, not at universities. In these institutions the goal is not to 
“learn to do” but to “learn to learn”, therefore French lites tend to be quite detached form research and science (with 
the exception of some highly intense Grandes Écoles institution e.g. École Normale Sup rieure or École Polytechnique)”. 
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A push towards changes in the power balance between PROs, and Universities was given by the 2007 
Law on the autonomy of universities that, by leveraging on some of the instruments approved by the 
2006 law on research, attempted to introduce an evaluation culture in the management of public 
funding systems73. The underlining logic of the LRU was to put universities at the centre of the system 
as main operator of public research (Musselin, 2017)74, which ran in parallel to a transition from a 
fully-block funding based research system towards a system in which funding for research were also 
assigned on a competitive basis.  
The ANR, established in 2005, changed its status becoming in 2007 a public agency in all respect, 
with administrative and financial decision-making autonomy, under the supervision of the Minister 
of Higher Education and Research. The agency took over the support actions previously financed 
through the FRT and FNS; subsidizing basic and applied research undertaken by public research 
organizations, universities and SMEs; as well as some direct institutional funding to research 
laboratories (Arnold, 2007; Lepori et al., 2017). Moreover, from 2010 onwards it has been appointed 
as the manager of the competitive funding system introduced with the Investment for the future plan 
(PIA).  Its underlining mission concerned the funding of research performers, according to the 
thematic priorities identified by the government, and these resources complemented PROs and 
Universities budget allocations.  
Over the years some researchers have expressed their concerns regarding the increasing power of the 
ANR and its direct ministerial control, claiming that this would have been detrimental to the 
multidisciplinary nature of PROs, mirroring the strong disagreement between governmental 
authorities and scientific community on who should identify national research priorities (Eparvier, 
Patrick; Turcat, Nicolas; Schoen, Antonie; Carat, Gerard; Nill, 2008). This has also been confirmed 
by one of our interviewees (INTERVIEWE 22): it is true, at the beginning the ANR was badly 
perceived, because there were already research operators, working on their programs…but everyone 
was doing its own thing in a corner. These researches were all relevant in their fields, but on the 
other hand we noticed that there were different scientific small and divided groups according to 
different themes. 
 
73 It is worth noting how this law was one of the strong suits of Sarkozy presidency, who was Minister of Economy 
Finance and Industry during the previous legislation, at the time when the 2006 Law on research was approved. Therefore, 
this might be also a reasonable interpretation for its coherence with the newly approved Law on the autonomy of 
universities.   
74 An example for that logic was the creation of PRESs (Research and Higher Education Clusters), a contractual tool for 
grouping Higher Education and PROs in geographical proximity, in order to pool their resources and create a unique 
cluster to manage research, education and valorisation activities. They represented a strategy to aggregate the different 
components of public research according to different thematic.  
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The expression of concerns from the research community regarding the capacity of the ANR to 
establish thematic priorities for French public research, paved the way for some changes in the 
go ernance of he organi a ion, i h he in rod c ion of he Alliance  in 2010. The e ere 
coordination institutions bringing together different public stakeholders in a given research domain 
to enhance coordination (Zaparucha, 2010); they were involved in the programming of the agency 
and they played a role in the priority setting exercise.  
As argued by the OECD (2014), the new role of Alliances within the design of ANR priorities entailed 
reinstating the planning function itself within the PROs, which run counter to the previous trend of 
separating powers (p.131). On the same line, the discontent of the research community pushed the 
ANR to introduce, in the same ear , he fir  ro nd of Programmes Blanc”, reserving a share of 
the budget allocation to non-thematic programs. Therefore, despite the introduction of an agency 
devoted to research funding allocation, the main constituencies of the sector detained a relevant 
bargaining power, and they managed to influence the nature, and powers, of the ANR.  
The budget allocated to ANR has been gradually increasing until 2009, when it levelled off and began 
to drop, with a slight increase in the last two years, as demonstrated from the table below 75.  
 
 
Table 6. 2 Evolution of budget allocation of the ANR (2005-2007) 
 
The endowment provided by the agency comes from the intervention appropriations included in the 
program 172 of the MIRES (see Table 6.1), and after 2010 from the PIA funding.  
The reduction in the allocation of funding to ANR has been initially justified by a shift towards a 
system of direct institutional funding allocation to PROs, as decided during the Asisses de la 
 
75 Taken from senate legislative report for the draft of the budget law 2019 http://www.senat.fr/rap/l18-147-323/l18-147-
32315.html (Last access 8 May 2019). 
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recherche 2012 by the Government (Hollande). On the other hand, this argument was no longer valid 
in recent years, to the extent that several EPSTs have experienced a reduction in their institutional 
funding streams76. Therefore, he red c ion of he ANR  b dge  alloca ion did rather flow into credits 
for project operators in the form of recurring grants.  
Consequently, despite the initial inflow of funds, and the flexibility in terms of changes in the 
governance arrangements, the ANR has struggled to find its position in the French R&I system that 
according to the OECD (2014) remained sensibly weighted towards PROs.  This was somehow in 
line with the results of the country report by Lepori et al. (2017), according to which the overall 
importance of project funding in the French public research system is rather low, and Public Research 
Organisations have a pivotal role in the management of public funding for research. 
 
6.3.2 The Private R&I Performers: an agency (ies) to rule them all 
The cleavages cutting across French R&I policies do not solely emphasize the divides existing among 
public research operators, to the extent that also the division between Public and Private actors is still 
quite pronounced. As argued by one of our interviewees (INTERVIEWE 13): Actually, the rupture 
between academic research and innovation in France is a very important, and long-lasting problem. 
The mistakes are shared to the extent that French universities have never enjoyed working with 
companies, and companies have not really enjoyed working with academic research either. 
According to the Berger Report (2016)77 the last 15 years of reforms in the French R&I system have 
mainly been designed to correct the perceived inabilities of the academic scientific community to 
establish linkages with industries; by replacing their role in the marketing of products and services 
resulting from the scientific advancements made in laboratories.  
In the former paragraphs we have extensively discussed the role public research performers played 
in this game, therefore it now becomes necessary to investigate the other side of the coin, meaning 
how did private R&I performers influenced the evolution of policy design and the way policy makers 
interacted with them. 
The French ind rial em a  hi oricall  charac eri ed b  Grand Program , a legac  diffic l  
to dismantle, as clearly demonstrated in the case of public research performers. This was further 
deepened by the low level of private participation in the R&D effort and the well-pronounced long-
lasting governmental attitude to invest mainly in specific sectors. Following on from the beginning 
 
76 As stated in the legislative report for the draft of the budget law 2017 http://www.senat.fr/rap/l16-140-325/l16-140-
32514.html (Last access 8 May 2019). 
77 This report was commissioned in 2015 by the Minister of Economy, Industrial and Digital Technologies (Emmanuel 
Macron), and the Minister for Higher Education and Research (Thierry Mandon) to Suzanne Berger, professor at the MIT 
and expert in technology transfer.  
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of the liberalization era, there has been an increasing propensity to sustain the development of national 
companies towards the acquisition of a dominant position in the international market, together with 
a more systemic support to the network of SMEs (BCG & CM INTERNATIONAL, 2008).  
Overall, the system suffered from the lack of SMEs technology-based companies, governments 
seemed to have changed their rhetoric towards large state-led companies. However these actors were 
ill (e en if more indirec l ) benefi ing from he lion  hare of p blic ppor  for R&D (Eparvier et 
al., 2009, p. 21). Therefore, as demonstrated in the following paragraphs, the dichotomy Big 
Enterprises versus SMEs has been persistent since some decades in French R&I policies. 
The landscape of private R&I performers was highly heterogenous, with different waves of salience 
on the role of SMEs as drivers of innovations and the persistent bargaining power of big enterprises 
on the background. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Chapter (5), even if the targets might have 
changed overtime, moving towards SMEs, the modus operandi of p blic a hori ie  didn  eem o 
ha e changed m ch being mainl  cen red aro nd an ind cemen  b idie  in e change of in ended 
beha io r . Thi  rend co ld be ea il  confirmed b  he pe of p blic agencie  pop la ing he ide 
landscape of public intervention towards innovative SMEs, and the evolution of their nature.  
For what concerns public strategies aimed at the valorisation of research results in the industrial 
system, and more broadly public support to SMEs, a public agency was in place since 1967: the 
ANVAR. With its 24 regional offices around the country, the agency played a double role by 
monitoring the evolutions and results of innovative sector of the economy, while assisting SMEs 
development. It provided support through interest-free loans for SMEs, repayable in case of 
successful projects; together with information guidance, access to consultancy services to support the 
creation of partnerships among actors. During the 1990s it started to focus more directly towards 
SMEs. In parallel with the actions of ANVAR, in 1982 the government introduced a specialized 
financial institution with a public-interest mission: SOFARIS. This agency aimed at the management 
of the guarantee funds coordinated by CDC78, European and regional finance. In addition to them a 
third organization was created in 1997, the Development bank for SMEs (BDPME), which provided 
public guarantees for high risk investments, therefore working in partnership with private credit 
system institutions.  
In 2005, almost in co-occurrence with the creation of competitive clusters, all these agencies were 
merged into a unique organization OSEO, a holding company owned by the state mainly reporting to 
the MINEFI, with the status of a private company and a mission of public interest (Schoen et al., 
2008). The tasks of this organization have been structured around three subsidiaries programs, 
corresponding to the activities of the former organizations in place, meaning: project-based support 
 
78 This is a state bank which funds companies and is heavily involved in innovation and SMEs financing (OECD,2014).  
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for innovative technologies (ex-ANVAR), loans guarantee system supporting banks and providing 
equity contributions to innovative SMEs (ex-SOFARIS) and the financing of business investments in 
partnership with other organizations (ex- BDPME) (Dosso, 2014). This merge was in line with one 
of the strategic orientations defined in the 2003 Innovation Plan to make OSEO the main public 
operator in the field of innovation, in charge of managing and implementing the measures established 
by the government to promote innovation  especially towards SMEs (European Commission, 
2005a). 
Before the creation of this umbrella organization, the budget allocation in support for R&I in the 
private sectors, especially those devoted to SMEs, were managed in a fragmented way by the three 
organizations in addition to the delegated regional offices related with the Minister of Higher 
Education and Research and the Minister of Economy Finance and Industry ( the Regional Research 
and Technology Delegation DRRT and the Regional Division for Industry, Research and 
Environment DRIRE).  
Therefore, the establishment of OSEO represented a strategy to rationalize the structure of innovation 
support for SMEs, along with the implementation of Competitive Clusters, which were also hinging 
upon the cooperation of these actors. So, after a period of stratified intervention towards SMEs and 
the delegation of their implementation to three different agencies, with the reorganization of OSEO 
policy makers re-centralised the implementation of R&I interventions under the supervision of the 
MINEFI.  
The nature of OSEO has been evolving over time, firstly in 2008 with the absorption of the Industrial 
Innovation Agency (AII), created within the framework of the competitive cluster policies. Following 
this merge, OSEO became the manager of the interministerial fund for collaborative projects.  
Then, in 2010, after the kicking off the Investment for the Future Plan, OSEO, together with ANR 
mainly for research-oriented projects, became one of the operators of the program.  
Ultimately in 2013, after the election of the new President of the Republic, OSEO disappeared for 
being incorporated, together with a branch of CDC and the Regional Fund for Strategic Investments, 
within a new public institution called BPI France. This was a public investment bank financing 
innovation activity through a different portfolio of actions, from the provision of loans and 
guarantees, to the shadowing and consultancy of innovation projects. 
The evolution of this agency represented a clear proxy for the state approach towards private 
performers in R&I. In the case of OSEO, policy makers were behaving such as private banks, 
providing out-of-market loans to innovative enterprises; with the supplement of consultancy services. 
Whereas, in the case of BPI France, the state became a shareholder of the innovative projects, being 
more centred around the innovation potential of the enterprise.  This seemed to be in line with the 
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p blic holding model  (Eparvier et al., 2011) described in the case of the PIA where, through the 
provision of different funds, the central administration detained financial stakes in innovation 
organizations, without the cost associated with their management.  
As reported by one of our interviewees (INTERVIEWE 21), the main problem with OSEO was that 
i  a n  r c red a  a pri a e bank, e peciall  for ha  concern  pr den ial reg lation, on the other 
hand this helped gaining freedom in managing highly innovative projects. Whereas with BPI we sort 
of overcame this issue; indeed, there has been an evolution towards taking risks in terms of innovative 
investments, which were closely followed by the agency that was autonomous in its (project 
investment) decisions.  
Therefore, despite the different historical phases national innovation policy has gone through, the 
underlining logic of intervention towards SMEs has often been to (financially) support private actors, 
and accompany them through consultancy. A pattern of carrot and sermons, which attempted to 
blandly nudge heterogeneous and differentiated actors towards the preferred behaviours.  
 
6.4 The role of tax research credit for business 
As we have already stressed, the dichotomy big enterprises versus SMEs has always been a constant 
of French R&I policies. The path dependent lock-in effects related with the legacy of state led R&I 
programmes, which tended to rely on the cooperation of big national enterprises, seemed to have 
consistently influenced the evolution national strategies. 
Right after the beginning of the liberalisation process, there has been a change in direction towards 
the role of SMEs, especially boosted by the creation of the competitive clusters. Then, as stressed in 
Chapter 5 the devotion towards SMEs decreased, and it was slowly included within the broader set 
of actions of the investment for the future program. Despite this fluctuating scenario, there has been 
an instrument addressed to support the innovative potential in big and small enterprises that did 
manage to survive from 1983 until nowadays: the research tax credit. 
According to our interviewees the crédit d'impôt recherche (CIR) did manage to survive because it 
was created and modified by different party in government, therefore it was not clearly related with 
a given political faction (INTERVIEWE 13), moreover enterprises did like it and especially, as 
reported by one of our interviewees: as an MP use to say regarding to fiscal niches: it is good to 
abolish fiscal niches, but within each niche there is a dog that bites (INTERVIEWE 17). 
Therefore, the combination between a strong constituency in support of the instrument, together with 
the intra party stratification process, crystalized the position of this instrument within the broader 
national policy mix.   
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As described in Chapter 5, this instrument has undergone through three different important phases of 
changes. The first one, with the drafting of the budget law of 2004, when the instrument was 
established (before it was based on a multi-year programming and after on a yearly-based) and the 
volume-based calculation of expenses was included. This reform was adopted under the mandate of 
Francis Mer, as Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry, a French business man, who had a 
prominen  role i hin he MEDEF, he large  emplo er  federa ion in France. 
As reported by one of our interviewees (INTERVIEWE 20): in 2000 the MEDEF published a report 
called Priori  measures to boost innovation in France 79. There, among other claims, the 
organisation clearly stated the need to reinforce the CIR, with a change in the methods for calculating 
the credit was needed, as well as the adoption of OECD definition for R&D (less restrictive than the 
French one ) and he general broadening of he ba e for credi  calc la ion80.  
The second important change of the instrument was adopted in 2006, therefore under a new Minister 
of Economy, Finance and Industry (Sarkozy) and right after the implementation of the competitive 
clusters. It introduced new costs as eligible for the tax deduction, as well as the possibility to 
subcontract research to third actors (e.g. like those involved in the future PRES or in the Competitive 
clusters) and an increase in the ceiling for expenses. Finally, the 2008 reform under the combination 
of the Christine Lagarde as Minister of the Economy Finance and Industry and Nicola Sarkozy as 
President of the Republic, suppressed completely the increase-based calculation, it adopted the 
Frascati Manual (OECD manual for collecting and using R&D statistics) for the classification of 
expenses and finally it removed any ceiling. As reported by our interviewee it seemed that effectively 
the evolution of the CIR somehow took inspiration from the suggestions made by the MEDEF report.  
The evolution and different calibrations of the instrument also suggested how this has been moulded 
according to different targets. Indeed, the balance between increase and volume-based calculation 
(finally removed by the reform 2008), awarded private actors who increasingly performed innovation 
over time or new enterprises which had no previous fiscal records of innovation and could benefit of 
a generous CIR in the first years of existence. On the other hand, the shift towards a full volume-
based calculation of the CIR allowed enterprise to get a constant share of tax credit according to the 
amount of innovation financed, somehow penalising more dynamics, and less constant, innovative 
enterprises. Nonetheless, the most relevant change in terms of target population access to the 
in r men  a  he elimina ion of he e pen e  limi . The ceiling  of e pen e  had been gro ing 
starting from 2003, moving up with the 2006 reform, to be finally completely removed under the 
 
79 Les mesures prioritaires pour une accélération du mouvement de l'innovation en France . 
80 https://www.lesechos.fr/2000/12/le-medef-souhaite-une-loi-cadre-pour-linnovation-758745 (last access 13 May 
2019).  
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Sarkozy presidency reform. These changes basically paved the way for big enterprises to exploit the 
benefits related with the R&D credit, since before, with the limit of expenses, they could only partially 
benefit of it. As claimed by some of our experts (INTERVIEWE 15): after the removal of the 
threshold the CIR has rather facilitated big enterprises. 
If we look at the data from the yearly evaluation report on the CIR made by the Ministers of Higher 
Education and Research81, the share of SMEs (blue area in the table below) benefiting of the credit is 
higher compared to the number of big enterprises (green area in the table below). On the other hand, 
when we look at the expenses of R&D declared, bigger en erpri e  end o repre en  he lion  hare 




Figure 6. 3 Recipients of tax research credit by enterprise size 
 
 































Figure 6. 4 Share of tax credit benefits by enterprise size82 
 
As Figure 6.3 and 6.4 show, SMEs enterprises represent the largest share of private R&I performers 
applying for tax reduction within the CIR scheme with peaks of 86% of the total sample in 2005, 
88,9% in 2012 and 89,8% in 2013. This trend seemed to be constant across all the period under 
investigation. 
However, if we look at how much did actually different enterprises benefited of the tax credit, the 
situation is almost flipped over, with big enterprises reaching a peak of 69,5% of the total benefits 
provided in 2010 and stabilizing around that amount for the rest of the period under investigation. 
Moreover, it is also worth noticing that SMEs dropped from a value of 55% in 2005, to 21,7% in 
2007, followed by a slight increase in 2008 (27,4%), which slowly increased to a last peak of 31% in 
2013. Overall, despite its role in contributing to national research expenses, the CIR basically allowed 
to decrease fiscal pressure on enterprises, due to their investments in R&D. So, as argued by one of 
our interviewees, the tax credit became the only instrument really in the hands of enterprises, because 
all the others were exhortations from policy makers (INTERVIEWE 20). 
In the French R&I sector, business demands were articulated both formally and informally. In the 
first case, consultation bodies like the Permanent Commission for Consultation with Industry (CPCI) 
advising the Ministry of Economic Affairs were called into question, bringing together experts from 
this and other ministries, industry representatives from the enterprise association MEDEF and other 
stakeholders. Moreover, also ad hoc consultative bodies drafting reports on specific issues on the 
behalf of the prime minister, and often chaired by industrialists, were another important mechanism. 
 
82 Data elaborated by the authors according to the official statistics published by the yearly evaluation report on the CIR 
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One example was the report by Christian Blanc (see 4.2) which initiated the creation of 
Competitiveness Clusters (Schoen et al., 2008, p. 22). 
More informal channels of communication took place on an issue-base mechanism between the 
Minister with delegated competences in Industry and the MEDEF. Nevertheless, it is also important 
to remember that this federation mainly represented SMEs and, as affirmed by one of our interviewees 
(INTERVIEWE 20), big enterprises tend to run their business autonomously. They could rely on the 
lobbying of the MEDEF as a forerunner, but they could also interact personally with the Ministry. As 
stated by one of our experts (INTERVIEWE 12): probably this was not a standard practice between 
the minister and the employees of the ministry; but it was rather an action by exception, triggered by 
the political powers at the highest level when they wanted to interfere.  
The possibility for big enterprises to have a voice in the policy making process, was also dependent 
upon the political attitudes of elected politicians, more specifically their openness towards the 
business world. The history of the CIR might have been shaped by these dynamics to the extent that 
also in contemporary literature we find many references to the cooperative attitude of the former 
President of the Republic (and Minister of Economy Finance and Industry), Nicolas Sarkozy, towards 
the industrial world. Indeed, he has described as an interventionist finance Minister, using his 
resources to create national champions and scare off foreign bidders (like the support in the merger 
be een Ga  de France and S e  o crea e a na ional champion  in he energ  ec or) and more 
generally as a friend of French business  (Cole et al., 2008, p. 20). Therefore, the possibility to 
overcome formal channels of interaction was really dependent upon the political openness of policy 
makers towards the business world.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
In order to shed light on the dynamics of conflict, and compromise, between the actors involved in 
the French R&I policy making we designed and approach which intersected different insights on the 
role of ideas (as the influence of dominant framing in a given political system); the opportunity 
structures provided by the institutional system (internal coordination and specialization between 
policy makers) and the role of target population (the strategies for interest intermediation).  
For what concerns the role of ideas, we were interested in understanding the combined effect of 
changes in cabinet compositions and the feedback effects related with the accumulation of long-
lasting policy framings influence and how their interaction affected the evolution, and characteristics, 
of R&I policy mixes.  
Even, if a cabinet turnover political effect can be spotted, its effect is consistently hampered by the 
dominant path dependent attitude on policy mix preferences; characterising the peculiar stability of 
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the R&I French system (Berger, 2016). Therefore, policy instrument selection process seemed to be 
truly linked to the nature of the general governance context and long-term policy styles embedded in 
national R&I strategies. And when policy makers had to decide upon how to shape the existent mix, 
given the constraints set in force by previous choices, they seemed to prefer relying on consolidated 
strategies.  
As suggested by the literature (Braun, 2008b; Chung, 2013; Smits et al., 2010), it has been recognised 
that the variety of national political and administrative institutions, and inter-institutions networks 
influence the ability of research and industrial actors to produce knowledge and innovation, as well 
as of policy makers to invest and regulate. The landscape of French R&I institutional organisation 
was organised according to an external specialisation strategy, to which many experimental strategies 
and forum for interministerial coordination have been layered on.  
Many efforts were made to create a common venue for decision making, gathering different 
interviews, but as reported by many interviewees, the lack of incentives, nullified the effective power 
of these committees and the purposive participation of different actors. Indeed, coordination to be 
effective has to be done by members of government with responsibilities on the coordination of funds 
and policy options to ensure a high level political coordination and to enforce decisions (Henriques 
and Larédo, 2013, p. 7). 
Many differences, especially in framing the issues related with R&I policy persist among the two 
ministries and the strategy to recentralize powers through the CGI seems to have only layered a 
further institution on the already intricated governance of the sector. In this specific case, the complex 
and interconnected system of interactions between minister, agencies and R&I performers was almost 
preserved and, smartly circumvented by the leadership of Sarkozy and the creation of the CGI, 
together with the entrepreneurial role played by BPI France. Therefore, by circumventing the clear 
problem of coordination at the core of an external specialisation ministerial structure (e.g. common 
budgeting), through the centralisation of some powers and the professionalisation of specific tasks 
(through public agency), a stratification strategy allowed policy makers to overcome decisional 
stalemates by delegating tasks to public agencies. So formally, institutional structures were 
coordinated, but informally there were still deep partisan and sectorial divisions among ministers with 
shared R&I competences. That was probably one of the reasons for the density of stratified 
intervention characterising the sector. 
For what concerns the structure of interest intermediation this is quite fragmented between public and 
private R&I performers. In the first case, as pointed out by the OECD (2014), the limited role in the 
competitive mechanisms for the allocation of public research funding, does not make it easy for the 
political authorities to manage public research. With the introduction of the ANR there has been a 
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strong attempt by the government to change the mechanisms of public research funding allocation, 
as well as to provide some thematic orientations. Over the years of its activity, the adoption of non-
thematic programs, and the inclusion of Alliances of public research actors softened the initial 
directive spirit of the agency. This underlining logic was somehow pursued by the PIA program as 
well, which identified areas of research priorities at the CGI/governmental level, providing a system 
of competitive funding. Consequently, the current public research system is combining elements of 
autonomous public research organisations, together with a model based on state-led programmes.  
Differently, in the case of private R&I performers, there have been different waves of salience on the 
role of SMEs as drivers of innovation. Even if the targets might have changed from the past, the 
modus operandi of p blic a hori ie  didn  eem o ha e changed m ch being mainl  cen red aro nd 
an ind cemen  b idie  in e change of in ended beha io r . Therefore, de pi e he differen  
historical phases national innovation policy has gone through, the underlining logic of intervention 
towards SMEs has often been to (financially) support private actors, and accompany them through 
consultancy. A pattern of carrot and sermons, which attempted to blandly nudge heterogeneous and 
differentiated actors towards the preferred behaviours, as confirmed by the evolution of public agency 
characteristics. As we have already stressed, the dichotomy big enterprises versus SMEs has always 
been a constant of French R&I policies. The path dependent lock-in effects related with the legacy of 
state led R&I programmes, which tended to rely on the cooperation of big national enterprises, 
seemed to have consistently influenced the overall national strategy. On the other hand, those actors 
seemed to have a bargaining power by exception, according to their cooperation with the MEDEF, 
and the different political attitudes of elected politicians, more specifically on the basis of their 













7 Chapter 7: The Italian Case study 
 
The Italian R&I sector is characterised by a highly centralised governance structure hinging upon two 
institutions, the Minister of Higher Education and research (MIUR) and the Minister for economic 
development (MIUR). The landscape is further complicated by the fact that beside these two 
institutions important contributions to the evolution of the sector, and the desire to promote research 
and innovation practices, can also be found in other ministers (e.g. Health, Agriculture and 
Environment), who respectively detain different Public Research Organisations under their control 
like the National Institute of Health (Istututo Superiore di Sanità) and the Council for Agricultural 
Research and Analysis of Agricultural Economy. This is symptomatic of the fact that the problems 
of the national R&I system are not exclusively linked with a low level of investments in R&I issues, 
but also to a lack of coordination between the field of scientific research and industry (European 
Commission, 2001). 
Historically, the Italian Innovation System relied on the on the coordination between public research 
institutions and firms, which use to be predominantly state-owned entities. As for the French case, 
this was matched with an important role of the public sector, both as a performer and financer of 
research and innovation activities.  
The end of the 1990s was marked by the beginning of a process of public service modernization, 
which involved all the national administrative system, cutting across different sectors, the so-called 
Bassanini reform (Capano and Gualmini, 2011). This process redefined the mission of several public 
institutions, and the different cabinets involved in its implementation sought to place their own stamp 
on the reforms and, in so doing, slowed the process down by changing the focus of the reform  
(Spence, 2014, p. 109).  
In the second semester of 2011 Italy was caught in the financial storm due to the worsening of the 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe; starting from 2012 the government concentrated its policies on public 
expenses reforms and on actions for promoting growth, including measures regarding R&D funding 
and the streamlining of the main research funds. This was also in line with a more general trend 
toward general reduction of funding in this sector (Nascia and Pianta, 2013). 
Overall, the national policy mix evaluation displays on one side a high polarized instrumentation 
between business-friendl  inno a ion ini ia i e , hile on he o her a re id al  approach o ard  





Figure 7. 1 The chronology of the case (Italy) 
The following chapter focus on investigating the most important policy events, as briefly summarised 
in Figure 7.1, and it is organized as follows. Firstly, we will broadly discuss the features of the 
national R&I governance structure then, we will dig into the instrumentation and the political process 
characterizing the policy design of encompassing Research and Innovation policy strategies. Then, 
we will discuss the reform characterizing the public research sectors, and the more general evolution 
of the national Higher Education Institutions. In section four we will chronologically describe and 
discuss the evolution of the instrumentation addressed to the industrial sector and finally the 
experiences of the industrial and technological districts taking place at the more regional level. 
 
7.1 The National Governance Structure 
The national R&I system basically consists of three groups of organizations: Universities and PROs, 
governmental institutions and enterprises. All of them, display a limited degree of interaction with 
each other, which indeed is considered as on the of the main weaknesses point of the national system 
of innovation (Malerba, 1993). 
In spite of the systematic attempts to link the public and private research system, the two sectors are 
still fairly detached from one another. The former is mainly focused on research of academic nature 
and more generally detached from the needs of industries, which on the other side are characterised 
by a generalised lack of demand for scientific and technological research (European Commission, 
2004b). The governance system enjoys a stable centre-of-government structure, via the development 
of multiannual national research plans, which are however matched with scarce monitoring 
procedures and uncertainties related with the availability of resources (Potì and Reale, 2011).  




Figure 7. 2 The governance arrangement (Italy) 
 
R&I activities tend to be related with heterogeneous governing tasks, to the extent that different 
research centers are attached to different ministries. Nevertheless, two ministers play a pivotal role in 
this sector, namely the Minister of Higher Education and Research and the Minister of Economic 
Development. The interministerial committee of economic planning (CIPE) develops functions of 
coordination in the field of planning and national economic policy, as well as coordinating the 
national economic policy with the community policies. Its main tasks include evaluating the DPEF, 
which defines the major strategic guidelines and the general economic strategy of the country, 
including the policy measures to foster Scientific research and Technology and the annual allocation 
of resources devoted to R&I (European Commission, 2006). 
Overall public research activities tend to be mainly concentrated among Higher Education Institutions 
and Public research Organisations. While the hybrid organisation of competitive clusters, and 





7.2 The Public Research Performers 
Public research Organisations  
The National Council for Research (CNR) was set up in 1923, and since the creation of the MIUR it 
has been put under its supervision. It was the major national public research organisation (Reale and 
Morettini, 2017) supporting scientific and technological research, its activities covered different 
multidisciplinary scientific and technological fields. For a long time (from 1923 to approximately 
2003), it has been in charge of the coordination and the funding support of national research policies. 
the first task was moved to the MIUR after its establishment (1989) and part of its financing activities 
were terminated some years later in the framework of an overall reform of public research 
organisation structures and powers.  
The CNR operated on the basis of its own three-years activity plan, defining the guidelines and 
establishing objectives, priorities and resources for the organisation actions, in coherence with the 
National Research Program (Coccia and Rolfo, 2010). It carried out institutional research activities 
in coordination with the MIUR, its main financially responsible minister, but it also collaborated with 
different functional ministers on specific projects. Together with the CNR other Public Research 
Organisations were supervised by the MIUR, such as the Italian Space Agency (ASI) and the National 
Institute for Nuclear Physics (INFN), the most relevant in terms of share of funding83. In addition to 
them there are also public research bodies under the specific control of functional ministers, among 
the biggest:  
- the National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development 
(ENEA), under the control of the Minister of Economic Development and involved in research 
concerning energy, environment and new technologies;  
- the National Institute of Health (ISS) under the supervision of the Minister of Health and 
involved in research concerning public health; 
- the Council for Agricultural Research and Analysis of Agricultural Economy, under 
supervision of the Minister of Environment and involved in research concerning Agri-food 
related themes. 
The na ional go ernance arrangemen  doe n  pro ide an  clear platform for dialogue among them; 
therefore, their action rely on the guidelines provided by the National Research Program and by their 




83 For a comprehensive list of Public Research Organizations under the supervision MIUR please make reference to the 
following: https://www.miur.gov.it/enti-pubblici-di-ricerca .  
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Universities  
Nowadays the Italian university system is made of 97 Higher Education institutions, of which 67 are 
State universities84.  
Historically, the system of funding for state universities was dependent upon governmental decisions, 
and it came together with restrictions on how these funds should be spent and distributed within the 
internal governance of the universities. The finance act of 1994 consistently reformed this system by 
introducing the Ordinary Financing Fund (FFO), a lump sum financing yearly assigned by the 
b dge ar  la  de o ed o co er ni er i ie  opera ing co , hich lef  ni er i ie  free o decided 
how to use these funds 
In parallel i h ha , d ring he la e 1990  ni er i ie  en  fir  hro gh a pha e of impo ed 
a onom  (Capano, 2008), then in 2010 a new dirigiste action of policy makers took place, allowing 
them to freely define their own statutes, under the condition defined by a tight ministerial regulation 
(Capano et al., 2016; Donina et al., 2015).  
 
7.3 Encompassing Research and Innovation strategies  
The beginning of the public research and innovation issues in the Italian case can be track down after 
the WWII, with the reorganisation of public research institutions. The National Research Council 
(CNR), founded in 1923, was transformed in Public Research Organisation in 1945, together with the 
creation of separate organisations from formerly included departments, like the National Institute of 
Nuclear Physics (INFN) established in 1945.  
In 1962 it was created the first Minister (without portfolio) for the coordination of scientific research 
under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers85. The governance of the sector was characterized 
by a minister, without related institutional budget, who played the role of supervision and control. 
While the CNR had the leading role in the public research sector as both research performer and 
manager of the main R&I instruments, namely the so-called finalized projects  (mission-oriented 
projects) and strategic projects86 (Potì and Reale, 2006; Sirilli, 2010).  
At the end of the 1960s a Special Applied Research Fund87 (FSRA l. 1089/68) was created, it 
consisted of a revolving fund with the purpose to finance research focused on economic activities, 
 
84 https://www.miur.gov.it/web/guest/istituzioni-universitarie-accreditate.  
85 The office of the Minister for the coordination of scientific research.  
86 Finalized projects, were aimed at supporting knowledge developments in specific research sectors, selected by the 
CNR, aimed at universities, public research organizations and firms. While, strategic projects, which ended in 2002, were 
collaborative research projects at the national level on priority research themes identified by the CNR, evaluated by 
external experts selected by the CNR and exclusively directed at CNR.  
87 Substituted by the Fund for Applied Research (FAR) in 1999 (d.lgs. 297/99).  
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the targets were industrial enterprises, research companies and public economic entities. The FSRA 
aimed at incentivizing research projects autonomously presented by R&I performers, together with a 
special attention towards creating network, by easing the creation of specific consortium between 
actors. 
The first clear reference to innovation issues took place in 1982, with the creation of the Fund for 
Technological Innovation (FIT) (l.46/82)88, devoted to research activities related with technological 
innovation and pre-competitive development. This was combined with the allocation of further 
resources to the Special Applied Research Fund, together with the inclusion of a targeted funding 
instrument, which allowed the minister in charge to devote an amount of the fund to specific (mission-
oriented) research projects. 
In 1989 (l. 168/89) the first Minister of Higher Education and Research was established, and a parallel 
trend towards a recentralisation of the national R&I governance at the mercy of the newly created 
institution slowly began. The following important event for the development of national R&I sector 
was the general reform of public administration undertaken by the newly elected government in 1996. 
Indeed, with the law 59/1997, so-called Bassanini I89, the Parliament asked the government to 
examine the national Science and Technology structures, which resulted to be mainly affected by: a 
weak systematic approach; the lack of assessment and foresight activities, weak planning capacity in 
elaborating strategic programmes and a feeble diffusion of the results achieved by the S&T system 
(European Commission, 1999). The analysis of the minister of Higher Education and Research, was 
incl ded in a doc men  ( Relazione alle camera del Ministro dell’Università e della Ricerca90”) and 
it followed the path defined by the Bassanini I, identifying five main steps for the reform process:  
- The delegation of some of the competences to regions for what concerns incentives in favour 
of innovation and the realization of interventions related with European funds (d.lgs. 112/98);  
- the design of a new governance system for public research (d.lgs. 204/1998); 
- the re-organisation of existent public research institutions (d.lgs. 19/99; d.lgs.27/99; d.lgs. 
36/99); 
- a revision of the system of incentives devoted to the support of industrial research and 
technological innovation (d.lgs. 297/99; DM MIUR 593/00; DM MISE 16/01/01), specifically 
concerning the reorganisation of the funding system; 
- he crea ion of Sviluppo Italia  (d.lg . 1/1999). 
 
88 The law on incentives for technological innovation was solicited by the great Italian groups, such as FIAT which was 
at the forefront in that period (Gallo, 2016, p. 18).  
89 Which was part of a broader set of norms (l. 127/97; l.1919/98), so-called Bassanini reforms, aimed at reforming and 
simplifying the public administration system and decentralizing some tasks and functions to regions and local authorities.  
90 Report to the Chambers of the Ministry of University and Research. 
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These principles have been developed through a fragmented package of reforms, which spread out 
along different years; and they have all been summarised in the following table. 




of the research 
system  
(d. lgs. 204/1998) 
Introduction of the National Research Plan (PNR Piano Nazionale di Ricerca), 
which programmatically defined research activities to be promoted. The budget 
allocations defined in this document were included in the national economic 
planning document (DPEF Documento Programmatico di Economia e Finanza), 
yearly approved by the parliament.  
Administrative 
Simplification  
[regulation # medium 
coercive] 
[low automatic] 







(d. lgs. 204/1998) 
Financed research projects on thematic areas according to the guidelines of PNR. 
Mostly collaborative projects at national level. It was jointly managed by the 
Minister of Finance and the MIUR (who had the titularity for the submission of 
financing proposals).  It required the co-financing of the public administration 
interested (30% of the budget required).  
Targeted Funding 
[expenditure # low 
coercive] 
[low automatic] 
[HEIs+ PROs+ Enterprises] 
One stop Shop 
for Enterprises  
(d.lgs. 123/98) 
It was a consulting service managed by municipalities (or aggregation of thereof) 
aimed at simplifying administrative procedures related with industrial activities 
thanks to the merge of different functions into a unique organization. Moreover, it 
also provided information advisory and corporate support for companies wishing 
to embark on an industrial activity.  
 
Consulting Service 









d.lgs.27/99; d.lgs. 36/99 
Aimed at reducing the overall number of Public Research Organisations and 
reorganise their internal departmental structure. In order CNR, ASI, ENEA. 
Administrative 
Simplification  







Managed by the MIUR, it was devoted to finance projects autonomously presented 
by performers, international projects, projects for the creation of research 




[expenditure #l ow 
coercive] 
[low automatic] 




Managed by the MIUR, it was devoted to finance research projects on themes 
identified by the minister. 
Targeted Funding 
[expenditure #l ow 
coercive] 
[low automatic] 




It contributed to the financing of recruitment for research personnel and 
outsourcing of research tasks to universities or public research organizations  
Tax exemption 






Managed by the MISE, it contributed to experimental development projects. 
De ed  e ea ch g am  bel  3 milli   a d i  c e ed 50% f he jec  
expenses for max 8 years. The subsidized rate of financing was equal to 20% of 
the reference rate into force 
Loan 






Managed by the MISE, it contributed to experimental development projects. 
De ed  e ea ch g am  ab e 3 milli   a d ela ed  a ba k l a  a  
market rate devoted to the financial coverage of the project. The interest rate 
contribution was 50% of the eligible costs, with a maximum duration of 8 years 
(on the original loan provided by the bank) 
Targeted Funding 






Table 7. 1 Instrument mix Bassanini Package 
 
In line with the general reorganization of Italian public administration, the first intervention (d.lgs. 
112/98) aimed at vertically re-organise competence divisions between regions and the central state 
for what concerns R&I financing. It delegated competences related with a set of former R&I 
incentives (l.1329/65; l. 317/91; l. 140/97) to local actors and it created a unique fund devoted to 
finance these activities: the single regional fund. Moreover, it established an important novelty for 
the services devoted to SMEs: the one stop shops for enterprise. This consisted of a consulting service 
provided by municipalities (or aggregation of thereof), which played a twofold function: simplify 
bureaucracy for administrative procedures SMEs have to go through, while at the same time 
providing consultancy on industrial activities, information advisory and corporate support (European 
Commission, 2001). 
The second intervention (d.lgs. 204/98) defined a new governance for the national system of R&I. 
The instruments adopted came together with a reorganisation of decision-making structures, the 
inclusion of R&I committees in the related ministries91 and the introduction of an evaluation system 
for the public research sector (Sirilli, 2010). At the same time, policy makers aimed at linking national 
R&I strategies with the more general economic strategy of the country, by designing a procedure to 
approve the National Research Program (every 3 years), which consistently interweaved with the 
standard economic planning procedures, involving the Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic 
Planning (CIPE). 
The revision of the incentive system (d.lgs. 297/99) eliminated all the previous interventions in the 
R&I policy field, organising inside a unique legislation the package of incentives devoted to industrial 
research. Moreover, it clearly defined the sphere of competences of the Minister of Economic 
Development and the Minister of Higher Education and Research, with their related funding 
availability. The Fund for Technological Innovation (FIT), managed by the MISE, was mainly 
 
91 The Committee of Experts for Research Policies (CEPR), the Steering Committee for the Evaluation of Research 
(CIVR) within the MIUR; the Research and Training Commission within the CIPE and the creation of technical 
observatories for R&I issues within both the MIUR and the MISE (European Commission, 2002b). 
FIT: Targeted 
funding 
Managed by the MISE, it contributed to experimental development projects. It was 
a quota of the FIT devoted to finance up to 20% of the costs for projects related 
with the areas and themes identified by the minister (Up to the minister a share or 
he al FIT all ca i  c ld be de ed   g am f ele a  i e e  f  he 
ech l gical a d d c i e de el me  f he c . 
Targeted Funding 






Public sector national development agency, under the financial control of the 
Ministry for economy and finance. It had the task of promoting productive 
activities and attracting investments; promoting entrepreneurial activities; 
supporting public administration in financial and project planning; consultancy on 
the management of national and European incentives, especially for Southern 
regions and depressed areas.  
Advisory Committee 
[regulation #l ow coercive] 
[low automatic] 
[HEIs+ PROs+ Enterprises] 
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oriented towards industrial research and pre-competitive development. It concerned aspects linked 
with the management of contributions aimed at making research support more consistent with the 
characteristics of the Italian industrial system. For implementing the measures, the granting of 
contributions was entrusted to one or more asset management companies (SGR Società di Gestione 
Risparmi) identified by tendering procedures from the minister, on the basis of the conditions 
necessary to assure an adequate performance of the service. Moreover, the limitations for investments 
(as provided by the first FIT) for big enterprises have been deleted (MISE, 2010).  
While, the Fund for Applied Research (FAR), was managed by the MIUR, and it was mainly oriented 
toward industrial research, including training and dissemination of technologies deriving from the 
activities financed by the former. It aimed at stimulating industrial research projects autonomously 
presented by companies, and to favour the establishment of new companies (MISE, 2010, p. 34).  
It represented a fundamental innovation in the national R&I instrumentation because for the first time, 
it financed industrial research with a strong focus on public-private collaborations, mobility of 
researchers and spin-off activities (Pierantozzi, 2007). The underlining objective was to facilitate, 
professors, researchers and their institutions, who wanted to transform a valid research project into a 
business venture of potential success, through the creation of a specific spin-off enterprise. It was 
inspired by a similar measure introduced in the French system (the SAIC, Industrial and Commercial 
Business Services, which was actually more direct in its goal), it provided the public research sector 
with the opportunity to pursue the creation of new business initiatives (Cobis, 2008). 
The FIT and he FAR f nd  ere mean  o in egra e each o her  ac ion, de pi e he long-term 
tendency to overlap. This drawback was closely related with the overtime reduction of the financial 
allocation for both funds, the general reduction in the number of applications, as well as the layering 
of multiple policy interventions upon their action (MISE, 2010, pp. 21 23). As we will discuss in the 
following paragraphs, these funds had a long history and they lasted for the whole period under 
investigation, despite the (sometimes) discontinuous allocation of resources, and therefore the 
impossibility to make use of their instruments on a yearly basis.  
Finally, in 2000 a national developmental agency, called Sviluppo Italia (Development Italy) was 
created; with the mission of regional promotion, investment attraction and supporting the 
development in new technologies. In February 2000 Sviluppo Italia signed an agreement with the 
MISE, to set up new technology-based firms through spin-offs from public research. The task of the 
agency was mainly devoted to support professor, researchers and students interested in developing 
and marketing the results of their research activities. Moreover, in the July of the same year (d.lgs. 
185/2000) the agency was appointed as the manager of incentives and selection of the projects, for 
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promoting the creation of new enterprises and the promotion of self-employment for the consolidation 
of different productive sectors (agriculture, industries and service sector).  
The overall goal of the Bassanini reforms, and related legislative interventions, was to improve the 
efficiency of the national R&I system, by encouraging managerial and administrative 
decentralisation; reducing the distance between policy-makers and R&I performers (the target) by 
relying on a less coercive type of instrument mix, despite they low adoption for mixed and automatic 
types of instruments. This reform was mainly addressed to the coordination, planning and evaluation 
of the national research policy but it did not introduced any strong link between the amount of 
resources available and the lines of action of the national research plan (European Commission, 
2006).  
All of that took place in the broader framework of the devolution process, which provided regions 
with increased autonomy and power to design and manage R&I policies at the regional level. 
Following on that, these actors acquired the autonomy to define their own strategy in terms of R&I 
policies, and the national government kept the necessary competences to monitor and control their 
implementation in order to transfer best practices around the national territory (European 
Commission, 2002b). The titularity of the central government in this field was closely related with 
the fact that regional innovation plans presented by each region had to be agreed with the MEF, MIUR 
and MISE to make sure that the promoted initiatives were in line with the national R&D guidelines 
and policies. The financial resources involved to support such programmes usually tended to be 
shared between regional and national governments, and also drawn upon European structural funds. 
 
7.3.1 Plan for Digital Innovation in Enterprises 
In July 2003 the Minister for Innovation and Technology (MIT) and the Ministry for Economic 
Development launched the Action Plan for Digital innovation in Enterprises, which designed an 
integrated framework of measures to promote ICT-based innovation economy. It was devoted to 
support the access to Information Technologies and technology transfer activities by SMEs (European 
Commission, 2003b). The plan was implemented throughout two different waves (2003-2005), both 
involving the cooperation of different ministers with R&I competences, under the leading role of the 
MISE and the MIT, in close collaboration with regional actors.  
The overall policy mix revolved around a combination of incentives, regulation and measures devoted 









Thematic Call for 
Innovation 
(Plan 2003) 
By relying on the resources of the Found for Technological innovation (FIT) and the 
Found for Underutilized Areas (FAS92) the plan identified specific calls for 
proposals to finance innovation projects devoted to the implementation of ICT-
related organizational system within SMEs.   
Targeted Funding 








Creation of a specific fund devoted to finance research projects of significant 
scientific value, also with regard to health safety and technological innovation, for 
the years 2003-2004. 
Targeted Funding 






The Italian Network for the dissemination of innovation and technology transfer was 
managed by Institute for Industrial Promotion providing information and technical 










By relying on the resources of the Guarantee Fund for SMEs (approved with the l 
662/96 and into force from 2000) a special section devoted to digital technologies 
was created. It provided public guarantee to SMEs in order to finance innovative 
projects related with ICT development. It facilitated credit access to SMEs, reducing 
the risk level of the credit given by banks and encouraging the consortium of 








Fund for public participation in risk capital of enterprises operating in High 
technology sectors (IT, electronics, nano-micro technologies, electro medical 
instruments). The participation addressed already established or to be established 
funds or may be implemented through a direct support to venture capital activities. 
It aimed at promoting the creation of innovative enterprises in high technology sector 
and attract traditional venture capital.  
Equity participation 






A financial facilitation (voucher) was provided to companies for the following 
activities: assistance to patent registration, business evaluation, technical due 
diligence and Ph.D. scholarships. Through this voucher SMEs and individuals could 
benefit of these services supplied by research institutes and universities accredited 








Table 7. 2 Instrument mix Plan for digital innovation in enterprises 
 
The policy mix was highly integrated not only across the two plans but also within the existent policy 
mix, as demonstrated by the thematic call for innovation projects. Both digital innovation plans relied 
on e pendi re in r men  o ppor  SME  projects, as well as on consulting instruments to 
enhance interactions with the public research sector. For what concerns technology transfer 
initiatives, the policy mix relied on information type of instruments, directed at improving the 
competitiveness of the productive system by strengthening and integrating the available supply of 
services for R&I activities. Especially the RIDITT project has been re-financed also after the years 
covering the two plans, because of its important contribution to the promotion of the competitiveness 
of the productive system (Gallo et al., 2008). 
 
92 Introduced by the Berlusconi II cabinet through the budgetary law for 2003 (l.298/02), see paragraph 7.7 on 
technological and industrial districts.  
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Despite the predominance of low automatic type of instruments, the mix appeared to increasingly 
rely on the collaboration of R&I performers and on more automatic type of delivery structures.  
Another important innovation of the plan was the joint policy making efforts of two ministers, in 
coordinating also specific collaborations among other ministries and regional actors. Indeed, the 
design of the two plans relied on a soft administrative decisional structure between the Minister of 
Innovation and Technology and the Minister of Economic Development, in order to identify the main 
lines of interventions. These, were then discussed with the other involved ministers and regions, with 
the open possibility to consult R&I performers.  
 
7.3.2 The s ra eg  Ind s ria 2015  
In the period between 2000 and 2006 R&I strategies were almost absent from the governmental policy 
agenda, which was mainly focused on specific one-off interventions included in the yearly budgetary 
law (as discussed in the following paragraphs) and on a revision of the governance for public research 
institutions and universities. With the election of the left-wing coalition lead by Romano Prodi in 
2006, public actors took on again the political burden to orient R&I national activities, with the 
defini ion of he Ind ria 2015  ra eg .  
This plan was the result of an increasing governmental awareness regarding the importance of 
innovation as a driver for economic development and competitiveness in the country, and it mainly 
aimed at creating an environment favourable to innovation and technology transfer. Its intermediate 
objective was to define major country goals on which to converge public action and the commitment 
of those actors operating in the market; while the ultimate aim was to ensure a strategic repositioning 
of the national economic system (Traù, 2009, p. 106). The program designed a medium-long term 
national strategy, and it tried to get head of the dominant legacy of one-time instruments (meccanismi 
a sportello), which demonstrated to be quite inefficient, due to the long time required to evaluate the 
projects to be financed, the instability of the funding allocations, as well as the wide discretionary 
space left to bureaucracy in funding allocation procedures (Sirilli, 2010).  
Industria 2015 involved a high degree of governmental planning resources, through the top-down 
identification of technological and productive areas of interventions (energy efficiency, sustainable 
mobility, new technologies of life, new technologies for the made in Italy, innovative technologies 
for cultural heritage), as well as related innovation goals to be achieved; together with a broader 
involvement of local authorities, industrial actors, universities, public research organizations and the 
financial system93. It relied on a policy mix which included both automatic and generalized 
 
93 http://www.industria2015.ipi.it/index.php?id=2  
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instruments, together with more selective measures tailored to the specific needs of the recipients, 
approved through the budgetary law for 2007 (l. 296/06).  
As discussed in more details in the table below Industria 2015 hinged upon: information and 
expenditure instruments aimed at supporting innovative projects (IIPs); expenditure instruments 
aimed a  helping ( hro gh p blic g aran ee) en erpri e  acce  o finance and a oma ic in r men ,  
fiscal incentives, directed at supporting the implementation of innovative strategies by enterprises 
and legal provisions devoted at easing the creation of business networks among SMEs.  
 







It financed IIPs related with the Industria 2015 plan. 
It brought together the resources formerly allocated to the FAS (fund for 
underdeveloped areas) and the Single Fund for Incentives to enterprises. 
The resources were allocated by the CIPE to the MISE. 
 
Targeted Funding 








These were project developed in specific areas, as identified by the Industria 2015 
strategy (energy efficiency, sustainable mobility, new technologies of life, new 
technologies for the made in Italy, innovative technologies for cultural heritage). 
They were managed by private managers95, with the task to identify specific support 












It facilitated access to credit and risk capital for SMEs, providing public guarantee. 
It is meant to be cyclically financed by the interest of the beneficiary enterprises in 
addition to public funding. The criteria and priorities for the implementation of the 
operations, also with reference to the recipient company and the eligible expenses 






Tax credit for 
research in 
enterprises  
Tax credit devoted to investments in specific geographical areas and expenses 
related with: machinery, software and patents.  
The tax credit was given in proportion to the amount of expenses in surplus to the 
depreciation calculated for the taxable period, and it was under the titularity of the 
MISE. 
Tax Reduction 







Tax credit equal to 10% of the expenses devoted to activities of industrial research 
and pre-competitive development. The tax credit increased to 15% in the cases of 
the research contracts stipulated with universities or public research organisations. 
The ceiling for maximum expenses is equal to 15 million euros. 
With the budgetary law of the for 2008 (l.244/2007), these ceilings were slightly 
modified. Indeed, the tax allowance for firms performing research activities in 
collaboration with universities rose to 40% of the expenses and the maximum 
amount of expenses to 50 million euros.  
Tax Reduction 






This legal provision was devoted to the simplification of the legislation related with 
the creation of business networks among enterprises. It was aimed at enhancing 
organizational coordination among companies, especially SMEs, which aimed to 
cooperate, in the development of a specific projects or for the application to specific 
funding, but did not want to merge.  
Contract 




Table 7. 3 Instrument mix Industria 2015 
 
94 It will continue to finance existing law in the same way until the implementation decrees of reorganization of the 
legislation o subsidies come into force, but it will also finance IIPs. The basic idea is to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the system by reducing the number of incentive tools.  
95 Pasquale Pistorio (energy), Giancarlo Michellone (mobility), Alberto Piantoni (hi-tech for Made in Italy), Claudio 
Cavazza (Technologies for Health) and Andrea Granelli (innovative technologies for cultural heritage) 
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The first pillar of the strategy was the Competitive and Development Fund, which was devoted to 
finance Industrial Innovation Projects, directed by different private managers, selected because of 
their proven skills and experiences in the specific strategic sector. Those managers designed the 
criteria to identify the industrial, institutional and research actors to be involved in different projects; 
moreo er, he  defined he mechani m  o ppor  projec  de elopmen  and all he nece ar  
regulations for their implementation.  
The IIPs aimed at co-ordinating activities of large-scale public and private enterprises, industrial and 
technological districts and the world of research and innovation. Their objective was to encourage 
the creation of partnerships between universities, research centres, private enterprises and financial 
capital, of national and international scope, in order to implement medium/long-term industrial 
initiatives able to make industry more competitive. 
The areas of interventions for these projects have been identified by the government, which then 
through the MISE has launched various calls for tenders, inviting industrial and research actors to 
create consortia and present project, according to one of the six areas of intervention.  
Proposals were examined by the National agency for the Diffusion of Technologies for Innovation, 
an institution created by the 2006 budgetary law (Berlusconi II government), according to technical-
scientific and economic criteria; then the MISE provided incentives to selected projects and together 
with the IPI it followed their management and administration.  
The other four instruments of the mix were then balanced according to the specific needs of each 
approved project. One of the innovations of Industria 2015, was exactly that public support for 
industrial innovation processes aimed at overcoming the correspondence incentive-specific activity, 
and it drafted the instrumentation according to the characteristics of the initiatives to be realised. This 
was also reflected by the high share of mixed and automatic delivery structures adopted.  
Indeed, the instrument mix was designed on the basis of a negotiation with the actors involved in the 
IIPs, considering also the financial commitment undertaken by involved enterprises. Within this 
system the role of the private managers was exactly to coordinate the interests of the actors involved, 
in order to define a well-suited instrument mix on the basis of he differen  projec  need .  
From a policy design perspective IIPs were the result of a strategic agreements and consultations 
between MISE, MIUR, together with the Minister for Innovation in Public Administration. Indeed, 
from both a financial perspective, due to the coordination of the funding attached to different 
ministers, and a policy-making perspective, in the process of approval of different projects, as well 
as for the appointment of project managers, the MISE closely interacted with the other ministers. This 
collaborative approach has been extended also at the local level, with the involvement of regions in 
the definition of IIPs strategies.   
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Moreover, Industria 2015 reorganized the existent funding mechanisms, not only in terms of logic of 
action but also from a technical perspective, through the merging of already existent funds. Therefore, 
it intervened in the fragmented and dispersed instrumentation that characterized national public R&I 
incentives for a long time, by merging different funding structures into the Competitive development 
fund, and by designing FIRST (Scientific and Technological Research Investment Fund), which was 
supposed to gather different funds under the titularity of the MIUR: the FIRB (mission oriented and 
basic research), the FAR (fund for applied research) and the PRIN (fund for basic research). The 
funding rationalisation process, was also supported by the creation of an organizational structure 
based on IIPs, which helped to concentrate resources on large projects and specific key sectors (Potì 
and Reale, 2010). 
Despite the limitations related with the process for identification of the six areas of intervention, and 
the ample room for manoeuvre left to the project managers in shaping the characteristics of each 
projects, Industria 2015 represented the first programmatic governmental effort to steer R&I policies 
towards specific policy goals (Silva, 2007). The underlining (soft) mission-oriented purpose of this 
strategy, was modified by the newly elected Berlusconi cabined (IV), which introduced (budgetary 
law for 2009 l. 133/2008) the possibility to identify new technological areas to be added to the initial 
six by means of a yearly revision process (Traù, 2009). 
 
7.4 The reforms in the Public Research Sector  
Until the late 1980s the governance of the public research sector hinged upon a minister, with 
supervision and control role, together with the CNR, who had a prominent role as public research 
performer and manager. This governance was mirrored by a similar funding structure in place for 
public research, indeed the CNR had the titularity in the allocation procedures for funding related 
with strategic projects, and especially for finalised projects, which were basically multiannual 
research projects in specific sectors addressed to academic research.  
Other instruments for financing basic research were managed by the MIUR, as the Research Programs 
of National Interests (PRIN)96, scientific research projects freely proposed each year by universities 
and some other bodies, selected by the MIUR through an evaluation commission and co-financed 
with public funds. Differently from the projects managed by the CNR, the PRIN included a system 
ba ed on e per  assessment, which evolved into a formally structured peer-review examination 
(Potì and Reale, 2007).  
 
96 In ministerial documents the acronym PRIN has been differently adopted, despite the reference to the same time of 
funding instruments. Until 1997 it was called 40% PRIN, from 1997 to 2004 COFIN-PRIN, and from 2005 PRIN. 
(Corradi, 2009, p. 147) 
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The PRIN started in 1981 as a fund for universities, then in 1994 changed name in COFIN, each 
program usually lasted two years; they were coordinated by a university professor, and carried out by 
research units belonging to different (or the same) universities. The financial participation of the 
MIUR for each individual project approved was the following: 
- 60% of the eligible costs was provided to universities, that in turn internally assigned to their 
professors; 
- 40% was allocated directly from the minister to the manager of the research projects.  
In 1997 (DM MIUR 320/97), the 60% quota allocated through this fund was merged within the 
funding allocation directly provided to university by the MIUR, the newly created Ordinary Financing 
Fund (FFO)97, and the remaining 40% was still bind to the PRIN procedures of ex ante assessment of 
national research projects. 
With the approval of the d.lgs. 297/99, the governance of national R&I was consistently modified, 
redesigning the system to support industrial/public research and experimental development managed 
by the MIUR. First of all, with the Ministerial Decree 593/00, which basically put into practice the 
details of the reform, the stratification of previous legislative interventions98 on public research 
funding was reorganised, with the aim of recentralising the responsibility for project funding 
allocation in the hands of the MIUR, together with a re-organisation of the existent public research 
institutions.  
The role of CNR as funding agency was slowly brought to an end. The finalised projects started to 
receive less funding from 1990s and they were replaced by the creation of two new funding structures, 
directly managed by the MIUR with the support of specific organisations in the evaluation process. 
While the strategic projects of the CNR were terminated some years later (2002) in the framework of 
an overall reform of the public research organisation role and powers. With the approval of the 
budgetary law of 2001, the government Amato introduced the Fund for Basic Research Investments 
(FIRB) (operative after the approval of the Ministerial Decree 08/03/01). This was a competitive 
funding instrument, managed by the MIUR, and devoted to finance activities aimed at expanding 
scientific and technical knowledge not connected to immediate and specific commercial or industrial 
objectives. It also aimed at strengthening interactions between public and private actors, while 




97 The finance act of 1994 radically reformed the funding of state universities through the establishment of the FFO 
(Fondo Finanziamento Ordinario). This is a lump sum budget university are free to spend as they wish to cover operating 
costs (Capano et al., 2016). 
98 Law 46/82 (art.1-13); Law. 488/92; Law 346/88, Law 196/97 (art. 14); Law 449/97 (art. 5). 
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FIRB (Fund for 
Basic Research 
Investments) 
Competitive funding managed by the MIUR and financed through the budgetary 
provisions included in the FAR. It financed projects to upgrade large public, or 
public-private research infrastructures, basic research projects of high scientific of 
technological contents, strategic projects for the development of pervasive multi-
sectorial technologies, the establishment and networking of highly qualified 




[expenditure #l ow 
coercive] 
[low automatic] 
 [HEIs+ PROs] 
 
Table 7. 4 Reform in public research sector I instrument mix 
 
It financed basic (both oriented and not-oriented) research, in coherence with the objectives identified 
within the National Research Plan; and the main targets were Public Research Organisations and 
Higher Education Institutions. Together with the Special Applied Research Fund, approved in 1998 
in the framework of the Bassanini Reform, it replaced the role of finalized project managed by CNR 
in financing public research activities. 
After the beginning of the 2000s, and the related interventions for the application of the Bassani 
reform, the national policy mix devoted to public research sector followed a discontinuous evolution 
pattern, characterized by specific one-off interventions approved in the framework of various 
budgetary laws. Two important interventions characterised this period, the first one is related with a 
change in Patent Regulation, approved in the framework of the budgetary law for 2002, while the 
second is a tax incentive addressed to individual researchers approved with the budgetary law of 
2004. 
 





(l. 383/2001 art. 7) 
In cases of employment relationship between a university or public administration 
having among its institutional aims research purposes, the researcher is the exclusive 






[HEIs + PROs] 
 
Tax Incentives to 
non-residential 
researchers 
(l. 326/2003 art. 3) 
The income from employment or self-employment of researchers who (from the date 
of entry into force of this decree or in one of the five subsequent calendar years) 
began to carry out their activity in Italy, and who consequently become fiscally 
resident in the State, were taxable only for 10%, for the purposes of direct taxes, and 
did not contributed to the formation of the value of net production of the regional 
tax on productive activities. The incentive was applied in the tax period in which the 
researcher became fiscally resident in the territory of the State and in the two 









Table 7. 5 Reform in public research sector II Instrument mix 
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With the modification of the patent regulation system, the so-called profe or pri ilege (Lissoni and 
Montobbio, 2015) was introduced. Therefore, despite professor had always enjoyed a free hand in 
dealing with IPRs matters (Lissoni et al., 2009, p. 601), after this new regulation researchers become 
the owners of the rights deriving from the patentable inventions produced as results of their research. 
Universities, and public research centres, have the authority to establish the maximum amount of the 
licence fees for the use of the invention by third parties. Nevertheless, in any case, the inventor was 
entitled to a minimum of 50% of the proceeds, or fee, for the exploitation of the invention.  
While the second instrument, adopted by the Berlusconi II cabinet, promoted a tax reduction for non-
resident researchers, either Italians working abroad wishing to come back to their home country, or 
foreign national residing aboard and wishing to work in Italy. Its ultimate goal was not only to contrast 
the widespread brain drain  phenomenon ackling I alian kno ledge ec or, b  al o o ppor  he 
technological and scientific growth of the country by easing the inward movement of new researchers.  
The overall evolution of policy mix in the sector of public research reflects the instrument polarization 
of he na ional R&I em and he re id al  approach adop ed for Uni er i ie  and P blic Re earch 
Organizations, especially after the beginning of 2000s. This trend is also evident in comparison to the 
heterogeneity, and especially the higher share of instruments devoted to business actors, as 
extensively discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
7.5 The reforms for Higher education institutions 
Higher education institutions are financed by the MIUR, who also manages the funding allocations 
for Public Research Organisations under its control, the Ordinary Fund for the Funding of Research 
Institutions and Bodies (FOE).  
Until 1994 the system for funding state universities was dependent upon governmental decisions, and 
it came together with restrictions on how these funds should be spent and distributed within the 
internal governance of universities.  
The finance act of 1994 consistently reformed this system by introducing the Ordinary Financing 
Fund (FFO), a lump sum transfers earl  a igned b  he b dge ar  la  de o ed o co er ni er i ie  
operating costs, which left universities free to decided how to use these funds.  
Between 1995 and 2003 its allocation was based on a so-called historical component, calculated 
according o he ed ca ional prod c ion of each ni er i  ( form la f nding ), in addi ion o f r her 
resources earmarked for specific governmental objectives. Starting from 2004, together with the 
institution of the CNVSU, (Committee for the Evaluation of the University System), a new funding 
procedure based on the assessment regarding the quality of teaching and the general working of the 
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university was implemented. The funding model for the FFO, was then tied to this evaluation 
procedure, establishing that one third of the fund was assigned to the basis of the number of students 
involved, one third on the outcomes of the educational process and the last share on the basis of 
number of researchers, the rate of success in the PRIN competition, and the income from research 
work commissioned from outside university.  
From 2009 onwards, with the return to power of centre-right coalition government led by Berlusconi 
(Berlusconi IV cabinet), public funding to universities started to shrink consistently and to be 
allocated according to a mixed rationality: a share based on an historical basis (funding allocation of 
previous years) and a portion according to some performance indicators. Specifically, a new 
intervention99 established that 7% of the total FFO would be allocated on the basis of the following 
criteria: quality of education supply and education results; quality of scientific research; quality 
efficiency and effectiveness of the teaching courses (Potì and Reale, 2009, p. 47). 
This funding distribution logic was said to deepen existent local imbalances in the country, 
intensifying the already existent inequalities among Universities across the national territory (Capano 
et al., 2016)100. This would likely trigger a vicious circle by which the best universities will manage 
to obtain more funding, while the worst off will further deteriorate their position because of the 
inaccessibility to new funding.  
The role of the CNVSU was replaced by the creation of a new agency, responsible for the external 
evaluation of the quality of the activities of Universities and Research Organisations receiving public 
funding: the ANVUR (National Agency for the evaluation of University and Research Institutes).  
It was officially created in 2006 (d.lgs. 262/2006), under the Prodi II cabinet, but it only became 
operative in 2011, after having been through a change in government composition and a shift in the 
political majority.  The agency was mainly devoted to evaluating national research activities, 
a e ing he q ali  of ni er i  ed ca ion program  a  ell a  doc ora e  and Uni er i ie  hird 
mission activities; it also set the minimum scientific performance requirements scholars must meet 
in order to be included in the national list of people qualified for recruitments in Universities (Potì 
and Reale, 2011). Given its nature of evaluation body, and the dependence of a share of FFO on the 
results of its assessment exercise, the agency was granted with organizational, administrative and 
financial freedom.  
 
99 Specifically, through the approval of the d.lgs. 213/2009 
100 This process tended to favour northern universities, located in the wealthier areas of the country, which were more 
capable of coping with increases in student fees, more likely to have a higher percentage of students completing their 
degrees within the allotted time; more capable of performing better in the research field, and more capable of setting off 
better results in regard to the allocation of the bonus component of funding, against the reduction in overall state spending 
in the Higher Education sector (Capano et al., 2016, pp. 127 128).  
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For what concerns the broader evolution of the governance of national Higher Education system, the 
sector has been historically characterised by a dynamic of push and pull between state and 
universities. Indeed, the first tried to pursue different rationalisation of the sector, often characterised 
by many inherent contradictions, while universities tried to resist in keeping their traditional model 
(Reale and Potì, 2009). Everything started with the l. 168/89 and the creation of the MIUR, which 
attempted to recentralise control over national university governance, which use to be left in the hands 
of different specific university-related powerful oligarchies and ministerial bureaucracies 
negotiations (Capano, 2008). Moreover, form the early 1990s, universities were provided with the 
possibility to be governed by their respective statutes, without any possible constraint from the 
ministerial side, granting these institutions with full freedom in defining their own regulation, 
management and financial strategies. Given the law rate of implementation related with the drafting 
of university internal statues, in 1995 the government approved a regulation which obliged 
universities to do so, and by 1997 all Italian universities did manage to be in compliance with the new 
regulation. Neverthele , hi  ca e of impo ed a onom  clearl  indica ed the difficulty universities 
experienced when given the opportunity to make a constitutional decision (Capano, 2008, p. 486). 
The landscape of the national governance of Higher Education institution was consistently modified 
by two legislative interventions of Letizia Moratti, the Minister of University and Research during 
the Berlusconi II and III cabinets. The reforms101, aimed at modifying the recruitment system for 
university teaching and research personnel, by introducing specific criteria regarding the national 
scientific procedures for undertaking the academic career (Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale). These 
provisions were then modified102 by the design of the new reform for the university governance, 
approved in 2010 under the Berlusconi IV cabinet, the so-called Gelmini Reform .  
This intervention arose in a general climate were universi ie  ere percei ed a  enjo ing a onom , 
i ho  re pon ibili , in hich pre re  of imilar reform  applied in o her E ropean Co n rie  
(e.g. the Law on the liberties and responsibilities of universities of the French case) were adopted to 
promo e imilar change  i hin he co n r . The Gelmini Reform  con i en l  modified he in ernal 
governance structure of Italian universities, changing the structure of power distribution among 
different internal bodies, increasing the verticalization of power and decision making within its 
internal structures (Capano et al., 2016). University Rectors were assigned with increasing powers 
and the ability to design specific policy orientation strategies for their institutions, as well as with the 
titularity to nominate Directors-General, who were responsible for the overall management of 
university technical and administrative services.  
 
101 Law 230/2005 and d.lgs. 164/2006. 
102 Art.16, C. 2 Law 240/2010.  
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Both the Senate and the Board of Governors were changed in their internal composition providing 
the former with the possibility to issue proposals in different areas (e.g. budgets, research teaching) 
and design internal regulations; while the latter with the power of strategic orientation for institutional 
strategy together with decisional powers with respect to budget, financial planning, administration 
and accounting function.  
Another important innovation with respect to the Board of Governors was that a certain number of 
members should be individuals not directly involved with university administration (since at least 3 
ear ), ne er hele  heir elec ion proced re a  lef  o ni er i ie  statutes choices. Moreover, the 
reform revised provisions regarding the recruitment of researchers and professors, it reorganised the 
internal structures of universities by abolishing faculties and providing departments with powers 
regarding the definition of scientific research, academic and recruitment business. 
Evaluation principles seemed to be a relevant criterion of the new reform process, because in 
combination with the connection between university performance and FFO allocations, an Internal 
Evaluation Committee (Nucleo di Valutazione) was provided with the responsibility of assessing all 
teaching, research and service-based activity of each university103. 
A  gge ed b  he e i en  li era re, he Gelmini Reform  eemed to be in line with the general 
tradition of external regulation in governing the national Higher Education sector. Indeed, as done in 
the past with the law creating the MIUR and the first moves toward government intervention in the 
university sphere; Higher Education Institutions have been left free to define their own statues, but 
under the invasive provisions of the new regulation (Donina et al., 2015). This reform could also be 
read as a neo-dirigiste reaction to the poor use that Italian universities have made of their autonomy 
(Capano et al., 2016, p. 108). 
 
7.6 Business actors: the industrial and technological sector 
Italy is characterized by an industrial specialization model based on traditional sectors, focused on 
intermediate technologies mainly relying on low internationalized SMEs. Overall, this structure 
suffers from a low propensity of enterprises to invest in R&I (Gallo and Silva, 2006). Economic 
specialisation is characterised by the dominance of low-to-medium technology sectors such as 
furniture, textiles and apparel, while it retains a leading position in design, agriculture, fabricated 
metal and non-metal products.  
 
103 An important new duty of this body was to connect institutional governance with system governance: beside 
submitting the results of its assessment to the senior management of the university, which could use them for strategic 
planning it also acted as an operating arm of the ANVUR (Capano et al., 2016, p. 107). 
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Starting from the 1930s the economy was effectively run by means of state participation, relying on 
specific public insti ion  like he Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale” (IRI), “Ente Nazionale 
Idrocarburi” (ENI). These actors formed part of state holding enterprises, which administered the 
majority of shares in the national leading companies (Spence, 2014, p. 105).  
At the beginning of the 1990s, this system went through a new phase and the country undertook a 
process of disposal of the very large amount of state participations in the processing industry, in the 
banking system and in the utilities sector. This process slowed down at the end of the 2000s, and not 
all the privatization processes were concretely translated into practices. Nevertheless, it set forth the 
exit of public actors from those stakeholders potentially able to provide directions to the industrial 
development of the country (Traù, 2009). 
From an instrumentation perspective, during, the 1980s-1990s, the design of public interventions in 
the R&I sector was focused on financing projects autonomously submitted by firms and automatic 
incentives were mainly directed towards the purchase of machinery. Due to the absence of any 
sectorial priority, the system endogenously favoured those firms which were able to submit requests 
for innovative projects and, especially to bear the costs connected with the delays in instrument 
activation and the effective provision of funding. The majority of public aids was devoted to a broad 
range of companies, while interventions specifically dedicated to SMEs and start-ups have been rare. 
A noteworthy exception was the l. 297/99 which focused on supporting spin-offs from public research 
(Gallo and Silva, 2006). 
The shift towards an instrumentation based on fiscal instruments during the mid 1990s, has not always 
been effective, due to the overlapping of different initiatives and the lack of an overall consistent plan 
for action; which has been further exacerbated by the irregularity of public financing (European 
Commission, 2000b). Moreover, these interventions have not always been matched with measures of 
informative, and training, nature (e.g. information campaigns, consultancy services) necessary to 
support the demand of instrument for innovative activities by enterprises.  
Overall, Italy had a relatively solid productive structure based on SMEs, which were among the main 
contributor to sustain employment and national economic growth; while large companies are still 
relatively weak and continue to shed jobs. As regard to the quality of human capital the country lays 
below the EU average, as its labour force largely consists of workers with medium to low skills 
(European Commission, 2004b). Indeed, Italian SMEs tend to mainly rely on product and process 
innovation, aimed at satisfying the demands of the clients rather than develop autonomous innovative 
strategies. Consequently, their demand for innovation is principally driven by the market and it is 
rarely strategic. Equipment, tend to be the most important source of innovation  in many 
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manufacturing firms, as confirmed by their small contribution to the development of research 
undertaken by research institutes (European Commission, 2000b). 
Starting from 1997 new measures directly devoted to SMEs have been introduced, in order to 
encourage their expenditures in R&D as well as the employment of research personnel. Public 
interventions were exactly aimed at tackling the issues of low qualified labour force, as well as the 
difficulties enterprises face in acquiring new technologies.  
One example is the Treu law (l.196/97) which supported full-time employment of professionals with 
PhD in research activities by SMEs, covering the costs of two years of contribution for each 
employee. The Law 449 of 1997, had the same objective of the previous one, but differently the 
incentive took the form of a tax credit per each employee with a PhD (or a researchers) seconded for 
a maximum of four-year period at a SMEs. Therefore, researchers could keep their job relationship 
with the relative University or PROs, and they could come back after the services period at a SME. 
Moreover, the measure allowed firms to use the fiscal incentives to pay for R&D projects carried out 
on their behalf by public research laboratories; this scheme had the objective of fostering cooperation 
between industry and public research institutions. Ultimately, SMEs have been sustained in their 
innovation activities also by the law 140 of 1997, which provided tax incentives related with a specific 
R&D-related expenses sustained by SMEs. The resulting policy mix is summarized in the following 
scheme.  
 





the field of 
Research 
(l. 196/97) 
It focused on the employment of professionals with PhD to be hired for research 
activities in SMEs.  
Targeted Funding 








It focused on the employment of professionals with PhD to be hired for research 








Tax incentives for 
R&D expenses 
(l. 140/97) 
It provided tax incentives for R&D-related expenses. It had the ultimate goal of 
encouraging SMEs to make explicit their innovation activities 
Tax exemption 





Table 7. 6 Business-oriented I instrument mix 
 
Following on from the reorganization of the R&I governance at the end of the 1990s (the set of 
reform  rela ed i h Ba anini  la ), ome of he mea re  de o ed o SME  ere delega ed o 
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regions (l.140/97); while central competences were grouped under the measures financed through the 
FIT and the FAR funds. 
A new instrument mix, always devoted to SMEs, was approved with the budgetary law for 2001 (l. 
388/2000), which was the last measure approved by the same centre-left governing coalition 
promoting the re-organization of R&I governance. 
 






connections in the 
textile-clothing 
footwear industry 
(art. 103 (5)) 
Tax reduction aimed at incentivise the development of telematic links, the speeding 
up of logistic flows, the exchange and acquisition of information, the creation of 
platforms for the development of standardised systems for the monitoring of the 
various phases of production and marketing.  
It was reserved to the textile, clothing and footwear sector in the attempt to increase 
he c m e i i e e  f ke  a ea  f he made i  I al . 
Tax Reduction 






(art.103, C. 5-6) 
Tax credit for investment programs aimed at the development of IT solutions to carry 
out electronic commerce activities and staff digital training.  
The eligible costs were related with hardware acquisition, software licences, 
consultancy services and advertising space online. The amount of the credit varied 
according to the beneficiaries. The minimum amount of the investment programmes 
h ld be e al  30.000 , a d he a  c edi  a ied 35-45% of total costs.  
Tax Reduction 





start-up (art. 106) 
It provided technical assistance for the start-up of new innovative enterprises through 
qualified selected entities. The measure covered expenses related with the following 
activities: feasibility studies, infrastructures, organizational and financial assistance, 
training, technical assessment of the projects. The measure aimed at encouraging the 
creation of business incubators that could favour the birth of innovative companies 










It provided state equity finance participation in risk capital for a minimum of 20% 
of the total capital of the enterprise. Alternatively, it could also provide funding to 
intermediary actors for the acquisition of a third enterprise capital quotas (in this 
ca e  m e ha  50% f he al am  f he e e i e  ca i al). I  a  
managed by the MISE. In order to apply for this aid, enterprises had to present a 3-
5 multiannual plan. 
Equity participation 








The incentive consisted of a tax credit that enabled firms to offset both direct and 
indirect taxes for investments on depressed areas. The incentive was exclusively 
devoted to companies carrying out specific type of activities (mining and 
manufacturing, service, tourism, trade and building activities, production and supply 
of electronic power, steam, and hot water, fishing and water farming, transformation 
of fishing and water farming products).  
Tax Reduction 





Table 7. 7 Business-oriented II instrument mix 
 
The underlining logic of the instrument mix aimed at incentivizing the adoption of ICT technologies 
in SMEs, as further promoted in the following years through the approval of the Plan for digital 
Innovation in Enterprises (as discussed above paragraph 7.3), as well as to support entrepreneurship. 
Indeed, the goal was to provide incentives to individuals to set up a new enterprise, or become self-
employed, while providing assistance during the early years of activity (when high start-up costs and 
modest amount of business is typical) (European Commission, 2001).  
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Wi h he elec ion of he ne  go erning coali ion (2001), and he igna re of he Pac  i h he 
I alian  b  he ne  Prime Mini er Sil io Berl coni, ome mea re  de o ed o relie e en erpri e 
from taxation while performing R&I-related activities were taken, together with a broader revision 
of the instruments addressed to SMEs and an increasing involvement of the private banking system 
as an intermediary structure for the implementation of these tools.  
The instrument package designed during the Berlusconi II cabinet mainly hinged upon specific one-
off interventions included in the yearly budgetary law. The same policy strategy was also adopted for 
the design of a regulation-oriented type of instrument mix, which differently had more long-term 
perspective of actions and aimed at modifying the governance of the sector.  
 





L. 383/2001  
(art. 4-5) 
It was a tax reduction for reinvested profits equal to 50% of the whole volume 
of investments in new instrumental goods exceeding the average amount of 
investments achieved in the last five years of taxation. It covered also expenses 
incurred in the training of personnel, which should be increased by no more than 









(l. 326/2003 art.1) 
It was a fiscal incentive for companies investing in R&D (product, process and 
organizational innovation). The incentive was equal to 10% of the R&D costs 
from the taxable income. In addition, a further 30% deduction was applied to the 
difference between the R&D cost of the current fiscal year and the average R&D 
costs during the previous 3 fiscal years. Among the expenses were also included 
costs of ICT related innovations. The same rule applied to SMEs that, pooling 
resources and creating consortia of at least 10 enterprises undertook innovative 
investments in information technologies. 
Tax Reduction 




Creation of the 
Italian Institute 
for Technology 
(l. 326/2003 art.4) 
Establishment of the Italian Institute of Technology (IIT). It was a foundation 
with the aim of promoting technological research and development of the 
country (mainly robotics, neuroscience, neuro technologies, computer science); 
jointly managed by the Minister of Economy and Finance, and Minister for 
Higher Education and Research 
Research institute 
[Regulation # Low 
coercion] 
[low automatic] 
[HEIs + PROs] 
Credit 
securitization 
(l. 326/2003 art.2); D.M. 
MEF 16/09/2004) 
Provided by the l. 326/04 and made operational in 2004. It reorganised the 
financing structure of R&I for the MIUR and the MISE. It foresaw the 




[regulation # medium 
coercion] 
[low automatic] 






(l. 311/04 art.4 C. 354) 
This instrument provided subsidised loans in the form of capital advances by 
CDP (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti), a national investment bank, according to a 
multi-year repayment plan. The identification of the objectives and the different 
applications of the fund was defined in the National Research Plan and devoted 
to: technological innovation, industrial sector, tourism and craftmanship sector 
plus agriculture and services. 
Cash Advance 




New measures to 
support the 
Italian economic 
system (l. 80/05) 
Modification of the incentive system for enterprises in underdeveloped areas 
(l.415/92; 488/92). It basically substituted non-refundable grants with subsidised 
loans involving the participation of the banking system.  
Loan 





Table 7. 8 Business-oriented III instrument mix 
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The Tremonti Bis was a time specific instrument (including only the expenses performed between 
the 1st July 2001 and December 31st 2002) directed at sustaining the re-modernization of existing (or 
the construction of new) plants, the completion of pending works, the acquisition of new 
tools/instruments and items (also leasing contracts). Inspired by an analogous measure approved in 
1994, it was improved in its action by including also expenses from training events organized within 
the companies or professional boards (European Commission, 2002b). It was followed by a very 
similar one-off intervention (in force only for 2004), the tecno-Tremonti, an automatic fiscal 
incen i e, a emp ing o im la e SME  R&I in e men , b  red cing heir a able income hro gh 
a combination of R&D expenses and increment.  
Differently from previous instruments, the list of eligible expenses for the fiscal deduction was 
broadly defined, therefore making it difficult to be easily applied by SMEs, and likely to be exposed 
to evasive behaviours by certain beneficiaries (on this point see Bersani, Letta, 2005 p. 16). 
In addition to these short terms measures a more substantial shift toward a new shape of instrument, 
namely loans, was undertaken. The first step of this process was the securitization of the MISE and 
MIUR ministerial credits, which started to be progressively transferred to the Italian Credit 
Securitization Company (Società di Cartolarizzazione dei Crediti Italiani). This allowed to transform 
the out-standing credits into short-term financing. The resources made available through this 
mechanisms have been used to re-open the evaluation procedures for projects submitted under the 
FIT and FAR funding schemes (European Commission, 2006). Form a policy-making perspective 
this was meant to supplement the progressive decrease in available resources for the MISE and the 
MIUR instrument implementation, and especially the lack of re-financing for many measures. 
In the same budgetary law, the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), a formerly public bank, was 
transformed in investment bank operating on the behalf of the government (which represented its 
main shareholder). By acquiring the juridical status of a joint stock company, CDP allowed for the 
participation of private shareholders in its capital104, and it became the financial intermediary to which 
were sold the shares of different companies held by the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
This process was closely followed by another measure approved in the budgetary law for 2005: The 
Revolving Fund to sustain enterprises investments (FRI). It was finalized to grant easy terms credits 
to companies, and it relied on the role of CDP as manager for loans implementation. The rules for the 
functioning of the fund were decided by the CIPE105, which established that least 30% of the finance 
was devoted to activities, programs and strategic R&D projects of companies to be carried out also 
 
104 In May 2015 the share of CDP were divided as follows: 80.1% Italian Government; 18.4% Banking Foundations and 
the remaining 1.5% in CDP internal treasury shares (http://www.cdp.it/en/company-profile/mission-and-role/mission-
and-role.html).  
105 (resolution 15/07/2005). 
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jointly with public research subjects. Overall, the fund was manly devoted to support initiatives for 
innovation promotion in less favoured regions, it was extended to technological districts, and 
supplemented in its funding procedures thanks to the Competitiveness Decree (l. 80/05).  
Moreover, the same law modified the incentive system for enterprises in underdeveloped areas (as 
provided by the l.415/92 and 488/92). It substituted non-refundable grants with subsidized loans by 
involving, at the same time, the participation of the banking system. The recipient could get 
subsidized loans up to 50% of the required financing, while signing a contract according to which: a 
share of the financing (at subsidized rate) was provided by CDP, and the other share by banks at 
market rate. In both cases the economic judgment of the R&I plan submitted by the recipients was 
analysed by the bank granting a share of the loan, and the financing could last for a maximum of 15 
years.  
The last set of reforms of the Berlusconi II cabinet was included in the budgetary law for 2006, and 
introduced the following instrument mix. 
 





for the Diffusion 
of Technologies 
for Innovation 
(l.266/05 art.1 C. 368d) 
It carried out tasks related with the economic, financial and scientific evaluation of 
industrial innovation projects. It promoted and coordinated activities aimed at 
forecasting technological-scientific and economic development trends. It operated 
on the basis of a three-year activity program updated annually, which determined its 
objectives and priorities. 
 
Advisory Committee 
[regulation # low 
coercion] 
[low automatic] 
[HEIs + PROs + 
SMEs] 
Tax relief for 
patent 
registration  
(l.266/05 art.1 C.351-352) 
Tax exemption on patent fees.  Tax exemption 
[Fiscal # Low 
Coercion] 
[high automatic] 
[HEIs + PROs + 
SMEs] 
 
Table 7. 9 Business-oriented VI instrument mix 
 
The mission for the National Agency for the Diffusion of Technologies for Innovation, was to 
gradually became a coordinating agent of the national R&I sector, especially for what concerns 
competitiveness of SMEs, industrial districts and the integration between public research and 
industrial sectors. However, after the launch of the initiative in December 2005, no major action has 
been undertaken by the government to follow-up on previous determinations regarding the tasks of 
this organisation (European Commission, 2006, p. 20). The same budgetary law provided also for the 
allocation of some resources, with the aim of paying off previous debt contracted by central 
government administration towards institutions, companies, individuals and various organizations, as 
well as the possibility to finance project adopted through the PICO (Piano per l’Innovazione, la 
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Crescita e l’Occupazione) in line with the objectives set out by the Lisbon strategy. These were 
gathered into a specific budgetary provision called innovation fund (l. 266/05, c.1:50). 
Overall, the major novelty of the Berlusconi II cabinet was the inclusion of banks in the financing 
system of innovation, for R&I performers, this meant that they were now forced to comply with credit 
and lending conditions provided by the private banking sector. Indeed, the new financing system 
didn  appear a  a friendl  inno a ion for SME  and micro-enterprises, because they were quite likely 
to face difficulties in meeting the requirements and conditions imposed by the private credit rules, 
therefore shrinking their ability to access credit (European Commission, 2006).  
In essence, the introduction of a credit financing system for innovation based on banks, was aimed at 
easing the planning of resources for investmen  in inno a ion b  en erpri e , b  i  didn  provide 
any specific policy goal in terms of national R&I strategy (Gallo and Silva, 2006). 
The newly elected (2006) centre-left cabinet coalition under the lead of Romano Prodi (Prodi II 
government), approved a first instrument mix with the crafting of the budgetary law for 2007, that 
included all the instrumentation provided by the Industrial 2015 strategy (see details of the strategy 
paragraph 7.3.2). This was a medium-long term national strategy aimed at promoting partnership 
among the actors of the national R&I governance (IPPs), in specific sectors identified by the 
government, through a mix of different types of instruments. 
The following Berlusconi Cabinet (in office since May 2008), firstly modified the characteristics of 
the Industria 2015 strategy, by providing the possibility for the MISE to identify additional 
technological areas to supplement the six IPPs selected under the previous cabinet. Then, it introduced 
new instruments across different legislative interventions, as described below. 
 




Tax exemption on 
capital gains from 
start-up 
(l. 133/2008 art.3) 
It established that capital gains were exempted from personal income taxes 
when: they have been possessed by at least three years, they came from young 
companies (no older than 7 years) and they were re-invested in the next two 
years in young start-ups that operated in the same sector as the first company. 
The maximum amount that could be tax-exempted was directly linked to a 
multiplier of the productive investments (material and immaterial goods and 
R&D expenses) carried out by the firm that originated the capital gain 
Tax exemption 






It was a private equity fund, dedicated to qualified investors, mainly financed 
by CDP and by other private banks. It was devoted to SMEs capitalisation and 
grouping for specific development projects. 
Equity participation 




JEREMIE Fund It supported the access to finance for SMEs via structural funds interventions, 
by offering credit and risk funding to SMEs and public guarantee to banks, in 
order to improve access to investment capitals by SMEs. It was devoted to 
activities aimed at: developing new products, securing and expanding market 
access. 
Equity participation 







It acted as an instrument to reduce investment risk for banks and financial 
intermediaries that participated in the funding/financing of innovative projects 
based on the valorisation and the use of patents. These resources aimed to help 
SMEs access to risk capital to finance innovative projects that made use of 
patents owned by SMEs. 
Economic Guarantee 




Tax credit for firms 
financing research 
projects in universities 
and PROs 
(l.106/2011 art.1) 
Aimed at promoting public research outsourcing from the business sector. The 
allowance was equal to 90% of the incremental expenses incurred by the firm 
financing the outsourcing of research activities to PROs and universities.  
Tax Reduction 
[Fiscal # Medium 
Coercion] 
[high automatic] 




It aimed at stimulating venture capital creation and adoption to finance the 
development of start-ups, by providing that revenues for the capital invested 
were not subject to taxation. 
Tax exemption 





Table 7. 10 Business-oriented V instrument mix 
 
With the approval of the Law 99 of 2009 the government has been delegated with the task to 
reorganize the system of incentives devoted to territorial and industrial development. This process 
produced a new set of financial instruments and fiscal measures mainly devoted to support the 
development of start-ups.  
In 2010 were launched the Italian Investments fund and the JEREMIE fund. The former was matched 
i h he crea ion of an a e  managemen  compan  and i  ppor ed he de elopmen  of SME  
innovation projects through private equity instruments. The fund was participated by other private 
organizations as Intesa San Paolo (Bank), Unicredit (Bank), Nexi (bank), the General Confederation 
of Italian Industry (Confindustria) and the Trade Association of Italian Banks. While, the JEREMIE 
(Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises Fund) for the Mezzogiorno established 
in November 2010 within the Plan for the South. It was an over-regional equity fund for temporary 
and minority participation in SMEs devoted to support the implementation of projects related with 
European structural funds (Potì and Reale, 2011). The expected returns from these investments were 
meant to be reinvested in the fund, leveraging its capital provisions. Finally, the National Innovation 
Fund, launched in 2011, supported SMEs in accessing risk capitals. It relied on the cooperation with 
two banks (Medio Credito Italiano and Unicredit), which had the task to evaluate the project and 
participate in the financing of the accepted ones, for a maximum of 3 million euros over ten years. 
These funds were matched with a new legislation defining the characteristics of Venture Capital 
Funds and providing public support for their development.  
Ultimately, the policy mix was mainly composed of fiscal measures; it was aimed at reinforcing the 
role of private investors (especially business angels) in start-up finance, supporting new 
entrepreneurial activities, together with a tax credit promoting the interaction between industrial and 
public research actors, while providing fiscal incentives for the outsourcing of research activities to 
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the latter. This tool, attempted to strengthen the links and the cooperation among the actors of the 
national R&I system, to promote an increase in the (currently low) level of R&D investments by 
firms and ultimately to raise the amount of funds available for public research.  
In conjunction with the third year of the Berlusconi IV cabinet, Italy was caught in economic and 
financial troubles due to the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The government 
resigned and left the floor to the emergence of the so-called cabinet of experts  Mon i go ernmen , 
in office from November 2011. This cabinet was operating under strict budgetary constraints, mainly 
aimed at the financial stabilization of the country. For what concerns the R&I sector, the Monti 
cabinet designed the following instrument mix, before resigning at the end of 2012 and going to 
general elections the following February. 




Tax credit Skilled 
workers 
(L. 134/2012 art.24) 
Tax reduction equal to the 35% of the costs for employing high skilled workers 
(individual who had a PhD or a master degree and were employed in R&D 
activities). The maximum amount of reduction for each enterprise was equal 
to 200.000 euros per year. Later extended also to start-ups. 
Tax Reduction 




Fund for Sustainable 
Growth  
 (L. 134/2012 art.23) 
It was focused on technological innovation and it substituted the former fund 
to sustain enterprises investments (FRI) approved with the budgetary law for 
2005. Managed by the MISE linked to Horizon 2020 guidelines and 
definitions. It simplified regulation and redefines the scope, the beneficiaries 







Creation Agency for 
Digital Italy 
 
(L. 134/2012 art.23) 
Creation of a new Agency for the implementation the strategy for the 
digitalization of the country, managing funds for R&D project based on ICT 
development. Suppression of the Agency for the Diffusion of Technology for 
Innovation, created with the budget law for 2006.  
Advisory Committee 
[regulation # low 
coercion] 
[low automatic] 
[HEIs + PROs + 
Enterprises] 
Start-up Law 
Legal framework for 
start-ups 
(l.221/2012 art.23) 
For the first time an extensive regulatory framework has been arranged in 
favour of this type of companies by legally defining their status according to 
some specific parameters: newly incorporated entities (< 5years old), not 
distributing profits, dealing with the production, development and 
commercialization of innovative goods of high technological value. Its 
innovativeness was defined by the following criteria: at least 15% of 
c m a  e e e  should be attributed to R&D, at least 1/3 of the total work 
force were PhD or alternatively 2/3 of the workforce must hold a master 








Fixed fiscal costs 
(l.221/2012 art.26) 
Those companies which fulfilled the characteristics of a start-up were 
exempted from paying administrative fees related with the official registration 
of the company. 
Tax exemption 




Tax exemptions for 
investments in start 
ups  
(l.221/2012 art.29) 
If tax payers i e ed a ha e f hei  ca i al , f  a ma im m f 500.000  f  
at least two years, in one or more innovative start-ups (directly or through a 
collective investment saving organizations) they could benefit for four years 
of a deduction equal to 19% on personal income tax. 
Tax exemption 





Table 7. 11 Business-oriented VI instrument mix 
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The reform  on firm  incen i e  (l.134/2012) a  ba ed on he Gia a i Repor 106, which aimed at 
reviewing the approaches adopted for funding loans and providing subsidies to firms (Nascia et al., 
2012, p. 28). This brought into being a simplification of the financing structure related with the 
resources for technological innovation, the replacement of the Agency for the Diffusion of 
Technology for Innovation, with a new agency mainly devoted to ICT technology development and 
the definition of a legal framework for start-up companies. This was matched with fiscal incentives 
aimed at promoting the employment of high-skilled workers, the creation and the investments in start-
up companies; ultimately these measures were complemented by other decrees focused on labour 
market and more general macroeconomic issues. 
 
7.7 Industrial-Technological districts and regional policies  
The Italian Industrial system is largely made up of SMEs, which represents over 95% of the total 
number of national enterprises, which tend to be mainly family-run business (Pierantozzi, 2007). 
The development of this type of industrial actors hinged upon a specific organization of the 
productive system, characterized by geographical agglomerations of enterprises, specialized in a 
related sector of activity: the industrial district. Indeed, industrial districts represented homogeneous 
production systems with a concentration of industrial companies, of small and medium size, with 
high productive specialization. Within districts, enterprises were integrated with each other in 
different phases of the same production process. Historically, these productive systems have emerged 
in a bottom-up manner through the autonomous concentration of geographically close industrial 
actors, especially in the field of textiles, clothing, mechanics and leather. They reflected the capacity 
of economic, social and institutional forces in a given territory to promote themselves, making the 
most out of their resources locally available in terms of human capital, raw material and knowledge.  
Since he beginning of he 1980  he organi a ion of prod c ion in radi ional ec or  ( o called made 
in I al  ec or ) in Nor hern region  had progressively evolved towards an organization based on 
districts. Over the years these expanded and consolidated, also in other regions, thanks to the 
successful mix provided by a combination of flexibility, usually related with the family ownership 
industrial structure, and the interactions with other firms in the district (Maio, 2014). 
 
106 This was a report commissioned by the Council of Ministries to an expert, the economist Francesco Giavazzi, in order 
o re ie  he em of go ernmen  b idie  o firm . Thi  repor  e ima ed a o al amo n  of nj ified  b idie  and 
argued their elimination with a parallel tax cut (Lucchese et al., 2016, p. 248) 
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The law 317 of 1991 was the first legal recognition of industrial districts, and it provided regions with 
the task to identify and finance this locally-based concentrations of enterprises, according to the 
ministerial guidelines defined by the MEF.  
In the following years, the so-called Guarino decree (l. 140/99), defined the criteria in order to identify 
industrial districts, and this was accompanied with an increasing empowerment of regional actors in 
their identification and management role. More broadly, regions had increasingly gained autonomy 
in planning innovation and industrial support programs in their territory; these provisions were 
included in the set of delegated powers defined in the framework of the R&I governance 
reorganization (d.lgs. 112/98), as discussed in paragraph 7.3 of this chapter.  
More specifically, regions were in charge of the promotion of applied and pre-competitive research, 
innovation and technology transfer programs. Consequently, they started to design their own 
strategies for regional innovation plans  that, in order to become operative, had to be first agreed with 
the Minister of Economy and Finance, Minister for Higher Education and Research and the Minister 
of Economic Development to make sure regional instrumentation was in line with national policies 
(European Commission, 2006). The recognition of the industrial district was basically a bottom-up 
process, involving regions and local actors in finding an agreement over the organization of the 
productive system. Nevertheless, the government, mainly through the MISE, did still play a 
prominent role, with the drafting of standards and orientations for their identification by regional 
authorities.  
The Berlusconi II cabinet introduced, with the budgetary law for 2003 (l. 289/02), a fund for 
underutilized areas, called the FAS. This fund, together with structural funds for national and regional 
operative programs (PON and POR), was aimed at financing regional policies for economic 
development. Therefore, industrial districts were supported through a mix of ordinary national 
budgets and resources for regional policy (which were themselves a mix of European structural funds 
and budget allocation from the FAS). Decisions regarding the allocation of resources related with the 
fund for underutilized areas were taken by the CIPE, where also the minister for regional authorities 
was included.  
The FAS gathered the resources previously allocated directly by the MISE through the so-called 
Single Fund for Enterprises Incentives, which was managed collectively by all the ministers involved 
in the CIPE. The recentralization over the allocation of funds for industrial districts can be read as 
both a result of the political willingness to prioritize some aspects of the industrial district 
development, as well as the necessity to make decision involving differentiated and increasingly more 
powerful regional actors, on a collegial-basis.  
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With the budgetary law for 2006 the Berlusconi II cabinet outlined the characteristics and the methods 
for identifying industrial districts and it also defined their tax-related regulation.  Then, the newly 
elected left-wing coalition lead by Romano Prodi, modified some of the characteristics of industrial 
districts organization through the 2007 budgetary law and a supplementary decree (d.l. 112/2008). 
These interventions were aimed at simplifying the tax regulation for industrial districts and they also 
included the Permanent Conference for Relations between the State, the Region and the Autonomous 
Provinces in the committee that determines the methods for identifying industrial districts. The former 
provisions, those related with taxation, were modified again by the new Berlusconi government in 
2009 (d.l. 5/2009), going back to the regulation identified by the previous 2006 budgetary law; and 
they were supplemented by further tax benefits for enterprises involved in industrial districts (l. 
122/2010). Ultimately, the Monti cabinet implemented a simplification of the procedures required to 
establish industrial districts (d.l. 83/2012). Although the legislation has been amended and modified 
several times, regions seemed to maintain the main responsibilities in identifying their local industrial 
districts (Pierantozzi, 2007). 
For a long time, industrial districts have been the backbone of the Italian economy; however, over 
the years, this system started to show some weaknesses mainly related with the industrial and 
economic structure of involved SMEs. Indeed, Italian SMEs tend to be characterised by a low degree 
of internationalisation, low investments in innovation activities, the lack of a consolidated 
management culture as well as a structural difficulty in scaling up production (Maio, 2014). That is 
why, in order to keep up with industrial and technological development, a new format of industrial 
districts was implemented by the MIUR, the so-called technological district.  
 
7.7.1 Technological districts 
The design of industrial districts was replicated by the MIUR, with the promotion, within the 
framework of the 2002 ministerial policy strategy, of technological districts and the contextual 
publication of the call for tenders in order to promote collaboration among the future actors involved. 
This intervention shared many similarities with Industrial districts. Indeed, they were both related 
with the geographical proximity of the actors involved in the production system and the benefits 
connected with the underlining dynamics of their interaction. Nevertheless, technological districts 
differentiated themselves because, first they were not limited to SMEs (also large and technological 
intensive firms were involved and played a catalyst role); secondly, they mainly relied on highly 
qualified human resources and on the pivotal role of local public research centres. Indeed, they were 
meant to facilitate cooperation between scientific and technological players together with companies, 
to support their joint collaboration in developing competitive research projects (European 
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Commission, 2004b). Their ultimate goals was to realize R&I networks, territorially embedded on 
specific technologies, with the collaboration of small and large firms and with a strong orientation to 
the socio-economic valorisation of results (Poti et al., 2008, p. 33). 
Ultimately, despite the territorial proximity of the actors involved, the economic and cultural bonds 
with the environment in which technological districts emerged, as from the case of industrial districts, 
they represented a broader recipient of governmental support compared to the former and they had 
also the ultimate goal of supporting national competitive capacity also internationally (Ministero 
dell I r ione dell Uni er i  e della Ricerca, 2005). Therefore, despite the close similarities with 
industrial district, their design was presented as an innovative strategy in order to support the 
innovative potential of the Italian cluster capacity internationally.  
From a policy instrument perspective, technological district represented PPPs between public 
research and industrial at the local level; they were supported by the MIUR, which provided the 
guidelines, and the funding, necessary for their establishment and development. Within this context 
also regional actors played also an important role, to the extent that they were the institutional 
promoters of these initiative, they established they coordination table at which local interested actors 
could participate, and they presented the official proposal to the MIUR. (Cobis, 2008). With the 
competitiveness decree (l. 80/05), technological districts were also provided with a specific funding 
stream to finance their initiatives, the FRI, which was devoted to activities, programs and strategic 
R&D projects of companies to be carried out jointly with public research centres.  
 
7.8 Conclusions 
Before the window of opportunity for change provided by the broader revision of national 
administration structures in the framework of the Bassanini reforms, national R&I governance in Italy 
was affected by: a weak systematic approach; the lack of assessment and foresight activities, weak 
planning capacity in elaborating strategic programmes and a feeble diffusion of the results achieved 
by the S&T system (European Commission, 1999). Despite the huge contribution of this reform in 
reorganising the national governance, specifically in highlighting the political relevance of these 
issues, its discontinuous implementation ended up reiterating the division of competences between 
ministers with shared R&I competences. This logic can be found in the persistent division concerning 
the titularity of the two main national research and innovation funds, namely the FIT, under the MISE, 
and he FAR nder he MIUR. The e o f nd  ere mean  o complemen  each o her  a k , b  in 
many occasions they ended up overlapping in their actions (European Commission, 1999). 
Despite the centralized governance structure of the Italian system of innovation, where it was clearly 
present a typical top-down culture for coordinating knowledge demands through the PNR and the 
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development of multi-annual strategy, the fragmentation and duplication of the measures was still 
persistent (European Commission, 2006). Indeed, the evolution of instrument mix characteristics 
didn  seem to follow any clearly identified long-term strategy; moreover, there was often 
misinformation between those who allocated the funds and the beneficiaries (De Maio, 2011). When 
policy were implemented the overall policy framework displayed a clear lack coherence, and given 
the layering of multiple measures the resulting objectives were not often carefully calibrated in their 
long- term effects (European Commission, 2005b). 
There had been some positive experiences regarding the design of long-term national strategies like 
for example the case of Industria 2015, and the more enterprise-oriented cases of the two digital 
innovation plans. Nevertheless, we can conclude that national policy instrument selection practices 
in R&I were heavily affected b  he carci  of an holi ic  polic  approach, and he general 
rationalities seemed to be that of approving yearly budgetary laws in which, on a case-to-case basis, 
different one-shot provisions were included. As already stressed at the beginning of this chapter, the 
resulting national policy mix is highly polarized between enterprise-oriented innovation initiatives 
and a re id al  approach o ard  Higher Ed ca ion In i ion  and P blic Re earch Organi a ion  
(Nascia et al., 2012). This trend could easily be spotted throughout the chronology provided in the 
former paragraphs, were interventions devoted to the business sectors were prominent compared to 
public research ones.  
To conclude, we can highlight the extent to which the historical evolution of instrument mix features 
suggests an increasing relevance of collaborative type of instruments, for example those based on the 
creation of Public Private Partnerships (like those found in the Industria 2015 strategy and in 
Technological districts). This tendency was also supported by the adoption of mixed type delivery 
structures relying on the collaboration of different actors in order to ease policy instrument 
implementation and uptake by recipients (like the inclusion of banks in the financing system for 
innovation). However, the increasing attention towards establishing collaborative relationships with 
R&I performer was not always matched with a sufficient effort in supporting, and stimulating, their 
demands for innovation. Indeed, as discussed in the next chapter, Italian R&I instrument mix display 
a consistent lack of culture and awareness about the possibilities this policy lever can offer to their 





8 Chapter 8: Case study II, the policy instrument selection in the 
Italian case 
In order to shed light on the dynamics underpinning the evolution of R&I policy mixes we designed 
and interpretative framework which intersects different insights on the role of ideas (the influence of 
dominant framing in a given political system); the opportunity structure provided by the institutional 
system (internal coordination and specialisation between policy-makers) and the role of target 
population (the strategies for interest intermediation). By unpacking the combined influence these 
factors have on policy instrument selection process, it has been possible to disentangle the political 
dynamics behind the selection, and assemblage, of different instrument mixes.  
The chapter is organised as follows; we will first dig into the influence that the dominant diffusion-
oriented framing characterising the Italian R&I policy making case played on the evolution of 
national policy mix characteristics. Then, we will investigate how different ministers with integrative 
competences in R&I did manage to create strategies for cooperation, while analysing the different 
coordination and specialisation strategies they adopted. Ultimately, we will discuss the alternative 
strategies for interest intermediation and more broadly, the characteristics of national R&I performers 
and their strategies for action in the broader national R&I governance space.  
 
8.1 Ideas 
Instruments selection is an ideational process to the extent that instruments embed different framings 
concerning the individual perceptions on a given problem, and possible strategies to tackle it. 
Therefore, policy design is a politically salient process exactly because the selection  of policy 
instruments can alter power dynamics, influencing the opportunities and constraints provided to the 
target population (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007; Salamon, 2002, Schneider & Ingram, 1990).  
Once selecting new policy instruments, policy makers are caught in the grip between their preferences 
on how to shape the existent mix and the room for manoeuvre they have, given the distribution of 
power and interest set in force by the legacy of previous instrument choices. Because, ultimately 
long-term state and societal preferences shape political debates around possible alternative design, 
hence influencing partisan preference formation (Jungblut, 2015). While, on the other hand, a shift in 
the power balance among the collective actors who possess the legitimate policy making power (e.g. 
cabinet changed) can open window of opportunities for new entrepreneurs to promote change.  
In order to understand the counteracting effect of institutionalised windows of opportunities (cabinet 
changes) and the persistence of long-lasting cognitive legacies (Mission VS Diffusion oriented) on 
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governmental R&I policy mix preferences we diachronically compared the evolution of instrument 
mix attitudes for different governing coalitions, o map o  he connec ion be een ac or  par i an 
positions and policy instrument preferences in R&I sector.  
We expected that in parallel with changes of parties in government, and of their likely policy style 
preferences, a shift in the preferences for R&I instrument mix characteristics will likely occur. 
Figure 8.1 displays the percentages of coding references for different cabinet periods according to the 
different types of R&I instruments preferences (as done for the France case in Chapter 6). In order to 
allow the comparability of the sample under investigation, and a meaningful interpretation of the 
codes, all the share of coding references for each instrument type have been weighed according to the 
number of sources analysed107. 
 
Figure 8. 1 Type of policy instrument preferences (Italy) 
 
On the left side of the table (Y axis), we find the percentages of coding, while on the bottom side of 
the table (X axis), the different cabinet periods under investigation108. 
The left-wing oriented Prodi I cabinet shows a policy mix preference pattern characterised by a quite 
authoritative attitude (50% of preferences for regulation and 22,22% for expenditure instruments), it 
is followed by the D Alema I cabinet, which displays a slight decrease in authoritative instruments 
preferences, and a parallel increase for fiscal (22,22%) and information (22,22%) type of instruments. 
 
107 Due to data accessibility issues, we were not able to analyse the same number of documents for each cabinet period. 
Therefore, the weighting procedure allowed to maintain a high degree of comparability between different cabinets.  
108 For reasons of historical accuracy, it is relevant to highlight that we merged the two-con ec i e cabine  of D Alema 
(D Alema I and D Alema II) in o one niq e cabine . Thi  beca e onl  one economic programma ic document was 
produced during these two cabinets, and the ministry with relevant competences in the R&I sector were stable or exposed 
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Finally, the last left-wing oriented cabinet of the first triplet (Amato), shows a decline in the 
preferences for more authoritative instruments (regulation 33,33%) in favour of an increasing share 
of preferences for less authoritative mixes, especially for information tools scoring 50% of the total 
cabinet preferences. The Berlusconi II cabinet, first right-wing oriented coalition of our time frame, 
displays a growth in the share of preferences for more authoritative policy instruments (36,73% 
regulation and 22,45% of expenditure instruments), at the expenses of a shrinkage in the share of 
information types of instruments, dropping at 16,33% of the total mix preferences. The following 
Berlusconi III cabinet, displays a generalised decrease in the share of preferences for authoritative 
instruments, which is characterised by an expansion in the share of preferences for fiscal instruments 
(50% of total mix preferences). The succeeding left-wing Prodi II cabinet scores an increase in the 
preferences for more authoritative instruments with a peak of 55,56% of preferences for expenditure 
and 22,22% for regulation instruments; followed by the last Berlusconi IV cabinet, characterised by 
a rise in the preferences for regulation instruments, which reaches 42 % of total instrument 
preferences. Finally, the so-called Mon i cabine  of e per , de pi e he decrea e in he preference  
for regulation instruments, shows an upward trend in the preferences for expenditures (37,68%) and 
fiscal (15,94%) instruments. 
Fig re 8.2 ho  cabine  preference  for differen  degree  of in r men  a oma ici , pro iding 
informa ion on cabine  orien a ion  regarding he diverse type of relationships between policy 
makers and target population established within the management of different tools.  
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The first three left-wing cabinets all display a stable share of preferences for not automatic delivery 
structures (50%); while preferences for automatic and mixed types of delivery are more skewed. With 
the Berlusconi II this percentage is increasing (with a peak of 60% of the preference in the first 
cabinet), despite the overall mix displays more balanced preferences for the other two types of 
delivery structures (20% of automatic and 20% of mixed) 109. The preferences of the last three cabinet 
periods are more heterogeneously distributed among our typologies of instrument delivery structures. 
With the Prodi II government displaying a similar share of preferences for both automatic and not 
automatic instruments (37,50%) and Berlusconi IV cabinet, which shows a similar pattern but 
oriented towards automatic and mixed type of instruments (scoring both 42,86% of the total 
preferences). Finally, the Monti government displays an increasing trend for not automatic delivery 
(40%), followed by mixed (36,67%) and not automatic (23,33%) delivery types.  
 
8.1.1 Cabinet turnover 
We expected that changes in governing coalitions should influence policy mix evolution, specifically 
the more similar the party politics orientations between incoming and outgoing governments, the less 
authoritative would be the diachronic evolution of policy mix preferences. This pattern is closely 
related with the fact that changes in cabinet composition represent an institutionalised window of 
opportunity where new ideas, and the policy entrepreneurs who support them, can increasingly 
acquire decision-making powers.  
To some extent the preference trend displayed in Figure 8.1 shows that a variation in terms of 
orientations for differently authoritative instrument mix is present between different cabinets, even 
though we canno  raigh for ard connec  i  i h cabine  poli ical orien a ion .  Thi  rend i  q i e 
evident in the left side of our table were the first three left- ing cabine  (Prodi I, D Alema I, Ama o) 
show a decreasing preference trend for authoritative instruments, in line with the political 
coordination needed to implement the Bassanini reform package and supplemented also by their 
similar party politics orientation. This is followed by an increase of preferences for authoritative 
instruments in the case of the right-wing oriented Berlusconi II cabinet, and a subsequent decrease in 
the case of the Berlusconi III government. Conversely, this alternation pattern is less clear-cut in the 
econd half of he able, here cabine  in r men  preference  are more heterogeneous among 
different politically oriented cabinets. 
 
109 During the Berlusconi III cabinet period only one governmental economic programmatic document was produced. 
The fact that no preferences could be identified is closely related with the fact that these documents have an underlying 
programmatic nature; therefore, they do not always provide detailed information regarding the specific instrument mix 
each government aims to implement during its mandate.  
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In order to read through the lines of these trends it is necessary to consider two peculiarities for the 
Italian case, as emerged from our interviews. The first is the general low political salience of the 
issues. As pointed out by representatives of Higher Education Institutions, Public Research 
Organisation and the business world, R&I issues have never been a priority for Italian governments, 
and they have neither been central in their decision-making agenda (INTERVIEWEES 11-7-10).  
The second is the inherent tendency of the system to wipe out what previous governments have done. 
Borrowing some of the words of Bassanini, the author of the reforms that modified the national 
go ernance of R&I ec or:  e en if ho e coming o po er o ld like to continue the reforms 
designed and approved using the bipartisan method, they find it hard to explain to their own majority 
that there is no need to go back to square one; that what is needed is simply to forge ahead, to adjust, 
supplement and comple e a reform ha  a  fa hioned oge her  (Bassanini, 2009, p. 376). 
Therefore, as clearly stated by one of our experts (INTERVIEWE 8) on certain issues, related with 
economic, industrial and knowledge development of the country, there is no continuity from a 
political perspective even though, theoretically, on these issues they should all agree. These 
tendencies, matched with the instability of Italian governments, especially in comparison with the 
French case, can be interpreted as one of the triggering causes of the failure of Italian political system 
to provide sound governance, also in the case of R&I policies (Spence, 2014). 
Italian politics has never fundamentally considered R&I themes as central for the development of the 
country, as demonstrated by our interviewees and the comparatively low level of R&I investment 
intensity of the country. This is also confirmed by the results discussed in the following paragraph, 
which exactly dig into the lack of a national political vision on R&I issues.  
Consequently, the alternation trend among the different cabinets, should be interpreted under the light 
of the general tendency to destroy the legacy of previous cabinets, rather than on the specific political 
salience of R&I issues. Therefore, our expectations are partially confirmed, even though this seems 
to be a national policy-making pattern, rather than a specificity of the R&I case.  
 
8.1.2 The path dependency effect  
The dominant cognitive background embedded in the national R&I policy mix influence the balance 
between appropriateness and consequentiality policy makers are facing during policy instrument 
choice.  This is why the technical and political legacy of past policy choices is said to influence new 
policy making activities, shaping the available alternatives (Bre er  and O Toole, 2005; Ca hore and 
Howlett, 2007; Hall, 2010; Howlett, 2009). Diffusion and mission-oriented cognitive legacies reflect 
this historical stratification of different institutional aims, which mirror the dominant policy framing 
characterising the evolution of state preferences for R&I strategies. Therefore, in the case of dominant 
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diffusion-oriented institutional aims characterising the Italian case we would expect that governments 
show a high share of preferences for less authoritative and more automatic instruments.  
Looking at the results in Figure 8.2 the path dependent effects of diffusion-orien ed paradigm doe n  
seem to be predominant on the evolution of cabinet R&I instrument mix preferences. Indeed, at a first 
glance the share of preferences for policy mix features seems to be more in line with a mission-
oriented ideal type, given the average high share of preferences for highly authoritative and not 
automatic instruments types, rather than with a diffusion oriented one. 
If we read these results together with the data on Governmental Budget allocation for R&D according 
to the sector of performance and the sector of investment (see Figure 4.3) it seems that Italy has a 
dominant preference pattern for an instrumentation of the mission-oriented type, but ultimately it uses 
the available mix in a diffusion-oriented manner. As claimed by one of our interviewee 
representatives of the business sector (INTERVIEWE 10): “nowadays Italy has a very efficient R&I 
instrumentation, we do really have all we need. What is missing, is exactly the idea, a political 
leadership eager to invest in this sector, which will also able to drive the industrial sector to 
mobilize”. 
Some examples of this mismatch can be found in our data, as the case in the case of Figure 8.2 for 
D Alema I and Prodi II cabine , ere a oma ic and no  a oma ic in r men  core the same share 
of preferences. Since different degrees of automaticity in the delivery structure of policy instruments 
mirror the extent of public resources necessary for instrument management, this tells us the highly 
ambivalence of different policy instrument application.  
The issue of the lack of political leadership, and therefore of a specific political orientation of the 
national policy mix emerges also from the results of our interviews where different experts clearly 
point out this problem. Indeed, they exactly claim that politicians are not clear about where they want 
to go and how they want to get there. Instead of starting from a political vision on where to go, policy 
makers tend to begin from instruments because they can be more convenient, or simply eager to fulfil 
patronage dynamics, but on the other hand they say little if there is no idea behind them 
(INTERVIEWE 8). Poli ical ideolog  doe n  eem o ma er oo m ch and polic  mi  charac eri ic  
seems to be rather a matter of satisfying the priorities of different political constituencies 
(INTERVIEWE 1). 
This narrative on electoral constituencies acquires greater relevance if we consider that some 
instruments have been activated only for a specific short period of time (like the case of some one-
off implementation of some fiscal instruments), such as if they were only meant to please the will of 
a specific electorate in a specific window of time.  
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Nonetheless, it is also relevant to notice that Italy has a strong legacy of mission-oriented policy and 
direct state participation in the field of R&I policies. Therefore, the reason for this mismatch between 
cabinet instrument preferences and effective investments in R&I sector can also be related with a 
legacy of slow and complicated (and probably not completely successful) transition towards a 
diffusion-oriented pattern.  
 
8.2 Institutions 
As for the French case, Italy pursued and external institutional specialisation strategy, according to 
which R&I competences are decoupled among functionally homogeneous ministerial organisations.  
The Minister of Higher Education and Research (MIUR) and the Minister of Economic Development 
(MISE) represent the two fundamental institutions of Italian R&I governance structure. Their internal 
organisation, name and competences have slightly changed during the period under investigation; 
despite that, the overall R&I governance structure has remained pretty stable.  
Such governance structure reflects how this policy sector is inherently made of two substantive parts, 
research and technological development, which can acquire different relevance, and level of 
integration, according to policy makers visions and capacities. In the following paragraphs we will 
investigate the evolution of national ministerial coordination strategies, in order to understand the 
extent to which these practices affected ministerial interactions and ultimately policy mix evolution.  
 
8.2.1 Ministerial coordination practices  
The Italian national governance of R&I hinges upon two main actors, the Minister of Higher 
Education and research (MIUR) and the Minister for Economic Development (MISE), which detain 
shared competences in the design of national R&I instrument mixes. The roots of this organisation 
date back to the Bassanini reform (d.lgs. 297/99), which reiterated the already pronounced division 
of competences between the two ministers according to the titularity of their respective funds, namely 
the FIT, under the MISE, and the FAR under the MIUR.  
This system hinged upon a linear understanding of innovation process, according to which the MIUR 
has competences related with the process that support blue sky and fundamental research, while the 
experimental development of this research, and eventually its market application, fall under the 
competences of the MISE. To some extent the MIUR covered the sphere of competences under the 
remit of the Frascati Manual, focusing its activities on research phases that are slightly behind the 
market; while the MISE made reference to the definition of the Oslo manual and it was more 
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concerned with how to transfer this research to the market110. As stated by one of our interviewees 
(INTERVIEWE 11) this separation of competences among ministers seems to suggest that there is 
one type of research that can be adopted to support economic development, and another type of 
research that cannot contribute to it; which in reality is not always the case.  
An important consequence of this structure was that coordination practices among ministers were not 
clearly defined. The division of tasks between their policy instruments was blurred, causing a 
fragmentation of public competences, increasing the likelihood of clashes between their action, 
ultimately hampering the design of a homogeneous research and innovation national strategy.  
This affected also the capacity of the target population (in the specific case mentioned during the 
interview enterprises), to navigate the system of available incentives resulting in the practice of 
applying with the same innovation project for different benefit schemes at the same time 
(INTERVIEWE 10). 
A first attempt to coordinate the action of the ministers with R&I competences was the creation of 
the National Research Program (NRP), in the framework of the Bassanini reform implementation.  
This document defined the national strategy for Research and Innovation Policies, by identifying the 
activities to be promoted and their respective budget allocations (almost) every three years. It was 
formulated by the MIUR after an extensive consultation with the actors of the innovation system and 
it was implemented after the approval of the CIPE (Lai, 2016). 
The centrality of the MIUR was related with its role of coordinator during the drafting of the 
document, which required consultations involving the scientific and academic community, the 
representative of the business world and all the public administrations concerned by the plan. 
Furthermore, the CIPE annually assessed the state of implementation of the PNR on the basis of a 
report prepared by the MIUR. However, these reports are not available, and neither the CIPE's 
resolutions regarding the results are known (Sirilli, 2010, p. 78). 
Despite the titularity of the MIUR in the drafting of this programmatic document, from our 
in er ie ee  emerge  ha , in prac ice, he Mini r  didn  de ain an effec i e primac  in he 
coordination of the national R&I strategy. Indeed, (INTERVIEWE 9): “[…] it is difficult to see this 
design in a coordinated and coherent way, the sensation is rather that of a set of interventions based 
on isolated spots. The lack of coordination is systemic because once a set of similar competences is 
established among several ministers, these administrations are of an equal level and it becomes 
difficult for a ministry to be the coordinator of the others because, in the end, their weight and 
institutional level is the same”. 
 
110 As confirmed by our interviewees representative of these institutions (INTERVIEWEES 9-5).  
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Consequently, the centralization of compe ence  in draf ing he NRP o he MIUR didn  eem o 
provide effective results in terms of coordination among the two ministers. That is why, also from 
many of our interviews (INTERVIEWEES 10-7-9) it emerged how probably, moving R&I policy 
making competences upwards, under the remits of the Prime Minister, might be a possible strategy 
in order to overcome the deadlocks related with the interministerial management of the policy design.  
Because, ultimately, the weak monitoring system, as well as the scarce coordination between different 
Ministers are factors that can inhibit the achievement of good results in R&I policy making practices 
(Potì and Reale, 2010).  
That is why a second strategy for coordinating ministerial action has been included in the national 
R&I policy making structure, through the support of the interministerial Committee for Economic 
Planning (CIPE).  
This was a committee in charge of coordinating and planning national economic policy, its board 
members were the Prime Minister (President), the Minister of Economy and Finance (vice-President), 
the Vice- Minister of Economy and Finance (Secretary) and other Ministers whose presence was 
necessary to deploy the overall industrial and economic policies(European Commission, 2004b, p. 
12). 
Its major functions included evaluating the Economic and Financial Planning Document, which 
defined the major strategic guidelines and the general economic strategy of the country, including 
policy measures to foster Scientific research and Technology (like the National Research Plan) and 
the annual allocation of resources devoted to R&I (European Commission, 2006).  
Therefore, the CIPE theoretically represented an additional forum, a director table, in which ministers 
with R&I competences could gather to discuss about national strategies, and especially funding 
allocations, under the coordinating role of the PM and the Minister of Economy and Finance.  
In 2006, with the election of the Prodi II cabinet, the technical-administrative structures supporting 
the CIPE, until then operating within the Minister of Economy and Finance, have been transferred 
under the Prime Minister offices, at the department for planning and coordination of economic policy. 
The underlining logic of this new organizational structure was to strengthen the role of the PM in the 
coordination of economic policies, and related planning activities; while re-centralising the control 
over the interministerial policy making practices.  
Nonetheless, despite the relevance of CIPE as a coordination body, the perceptions regarding its 
effectiveness are contrasting among our interviewees. Indeed, many (INTERVIEWEES 11-3-5) 
claims that actually the CIPE exactly mirrors the political dynamics internal to the current cabinet 
organisation. Therefore, when ministers meet at this table, they are already aware of the power 
balances among different ministries, and of their related funding allocations. Consequently, the CIPE 
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actually appears to be only a formal, rather than an effective, coordination table among ministers; 
beca e l ima el : policies are designed within the government and my feeling is that CIPE is not 
the platform through which public policies are effectively designed  (INTERVIEWE 3).  
Therefore, the coordination among ministries seemed to be left to the internal dynamics taking place 
within cabinets, and to the political attitudes among ministers. As suggested by one of our interviewee 
representatives of the MIUR (INTERVIEWE 9), the coordination between MIUR and MISE has 
smoothly taken place many times, especially thanks to the presence of personalities who have 
interpreted more correctly these issues compared to others. In certain cabinets the MIUR has been 
split into two separated institutions, and maybe during these periods the minister didn  manage o be 
a strong representative of the internal perceptions of R&I policies. Borrowing some words from our 
interviewee: “it is exactly here the main issue of the Italian R&I governance system, because if 
everything can depend upon the strength, or not, of a single minister, it means that the architecture 
of the system is not solid and paraphs it should be reformed”.  
Consequently, governmental capacity to build an encompassing national R&I policy seemed to be 
left in the hand of one of the two ministers (MIUR or MISE), which through their (eventually) 
entrepreneurial attitude could be able to create the necessary coordination among the two institutions, 
in order to define a shared national strategy. This governance failure was also perceived by R&I 
performers, who looking at the organization of the public structure have the impression that the two 
ministers do more or less the same thing (INTERVIEWE 10-11). 
Therefore, as suggested by the existing literature (Potì and Reale, 2010) the coordination between 
MIUR and MISE needs to be improved for overcoming the traditional separation of the national 
system between research and innovation. Moreover, the organization of competences among these 
institutions should avoid the risk to fall in the trap of creating structures in which the bureaucracy 
derives its raison d’être only from the administration of subsidies, leaving apart the willingness to 
pursue a broader national strategy for development.  
 
8.2.2 The actual patterns of Ministerial Interactions 
The institutional landscape of national R&I policies has been historically characterised by a high level 
of fragmentation. Starting from the era of public participation in the national economy, through state 
owned enterprises, decisions concerning national industrial strategies were taken by two different 
ministers that were often in conflict, the ministry of Industry (established in 1948) and the ministry 
of state-holdings (established in 1956) (Maio, 2014, p. 248). After the suppression of the latter in 
1993, in conjunction with the dismissal of many state-owned enterprises, the evolution of the minister 
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with competences on industry has been fluctuating among cabinet periods characterised by a 
reunification of different competences and moves towards their re-fragmentation.  
An important step in this development has been the Bassanini reform that reunified all the ministerial 
competences related with industry, national and international trade and communications into a unique 
institution, the minister of productive activities. During the following governments its competences 
have been differently unpacked in detached ministerial institutions. The MISE as we know it today 
has been created in 2006, under the Berlusconi III cabinet, which provided this institution with the 
task to implement policies for the development of the national productive system and cohesion 
policies. Ultimately, the new Ministry has been internally organised in department and directorates, 
mirroring the different competences that have been merged from different institutions.  
Similarly, the MIUR went through a long evolution process. The institution was created in 1989 (l. 
168/89) and it merged the competences for scientific research and university education that had 
previously pertained to the Ministry without Portfolio for the Coordination of Scientific and 
Technological Research, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Public Education 
(Capano et al., 2016). It slowly hollowed-o  CNR  compe ence  in p blic re earch polic , o 
recentralise powers in the newly created ministry.  
During the period under investigation the minister has been divided into a Minister of Public 
Ed ca ion and a Mini er of Uni er i , Scien ific and Technological re earch d ring he D Alema I 
and Amato cabinets then, during the two mandates of Berlusconi it has been reunited under the MIUR. 
In the following Prodi II cabined it has been divided again in two institutions, for being then finally 
united under the MIUR from the Berlusconi IV cabinet onwards. In line with the statements of our 
interviewee (INTERVIEWE 9)111, it was easy to see how the periods of minister unification under 
the MIUR correspond with the years in which the main reforms of Higher Education Institution and 
Public Research governance have been implemented.  
In addition to the evolution of the MISE and the MIUR structures, it is also relevant to notice how 
these two actors have been supplemented in their actions by the creation of specifically innovation-
oriented ministers. Like under the Berlusconi II and III cabinets, when a new minister for innovation 
and technology was created, and lately substituted during the Prodi II government with a minister for 
Innovation in the Public Administration.  
The landscape was further complicated by the fact that beside the MIUR and the MISE, who played 
a major role in the national R&I policy making, important contributions to the evolution of the sector, 
and the desire to promote research and innovation practices, can also be found in other ministers (e.g. 
 
111 Regarding the fact that during the period in which the MIUR was divided into two separated institutions, the minister 
didn  manage o be a rong repre en a i e of he in ernal percep ion  of R&I policie  
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Health, Agriculture and Environment), who respectively detained different Public Research 
Organisations under their control like the National Institute of Health (Istututo Superiore di Sanità) 
and the Council for Agricultural Research and Analysis of Agricultural Economy.  
Indeed, as the table below suggests the universe of ministers participating to the financing and 




Figure 8. 3 Aggregate public expenses on R&I mission by Minister112 
 
The MIUR was the main financial contributor to the national R&I policies, followed by an alternation 
between the MISE and the Minister of Health, who heavily contributed to the financing as well. The 
latter managed research funding in its specific field, and through its public research organisation, the 
ISS, it also took part to several initiatives and infrastructures in the field of Medical research as the 
European Clinical Research infrastructures Network (ECRIN) (Potì and Reale, 2011, p. 33).  
This was once again symptomatic for the fragmentation of the national R&I strategy (INTERVIEWE 
10). Differently from the French case no common budgeting procedure was planned and the 
agreements over the PNR concerned broad national goals, and did not provide any direction regarding 
the effective implementation of different measures. Moreover, as suggested by the literature, the lack 
of financial commitment to the multiannual strategies defined in the document has often resulted in 
unrealistic targets (Nascia and Pianta, 2013, p. 24) and unsatisfactory implementation (Grilli and 
Mariotti, 2006). Therefore, each minister could essentially carve out a niche for its own interventions 
 
112 Data elaborated by the author. Aggregate public expenses by administration and mission (research and innovation 
mission) source: https://bdap-opendata.mef.gov.it/content/rendiconto-pubblicato-serie-storica-spese-aggregato-
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and when the areas overlap, coordination could be found internally between specifically concerned 
ministers (INTERVIEWE 5). 
Nonetheless, some extent of coordination has been possible, but mainly thanks to the entrepreneurial 
activity of individual ministers, like in the case of the Industria 2015 design. As confirmed by one of 
our experts (INTERVIEWE 8), the success of the strategy was due to the fact that the Minister of 
Economic Development, did manage to rapidly exploit a political window of opportunity present at 
that time.  
This is why, as also confirmed by another interviewee (INTERVIEWE 10), the strategy did manage 
to survive only for the period of the Prodi II, cabinet for being then modified by the following 
Berlusconi IV and changed in its underlining logic of action.  
The collaboration between the Minister of Innovation and Technology and MISE in the drafting of 
the Plan for digital innovation in enterprises seemed to be smoother and more enduring compared to 
the Industria 2015. However, it is important to notice some relevant specificities, like for example 
the fact that the ICT strategies for enterprises were formulated across two cabinets of the same 
political orientation. Moreover, part of the instrumentation relied on the re-calibration of existing 
instruments toward the promotion of new technologies for enterprises, rather than on a brand-new set 
of instruments. 
Once again this confirm the extent to which the coordination between ministers involved in the R&I 
is left in the hands of each specific institutions, or personalities, and no clear coordination practice is 
provided at the national level. As stated by one of our interviewees, Italy clearly displays a 
governance issue in the R&I policy sector, there is often a confusion between instruments and goal 
(INTERVIEWE 8), and the boundaries of competences between different policy making institutions 
are often fuzzy. This further hamper the policy-making capacity to design long-term national 
strategies and to politically prioritize R&I policy as a possible strategy for national development. That 
is why, often, the evolution of the national R&I policy mix is made up of fragmented instruments, 
which look like day-to-day administrative management, rather than a national strategy 
(INTERVIEWE 10).  
 
8.3 Interest 
The design of Italian R&I policies tends to be mainly performed at the governmental level, where the 
main priorities are identified. Consultations with key stakeholders are performed on a regular basis, 
however their involvement is still partial and has only limited influence on policy making (European 
Commission, 2006). Indeed, a  gge ed b  one of o r e per  (INTERVIEWE 4): he inability to 
coordinate different actors, and the lack of a long-term political vision, make policy makers prisoners 
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of actors who support their specific interests (who can be the business world, some powerful research 
centre or universities)”. The majority of Italian cabinets during the period under investigation have 
never perceived R&I issues as strategic for their country, on the side of R&I performers this was 
mirrored by a fragmented structure of interest intermediation which jeopardized their power to 
influence policy making process.  As argued by our interviewee (INTERVIEWE 9), nowadays there 
is a lower tendency toward the dialogue between ministers and R&I performers and if that is strictly 
needed, these practices are kept at the institutional level. To some extent this is also related with the 
fact that policy-makers are not solicited anymore by social partners or business representatives to do 
so; it almost seems like nobody has more interest in doing it.  
Moreo er, he na ional go ernance em doe n  en i age an  peciali ed agenc , hich co ld help 
the dialogue between policy makers and target groups, supporting the program management and 
implementation of national R&I strategies. There have been some attempts to establish specific actors 
with similar competences (like Sviluppo Italia and the National Agency for the Diffusion of 
Technologies for Innovation), but their role has always been marginal, especially because of their 
short life. National R&I policies were steered directly by different ministers involved, under the 
supervision of the parliament. Consequently, there seems to be a high degree of dependency upon the 
political volatility, and the frequent cabinet reshuffles, characterizing the national political system at 
large. 
 
8.3.1 The lack of an intermediary body 
The governance structure of national R&I policies has not always been stable with regard to 
intermediations practices with R&I performers. Indeed, there use to be a quasi-agency actor, playing 
the role of intermediary between the public research world and the government, this role used to be 
played by the National Research Council (CNR). 
Indeed, the CNR used to have a double function, it was both a research funder and performer. It 
managed the administration, and selection, of research projects financing free grants devoted to 
individual researchers (finalized projects), while carrying out its own research activities through 
strategic projects. The former, organized according to specific thematic fields of research selected by 
CNR, were administered by the research council after the financial allocation done by the CIPE and 
were mainly devoted to academic research. While the latter, were oriented by the internal research 
agenda defined by the council. They were evaluated by external experts selected by the CNR and 
were exclusively devoted to finance research activities of the organization (Potì and Reale, 2007). 
With the establishment of the Minister of University and Research in 1989, and the implementation 
of the Bassanini reform (Ministerial Decree MIUR 593/00), the instrument mix into force was 
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reorganised with the aim of recentralising the responsibility for project funding allocation in the hands 
of the MIUR, together with a re-organisation of the existent public research institutions.  
After the establishment  of the Minister of Higher Education and Research the CNR has continued to 
manage its finalised projects (Sirilli, 2010), but its role of funding agency was slowly brought to an 
end. Indeed, these projects started to receive less funding from 1990s and were replaced by the 
creation of two new instruments, directly managed by the MIUR (both in terms of financing 
procedures and selection of thematic areas): The Fund for basic Research Investments (FIRB), and 
the Special Applied Research Fund (FISR). While, strategic research projects were terminated some 
years later in the framework of an overall reform of the public research organisation role and powers 
implemented in 2003.  
The CNR went through a consistent administrative reorganisation process of its structures, together 
with other public research organisations under the MIUR supervision113, its coordination functions 
were progressively moved to the MIUR. In detail, with the 1999 reform package, the government 
decided to merge the existing 316 research units, into about 100 institutes; however given the 
opposition and the bargaining power of the CNR personnel (who had the status of civil servants), it 
was impossible to accommodate the personnel as planned, with a consequent scattering of the 
institutes into more than 200 locations (Coccia and Rolfo, 2010, p. 139).  
This reform was part of the broader administrative reorganization undertaken within the Bassanini 
process and, as argued by one of our interviewee (INTERVIEWE 7), at that time the CNR used to 
ha e a r c re poorl  i ed o for he dominan  lei mo i  large i  bea if l , according o hich 
it took a great deal of concentration of resources into big structures to do research of high scientific 
quality.  
While this reform was still underway, the CNR went through an additional, and more consistent, 
reform process, which aimed at restructuring the institution redefining its purposes, activities, 
principles and criteria of organization and functioning. This transformation was undertaken under the 
Berlusconi II cabinet by the Minister of Higher Education and Research Letizia Moratti (d.lgs. 
127/2003). In a nutshell, differently from the previous intervention, this reform affected the scientific 
nature of the organization and its underlining competences and role within the broader national R&I 
governance. Inspired by the principles of project management, the CNR was reorganized according 
to 11 scientific departments, to which different institutes belonged to; these had the goal of directing 
projects and being the interface of the organization with external third parties (e.g. the government, 
the industrial world or universities) and research demands coming from the economic system (Coccia 
and Rolfo, 2007).  
 
113 Through the following legislative interventions: d.lgs. 19/99; d.lgs.27/99; d.lgs. 36/99. 
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The combination between these reforms, and a more general shrinking of public funding for research, 
did actually triggered the transformation of the CNR moving the organisation from scientific research 
institution, into a technological service-oriented actor, which compensated for the reduction of public 
funding through the provision of some specialized services like analysis and technical tests, 
technological services, quality service, environmental service (Coccia and Rolfo, 2010).  
Therefore, at the end of this process the CNR totally lost its role as an intermediary agency of the 
MIUR, and became solely a performer of the national R&I system competing, together with other 
Higher Education Institutions, for funding to support their research activities.  
Before this transition, the CNR was perceived as an extension of the university, maybe at the expenses 
of the relationship with the industrial world (INTERVIEWE 7) and, according to some of our experts 
(INTERVIEWE 6): “it dirigistically selected which research sectors to push forward and in which 
direction. It used to behave as a public body”.  
Despite the contrasting views (also among our interviewees) regarding the titularity, and the 
effectiveness, of its action there was without any doubt an agreement concerning its pivotal role in 
the public research governance. Therefore, it seems that underlining logic of this reform process was 
exactly to hollow out the research management competences of the CNR and recentralize these 
powers under the MIUR. 
Nevertheless, as argued by one of our interviewees (INTERVIEWE 7), it seems that actually what 
was missing in this reform was a replacement of the CNR with another body that could perform the 
same function. This is actually also a widespread perception among the broader pool of our 
interviewee (INTERVIEWEES 9-10), who claim that the Italian R&I governance is lacking a unified 
political responsibility centre to whom different stakeholder can raise their claims and suggestions.  
 
8.3.2 The fragmentation of vested interests 
If on the one hand R&I performers are calling for a unified centre of political responsibility, and some 
of them go even beyond by calling for the establishment of a devoted public agency; on the other 
hand, is it relevant to notice the endemic fragmentation characterizing the representation of R&I 
performers interests on both the public and the private side. 
Historically, the Higher Education sector has been characterized by a dynamic in which governments 
have tried to purse a rationalization of the sector, often characterized by many contradictions, while 
universities had always tried to resist and maintain their traditional model (Reale and Potì, 2009). 
D ring he la e 1990 , ni er i ie  had fir  en  hro gh a pha e of impo ed a onom  (Capano, 
2008), then in 2010 a new dirigiste action of policy makers took place, allowing them to freely define 
their own statutes, under the condition defined by a tight ministerial regulation (Capano et al., 2016; 
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Donina et al., 2015). On the other side the CNR, as the biggest public research organisation, went 
through a long reform process which changed its nature, shifting from financer and performer to a 
position that, from a merely R&I governance perceptive, share many similarities with those of 
universities. 
As reported by one interviewee (INTERVIEWE 7), even if in parallel with the end of the financer 
role the cohesion with the university has loosened, there is still a continuous exchange and 
collaboration between universities and the CNR. However, no clear collaboration structure was 
provided, differently to what happens in France with the mixed research unities, the opportunities for 
their interactions were left to the specific will of researchers. This was even more accentuated by the 
fact that after the reform process the CNR became an additional performer of the research sector, 
therefore somehow competing side by side with universities for public research funding. 
Despite some peculiarities of the system, like for example the fact that differently from universities 
CNR  re earcher  ha e no eaching obliga ion , herefore he majori  of i  per onnel a  mainly 
devoted to research activities, these two actors seemed to display a quite cooperative attitude.  
The situation was similar among different universities, as argued by one of our interviewee 
representative of the CRUI (The university association delegated with the power to guide and 
coordinate their autonomy); the rectors of different institutions could have heated debates, but at the 
end they do always managed to agree upon a common terrain for action. On the public research side, 
it is also worth mentioning the experience of the Gruppo 2003 (Group 2003), established during the 
period of the CNR reform process, it gathered scientists working in Italy and appearing in the list of 
the world most cited researches within their specific scientific fields. The group drafted a manifesto 
addressed to policy makers, which listed the deficiencies affecting the Italian public research structure 
and proposed some alternative paths for reforms. Along the years, it managed to meet some of the 
Italian Presidents of the Republic in order to discus  and rai e polic  maker  a arene  abo  he e 
themes. Besides that, its action has been limited to the organization of press conferences, and to the 
promotion of some initiatives addressed also to the general public. 
Ne er hele , all of ha  didn  eem to be enough in order to constitute a block powerful enough to 
play a relevant role in the R&I policy making process. As many of our interviewees suggests 
(INTERVIEWEES 8-4) universities did not really represent a dynamic actor in R&I policy making, 
there were some important research centers but overall, they were not powerful enough to guide the 
design of a policy and to be a stable interlocutor of the government.  
If we turn on the side of the industrial and business actors, the panorama seems to reflect a similar 
endemic fragmentation.  
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The representation of the industrial world tended to hinge upon the General Confederation of Italian 
Industry (Confindustria), an association with voluntary membership, representing companies, their 
values and interests, at the institutional level. As suggested by the literature (Lanza and Lavdas, 
2000), historically the business representation in Italy has been marked by an high degree of 
fragmentation.  
According to some of our interviewees (INTERVIEWEES 8-11), nowadays this organization is 
facing the challenges that many representation bodies were already facing in the broader Italian 
political system. Some of our interviewees believe that this was closely related with the fact that 
Confind ria didn  r l  belie ed in inno a ion a  a mo or for I alian economic de elopmen  
(INTERVIEWE 6).While others claim this was due to the fact that big enterprises, once more 
involved into Confindustria, and usually representing the biggest contributors in terms of national 
private expenses for R&D, have started to behave more autonomously in the national R&I governance 
and in their innovation investment choices (INTERVIEWEES 4-7-9). This was also reflected by the 
statement of our interviewee representing the MISE (INTERVIEWE 5), who argued that once 
designing ministerial strategies, in addition to the dialogue with Confindustria the minister also 
organizes one-to-one meetings with representatives of big Italian enterprises.  
Therefore, there seems to be a widespread perception regarding the increasing incapacity of 
Confindustria to catch the requests of big enterprises in the field of R&I sector, which has been 
somehow translated into a greater attention towards the needs of SMEs.  
The literature also suggests the ambiguity of the private sector role in the national R&I governance. 
Indeed, on the one hand Confindustria used to highlight the need to enhance the production of high 
qualities human resources in S&T field. While, on the other hand, the number of graduates hired by 
firms was one of the lowest in Europe (Poti et al., 2008, p. 19). This contradiction seemed to be 
symptomatic of a phenomenon our interviewee from Confindustria (INTERVIEWE 10) defined as 
the crisis of innovation demand of Italian SMEs.  
Indeed, national Small and Medium-Size Enterprises were overwhelmed by the instrumentation at 
their disposal, and the role of Confindustria should have been to accompany these actors during the 
selection of the most suited instrument. Borrowing some words from our interviewees 
(INTERVIEWE 10): “The confederation has always been very busy in dealing with the offer 
(establishing a dialogue with policy makers), but very little attentive to the demand side”. 
Alongside with the loss of representative power from Confindustria and more generally from the 
representatives of the public research sector, there are other types of interests that seemed to have 
gained ground, like the Presidents of regions. Indeed, as claimed by one of our interviewees 
(INTERVIEWE 9) there are lobbying interests, paraphs local ones, related to important productive 
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structures present in certain areas of the national territory that have increasingly started to strongly 
support politics.  
This is closely related with the fact that the contribution of regions to the national innovation effort 
has increased in the last years thanks also to the activation of instruments supported by European 
Structural Fund. Indeed, regions have increasingly been provided with the power to design their R&I 
regional strategies, mainly oriented to the field of applied research, technology transfer and pre-
competitive activities (European Commission, 2006; Sirilli, 2010). As far as curiosity driven research 
i  concerned he  didn  ha e a preeminen  role (if no  indirec l ), hile in he ca e of ind rial 
clusters, local administrators were among the main actor of the network which varied in its 
characteristics according to the actors involved and the history of different local regulatory 
interventions (De Maio, 2011). Every region was capable of defining its own strategy and the central 
government kept the process monitored, to the extent that regional innovation plans presented by 
regions had to be agreed with the Minister of Economy and Finance the MIUR and the MISE to make 
sure that the regional initiatives were in line with the national R&D guidelines and policies.  
There were also some drawbacks related with these developments, to the extent that the most 
advanced regions (in terms of output per capita and R&D investments intensities) had been more 
active in financing and developing their innovation strategies. This difference in the ability of local 
administrator to manage their policy strategies, and related resources could give rise to greater 
divergence in growth and development opportunities across regions (European Commission, 2004b, 
p. 8). Also Confindustria, as stated by one of our interviewees (INTERVIEWE 10), had started to 
develop a territorial strategy in order to coordinate with local representatives of the industrial 
confederation and open a dialogue with regional institutions. Nevertheless, the division of 
competences between national and regional level still suffer from various cases of overlapping, and 
some confusion regarding the competences of the various level of government involved (Gallo and 
Silva, 2006). Therefore, despite the increasing policy entrepreneurship of R&I performers and 
regional politicians at the territorial level, given the sometimes nebulous division of competences 
between central and regional governments and the only recent attempts of some industrial 
stakeholders to develop local strategies, it might probably be too early to clearly identify them as a 






In order to shed light on the dynamics underpinning the evolution of R&I policy mixes we designed 
an interpretative framework that looked at the roles of ideas (intended as dominant cognitive 
framings), at the internal coordination and specialisation between policy makers and ultimately, at 
the different strategies adopted for interest intermediation. The combined influence these three factors 
play in the process of policy instrument selection could help us to interpret the political dynamics 
defining the selection, and blending, of different instrument mixes.  
For what concerns the role of ideas we were interested in understanding the combined effect of 
changes in cabinet compositions, the feedback effects related with the accumulation of long-lasting 
policy framings and how their interaction influenced the evolution, and the characteristics of national 
R&I policy mixes. The results of our analysis suggested that a variation in terms of cabinet attitudes 
for different authoritative instruments was present between alternative politically-oriented cabinet 
periods. Nevertheless, given the inherent tendency of the system to wipe out what previous 
governments have done, and to erase the legacy of previous cabinet policies, we are confident to state 
that our expectations were only partially confirmed.  
Moreover, a striking feature emerging from our analysis suggested how, overall, different cabinet 
periods displayed a dominant share of preferences for instrumentations of a mission-oriented type, 
but ultimately used the available mix in a diffusion-oriented manner. This was consistent with the 
lack of political leadership in R&I policy design characterising the Italian case and, more generally, 
with the inability to design a long-term R&I national policy strategy.  
The variety of national (formal and informal) institutional organizations in the R&I sector was said 
to influence the ability of research and industrial actors to produce knowledge and innovation, as well 
as of policy makers to invest and regulate the sector (Braun, 2008b; Chung, 2013; Smits et al., 2010). 
Italy had pursued an external ministerial coordination strategy, which hinged upon the division of 
policy making competences between the Minister of Higher Education and Research and the Minister 
of Economic Development, with the open possibility to involve different functional ministers on a 
case-to-case basis. Our analysis suggested, as also confirmed by the results of our interviews, how 
the country clearly displayed a governance issue in the R&I policy sector. More generally, this was 
characterized by a widespread confusion between goal and instruments, together with a blurred 
division of competences between different policy making institutions. Indeed, coordination between 
different R&I policy making institutions was left to the internal dynamics taking place within the 
cabinet and to the cooperative attitudes of individual ministers. These features further hindered the 
policy-making capacity necessary to design long-term national strategies and to prioritize R&I policy 
as a viable strategy for national development. That is why, often, the evolution of the national R&I 
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policy mix seemed to be made of fragmented day-to-day interventions, rather than a combined blend 
policy instrument.  
The structures for interest intermediation were quite fragmented both on the public and on the private 
side; moreover, the experiences of public agencies in R&I sectors had always been marginal and 
characterized by a short life. R&I performers claimed that Italy was missing a unified political 
responsibility centre in R&I, and given their inability to coordinate intermediation between 
stakeholders, policymakers actually seemed to be prisoners of those powerful actors able to mobilize 
the necessary resources to fulfil their specific interests.  
These characteristics, matched with a similarly fragmented panorama in the field of public research 
and higher education performers, consistently complicated the process of interest representation in 
the assemblage of different instrument mix.  Indeed, on the one hand policy makers seemed to be 
loosely attracted by R&I themes, both for their political ambitions and as a strategy for national 
economic development. While, on the other hand, R&I performers seemed to be unable to raise their 



















9 Chapter 9: Conclusions  
The ultimate goal of the present research is to shed light on the political dynamics taking place behind 
he cene  of polic  de ign proce e ; b  in e iga ing ac or  ake  for al erna i e rajec orie  of 
change and how these have been shaped along the formulation process into different instrument mix 
characteristics. We aimed first at exploring the variations in R&I policy mix (by testing our new 
instrument classification typology) then, through an analysis of the way actors interact, we shed 
identified the causal pathways which can help to make sense of the political process behind the 
selection of alternative instrument mixes. Indeed, the novelty of our contribution stands exactly on 
explaining how tools are selected from the perspective of the actors making the decision.   
Policy making processes are said to be shaped by conflicts and compromises among involved 
interests, by the rule system inherited from the past, and by the formulation of different cognitive and 
normative framings (Palier and Surel, 2005). Consequently, in order to understand their internal 
dynamics, we decided to break up the influence that different combinations of ideas, institutions and 
interests could have in shaping their developments. We designed a theoretical framework which 
intersects insights on the role of ideas (as the impact of dominant framings in a given political system); 
the opportunity structures provided by the institutional system (internal coordination and 
specialisation between bureaucrats) and the role target population (the strategies for interest 
intermediation) plays in policy design process.  
More broadly, this perspective helped us to understand how actors interact for the selection of policy 
instruments, and the way this process influenced the diachronic evolution of policy mixes. The 
comparative analysis between Italy and France sheds light on the different national policy design 
practices, showing the various strategies (and sometimes legacies) according to which national 
instrument mix were blended. When we focus only on how different national governments use their 
legitimate power to shape public action (e.g. instrument families) our two cases share many 
similarities in their aggregate policy mix characteristics. But if we look at the aggregate 
characteristics of how different instruments exercise social control (e.g. instrument shapes) and the 
relationships between policy makers and target population (e.g. delivery structure) our results display 
a greater variety. These differences reflect the alternative approaches the two countries have 
undertaken to interact with target population, as well as the different degree of political 
entrepreneurship and organizational capacity of national R&I performers. 
This conclusive chapter is organised as follow; first, we will briefly summarize the most relevant 
historical events characterising the evolution of national R&I sector in our two cases as extensively 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. Then, we will review the aggregate evolution of policy mix 
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characteristics, with a perspective on the behavioural changes required to the target population in 
order to trace the evolution of national R&I strategies and deepen the comparative analysis of our 
two-case studies. Then, we will go through all the theoretical factors of interest we have identified in 
previous chapters, and we will assess their contributions in explaining different perspectives of policy 
instrument selection process. Ultimately, in the general conclusion of the chapter we will wrap up on 
our contribution to the scholarship in the field, and we will discuss alternative policy implications.   
 
9.1 The historical evolution of the two cases 
As already discussed in Chapter 4 the French and Italian R&I sectors, are two highly comparable 
systems, despite some of the different political choices that have characterized their evolution.  
Indeed, both countries have a long history of public-owned enterprises in highly intensive R&I 
sectors, which was accompanied by a pivotal role of public research organisations. At the beginning 
of the 1990s both cases went through a process of disposal of state participations in many sectors of 
the national economy. For the Italian case, due to the absence of clear sectorial orientations, the 
system endogenously tended to favour those actors who were able to autonomously submit request 
for innovation projects, and above all those who were able to bear the costs related with delays in 
instrument activation process and funding provisions. That is why Italy is said to display strong 
weakness in its capacity to adopt mission-oriented polices (Onida and Malerba, 1990). Indeed, despite 
these vulnerabilities are well recognised also in official strategic documents, their implementation 
attempts have been unsatisfactory for now (Grilli & Mariotti, 2006). 
Differently, in the French case the dismissal process took another path and policy-makers did 
maintained a greater extent of participation in specific sectors of national economy. As argued by one 
of our interviewees (INTERVIEWEE 17): in he n clear ind r  he a e didn  en  hro gh an 
economic disengagement process, because it wanted to keep strategic autonomy. Indeed, we believe 
that there are given industries where it is needed to preserve (state)competencies, also from a 
geopoli ical ra egic per pec i e. Thi  i  no  he cla ic  pe of S a e con rol, i  i  ra her 
supervision.   
The following figure, chronologically displays the main events characterising the history of the R&I 




Figure 9. 1 The chronology of the two cases 
 
In 1998 both countries systematically examined their research and innovation systems, through the 
report to the Parliament of the Minister of Higher Education and Research in the Italian case and with 
the Guillaume report in France; both triggered a reorganisation of national (and regional) institutions 
and of R&I strategic role for national economic development strategies. For the French case this 
process culminated in the drafting of the 2003 Innovation plan, followed by the Research act in 2006 
and the Law on the autonomy of university in 2007114. While, in the Italian case the revision of 
national R&I governance found its place in the broader framework of a country-wide administrative 
reorganisation (the Bassanini package). 
Looking at the chronology of national interventions in R&I it is possible to draw some parallels 
between the two countries. For example, in both Ind ria 2015  and in he In e men  for he f re 
plan, national governments, either through the collaboration between ministers or the creation of a 
new organization (the French General Commissariat for Investment), policy makers identified 
specific technological and productive areas for R&I investments, while designing long-term 
strategies for national development.  
Therefore, in both countries national governments detained the titularity to translate national 
objectives into R&I objectives. The Italian experience had a short life, because the underlining (soft) 
mission-oriented purpose of this strategy was modified by the newly elected cabinet (2008), which 
introduced the possibility to increase the number of sectors for investments (Traù, 2009). While, in 
 
114 We already discussed in Chapter 5 about the timing and the drafting of these reforms. 
 229 
the case of the Investment for the Future Plan the strategy was slightly reoriented and calibrated but 
it did manage to maintain a mission-oriented aim across different political mandates.  
Moreover, both countries had quite developed records of interventions in the field of competitive 
clusters. In this sector Italy was the forerunner, since the beginning of the 1980s the organisation of 
production in traditional sectors of northern regions had progressively evolved towards a system 
based on districts. Over the years this format was expanded and consolidated also in other regions; it 
was accompanied by specific funding (e.g. Fund for underutilised areas, European structural funds) 
and legal provisions to simplify the division of competences between regional and national 
authorities. This design was replicated in 2002 by the Minister of Higher Education and Research, 
which established he technological districts . These systems shared many similarities with 
industrial districts, despite the fact that the former was not limited to SMEs (also large 
technologically-intensive firms were called to participate) and it mainly relied on highly qualified 
human capital coming from public research centres.  
The French cluster experience started in 2004 with the pôles de compétitivité, territorially-based 
competitive clusters aimed at fostering the synergetic development of specific sectors (or 
technologies) through an active partnership between members. These networks were territorially 
defined by the coexistence of an highly specialized industrial basis matched with research and 
education organisations that, through the establishment of  partnerships, could have access to funding 
under privileged conditions and rebates on corporate and social taxes (European Commission, 2005a).  
Differently from the Italian case, the French industrial clusters were almost directly steered from 
central government, and the local base mainly represented the most suitable administrative level to 
implement such strategy. Indeed, already in 2008, the pôles de compétitivité became one of the main 
recipients of a public procurement-based instrument mix. Therefore, once again, France and Italy 
went through very similar policy design experiences, but in the first case these were mainly centrally 
steered, while in the latter a national framework was missing, and strategic choices were mainly left 
in the hands of regions.   
Finally, both our cases implemented a reform of higher education system during the time frame under 
investigation. The French reform, the Law on the autonomy and responsibility of Universities (LRU), 
reduced the size of universities administrations councils, while increasing the role of their presidents. 
Overall, universities acquired greater budgetary and financial management competences of their 
institutions, together with that it became obligatory for them to sign a four-year contract (contrat 
quadriennaux) with the ministry of Higher Education and Research for a coordinated management 
of their strategies. The underlining logic of the LRU was to put universities at the centre of the system 
as the main operators of public research. This ran in parallel with the increasingly undermined role 
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of Public Research Organizations in terms of both funding powers, following on from the creation of 
ANR, and evaluation role, after the establishment of the AERES (Musselin, 2017). 
The 2010 Italian reform (Riforma Gelmini) arose in a general climate were universities were 
percei ed a  enjo ing a onom , i ho  re pon ibili , in hich pre re  of imilar reform  
applied in other European Countries were adopted to promote similar changes (Capano, 2008).  
As for the French case, the law modified the internal governance structure of universities, the 
provisions regarding the recruitment of researchers and professor as well as the power and 
competences of internal university organisation structures. The two reforms shared many similarities 
(e.g. increasing financial and managerial autonomy of universities; promoting a push towards a 
competitive-based funding provision) and they both represented a good example of external 
regulation in governing the national Higher Education sector. 
This historical overview of the most relevant reforms our two cases had went through justifies our 
claim regarding the highly comparable nature of the French and the Italian R&I systems. These two 
countries share many similarities in their R&I policy-making experiences; however, if we narrow 
down the focus of analysis, it is possible to highlight the differences embedded in their heterogeneous 
paths of evolution.   
 
9.2 The Evolution of the Policy mix 
As discussed in previous chapters, policy instruments are said to be highly context dependent (Edler 
et al., 2016); therefore, the actors and the institutional contexts in which they operate become crucial 
in determining their effects (Flanagan et al., 2011). Decisions regarding policy design tend to be made 
in a nested context characterised by a complex regime of goals, related instruments and settings, in 
which new elements have to be adjusted within the existing framework (Cashore and Howlett, 2007).  
For all these reasons, even though instruments may be, in some theoretical or technical sense 
substitutable (any instrument could achieve any end), in practice they differ in a number of ways, 
making their selection a complex political matter (Howlett, 2005). 
The typology of policy instrument classification proposed in this research aims exactly to put forward 
a more accurate classification of R&I policy instruments, considering both the behavioural and 
political characteristics embedded in different tools. Since, ultimately, instruments refer to the aspect 
of policy intended to motivate target population to comply with a policy, or utilize policy 
opportunities (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 338); we believe that the relationship between decision 
makers and target population can help us to understand the underlining logic of instrument action. 
Indeed, even if some policy instruments might look similar in the ways they define, or approach, a 
problem, there will always be substantial differences not only in terms of the concrete details of how 
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instruments are chosen and designed, but also in terms of the context in which instruments are applied 
(Borrás and Edquist, 2019, p. 228). 
Taking into account all these factors, the following series of tables summarize the characteristics of 





Figure 9. 2 Share of instrument families in France and Italy policy mixes 
 
Before discussing this information, an analytical caveat is needed. The following tables display the 
frequency of different policy instrument components (family, shape, delivery components) across the 
two cases under investigation. Previous researches (Capano et al., 2019) have already demonstrated 
he e en  o hich he mi  of in r men al hape  make  a difference regardle  of he q an i  of 
shapes of the same family of substantial instruments introduced. Following on that, the scores for 
different instrument components in our tables do not show the aggregate frequency distribution of 
the shapes, but they rather focus on the frequency distribution of different combination of instrument 
characteristics (e.g. a specific combination of Family, Shape and Delivery). This choice was 
motivated not only by the results of similar analytical exercises, but also because the underlining 
















logic was to understand the relevance of specific instruments components across the overall policy 
mix evolution115.  
Figure 9.2 shows the distribution of instrument families across the R&I policy mix of France and 
Italy. As discussed in Chapter 3 these typologies show the way governments use their legitimate 
power to shape public action. From this perspective our two cases display similar results; 
characterised by a high share of expenditure instruments (more than 50% of the total mix), which is 
consistent with the underlining redistributive nature of R&I policies. This is followed by the 
regulation family (24%), information (14%) and ultimately fiscal instruments (10%). These results 
confirm the binary characteristics of our two cases and are substantially in line with the similar 
developments they have experiences in the R&I sector as confirmed by the chronological evolution 
of their policies (Figure 9.1).  
However, each family of tool displays a high degree of heterogeneity regarding the way in which 
their basic inducement is moulded to obtain compliance from the target population; because policy 
instruments containing similar inducement principles can be actually applied in different ways 
(Vedung, 1998). Indeed, even if instruments can be grouped into families according to the degree to 
which governments use their power, each of them displays a high level of variation in their action 
content, meaning in the different extent of constraints they can enforce (Woodside, 1986). Because, 
in addition to social control, any tool embeds a particular way of exercising it, influencing how target 
population will behave, by privileging some actors and interest over others (Kassim and Le Galès, 
2010; Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007). Consequently, in order to acquire a deeper understating of 
how social control is exercised, and more broadly of the degree to which target population is free to 




115 Indeed, thanks to this approach it has been possible to clean up the effect of the layering of multiple similar 




Figure 9.3 Share of instrument shapes in France and Italy policy mixes 
 
The shapes are grouped by families (from the most to the least authoritative), and ordered from the 
most to the least coercive in Figure 9.3. 
In this case our sample displays many differences in terms of both the type of shape and their coercive 
power. Indeed, the French policy mix is mainly characterized by highly coercive regulatory 
instruments (e.g. agency for evaluation, funding agency) and by highly coercive expenditure type of 
instruments (e.g. public procurement and cash advance). While, the Italian mix, despite containing a 
highly coercive regulatory shape, after the introduction of a new patent regulation legislation; it tends 
to be mainly oriented towards a mixed level of expenditure-based coercive shapes (e.g. equity 
participation, economic guarantee and targeted funding). In the bottom-half of the table the two 
countries tend to acquire more similarities, especially for what concerns the presence of less coercive 
expenditure shapes like competitive funding, and more heterogenous shapes of the information and 
fiscal families. Figure 9.4 focuses on the variety of delivery components which come together with 
the evolution of national policy mix.    
 



































Figure 9. 4 Share of instrument delivery structures in France and Italy policy mixes 
 
With delivery component we mean the type of governing arrangement accompanying each 
instrument, which basically substantiate the type of relationship between policy makers and target 
population. It provides insights on those actors who have the power to steer instrument action along 
the management process; describing the parties involved in a particular policy instrument 
management (Bouwma et al., 2017). The French policy mix is highly polarised between low and high 
automatic delivery structures. This pattern basically recalls a governance arrangement in which 
instrument activation process is either in the hands of policy makers (or their supervised public 
agencies) or left to existent organizational structures like the market or the fiscal system. Similarly, 
Italy displays an equal share of highly automatic delivery; while medium components exhibit an 
increase in the representativeness at the expenses of a reduction in low automatic delivery.  
In this case the governance arrangement is more evenly distributed among the three typologies, with 
an interesting 33% of mixed delivery structures, which portraits the increased relevance that private 
banking sector has acquired as intermediary actor in the governance of Italian R&I national 
instruments.   
Overall our two cases display a similarly sophisticated instrumentations, nevertheless it is worth to 
highlight how when focusing only on the authoritative components of instrument families the two 
policy mixes look the same; while, when looking at the distribution of shapes and delivery structures 
this similarity is consistently attenuated.  
These evidences support our main theoretical claim regarding the necessity of a more accurate 
instrument classification typology, which needs to be able to grasp the constitutive differences 
embedded in instruments shapes. Indeed, ultimately, these characteristics define the essence of social 
















control exercised through public action, while shaping the relationship between policy makers and 
target population. Therefore, if e an  o nder and he a  in hich differen  echniq e  of 
go ernance  affec  he reali  in hich ac or  in erac , a foc  on he differen  hape  and deli er  
structures seems to be needed.  
As discussed in previous paragraphs, our two cases have followed a binary path of evolution on their 
R&I policies; however, if we look at the specific dynamics characterising these developments, their 
constitutive differences seem more evident. Likewise, they display a high degree of similarity in the 
distribution of their instrument families; while, when looking at instrument shapes and delivery 
structure they display a highly differentiated pattern. Consequently, France and Italy can be said to 
share many similarities concerning the degree to which governments use their legitimate power to 
shape public action; while they undertook different strategies with respect to the way social control 
is exercised (instrument shape) and the preferred type of governing arrangements accompanying 
policy instruments (delivery component).  
Another great difference between the policy mix evolution of our two case studies is the additionality 
effect of different policy instrument components, so the way instrument mix are diachronically 
shaped, and eventually re-calibrated.  
In the French case it is relevant to highlight how, despite changes in the Prime Minister (or in the 
President of the Republic), many proposals for reforms displayed a high degree of continuity like the 
case of the proposal for Higher Education reform put forward by Luc Ferry in 2003 and the ultimate 
shape of the Law on the Autonomy and Responsibilities of universities finally approved in 2007. 
Despite the initial fragmentation of national strategies, as reported in the analysis of the Guillaume 
Report, it is possible to trace its overtime evolution towards the design of long-term national R&I 
missions. Differently, the Italian case is much more fragmented, R&I policy mixes are mainly 
designed through one-off interventions approved in the framework of various budgetary laws. As 
argued by our INTERVIEWEE (10), hi  pa ern doe n  onl  crea e red ndancie , hich ome ime  
lead to the overlapping of similar instrument shapes; but it especially creates confusion on the target 
population which tend to be lost in the jungle of very similar tools at their disposal.  
Therefore, even though the two countries share a stable centre-of-government R&I structure (as 
displayed by the similarity in instrument families Figure 9.2); the Italian case suffers from an inherent 
fragmentation and duplication of instruments, that is matched with a scarcely effective monitoring 
and the uncertainties related with the implementation process and availability of resources (Potì and 
Reale, 2011). Therefore, if e in erpre  la ering a  a mode of de igning in i ion  hro gh hich 
polic  maker  in er ene  addi i el  o affec  rela ed beha io r  (Capano, 2019 p.5), we can 
differentiate the layering for equilibrium pursued in the French case and the attempts of layering for 
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change characterising the Italian context. Indeed, in the former, experiences like the evolution of the 
Research Tax Credit (Crédit Impôt Recherche) and the Incubator and Technology Transfer 
Organisations (see Chapter 4), suggest an underlying design logic aimed at chasing coherence through 
the stratification of multiple (often similar) instruments. Whereas, in the Italian case the systematic 
tendency to design one-off instruments, approved in the framework of broader national decrees, 
allude to an attempt to trigger changes by exploiting the window of opportunity provided by 
systematic national policy design practices, like the drafting of the yearly budgetary law, rather than 
to a broader systemic logic.  
 
9.3 Ideas 
Innovation rarely represent a goal in itself, but rather a means to achieve broader political goals. 
National R&I strategies represent one of the instrumental paths through which governments attempts 
to reach these wider purposes, by means of meso-level innovation goals. Consequently, how these 
objectives have to be translated into innovation-intensity targets, and the way in which these 
interventions should be balanced represent a relevant political matter (Edquist and Borrás, 2013).  
Therefore, it is plausible to expect that different actors would have different stakes with respect to the 
positive (or negative) spill-overs various interventions can trigger. Meaning, the choices of alternative 
designs for public policy interventions in R&I should represent the result of different political 
framings concerning both problems interpretation and the expected benefits from the application of 
a given set of policy instruments.  
The existent literature displays a clear shortcoming regarding the relevance that political ideas can 
have in shaping the design of R&I policy strategies, many studies overlook its relationship with party 
politics and more generally with government ideology (Bergek et al., 2015; Bhattacharya et al., 2017; 
Wang et al., 2019). We know that the political context can differently influence the availability of 
financial resources for investments in R&D (Bergek et al., 2015), but it is still unclear how do party 
politics preferences influence policy-makers attitudes in selecting specific R&I policy instrument 
characteristics. Therefore, with our analysis, we aimed at investigating this type of decisions, using 
as a proxy policy instrument characteristic; more broadly, we were interested in understanding how 
do the political preferences of different cabinet periods influence the formulation of national Research 
and Innovation policy strategies? 
We also know that problem-solution framings tend to cluster in long-term paradigms, acting as a lens 
that filter information and focuses attention on specific issues (Wilson, 2000). Consequently, different 
framings can be able to influence various sets of social and political values, interpretations of the 
reality and images of target population, shaping the characteristics of the overall governance 
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arrangement (Capano and Lippi, 2017; Edler et al., 2016; Sanz-Mendez and Borrás, 2001). That is 
why, during our investigation, we also focused on explaining how governmental instrument mix 
preferences have evolved against different cabinet periods and the feedback effects related with the 
accumulation of long-lasting institutional aims attached to different dominant R&I paradigms.  
Our two cases reflected different traditions of cognitive legacies in the R&I; specifically, France can 
be assimilated with the mission-oriented tradition while Italy with the diffusion-oriented. 
Consequently, we expected that in the first case it was more likely that governments would display 
preferences for a more authoritative and less automatic policy mix; while, in the diffusion-oriented 
case, we expected that cabinet preferences would rather cluster towards less authoritative and more 
automatic instruments.  
As discussed in Chapter 6 and 8 our expectations were only partially confirmed.  
Indeed, in the French case the path dependent effect of mission-oriented R&I paradigm seems to be 
predominant on the evolution of cabinet R&I instrument mix preferences. This is also confirmed by 
the dominant trend of preferences for more authoritative and less automatic instruments.  
Therefore, policy instrument selection process seems to be truly linked to the nature of the general 
governance context and long-term cognitive legacy embedded in the history of national R&I 
strategies. And when policy makers have to decide on how to shape the existent mix, given the system 
of interests and institutions set into force by previous choices, they seem to prefer falling back on 
consolidated strategies, rather than breaking the path with innovative solutions.  
Differently, in the Italian case, the path dependent effects of the diffusion-orien ed legac  don  eem 
to influence the evolution of cabinet preferences for different R&I instrument mixes.  
Indeed, at first glance, the distribution of preferences seems to be more in line with a mission-oriented 
ideal type, given the average high share of highly authoritative and not automatic instruments types, 
rather than with a diffusion oriented one. If we read these results together with the data on 
Governmental Budget allocation for R&D according to the sector of investment (see Chapter 4 on 
case selection) it seems as if Italy shows a dominant preference pattern for an instrumentation of the 
mission-oriented type but, ultimately, it uses the available mix in a diffusion-oriented manner 116. 
Moreover, since we were deeply interested in understanding the relevance that different political ideas 
could have in shaping the design of R&I strategies, we investigated the extent to which the 
charac eri ic  of differen  cabine  rno er  o ld likel  infl ence he e ol ion of go ernmen  
preferences for policy mix features. We expected a trade-off between the willingness of new 
 
116 Some e ample  of hi  mi ma ch can be fo nd in o r da a, a  in he ca e of Fig re 8.2 for D Alema I and Prodi II 
cabinet, were automatic and not automatic instruments score the same share of preferences. Since different degrees of 
automaticity in the delivery structure of policy instruments mirror the extent of public resources necessary for instrument 
management, this tells us the highly ambivalence of different policy instrument application. 
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governing parties to modify the dominant policy style into force and the room for manoeuvre they 
had given the legacy inherited from previous governments. Specifically, we hypothesized that the 
more similar the political orientations between incoming at outgoing governments, the less 
authoritative would be the diachronic evolution of instrument mix preferences.  
The rend di pla ed b  he French ca e doe n  comple el  confirm o r e pec a ion . Indeed, an 
alternation of different politically-oriented policy mix preferences seems to be meaningfully present; 
however, this is also consistently subject to internal national political and electoral dynamics. 
Nevertheless, these results are symptomatic of the related political payoffs that alternative choices in 
the design of national R&I strategies can play in the party politics battle field.  
Similarly, also in the Italian case some variations for differently authoritative instrument mixes are 
pre en , e en ho gh e canno  raigh for ard connec  he e re l  i h cabine  turnover because 
of two specific features characterising national R&I policy design. The first is related with the general 
low political salience of the issues: R&I issues have never been a priority for Italian governments, 
and they have neither been central in their decision-making agenda (INTERVIEWEES 7-10-11). 
Indeed, the Italian cultural landscape has historically displayed a generally widespread negative 
outlook toward science and technology (Nuvolari and Vasta, 2015, p. 282). 
The second factor refers to the inherent tendency of the system to wipe out what previous 
governments have done. Newly elected governments tend to find hard to explain to their own majority 
that there is no need to go back to square one every mandate, and that what is needed it simply to 
forge ahead, to adjust what has been previously done (Bassanini, 2009). Consequently, the alternation 
trend among different cabinets, should be read under the light of the general tendency to destroy the 
legacy of previous cabinets, rather than the specific political salience of R&I issues.  
In both cases, the authoritative component of policy mix preferences is somehow influenced by 
political variation in the governing party. For what concern the path dependent effect of long-lasting 
R&I cognitive framings, their influence is evident in the French case, which displays an overtime 
evolution in line with our expectation. While, for the Italian this effect is less evident and it is 
somehow intertwined with some cultural and political peculiarity related with national R&I policy 
design practise. Overall, from our results it emerges that the politics of R&I does not mirror traditional 
cleavages and that its political salience is highly context dependent.  
 
9.4 Institutions 
Traditionally, Research and Innovation issues lie within the remit of different ministerial 
responsibilities, whose task division varies according to different national contexts (Edler et al., 2016; 
Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). From an institutional organisation perspective, R&I policies (like for 
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example climate policies (Van Asselt et al., 2015), migration policies (Scholten et al., 2017) and 
health care policies (Trein, 2017)), and a  he in er ec ion of cla ic polic  ec or .  The a  in 
which national R&I responsibilities have been organized mirrors different national specificities 
reflecting their institutional systems, the different framings of R&I issues and of related policy 
strategies. Since ministerial organisation is not strictly determined by law, for the most part different 
structures tell us how national governments have differently framed policy problems and the political 
priorities to be tackled (Peters, 1998).  
The literature recognizes the influence the variety of national institutions, and inter-institutional, 
networks play in shaping the ability of research and industrial actors to produce knowledge and 
innovation, as well as the set of problems related with policy areas characterised by the integration 
of different responsibilities, like the case of R&I policies (Braun, 2008b, 2008a; Chung, 2013; Edler 
and Kuhlmann, 2008a; Griessen and Braun, 2008; Koch, 2008; OECD, 2005; Pelkonen et al., 2008; 
Smits et al., 2010). Our contribution builds on these evidences and attempts to move forwards the 
focus of analysis, in order to investigate how the different morphologies of formal (and informal) 
ministerial organisation patterns have influenced the ability of policy makers to design instrument 
mix able to consider multiple traditional subsectors of public action. More specifically: how did the 
internal policy making ability in R&I policy sector was challenged by the underlining necessity to 
integrate different policy responsibilities? And, to what extent did different policy mix choices 
addressed (un)balanced or (un)coordinated blend of instruments to their targets? 
Both our cases pursued an external specialisation pattern. Indeed, their R&I policy competences lie 
under the remit of the minister for Higher Education and Research, and the Minister with economic 
competences (called Minister of Economic Development in the Italian case, and Minister of Economy 
and Finance in the French case). Consequently, since the success of this institutional organizational 
structure is highly dependent upon the ministerial capacity to create dialogue among different policy 
responsibilities, we expected that countries undertaking similar ministerial specialization strategy 
would likely adopt similar coordination practices 
France and Italy have been historically characterized by a high level of institutional fragmentation in 
the R&I sector. In the first case, higher education and public research structures have a mixed nature, 
involving three different (and sometimes conflictual) actors, the Grandes Écoles, Universities and 
Public Research organisations. Moreover, functional ministers, often closely related with one of the 
above-mentioned actors, still play an important role in the allocation of funding for public research 
(Lepori et al., 2017). Similarly, in Italy, dating back to the era of state owned enterprises, decisions 
concerning national industrial strategies were taken by two different ministers that were often in 
conflict, the ministry of Industry (established in 1948) and the ministry of state-holdings (established 
 240 
in 1956) (Maio, 2014, p. 248). Moreover, as for the former case, also functional ministers do play an 
important role in the evolution of the sector, by contributing to the research mission of their controlled 
Public Research Organisations.  
In line with the high degree of similarities France and Italy show in the dynamics characterising R&I 
policy responsibilities distributions, they also experience a deep divide in the framings of R&I issues 
by ministers with joint responsibilities. Indeed, the different ministers involved seem to perceive their 
responsibilities according to a linear understanding of the innovation process, where one minister 
deal with research, while the second has the titularity over the experimental development phase, and 
eventually its market application (INTERVIEWEES 5-21-17). Accordingly, different ministers with 
integrative R&I competences are also perceived as having two different and separate constituencies. 
Indeed, the Minister with research responsibilities refers to PROs and universities, while the Minister 
with competences in economic development is mainly oriented towards helping enterprises and the 
innovations developed by them (INTERVIEWE 17). 
So, given the combination between different institutional perspectives on R&I issues, and the 
different constituency-based nature of this relationship, policy-making coordination117 practices have 
not always been a smooth process. The following Table 9.1 summarizes the coordination practices 











117 Here coordination can be intended as the spectrum of activities in which one party alter its own political strategy to 
accommodate the activity of others in pursuit similar goals (Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998, p. 480). 
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Table 9. 1 Coordination practices in France and Italy 
FRANCE ITALY 
The Civil Budget for Research and Technological 
Development -BCRD- (1997): It was a budgetary 
platform defining the credit for public research within a 
single procedure. Autonomously led by the minister of 
Higher Education and Research, leaving the possibility 
for sectorial ministers to participate in the definition of the 
budget. Its relevance as an instrument for interministerial 
coordination should not be overestimates. Because, when 
a specific research sector was deemed as strategic for a 
given ministry, this had the possibility to negotiate 
directly with the minister of finance. 
National Research Program -PNR- (1998): It was a 
document which programmatically defined national 
strategies for R&I, by identifying the activities to be 
promoted (almost) every 3 years. It was formulated by 
the MIUR after an extensive consultation with the 
actors of the innovation system. 
  
Constitutional Bylaw on Finance -LOLF-(2006): It 
provides a common framework for budgeting procedures 
in the field of R&I by creating an interministerial mission 
for Research and Higher Education (MIRES), widening 
the scope of BCRD. The minister responsible for research 
was in charge of coordinating government action among 
different ministers. But it did  ide a  bliga i  f  
joint programming, so each minister could participate in 
the mission simply by including its autonomously 
designed program. 
Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning 
-CIPE- (2006): National Committee in charge of 
coordinating and planning national economic policy. It 
represented an additional forum, a director table, in 
which ministers with R&I competences could gather to 
discuss about national strategies (especially funding 
allocations) under the coordinating role of the PM and 
the Minister of Economy and Finance. In 2006 it has 
been transferred under the PM office, to strengthen its 
role as coordinator while re-centralising the control over 
the interministerial policy making practices.  
 
National Strategy for Research and Innovation -SNRI- 
(2008): It was a bottom-up priority setting process 
involving public research, business and civil society 
stakeholders, to identify the main Social Challenges 
national R&I policies should be directed at. 
The investment for the future plan (for the 1st wave of 
application) was in line with these priorities. 
 
Commissariat G n ral à l Investissement (CGI): 
National Committee with the task of managing the 
implementation of the Investment for the Future Plan. It 
coordinated interministerial policy design under the 
authority of the PM as well as the cooperation among 
other governmental bodies responsible for the distribution 
of funds. It ensured the transparency and quality of the 
selection procedures, the allocation of funds to existent 




In the French case there has been a first attempt to coordinate policy making with the BCRD where, 
despite the role of formal coordinator attributed to the Minister for Higher Education and Research, 
different functional ministers preserved enough power to develop their own strategy, sometimes 
nullifying the cooperative effort of the whole platform (Cytermann, 2006). Similarly, in the MIRES, 
despite the introduction of an integrated monitoring, each functional minister preserved its own 
budget, and competences, over the design of individual research strategies (OECD, 2014). Therefore, 
the programs making up the strategy clearly mirrored different functional research competences 
showing how actually the dialogue between project managers (ministers) remained consistently 
unstructured (Cytermann, 2006). Also the binding power of the National Strategy for Research and 
Inno a ion a  q i e limi ed, o he e en  ha  i  a  no  e  a  he opera ional le el, and i  didn  
allocate budget, circumscribing its action to the provision of thematic guidelines for R&I national 
themes (OECD, 2014). Under the Sarkozy presidency, within the framework of the Investment for 
the Future Plan, a new layer was added to the complex national governance of the system, through 
the creation of the General Commissariat for Investments (CGI). Rather than a pure instance of 
coordination, this committee was much more an attempt to re-centralise some of the R&I policy 
making competences under the authority of the Prime Minister118. In line with the priorities identified 
by a group of experts, the CGI managed the enactment of the Investment for the Future Plan, but it 
didn  pro ide an  e plici  a emp  of coordina ion or in erac ion i h he o her mini er  in ol ed in 
the R&I national effort (Lepori et al., 2017).  
In the Italian case any common budgeting procedure among ministers involved in R&I was 
implemented. The PNR mainly concerned the definition of broad national goals, and it did not provide 
any direction regarding the effective implementation of different measures. Moreover, the lack of 
financial commitment to the multiannual strategies defined in the document has often resulted in 
unrealistic targets (Nascia and Pianta, 2013, p. 24) and unsatisfactory implementation (Grilli and 
Mariotti, 2006). The formal i lari  of he MIUR in draf ing hi  programma ic doc men  didn  
assigned any coordination power to this actor; consequently, as supported by our interviewees, this 
cen rali a ion of compe ence  didn  eem o pro ide an  effec i e re l  in erm  of coordina ion 
among the ministers involved (INTERVIEWEES 10-7-9). In the case of the CIPE, despite its re-
centralization under the Prime Minister office, this committee tends to mirrors the political dynamics 
internal to the current cabinet organisation; therefore, it represents only a formal, rather than an 
effective, coordination table among ministers (INTERVIEWEES 11-3-5). 
 
118 A  arg ed b  one of o r e per : i h he CGI he  didn  crea e coherence among he organi a ion  in ol ed, b  
ra her compe i ion be een mini er  and he PIA  (INTERVIEWE 15). 
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Consequently, our expectations regarding the similarity of coordination practices adopted by 
countries undertaking analogous ministerial coordination practices were confirmed. Indeed, both 
France and Italy p r ed imilar coordina ion ra egie  hich didn  ac all  implemen ed any 
binding obligation to the ministers involved in R&I policy design.  
Moreover, both countries have tried to recentralise their coordination powers. First Italy, with the 
mild attempt to bring the CIPE structures under the Prime Minister office; then France adopted a 
similar strategy by adding a new layer to the complex national governance of the system with the 
creation of the General Commissariat for Investments.  
As suggested by the literature, the most relevant drawbacks of various ministerial coordination 
practices are related with the fact that normally, these decision-making venues, do not have their own 
organizational identity, and they tend to be an arena for exchanging information dependent upon the 
political will of singular ministers119(Braun 2008a); rather than an effective policy-making 
laboratory.  
Consequently, as confirmed by our interviewees (INTERVIEWE 9), the coordination among minister 
is left to the internal dynamics taking place within cabinets, and to the political attitudes among 
ministers. 
Indeed, when coordination was reached (e.g. in the case of Industria 2015 for Italy; in the case of 
Research and Innovation act and of the Innovation plan for France120), this was due to either the 
entrepreneurial capacity of a specific minister or to the collaborative attitude between individuals in 
charge of different ministries. These dynamics are symptomatic of a failure in the national governance 
of R&I, because if the ability to design R&I policies is left in the hands of the entrepreneurial 
attitudes, and individual willingness towards collaboration, of each minister this means that the 
architecture of the system is not solid enough to function autonomously (INTERVIEWEES 9-10-17-
21). 
In the Italian case this can be read as one of the cofounding drivers of the fragmentation and 
duplication characterising national R&I policy mix evolution. Indeed, when a set of very similar, and 
poorly defined, competences is established among ministers of an equal institutional weight, it 
becomes difficult for one minister to take the lead. This would likely increase the tendency for these 
two actors to work autonomously and to ultimately design very similar instruments. A systematic 
institutionalisation of these dynamics can further hamper the policy-making capacity to design long-




120 As confirmed by our interviewee (INTERVIEWEES 8-9-10-15). 
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Differently, France has tried to overcome the impasse of R&I ministerial competence divisions by 
creating a new institution, the General Commissariat for Investments, which had become the pivotal 
actor in the management of the Investment for the Future Plan. Indeed, Musselin (2017) argues that 
as a result of the increasing relevance of the Commissariat, the Minister for Higher Education and 
Research was increasingly marginalised and deprived of the control over some of its necessary means 
of intervention. This approach seems to share many similarities with the strategy of layering for 
equilibrium generally pursued by the French case in the R&I policy design. Indeed, the CGI was 
in rod ced abo e  he comple  em of in erac ion be een mini er  and R&I performer , hich 
was almost preserved, and smartly circumvented through the leadership role of the new committee. 
This allowed to recentralise the identification of national priorities for the development of R&I 




In policy making activities requiring technical competencies and skills that decision makers cannot 
provide by themselves, like in the case of knowledge or technological intensive activities, decision-
makers are likely to rely on the collaboration of external actors (Guston, 1996). This suggests how in 
R&I policy design practices it has increasingly become necessary to consider that governments are 
not anymore simply and unilaterally authoritative, but they are instead dependent upon the action, 
acq ie cence or ppor  of o her , hich he  do no  direc l  con rol (Bre er , O Tolle, 1998; Goetz, 
2008; Salamon, 2012; Glasser, 2008 in Nauwelaers, Wintjes, 2008; Mazzuccato, 2017).  
These dynamics are in line with some of the arguments illustrated for environmental policies 
(Kammermann, Ingold, 2019; Ingold et al., 2018; Dermont et al., 2017; Gross, 2007; Varone, 
Aebischer, 2001); according to which also the preferences of target population become important, to 
he e en  ha  he lack of akeholder  ppor , or legi imac , for he beha io ral change propo ed 
by a new instrument can hamper cooperation and undercut successful implementation. 
Indeed, when actors are cooperating to produce a public good (like knowledge), some extent of 
preference alignment between the principal and the agent is needed, in order to limit free-riding 
behaviours (Braun, 1993)121. On the one hand, this provides R&I performers with the power to shape 
the final instrument mix and to steer policy design process towards their expected benefits. While, on 
the other hand, a portion of this population can miss the opportunity to see their interests represented, 
because of their incapacity to identify shared needs and behave as a political constituency.  
 
121 This is what Trein (2017) in is framework of analysis defines as actor responsiveness 
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Consequently, in addition to the internal ability of policy makers (e.g. coordination of ministerial 
responsibilities), we also have to consider their capacity to account for the characteristics of their 
target population, which will ultimately influence the design of the right inducement. Therefore, also 
policy recipient matter, but since their heterogeneity in R&I sector we still know little about their 
strategic behaviours. For these reasons, it becomes relevant to investigate: How do target groups 
relate to the policy process and the actors involved in these dynamics? And to what extent do the 
different strategies of interest intermediation influence the characteristics of the instrument mix 
selected? 
To overcome these uncertainties, and in the attempt to institutionalise potential conflicts, policy 
makers have developed different strategies which rely on the design of intermediary agencies, who 
can help to translate political guidelines, or thematic priorities, into different practices (Glasser, 2008 
in Nauwelaers, Wintjes, 2008). As discussed in previous chapters, these actors acquire different 
morphologies according to the number of principals and agents they are related with. Moreover, there 
are also cases in which any intermediary institution is provided and ministers dialogue directly with 
target populations.  
Therefore, we would expect that different combination between R&I performers able to collectively 
mobilize their resources, and institutional fragmentation among decision-makers (e.g. coordination 
problems between R&I ministers), will likely impact the characteristics of the instrument mix. 
Specifically, the higher the capacity of target population to nullify or alter the policy process, and the 
more severe the institutional fragmentation is, the more likely it will be to have more permissive (less 
coercive shapes) in r men  and a grea er R&I performer  po er in the management of their 
activation (more automatic delivery structure). 
Our two cases show very different attitudes with respect to the intermediation strategies adopted to 
interact with target population. French R&I policy making has an extensive record of consultations 
with R&I performers (as discussed in Chapter 5). These practices are closely related with the inherent 
heterogeneity of actors populating the system in terms of institutional characteristics, powers and 
functions; which often mirrors clear divides in their capacity to influence policy process. The national 
public re earch land cape look  q i e nbalanced, on he one hand, ni er i ie  eem o be le  
po erf l  beca e he  are di per ed acro  he na ional erri or ; herea  PRO , e en iall  
financed by the state, are organisations with a structured network of national laboratories, which allow 
them to design a well-structured national strategy (INTERVIEWEES 21-17).  
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This divide is not only functional, but to some extent also cultural122, to the extent that this cleavage 
was also present in the movement (SLR) against the 2006 Law on Research. A push towards changes 
in their power balance was given by the 2007 law on the autonomy and responsibilities of universities, 
which aimed to put universities at the centre of the system as main operators of public research 
(Musselin, 2017), while moving from a fully-block funding based research system towards a system 
in which funding for research were also assigned on a competitive basis. Nevertheless, this shift was 
only partial, and short-lived, because as reported by Lepori et al. (2017) the overall importance of 
project funding in the French public research system is rather low, and Public Research Organisations 
get back to a pivotal role in the management of public funding.  
In the Italian case, formal consultations with key stakeholders are performed on a regular basis, 
however their involvement is still partial and has only limited influence on policy making (European 
Commission, 2006). Indeed, as suggested by one of our experts (INTERVIEWE 4) the inability of 
national policy makers to coordinate different actors, and the lack of long-term political vision, make 
decision makers prisoners of actors (e.g. business or powerful research centres) supporting their 
specific interests. Nowadays, there is a lower tendency toward the dialogue between ministers and 
R&I performers and if that is strictly needed, these practices are kept at the institutional level.  
Contrary to the French case, the Italian R&I system is characterized by an endemic fragmentation in 
the representation of R&I interests on both the public and the private side. Indeed, as suggested by 
our interviewees (INTERVIEWEES 8-4) universities, together with PROs, do not manage to 
represent a dynamic actor in R&I policy making, there were some important research centres but 
overall, they eren  powerful enough to guide the design of a policy and to be a stable interlocutor 
of the government.  
The panorama on the side of the industrial and business actors seems to reflect a similar endemic 
fragmentation, as well as a greater similarity among our two cases. In the Italian case the 
representation of the industrial world hinge upon the General Confederation of Italian Industry 
(Confindustria), an association with voluntary membership, representing companies, their values and 
interests, at the institutional level. Nowadays this organization is facing some consistent challenges 
in terms of representativeness (INTERVIEWEES 8-11). There seems to be a widespread perception 
 
122 As argued by one of the experts we interviewed (INTERVIEWE 13): “it is necessary to understand that in France 
universities didn’t use to be relevant institutions. Differently from other countries, the executive élites are not trained 
within universities. This is historically related with French Revolution, at that time universities were related with the 
church. Since the revolution was anticlerical, we have created new élites detached from the church, with the creation of 
the Grandes Écoles; which has been enhanced during the Napoleon era, and in 1945 with the creation of ENA. Therefore, 
French bourgeoisie trains their children in the Grandes Écoles, not at universities. In these institutions the goal is not to 
“learn to do” but to “learn to learn”, therefore French lites tend to be quite detached form research and science (with 
the exception of some highly-research intense Grandes Écoles institution e.g. École Normale Supérieure or École 
Polytechnique)”. 
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regarding the increasing incapacity of Confindustria to catch the requests of big enterprises in the 
field of R&I, which has been somehow translated into a greater attention towards the needs of SMEs 
and a greater autonomy of bigger enterprises in their innovation-related investments. All of that is 
also reflected by the fact that when designing policy, in addition to the dialogue with Confindustria, 
ministers organizes also one-to-one meetings with representatives of big enterprises (INTERVIEWE 
5). Similarly, in the French case, interest representation from the business world is organized around 
the MEDEF, he large  emplo er  federa ion in he co n r . Thi  organi a ion mainl  repre en  
SME  beca e, big en erpri e  end o r n heir b ine  a onomo l  (INTERVIEWE 20). 
Indeed, these actors can rely on the lobbying of the MEDEF as a forerunner but, as for the Italian 
case, they can also interact personally with the Ministry123. Consequently, in both cases, business 
in ere  repre en a ion i  organi ed according o pecific organi a ion , b  he o erall deci ion-
making structure is biased towards the direct intermediation strategies adopted for dialoguing with 
big enterprises.  
 
9.5.1 Intermediary agency VS ministerial intermediation 
 
The creation of an intermediary agency, represents a strategy to externalise the management of 
specific governing tasks in the effort to fulfil greater neutrality and professionalism. The French case 
has extensively developed this approach in order to design, and implement, its R&I instrument mixes.  
One examples of this practice is the National Agency for Research. It was established in 2005, with 
administrative and financial decision-making autonomy, under the supervision of the Minister of 
Higher Education and Research124. Its mission concerned the funding of research performers, 
according to the thematic priorities identified by the government. The expression of concerns from 
the research community (and the protests of researchers as discussed Chapter 6) regarding its power 
to establish thematic priorities for French public research, paved the way for some changes in its 
go ernance, i h he in rod c ion of he Alliance 125  in 2010. De pi e he ini ial inflo  of f nd , 
and the organizational flexibility provided in the design of thematic priorities, the ANR has struggled 
to find its position in the French R&I system that according to the OECD (2014) remains sensibly 
weighted towards PROs.   
 
123 As we described in Chapter 6 with the example of the tax credit for research (crédit d'impôt recherche). 
124 The agency took over the support actions previously financed through the FRT and FNS; subsidizing basic and applied 
research undertaken by public research organizations, universities and SMEs; as well as some direct institutional funding 
to research laboratories (Arnold, 2007; Lepori et al., 2017). 
125 These were coordination institutions bringing together different public stakeholders in a given research domain to 
enhance coordination (Zaparucha, 2010); they took part at the programming of agency and played a role in the priority 
setting exercise. 
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In the field of the valorisation of research for the industrial system, and more broadly public support 
to SMEs, a public agency was in place since 1967: the ANVAR. Its activities were combined with a 
specialised financial institution (SOFARIS), which managed CDC126 guarantee fund for the 
development of SMEs. In 2005, almost in co-occurrence with the creation of competitive clusters, 
these agencies were merged into a unique organization OSEO, a holding company owned by the state 
mainly reporting to the MINEFI. 
This agency rationalised the structure of innovation support for SMEs, and it became the main 
operator in charge of managing and implementing the measures established by the government 
(European Commission, 2005a). Its nature has been evolving over time, first with the absorption of 
the industrial innovation agency (2008), then it was in turn incorporated (in 2013) within BPI France 
(a public investment bank financing innovation activity through a different portfolio of actions). 
Differen l , he I alian ca e doe n  en i age an  peciali ed agenc . There ha e been ome a emp  
to establish specific actors with similar competences127, but their role has always been marginal, also 
because of their short life.  
National R&I policies are steered directly by different ministers involved, under the supervision of 
the parliament. Consequently, there seem to be a high degree of dependency upon the political 
volatility, and the frequent cabinet reshuffles, characterizing the national political system at large.  
There used to be a quasi-agency actor in the public research sector, the National Research Council 
(CNR), which played a double function, as both a research funder and performer. It managed the 
administration, and selection, of research projects financing free grants devoted to individual 
researchers, while carrying out its own research activities through strategic projects.  
With the establishment of the Minister of University and Research in 1989, and the implementation 
of the Bassanini reform128, the instrument mix was reorganised with the aim of recentralising 
responsibilities for project funding in the hands of the MIUR, together with a re-organisation of the 
existent public research institutions. Consequently, the CNR went through a consistent administrative 
reorganisation process, and its coordination functions were progressively moved to the MIUR. 
Despite the contrasting views (also among our interviewees) regarding the titularity, and the 
effectiveness of CNR activities, there is a widespread agreement concerning the empty space left by 
hi  reform, hich didn  pro ide an  o her actor able to represent a unified political responsibility 
centre to whom different stakeholder could raise their claims and suggestions (INTERVIEWEES 7-
10-9).  
 
126The Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (Deposits and Consignments Fund) is a state bank which funds companies 
and it is heavily involved in innovation and SMEs financing (OECD,2014).  
127 Like Sviluppo Italia and the National Agency for the Diffusion of Technologies for Innovation. 
128 Ministerial Decree MIUR 593/00 
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Overall, the structure of interest intermediation between decision-makers and R&I performers were 
quite fragmented in both our two cases. In the Italian case, on the one hand policy makers seems to 
be loosely attracted by R&I themes, both for their political ambitions and as a strategy for national 
economic development. While, on the other hand, R&I performers seemed to be unable to raise their 
voice in attempting to influence policy making process. In the French case, the landscape of R&I 
performers was highly disjointed. Nevertheless, despite the great divide between public R&I 
performers, these actors have been able first to mobilise their resources to slow down the creation of 
the ANR, and then to mould the characteristics of the newly born agency at their favour. 
In the case of private R&I performers, for both countries, in ere  repre en a ion i  organi ed 
according to specific organisations, but the overall decision-making structure tend to be biased 
towards the direct intermediation strategies adopted for dialoguing with big enterprises. Those actors 
seemed to have a bargaining power by exception, according to the different political attitudes of 
elected politicians, and more specifically on the basis of their openness towards the business world. 
For what concerns the characteristics of the resulting policy mix our expectations were not confirmed, 
as demonstrated in the French case by the decreasing powers of ANR after the internal lobby of R&I 
performers, and the more generalised low automatic and permissive attitudes both countries have 
shown towards private R&I performers. Nevertheless, it is relevant to highlight an important process 
characterising the relationship policy makers are building with target population.  
In the French case, following on from the creation of BPI France and the inclusion of ANR as one of 
the main operators of the Investment for the future program, policy makers have consistently 
modified their approach towards R&I funding. Indeed, they are increasingly converging toward a 
p blic holding model  (Eparvier et al., 2011) where, through the provision of different funds, the 
central administration detained financial stakes in innovation organizations, without the cost 
associated with their management. Examples like the Technological Transfer Acceleration companies 
(SAAT) and France Brevet (in the Investment for the Future Program); or the SME pact and the Small 
business act (among the interventions for SMEs supporting public procurement) suggest how public 
actors have changed their narrative towards R&I performers. Of course, we cannot directly connect 
these experiences with the presence of intermediary agencies; nevertheless, it is plausible to 
hypothesis that since the management of (differently po erf l) R&I performer  in ere  was 
delegated to specific organisations, decision-makers have started to externalise administrative and 
management costs, while focusing on he admini ra ion of heir a e  across different innovation 
bodies.  
Differen l , a  e ha e een, I al  didn  de elop an  in ermediar  agenc  o admini er i  
interactions with R&I performers. Nonetheless, the country was heavily exposed to uncertainties 
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related with monitoring and implementation processes, and more generally by the cumbersome nature 
of the bureaucratic system (Potì & Reale, 2011). Another critical problem of Italian R&I policy was 
the implementation of different measures; in many occasions innovative policy tools, could not be 
effectively implemented because of the lack of resources, or delays in their availability (European 
Commission, 2004b, p. 11). Indeed, from the beginning of 2000s (specifically with Berlusconi II 
cabinet) policy makers started to increasingly rely on the collaboration of private banks in the 
financing of innovation. The introduction of a credit system based on banks, was manly aimed at 
ea ing he planning of re o rce  for in e men  in inno a ion b  en erpri e , b  i  didn  e pre  
any specific policy goal in terms of R&I strategy (Gallo and Silva, 2006). Private banks provided 
finance to enterprises (mainly SMEs) and basically public actors participated to back up with public 
guarantees loans or cash advances to business actors. In this pattern, instead of behaving as 
shareholders, policy makers became the bearer of the risks related with R&I investments, but they 
were cut off from future benefits produced by the firm they supported. Basically, the private banking 
system provided available credits to R&I performers, overcoming the sluggishness related with the 
public management of these funds; while policy makers were bearing the costs of the possible related 
failures.  
To conclude, our expectations regarding the influence that the type of interest intermediation strategy 
has on the characteristics of the instrument mix have not been fully confirmed by our data. Indeed we 
expected that the higher the capacity of target population to nullify or alter the policy process, and 
the more severe the institutional fragmentation is, the more likely it will be to have more permissive 
(le  coerci e hape ) in r men  and a grea er R&I performer  po er in he managemen  of heir 
activation (more automatic delivery structure). 
Both cases display a high degree of fragmentation with respect to the organisation of ministerial 
policy responsibilities; while, French R&I performers demonstrate a greater ability to interfere with 
the national R&I policy making compared to their Italian counterpart. And both policy mixes are 
unbalanced in favour of low and medium (rather than automatic) instrument delivery structures. 
While, for what concerns the distribution of instrument shapes, only France, with its higher coercive 
attitudes, displays some similarities with our expectations.  
Therefore, despite the coordination problems ministers are facing, these issues do not seem to 
infl ence polic  maker  capaci  o pro ide a con i en  manda e o heir in ermediar  agencie  (in 
the French case). Differently, this issue seems to be more prominent in the Italian case, which suffers 
from both institutional and target population fragmentation in interest representation strategies.  
Moreover, the greater activism of French R&I performers, differently from what hypothesised, has 
been matched with a greater coercive attitude from policy makers, as suggested by the centralisation 
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of intermediation powers in the hands of the CGI. Differently, for the Italian case, the atomisation of 
R&I performer  in ere , and incapaci  o de ign a long-term ministerial strategy, is directly 
portrayed by the fragmentated evolution of national R&I policy mix and the characterising one-off 
intervention nature.  
 
9.6 Final Remarks 
In this research we were interested in understanding the political dynamics that stand behind policy 
instrument selection process in the research and innovation sector. We investigated how the 
interactions between differently motivated actors involved in the governance of R&I, including 
knowledge producers and developers, public and private actors, together with policy makers 
influenced R&I policy instrument selection. The analysis illustrated the way governments design 
more ambitious policy mixes aimed at solving the complex, and cross-sectorial in nature, social 
challenges contemporary societies are facing. It was focused on providing both theoretical and 
empirical contributions to support an explanation on how policy instruments are effectively selected 
from the perspective of the actors making the decision. This also represents an interesting addition to 
the scholarly understanding of how the holistic nature of many R&I policy issues maps out 
governance arrangements where actors become interdependent on the basis of the exchange of 
resources.  
In order to make sense of these dynamics, we theorised an R&I policy instrument typology able to 
provide information on both the different ways social control is exercised (instrument shape) and on 
the type of governing arrangements coming together with instruments (delivery structure). 
As demonstrated by the results of the comparative case study of France and Italy, similarities in the 
way governments use their legitimate power to shape public action (instrument families Figure 9.2), 
can actually hold substantial internal differences in the relationships between policy makers and target 
population (as demonstrated in Figure 9.3 and 9.4) these activate.  
Indeed, both our two cases have the necessary R&I instrumentation at their disposals, but they are 
not equally able to make use of them at their advantage. The Italian case suffers from an inherent 
fragmentation and duplication of instruments, and actors tend to follow a short-term logic of layering 
for change through the design of one-off interventions. While, France shows a more consistent 
layering for equilibrium  behaviour. Indeed, experiences like the evolution of the Research Tax 
Credit (Crédit Impôt Recherche) and the Incubator and Technology Transfer Organisations (see 
Chapter 4), suggest how actors chase their goals through the stratification of multiple (often similar) 
instruments. Those results further support the theoretical and empirical capacity of our instrument 
typology, which is actually able to provide insights on the constitutive differences embedded in 
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instruments shapes and delivery structures. Indeed, from an empirical perspective, it is not enough to 
look at the types of instruments selected (families), but it is necessary to have a grasp on their capacity 
to induce a specific behaviour while addressing the right target. Policy instruments containing similar 
coercive principles, can be actually applied in different ways (Vedung, 1998), because in addition to 
social control each tools embed a particular way of exercising it (Kassim and Le Galès, 2010; 
Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007). Indeed, as demonstrated throughout our analysis, the choice and 
also the particular way in which instruments are structured and assembled reflect the interaction 
between decision makers and the political clientele of the policy. 
Along our analysis we also investigated how innovation represents a special investment in long-term 
intangible assets that will (likely) generate profits in the future. Therefore, the way it is different from 
regular investments in tangible assets, such as capital expenditures, because of its longer time horizon 
and higher risk (Bhattacharya et al., 2017, p. 2). Consequently, when making these choices a political 
strategy is needed, because the investment made today will produce results tomorrow. Indeed, if 
policy makers do not construct a vision, some expectations regarding what they want to achieve 
through R&I policy, they might fall in the trap of creating structures in which bureaucracy derives its 
raison d’être only from the administration of subsidies, leaving apart the willingness to pursue a 
broader national strategy for development. Similarly, also R&I performers will struggle to foster their 
business, given the high volatility related with the lack of a political leadership. Such differences are 
evident among our two cases, with France repeatedly trying to re-centralize decision making powers, 
at the expenses of a broader dialogue with its national R&I performers; while Italy seems to be stuck 
in the grip between some attempts to design a national strategy and a more general tendency to satisfy 
the short-term priorities of different political constituencies. Therefore, in both cases, despite some 
specific national dynamics, policy makers did struggle to find an equilibrium with the recipient of 
their policies and moments for dialogue seem to be consistently decreasing in number. However, the 
different forms of stabilisation among these actors are closely dependent on the dynamics 
characterising the different national systems; hence, on the preferences, the perception of preferences 
and the strategies of the actors involved, and how these relations are institutionalised (Van der 
Meulen, 1998a). 
The national organisation of ministerial responsibilities in R&I does not ease this process; indeed, 
both our cases followed an external specialisation strategy which implicated a profound divide 
characterising both the framing of R&I issues and the interactions between their respective 
constituencies. Despite similar efforts in the design of coordinated R&I policy mixes across the 
ministries with joint responsibilities in this field, the fact of belonging to a specific institution with 
its embedded values, identities and attitudes consistently influenced the capacity of different actors 
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to design R&I policy mixes encompassing different sectorial policy responsibilities. Therefore, the 
siloed approach characterising many public administrations (Christensen et al., 2014; Pencheva et al., 
2018), as well as the classic departmentalised structure of formal policy making institutions (Pelkonen 
et al., 2008), is still predominant over the attempts to jointly design more ambitious policy mixes 
aimed at tackling the cross-sector nature of Grand Societal Challenges.  
The governance of R&I policies represents an extremely complex arena for policy making, exactly 
because the resources needed for instrument activation are increasingly dependent upon the 
participation of different actors, and the assets they can mobilize (Béland and Howlett, 2016; Capano 
and Lippi, 2017; Flanagan et al., 2011; Majone, 1976). Indeed, R&I performers do benefit of public 
funding for their activities, but on the other hand, also policy makers benefit from the results of the 
same activities. Therefore, the tension for power between policy-makers and R&I performers is 
persistent in the sector, especially for what concerns the identification of those actors who will have 
the legitimacy, and power, to determine national R&I investment decisions, and whether those 
choices should be driven by market needs versus scientific considerations.  
Con eq en l , akeholder  ppor , or legi imac , for he beha io ral change propo ed b  a ne  
instrument become a relevant asset for fuelling the policy design process, while pursuing the 
successful implementation of different policy instruments. Ans, as confirmed by our analysis, their 
role become even more important in policy making contexts characterised by high level of 
institutional fragmentation.  
All of that suggests how in R&I policy design practices, it has increasingly become necessary to 
consider how governments are not anymore simply, and unilaterally authoritative, but they are instead 
dependent upon the action, acquiescence or support of others, which they do not directly control 
(Bre er  and O oole, 1998; Ga ler e  al., 2008; Goe , 2008; Ka el and Ma ca o, 2018; 
Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2008; Salamon, 2002a). On the other hand, looking at the heterogenous 
characteristics of R&I performers, and at the different intermediation strategies undertaken by our 
two cases, some reflections are needed. First of all, the permeability of the policy design process for 
R&I performers is not given by default, but it is rather dependent upon their capacity to behave as a 
constituency. Indeed, the successful cases in which target populations did manage to raise their claims 
were related with either their ability to design a well- structured national strategy for action, or their 
capacity to mobilize resources perceived as essential, or however highly valuable, from policy-
maker  per pec i e. Secondl , i  i  mi leading o eq a e he par icipa ion of in ermediar  agenc  in 
the policy making process with a less coercive attitude of policy-makers. Indeed, as demonstrated in 
the French case, the introduction of this type of agent within the national R&I governance represented 
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a strategy to recentralise power, hich didn  nullify the authority of policy-makers to steer decision 
making process at their favour.  
To conclude, R&I policies do actually design highly complex governance arrangements, where actors 
and recipients of different (formerly detached) policy sectors interact. However, the barriers that 
hinder actors  coordination in this sector seem follow the features characterizing decision-making 
process in the classic sectors of government responsibilities. Like, for example, the presence of 
relatively stable groups of actors and institutions; their associated interests, representation practices 
and perceptions of the problems (Candel and Biesbroek, 2016). Therefore, we believe that, in 
analysing policy sectors standing at the cross road of different policy responsibilities the adoption of 
an actor perspective, together with a profound understanding of the dynamics characterising each 
specific policy responsibility is needed.  
 
9.7 Policy implications and issues for future research  
Following on from the results of our analysis, some policy implications are suggested. 
In our investigation, especially during the data collection process, we observed a consistent gap 
between the scholarly theorisation of innovation process and the attitudes of policy makers and R&I 
stakeholders. This divide concerned two main practices in R&I policy making, the first refers to the 
perceptions over the mechanisms driving innovation. Indeed, across our empirical analysis of R&I 
policy design in France and Italy, it emerged a quite consolidated and generalised linear ie  of 
innovation among policy makers. These findings clash with the some of the theoretical approaches 
adopted in the current literature for explaining co-evolution of R&I policy change. Specifically 
(Mytelka and Smith, 2002), through a diachronic analysis of the innovation theories and ideas from 
1970s to 1990s, argue that a clear connection between policy and theory does exists. Indeed, 
according to the authors, the theories and the actual policy-making practices in the R&I coevolve; 
this is a process of interactive learning, in which a social science field, and a policy arena, have been 
jointly and interactively shaped (p. 1468). 
Throughout our research, we actually highlight how policy makers tend to aim for applying the latest 
scholarly theories in their policy making practices (as also discussed with respect to the concept of 
Grand Societal Challenges), but they ultimately fail in adopting them; falling back into consolidated 
linear views of innovation process. Indeed, since our analysis was focused on adopting an actor 
perspective to understand the capacity of different governments to get things done, we are confident 
to state that policy makers tend to make use of the narratives related with the latest developments in 
the field of innovation research. However, once they have to agree upon how to coordinate their 
action internally (e.g. among ministers with shared R&I competences) and externally (e.g. in their 
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interaction with stakeholders) they tend to adopt more consolidated linear view of innovation in which 
the innovation process is mainly seen as a chain of events starting with investments in basic research, 
leading (possibly) to the development and prototyping of the results of these investments and 
ultimately to the production and commercialisation of resulting innovations. Ultimately, since R&I 
policies are said to design complex governance arena for policy making, given the resource 
dependency on different actors, it is necessary to considerer how the capacity of innovation theory 
and policy making practices to co-evolve is not only dependent upon decision-makers, but also on 
R&I performers. Therefore, differently from how portrayed in the current literature, the learning 
process can also be hampered by the opposition of R&I performers which may not see their interest 
fully represented by the newest theories on innovation process. Similarly, also the ability of policy 
makers to promote a specific narrative and policy making practice is linked with their capacity to stay 
in power and generate consensus over national R&I strategies.  
The second important empirical gap we identified from the theory to the effective R&I policy making 
practices was related with the attitudes of policy makers towards policy instrument selection.  
Indeed, when policy-makers design new instruments, they do not always have a clear overview of 
what has been done before, and of what it is already into force. This often leads to an inconsistent 
layering of instruments and a related low uptake of these instruments from the recipients, who are 
lost in the jungle of very similar tools at their disposals. Consequently, we believe that scholarly 
attention should be devoted to work on identifying a more accurate, and empirically grounded, 
classification of R&I policy instruments. This exercise will be able to provide a more accessible 
analytical tool to political actors shaping national Research and Innovation policies, and it will also 
be beneficial for the scholarly community, who will be able to work within a common framework of 
analysis and to trace the overtime activity of instruments more easily.  
Therefore, we believe that is important to further stress the necessity to work on an integrated 
theoretical framework on the study of R&I policy instruments. This, as demonstrated by the results 
of our analysis, should investigate tools, and their selection process from a two-way perspective, 
where both policy-makers and recipients are considered as actors able to influence the characteristics 
of public action. Because, similarities in the way governments use their legitimate power to shape 
public action (instrument families), do actually hold substantial internal differences in the 
relationships between policy makers and target population these can activate, which we have only 
been able to grasp thanks to the introduction of instrument shape and delivery structure categories.  
Policy instruments containing similar coercive principles, can actually induce behaviours in different 
ways (Vedung, 1998), because in addition to social control each tools embed a particular way of 
exercising it (Kassim and Le Galès, 2010; Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007). Therefore, theories on 
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R&I policy instruments, and their related classifications into typologies, should be able to grasp not 
only how governments use their authority to induce specific behaviours on target population, but also 
the extent to which the way instruments are structured and assembled actually reflects the interaction 
between decision makers and the political clientele of the policy.  
These insights will actually be beneficial for the analysis of policy design process not only in the R&I 
sectors, but more generally, for complex governance arrangements characterised by cross-sectorial 
policy issues.   
During our analysis we faced some issues regarding the low accessibility of private actors in the data 
collection process. Our investigation was mainly oriented towards policy formulation process; 
therefore, we are confident to state that by interviewing policy makers and representative of business 
organisations we reached the needed data saturation point. Nevertheless, we believe that further 
researches in this field would consistently benefit of a broader spectrum of data coming from private 
enterprises. Moreover, given the time frame of analysis, and the limitations related with the 
management of our research for both cases, we decided to leave out two industrial policies, namely 
Industrie du Future (Industry of the future) for the French case and Industria 4.0 (Industry 4.0) for 
the Italian case. This choice was mainly driven by the fact that these two policies were going through 
a formulation process during the period of our data collection. Therefore, given the fact that the 
numbers of years under investigation was in line with the appropriate time frame for analysing policy 
change identified by the literature (Sabatier, 1986), and the consistent problems we faced in collecting 
and translating information over policy instruments, we decided to leave out these two new-born 
policies. We do not regret our choice, and we rather believe that this decision just paved the way for 
a (follow-up) comparative analysis of these two policies in the light of the analytical framework 
developed in the present study, this will surely provide a valuable contribution to the existent 
literature in the field.  
To conclude, we are aware that this study adopted a macro perspective on the analysis of the Research 
and Innovation policy sector. Our aim was exactly to have an understanding of the national-wide 
dynamics shaping the design of these policies in two different countries. Therefore, as a future 
research venue we aim at narrowing down the focus of the analysis to either a specific R&I sector, or 
better to a regional or local perspective, in order to test the validity of our policy instrument selection 
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